Iulian BOLDEA
(coordinator)

DEBATES ON GLOBALIZATION. APPROACHING NATIONAL IDENTITY THROUGH INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Studies and Articles

Section: Sociology, Political Sciences, International Relations

"ARHIPELAG XXI" Press
2015

Debates on Globalization. Approaching National Identity through Intercultural Dialogue Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference "Globalization between Intercultural Dialogue and National Identity", Tîrgu Mureș, Romania, 2015
ISBN 978-606-93692-5-8

Edited by:
The Alpha Institute for Multicultural Studies
Moldovei Street, 8
540522, Tîrgu Mureș, România
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Email: iulian.boldea@gmail.com

Published by:
"ARHIPELAG XXI" Press, Tîrgu Mureş, 2015
Moldovei Street 3
Tîrgu Mureş, România
Tel./fax: +40-744-511546

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GLOBALISATION AND POSTMODERNISM

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Abstract: Globalisation is a contested and highly controversial concept. Just like the concept of postmodernism, in fact. Both concepts refer to the physiognomy of contemporary man marked by the desire to step out of isolation and become perfectly integrated into a dynamic, global, open, prosperous, complex, and free society, by means of science and technique, by means of a new malleable and permissive life philosophy which is pragmatic and individualistic, having abandoned absolute moral standards and the old metaphysical values of the past, and promoting in exchange the new ideals of plurality and diversity. Globalisation and postmodernism constitute a legitimate terminological pair, as there is more and more debate lately on the existence of postmodern globalism or a globalised postmodernity. Although we are living in the globalisation age, there are nevertheless voices contesting the existence of a real connection between globalisation and progress.

Keywords: ***globalisation, postmodernism, pluralism, secularisation, relativism***

The European integration of the Eastern-European countries is a process which takes place within the larger framework of globalisation, during the postmodern era. A citizen of an Eastern-European country who lived in communism and who is now part of the free world has, in other words, more reasons to approach such a topic, relating to globalisation and, implicitly, postmodernism. However, at the same time, the century we live in is upsetting and controversial: upsetting, considering the serious political and military events that take place in this part of the world, and controversial because globalisation and postmodernism are two words related to a few others belonging to the same cultural family: relativism, secularisation, atheism, subjectivism and individualism.

The term itself seems to have appeared for the first time in American English more than half a century ago, although the idea of globalisation is much older[1]. At present, globalisation is perceived as an economic and irreversible phenomenon which we cannot escape. Today, market economy has spread all over the world and under its auspices there is a deeper and deeper integration of the national economies that are in competition, but also in search of progress and prosperity: these last two values are perceived as more important than the preservation of national sovereignty and cultural identity. In the age of globalisation, the borders are less and less relevant: the sought for globality is definitely postmodern.

Although globalisation is, primarily, an economic and financial phenomenon, it also represents a complex reality, with many controversial aspects. Not only is globalisation economic, but also cultural, political, communicational, technological and ecological. It develops in a world dominated by liberalism, democracy, freedom, hedonism, eclecticism[2] and consumerism.

And although globalisation *has a meaning*, it is still "a contested concept that refers to sometimes contradictory social processes", as there are still voices "who denounce modernity

[1] Jan Aart Scholte, "Globalization", in Barry Jones 2001:613.
[2] Featherstone 1995:76.

and secularism"[3]. And not without reason. In what the economic aspect is concerned, although national economies tighten their connexions more and more, the economic gaps are not in the least eliminated.

It is even more sensitive when it comes to the spiritual and cultural aspects, as *integration* is utterly opposite of terms such as *uniqueness* and *distinctiveness*. Can we live comfortably in a global culture? This is a legitimate question, as, in order to behave similarly and live together in a single globalised village, people from different parts of the world, with specific traditions, should adopt, after all, a shared set of values, principles and standards, i.e., the Western ones, to become, at least to a certain extent, cosmopolitan, and critics of their own theological and philosophical traditions.

Can we legitimately aspire towards a universal ethics, one to disregard the religious factor and to be, at the same time, able to make anyone happy? These pages can only propose some hallmarks, and not to exhaust the topic in order to give a final verdict.

Can we, humans, be happy without identifying, through philosophy and theology, the meaning of our own lives[4] and without having "an intrinsic nature"[5]? Or, rather, do we have every reason to be desperate under these circumstances? French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre admitted that, without God, our existence can no longer be explained – it is contingent, absurd, and meaningless[6]. "If God does not exist, everything is permissible"[7]. Although we live on different continents, we, humans, live in the proximity of the others thanks to the modern means of communication and to the unprecedented development of science and technology. Although we neighbour physically, we are more and more spiritually estranged when we unyieldingly pursue only our personal interests.

The freedom of the Western world is not at all times positive and without disagreeable traits. Thus, the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama made the following remarks in one of his well-known books, proving that the excessive accentuation of freedom to the detriment of authority is bound to seriously affect the existence of social cohesion: "In societies where individuals enjoy more freedom of choice than at any other time in history, people resent all the more the few remaining ligatures that bind them. The danger for such societies is that people suddenly find themselves socially isolated, free to associate with everyone but unable to make the moral commitments that will connect them to other people

[3] Steger 2003:1. The globalisation-postmodernism pair is legitimate for the good reason that both terms are equally contested "postmodernism is fundamentally contradictory, resolutely historical, and inescapably political" (Hutcheon 1988:4).

[4] "Science, on the other hand, cannot understand why it itself exists. It does not reveal the meaning of life, provides no guidance." (Jaspers 1957:38) To put it otherwise, science does not possess, as philosophy and theology, an ethical dimension (Michelman 2008:261).

[5] Rorty 1989:8. In this circumstance, one should not be surprised that man of today no longer knows who he really is. (Heidegger 1991:209, Niebuhr 1941:4).

[6] Sartre 1938:187. "With the supernatural removed from the world-view of modernity, all meaning has been ripped out of the universe and life is left without purpose." (Baggini 2005:10). See also Camus 1957:183 and Sleasman 2011:3. On the contrary, if our life is "meaningful", then it is also "worth living". It is indeed doubtful whether the "meaning of my life" can be "my fundamental project" (Young 2005:5) as long as in the atheistic views, death is a (total and definitive) annihilation of existence.

[7] Sartre 2007:28-29.

in true communities."[8] If community life is in decline, then we *all* risk of becoming egocentric people, devoid of any higher aspiration, looking only for comfort[9].

We live in a historical period dominated by functionalism, operationalism, technologism, and they all depersonalise and dehumanise: man lives in a state of alienation, in insecurity and disorientation[10]. Postmodern man is no longer searching for wisdom, but for science. He tends to completely give up *metaphysics* for *physics*. Although science and technology have reached unprecedented heights in our times, the progress has never been accompanied by spiritual evolution.

We live in postmodernism, i.e., in an age dominated by relativism, a problem of interest for philosophers, sociologists and theologians. Relativism equates disorder; it presupposes a radical conceptual upheaval[11] of our ideas of science, rationality and man. If there is no authentic and constant human nature along the centuries, then, there is no ethical universality or an ethical truth either. In other words, Kant's question, *What should I do?,* can have more possible answers, depending on the historical and socio-cultural context in which is placed the one who answers to it[12], and also depending on his/ her personal preference.

Everything depends on a certain perspective, everything is reduced to a simple opinion, everything represents a mere point of view and the result of an emotional preference – these are the statements to which our cultural relativism may be reduced[13]. Relativist postmodernism arbitrarily separates facts from their signification: the ideas "there are no facts, only interpretations"[14] may become extremely dangerous when applied in the field of ethics, i.e., in the area of interpersonal relationships.

Raymond Boudon maintains that relativism is, primarily, an effect of the egalitarianism promoted by the democratic political regime. If all the individuals who share different values are considered equal, then equality is the only incontestable truth, and any other truth vanishes[15], together with the notion of objectivity: if all men are equal, then their statements are also equal, though they may be in complete opposition.

"Modern man, instead of attempting to raise himself to truth, seeks to drag truth down to his own level"[16]. This explains why subjectivism perfectly matches pluralism and the more and more prevailing sense of insecurity felt in contemporary society. In postmodernism, there are no longer strict, predetermined, inflexible moral principles dictated by the State or the Church, whilst reality is complicated: it generates ambivalent moral choices. Postmodern

[8] Fukuyama 1999:48. "And the culture of intensive individualism, which in the marketplace and laboratory leads to innovation and growth, spilled over into realm of social norms, where it corroded virtually all forms of authority and weakened the bonds holding families, neighborhoods, and nations together." (Fukuyama 1999:5-6).
[9] Fukuyama 1992:328.
[10] Rauche 1974:vii.
[11] Rios 2006:120.
[12] Jennifer C. Manion, « Moral Philosophy », in Taylor and Winquist 2001:253.
[13] Boudon 1996:170.
[14] KSA 12:315. Boudon 1996:179.
[15] René Guénon maintains that equality is a lay dogma of the present-day Western world (Guénon 2001:71). Gilles Lipovetsky notes that the modern age has morally equated the believer and the unbeliever (Lipovetsky 1992:39-40). In other words, the century of secularisation and egalitarianism annulled the hierarchical difference (Lipovetsky 1992: 40) between Christians and atheists (and, inherently, between their ideas). However, as René Guénon argues, negating the differences between men can only bring chaos to society (Guénon 2001:70).
[16] Guénon 2001:66.

society has given infallibility a mortal blow. Zygmunt Bauman suggestively describes the complicated situation of man nowadays, determined by his lack of moral certainties: "With the *pluralism* of rules (and our times are the times of pluralism) the moral choices (and the moral conscience left in their wake) appear to us intrinsically and irreparably *ambivalent*. Ours are the times of *strongly felt moral ambiguity*. These times offer us freedom of choice never before enjoyed, but also cast us into a state of uncertainty never before so agonizing. We yearn for guidance we can trust and rely upon, so that some of the haunting responsibility for our choices could be lifted from our shoulders. But the authorities we may trust are all contested, and none seems to be powerful enough to give us the degree of reassurance we seek. In the end, we trust no authority, at least, we trust none fully, and none for long: we cannot help being suspicious about any claim to infallibility. This is the most acute and prominent practical aspect of what is justly described as the 'postmodern moral crisis'."[17]

Postmodernism is characterised by great, tolerant, ethical flexibility, turning *right* and *wrong* in *functional values* of limited viability, historically perishable[18]. Postmodernism contests the legitimacy and scientific value of the traditional Western explanatory systems, as well as their ability to establish moral, social and political practices. "Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward metanarratives."[19] Postmodern science and knowledge no longer means consensus, but a quest for instability[20]. Postmodernism resorts, to a great extent, to aphorisms and metaphors[21], it brings forth a multiplicity of meanings (marked by ambiguity and hazard)[22], and interpretations; disorder becomes its constant: it is no longer an exception in postmodernism[23]. Postmodernism aspires to be a battle for emancipation from any tyranny[24] (be it conceptual, epistemological, moral or of any other nature).

Nevertheless, postmodernism weakens its own position with such a stand. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that some authors doubt the existence of a *postmodernity*, whereas other intellectuals prefer to speak of *postmodernities*[25], in the plural. A possible explanation for this predicament is that the postmodern discourse is under the sign of difference, heterogeneity, multiplicity of the cultural contexts, and, implicitly, of the

[17] Bauman 1993:20-21. Harvey 1990:10-11.
[18] Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 1993:37) resorts to a text by Robert Musil, which we shall quote in French: "Qui peut encore se passionner pour de millénaires bavardages sur le bien et le mal, quand on a établi que ce ne sont pas des 'constantes', mais des 'valeurs fonctionnelles', de sorte que la bonté des œuvres dépend des circonstances historiques, et la bonté des hommes de l'habileté psychotechnique avec laquelle on exploite leurs qualités!" (Musil 1995:46).
[19] Lyotard 1984:xxiv. Evaldas Nekrasas, "Positivism, Post-positivism and Postmodernism", in Baranova 2005:152 ff.
[20] Fredric Jameson, "Foreword", in Lyotard 1984: xix.
[21] Nietzsche answers as follows to the question "What is truth?": "A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations"; the truths, adds Nietzsche, are just "illusions" (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne", in KSA 1:880-881). In this case, the proposition that truth is an illusion becomes the new truth of postmodernism, which we should not doubt! See also Hart 2003:7.
[22] Derrida 1972:81, 109.
[23] Lefebvre and Letiche 1999:12.
[24] Baghramian 2004: 81.
[25] Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Theology and the condition of postmodernity: a report on knowledge", in Vanhoozer 2003:3.

meanings, of the paradox, duality and duplicity[26], of overcoming the limits and excesses[27]: for Jacques Derrida, "il n'y a pas de hors-texte."[28]

There is no unity of views on postmodernism: it has multiple meanings. The supporters of this intellectual movement contest the possibility of the objective knowledge of reality, the existence of truth and the unity of the human ego. Postmodernism is, par excellence, unconventional, contesting, critical – it attacks the intellectual basis of Western civilisation[29].

If the Western intellectual tradition is a road, then the postmodern scholars drive on its wrong side. They prefer indeterminacy to determinism, diversity to unity, difference to synthesis, complexity to simplification, the unique to the general, relativism to objectivity, and fragmentation to totalisation[30].

Philosophically and ethically speaking, the world we live in is in quandary; present-day man aims to reconcile unconciliating facts, which contradict and exclude each other. He wishes to be the sovereign creator of his own moral and, at the same time, to feel secure and permanently protected by it[31]. In this context, the critical departure from postmodern philosophy may seem to many a salvaging solution.

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[26] Hutcheon 2002:1.
[27] Habermas, 1985:279.
[28] Derrida1997:158. This proposition can be also understood in the sense that there is no truth outside the text: in other words, truth is an effect of the discourse and of its governing rules (Phillips 2007: 24).
[29] Cahoone 1996:1-2.
[30] Rosenau 1992:8.
[31] "I want to believe - and so do you - in a complete, transcendent, and immanent set of propositions about right and wrong, *findable* rules that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live righteously. I also want to believe - and so do you - in no such thing, but rather that we are wholly free, not only to choose for ourselves what we ought to do, but to decide for ourselves, individually and as a species, what we ought to be. What we want, Heaven help us, is simultaneously to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same time to discover the right and the good and to create it. " (Leff 1979:1229).

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THE EFFECTS OF SECULARIZATION ON SPIRITUAL KINSHIP

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Abstract: From a socio-anthropological and cultural perspective contextualized, with theological meanings, in this study we aim to reveal some aspects of manifestation of modernism and postmodernism in the sphere of family life by theories of secularization and the impact of anomic/secular phenomena of the family in contemporary society „globalized". Starting from the definition of "secularization" whose „inner tension" outlines the main formulations of „secularization thesis", including sociological theories, we consider the dilemma relation to modernity and postmodernity. So how modernity understands itself, relative to the family, highlighting the influences on defining and structuring family system and the functions that society expects of the family. In essence, the study is focused on highlighting the „crisis" current family of Christian morality vs ethics philosophical perspective embodied in the principles of bioethics looking at all aspects relating to the couple relationship, filiation and kinship or parental system.

Keywords: ***secularization, christian morality, family, kinship, parental system***

1. Strategiile secularizării şi manifestarea inedită a religiozității în societatea contemporană

Pornind de la definirea conceptului de „secularizare" a cărui „tensiune interioară" defineşte şi conturează principalele formulări din „teza secularizării" avem în vedere dilematica raportare la modernitate şi postmodernitate. Înţelesurile contradictorii din cadrul *teoriilor secularizării* se raportează la două tipuri de corelaţii care influenţează în mod diferit modul în care „modernitatea se înţelege pe sine" şi anume: secularizarea ca „imanentizare a divinului" respectiv, secularizarea ca „retragere din lume a divinului."[1] Complexitatea valenţelor şi ariei semantice a conceptului de „secularizare" ne aduce în vedere o paletă largă de „opţiuni teologice, politice şi metafizice" care contribuie la „reconfigurarea raportului de forţe ale modernităţii"[2] şi implicit, la conturarea şi definirea formelor de manifestare a fenomenelor şi proceselor vieţii familiale în contextul societăţii moderne şi postmoderne.

Urmând traseului semantic complex, conceptul de „secularizare" a fost utilizat iniţial ca un „termen tehnic de drept bisericesc" pentru ca ulterior, să reprezinte fundamentul legal al raporturilor juridice dintre puterea ecleziastică şi puterea laică. O altă etapă a evoluţiei semantice se cristalizează în jurul conceptului de „mundanizare" (*Verweltlichung)* aflat în centrul preocupărilor filosofiei istoriei şi filosofiei culturii secolului al XIX-lea (K. Marx, L. Feuerbach, Georg W. Fr. Hegel), perioadă urmată de „secularizarea creştinismului" (Franz Overbeck). In sens cronologic, „teologia dialectică" a secolului XX explică fenomenul secularizării din perspectiva „istoriei creştinismului în sens restrâns" raportându-se fie la „dialectica internă a revelaţiei", fie la „modalitatea existenţei temporale" a creştinului".

[1] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. „Secularizarea". *Concepte şi teorii social-politice* 7: 207-230, pp. 207-208.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 211.

Polisemantica termenului de „secularizare”[3] aduce în vedere pe lângă ambiguitatea conceptului, corelațiile în dublu sens dintre „modernitate” și „tradiția creștină”, cee ce atrage proliferarea surselor de ambiguități în sensul „«multiplicității» modernității” care propune „două tipuri de raționalitate” fondatoare pentru „scenarii alternative ale secularizării”: „depășirea religiosului prin mecanismele laicității”, respectiv „proliferarea”[4] religiosului în forme și manifestări inedite.

În ceea ce privește *fenomenul secularizării*, începând cu anii 1960, s-a scris mult despre acest subiect cu luciditate, responsabilitate și chiar, îngrijorare mai ales, în Occident, unde există o abundență de asemenea scrieri fiind îmbrățișate perspective diverse: filosofică[5], istorică[6], sociologică[7] și nu în ultimul rând, teologică[8]. Așa cum concluzionează Ioan Alexandru Tofan în lucrarea intitulată „Secularizarea”[9], literatura de specialitate pune în discuție nu numai „universalitatea” acestui fenomen – avem în vedere, de exemplu, diferențele semnificative de manifestare în spațiul european și în cel american – ci și abordarea diferită, ca răspuns la „observațiile empirice” ale fenomenelor asociate cum ar fi: proliferarea noilor culte; fundamentalismul religios *vs.* fundamentalismul secular; „privatizarea” religiei *vs.* „de-privatizarea” religiei; „de-sacralizare” *vs.* „re-sacralizare”. La aceste aspecte se adaugă raportarea critică la *dimensiunea etiologică* a fenomenului secularizării ca semn distinct al „raționalității moderne” sau al logicii capitalismului, depășite dealtfel, de „filosofia postmodernă a evenimentului” care revalorizează paradigma secularizării oferind „șansa reabilitării creștinismului”[10]. Autorul face aici referire la studiul lui Mihail Neamțu[11], care realizând critica secularizării la Milbank deschide calea înțelegerii privind „restaurarea viziunii creștine asupra lumii”[12].

În principal, *perspectiva teologică* ne aduce în atenţie „maladia secularismului” care „afectează grav” nu numai „sănătatea spirituală a Europei contemporane”, ci şi destinul întregii umanităţi[13]. În acest sens, invocându-l pe Mircea Eliade, Preotul Ioan Bizău include manifestarea secularismului în categoria «terorilor istoriei» ca fiind „cea mai complexă experienţă compromiţătoare din câte a cunoscut istoria umanităţii”.[14] Încă din anul 1999, într-

[3] Termenul aparţine sociologului Max Weber care, în renumita lucrare din anul 1934 intitulată *DIE PROTESTANTISCHE ETHIK UND DER GEIS DES KAPITALISMUL*. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) (versiunea românească, traducere de Ihor Lemnij din 1993. *Etica protestantă şi spiritul capitalist*. Bucureşti: Humanitas) explică modernizarea societăţii prin raţionalizare ştiinţifică crescută, referindu-se la prevalenţa „raţionalităţii cognitiv-instrumentale” faţă de „raționalitatea moral-practică”, atunci când evidenţiază problematica lumii moderne. Etimologia termenului pe linie de provenienţă are în vedere latinescul *saeculum*, care iniţial desemna „vecii vecilor” cu trimitere la „timpul plenar” măsurat ca secol (Nicu Gavriluță. 2013. *Sociologia religiilor. Credințe, ritualuri, ideologii.* Iași: Polirom, p. 233).

[4] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

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[9] Lucrarea a fost realizată în cadrul proiectului *Societatea bazată pe cunoaștere – cercetări, dezbateri, perspective*, cofinanțat de Uniunea Europeană și Guvernul României din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, ID 56815.

[10] *Ibidem*, pp. 224-225.

[11] Mihail Neamțu. 2007. *Gramatica Ortodoxiei. Tradiția după modernitate.*Iași: Polirom.

[12] *Ibidem*, p. 224.

[13] Pr. Ioan Bizău. 2002. *Viaţa în Hristos şi maladia secularizării*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Patmos: 5-12.

[14] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

o conferinţă susţinută la Bacău, Părintele profesor Constantin Galeriu atrăgea atenţia asupra faptului că „distrugerea spiritului" (a spiritualităţii) înseamnă „distrugerea unităţii unui neam", în acest sens „persoana, familia, neamul (naţiunea) şi umanitatea" fiind „creaţia, opera lui Dumnezeu"[15]. În cadrul unei recente conferințe[16] susținută de către profesorul emerit Georgios Mantzaridis de la Facultatea de Teologie a Universității „Aristotel" din Tesalonic, fenomenul secularizării este abordat din perspectiva relației antinomice dintre Biserică și lume. Pericolul semnalat de către profesorul Mantzaridis are în vedere "secularizarea libertății Bisericii" în plan juridic și instituțional, care în contextul lumii contemporane se manifestă ca "două realități care-și revendică libertatea", fără să "se mai poată ajuta una pe alta."

Însă, nu ne oprim aici deoarece filosofii și socio-antropologii ne prezintă astăzi perioada "post-secularizare" – de exemplu, Jürgen Habermas[17] – ca o tendință relevată de către sociologia religiilor ca fiind "reliogizitatea socialului" care antrenează într-un cerc vicios "religia secularizată". Dincolo de abordarea strict teologică, autorii menționați fac referire în mod expres la "riscurile majore" pe care le prezintă secularizarea în viața Europei contemporane antrenând o "criză spirituală de proporții"[18] ale cărei forme de exprimare sunt rezumate ca fiind: materialism și mediocritate culturală; emoții superficiale întreținute puternic de media; fatalism și resemnare maladivă. Mult mai grav pare a fi că "mișcarea ecumenică", ca antidot la "maladia secularismului", pierde din "zelul" și "vigoarea" proiectului inițial rămânând "strict geografică, de fațadă".[19]

2. *Efectele procesului secularizant asupra kinship-ului și asumarea descendenței creștine raportată la „secularizarea-eveniment"*

Depășind viziunea teologico-filosofică, „unidimensională" și teoretică asupra conceptului de „secularizare", Charles Taylor deschide calea cercetării sociologice abordând secularizarea ca *proces* în care *fenomenul religios* se prezintă ca *alternativă existențială concurențială*, aspect pe care teologii îl percep ca reprezentând un pericol pentru lumea contemporană.

Așa cum arată pe larg Ioan Alexandru Tofan, în viziunea lui Taylor, secularizarea se raportează la „condițiile credinței" luând „forma unui complex de factori culturali, științifici, teologici" care condiționează manifestarea credinței ca „opțiune" existențială mai mult sau

[15] Pr. prof. Constantin Galeriu. 1999. „Cardinalitatea românilor. Originea de limbă, credinţă şi spiritualitate" Bacău. Conferinţă difuzată de Radio TRINITAS în cadrul emisiunii „Lumini pentru suflet", 13 februarie 2014, h 21,10-21,30.

[16] Georgios Mantzaridis. 2014. Conferința-dezbatere intitulată „Secularizarea", moderată de Pr. prof. dr. Ion Vicovan, Decanul Facultății de Teologie Ortodoxă „Dumitru Stăniloae" din cadrul Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iași, marți, 11 noiembrie 2014, biblioteca facultății, ora 10,00. Georgios Mantzaridis este profesor emerit la Facultatea de Teologie a Universității „Aristotel" din Tesalonic și autorul unui număr impresionant de lucrări, dintre care unele au fost traduse și la noi: *Globalizare și universalitate*; *Despre îndumnezeire* și *Morala creștină*.

[17] Jürgen Habermas. 2000. *Discursul filosofic al modernității*. *12 prelegeri*. București: Editura All; Jürgen Habermas&Ratzinger Josepf. 2005. *Dialectica secularizării. Despre rațiune și religie*. Cluj-Napoca: Biblioteca Apostrof.

[18] Pr. Ioan Bizău. 2002. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

[19] *Ibidem,* pp. 16-17. Autorul arată că „mișcarea ecumenică" poate fi definită ca un remediu spiritual-creștin pe principiul "co-responsabilizării fraterne active" având drept scop „re-încreștinarea" sau „re-evanghelizarea" care a devenit program inițiat de Papa Ioan-Paul al II-lea, încă din anii "80.

mai puțin confortabilă[20]. În acestă viziune, definirea secularizării ca *proces emergent* pentru opțiunile existențiale ale modernității ca „epocă concretă" nu poate fi redusă pe de o parte, la stricta raportare a instituției religioase la cea laică sau la prezența, respectiv „absența referinței transcendente" în spațiul public iar pe de altă parte, nici la aspecte care țin de convingerile religioase, de slăbirea credinței, „frecventarea Bisericii sau participarea la viața religioasă în întregul ei."[21] Abordarea lui Taylor completează practic, analiza strict conceptuală asupra secularizării oferind totodată, posibilitatea lărgirii ariei de cercetare asupra *dimensiunilor* procesului de secularizare cu identificarea de „mărci sau simptome", după cum urmează[22]:

- decadența religiosului;
- mundanizarea religiosului (Marcel Gauchet) ori nihilismul ca un fel de „derivă mundană" a religiosului (Gianni Vattimo);
- desacralizarea (Peter Berger; Nicu Gavriluță);
- „privatizarea religiei";
- transpoziția formelor religioase în forme laice – etica protestantă (Max Weber); „religia invizibilă" (Peter Berger și Thomas Lukmann); „religia civilă" (Robert Belah).

Un punct comun pentru filosofie, teologie și sociologie în elaborarea teoriilor despre secularizare este reprezentat de teza potrivit căreia „A este B secularizat". Practic, sociologia, de la Ernst Troeltsch la Max Weber, susține că „modernitatea este lumea creștină secularizată"[23]. De exemplu, sociologul Max Weber se referă la „secularizare" explicând modernitatea prin metafora „desvrăjirii lumii" ca „proces politic" și „cultural-istoric" aducând în atenție prezența unor „formațiuni culturale", a unor „instituții și manifestări inedite ale religiozității"[24] în contextul lumii contemporane. În concluzie, studiul nostru are în vedere următoarele *coordonate ipotetice* condiționate de *evaluarea* și *reevaluarea procesului secularizării* în raport cu manifestarea *fenomenului religios* în *societatea modernă* și *postmodernă*:

a. În primul rând, ambiguitatea conceptului de „secularizare" atrage după sine pe de o parte, dificultăți privind definirea și analiza *fenomenului secularizării* iar pe de altă parte, dificultăți privitoare la evaluarea modalităților de manifestare ca „secularizare «pluralã»"[25];

b. În al doilea rând, fie că ne raportăm la „secularizarea tare" fie la „secularizarea slabă", procesul secularizării poate fi valorizat atât în *sens pozitiv* – ca „șansă a istoriei"[26] – cât și în *sens negativ* – ca „rătăcire a istoriei"[27];

c. În al treilea rând, „scenariile alternative ale secularizării" pot fi surprinse și explicate numai în corelație cu *tipul de modernitate* la care ne raportăm, ca

[20] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 210. Autorul face trimitere la Charles Taylor. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
[21] *Ibidem*, pp. 209-210.
[22] Larry Shiner *apud* Ioan A.Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 210.
[23] Jean-Claude Monod. 2002. *La guerelle de la sécularisation. Théologie politique et philosophies de l'histoire de Hegel à* Blumenberg. Paris: Vrin *apud* Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 211.
[24] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 211.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 214.
[26] Mihail Neamțu. 2007. *Op. cit*.
[27] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

expresie a *modernităților „latente”*[28] sau în corelație cu *paradigma postmodernă* din societatea actuală;

d. În acest context, *fenomenul religios* se prezintă ca *alternativă existențială concurențială* care se circumscrie *procesului secularizării* raportată la *tipul de modernitate* definită ca etapă istorică sau epocă concretă; în ceea ce privește raportarea la postmodernism, perspectiva *teologiei creştine* şi chiar cea *filosofică*, relevă imprecizia eticii, alterarea valorilor şi denaturarea criteriilor axiologice[29];

e. Dacă punem în ecuație *„multiplicitatea” modernității* (Jürgen Habermas) – *tradiția creștină* – *postmodernitatea*, vom obține „scenarii alternative” [30] ale secularizării, după cum urmează:

- *„depășirea religiosului*” – „paradigma comunicativă” sau „comunicațională” a raționalității moderne (mecanismele laicității);
- *„proliferarea religiosului”* – raționalitatea modernă centrată pe subiect (relativizarea tradiției și instituirea instanțelor teologice „tari”);
- *„respingerea religiosului”*[31] – nihilism şi teologia postmodernă sau „postmodernismul ca „«artă» a speculației”[32] caracterizată prin protest, inautenticitate și lipsa unei etici a asumării;
- *resacralizarea*[33], respectiv *reabilitarea creştinismului* prin revalorizarea paradigmei secularizării în cadrul filosofiei moderne și postmoderne a evenimentului – „secularizarea-eveniment”.[34]

Corelarea fenomenului religios specific poporului român la contextul european secularizant sau de-secularizant?! suscită o serie de întrebări, nu retorice, în ceea ce ne priveste, ca de pildă: Care sunt „mărcile„ sau „simptomele” secularizării în *societatea românească* actuală? Cărui *tip de modernitate* se poate raporta *fenomenul religios*, respectiv Biserica în România[35]?

În contextul socio-politic și cultural european, ”paradigma religioasă oferită vieții sociale” plasează practic fragila democrație românească într-o „situație intermediară” față de exemplu, de „dictatul religiei” în spațiul public al *fundamentalismului islamic* sau față de „secularizarea slabă” – „privatizarea religiei” și *etica protestantă* – ori față de „secularizarea tare” din spațiul occidental care oscilează între extrema *proliferării fenomenului spiritual-religios* și cea a *nihilismului postmodern*. Ca atare, creștinism-ortodoxia românească (86,72%) vine ca „propunere” și nu ca „impunere” a depozitului său spiritual, Biserica Ortodoxă Română contribuind astfel, la „desecularizarea credinței”.[36]

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[28] *Ibidem*, pp. 210-211.

[29] Bogdan Costin Georgescu. 2014. *Încercări de hermeneutică antropologică asupra ritualurilor religios-creştine*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura EIKON, pp. 252-259.

[30] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 224.

[32] Bogdan-Costin Georgescu. 2014. *Op. cit.*, p. 253-254.

[33] Nicu Gavriluță. 2013. *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-238.

[34] Pentru detalii a se vedea Richard Rorty&Vattimo Gianni. 2008. *Viitorul religiei. Solidaritate, caritate, ironie*. Pitești: Paralela 45 *apud* Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

[35] Mihail Neamţu. 2013. *Credinţă şi raţiune. Dialoguri, contradicţii, împăcări*. Bucureşti: Lumea Credinţei, pp. 37-38.

[36] Anca Manolescu. 2011. „Democrația pluralistă: o șansă pentru desecularizarea religiei?”, în Camil Ungureanu. 2011. *Religia în democrație. O dilemă a modernității*. Iași: Polirom, p. 378.

Corelând perspectiva *teologiei creștine,* care ne relevă „originile transcendente ale familiei", cu referire în mod particular la „familia creștină" păstrătoare de „resurse spirituale"[37] sau „credite ontologice" (Bădescu, 2014)[38], cu *socioantropologia familiei* se evidențiază următoarele aspecte definitorii pentru abordarea *parentalității* sau a *kinship*-ului contemporan:

a. *Parentalitatea* în sens larg[39] incluzând „componenta ideologică" definește astfel, „*kinship*"-ul descendenței inter-generaționale (relații de rudenie)[40] care asigură, prin „identificarea religioasă", efecte atât în plan „religios-socializant", cât și în plan economic și al prestigiului social (trecerea de la „familia patriarhală" la „familia paternală"); astfel, în viziunea lui Harris (1998), *rudenia* este determinată, în sens cauzal, de un „set de valori, credințe și norme care structurează acțiunea socială" având o semnificație mai largă referitoare la „fenomenul rudeniei"[41]. Legătura dintre *sensul larg* al termenului de „parentalitate" și *sensul restrâns* este realizată de termeni comuni cum ar fi „descendența" (*descent*) și „filiația" (*filiation*)[42].
b. *Parentalitatea* în sens restrâns[43] vizează *filiația față de mamă* sau *față de tată*, respectiv *maternitatea* și *paternitatea* având ca nucleu juridic „autoritatea părintească", accentul fiind pus, în ceea ce ne privește, pe relevanța factorului spiritual-religios în *asumarea maternității/paternității*, *construct socio-cultural* cu *valențe spirituale* în cadrul *familiei nucleare* sau *restrânse* (trecerea de la „familia conjugală" la „familia parentală").

Aceste disocieri și analogii arată, o dată în plus, accentele puternic contextualizate socio-economic, politic și cultural pe care le capătă familia prin trecerea de la „patriarhal" la „paternal/patern" spre „conjugal". Este ceea ce sociologul francez, Émile Durkheim, anticipa încă din anul 1892, în celebra lucrare *La famille conjugale,* cu privire la consolidarea

[37] Faros, Filoteu (Pr.). 2013. *Criza vârstei de mijloc*. *Provocări și perspective*. București: Sophia, p. 20.
[38] Sociologul Ilie Bădescu ne aduce în vedere perspectiva *antropologiei creștine* care vizează „omul purtător de credite ontologice", context în care, autorul face referire la trăsăturile caracteristice ale românilor de „a lucra cu virtualitatea, cu latențele" în spiritul *teologiei răsăritene* a „energiilor necreate" (Prof. dr. Ilie Bădescu. 2014. „Pierderea identității". *Interviu* la TVR Trinitas, aprilie 2014).
[39] „Parentaliatea" în sens larg semnifică „universul parental" sau „sistemul parental" care vizează amplitudinea relațiilor de rudenie sau genealogia dar și alte „variabile de selectivitate" cum ar fi cele culturale, organizate în spiritul solidarității sociale. Conceptul nu se confundă cu parentalitatea în sens restrâns, care desemnează *asumarea responsabilităților parentale* aferente rolurilor materne sau paterne.
[40] Iluț, P. 2005. *Sociopsihologia și antropologia familiei*. Iași: Polirom, pp. 89-90. Pentru detalii a se vedea Christopher C. Harris. 1998. *Relațiile de rudenie*. Traducere din engleză de Antonia Opriță. București: Editura DU Style.
[41] Maria Voinea. 1998. „Introducere la ediția românească", în Christopher C. Harris. 1998. *Op. cit*., pp. 9-13.
[42] Termenul de „filiație" exprimă faptul descendenței unui copil din părinții săi, bazându-se față de mamă, pe însuși faptul nașterii, iar față de tată, pe faptul concepției, ceea ce dă naștere unei legături de sânge între copil și părinții săi (Tomșa, Gh. (coord.). 1984. *Dicționar de dreptul familiei*, București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, p. 87). Noțiunea își are originea în latinescul filia, -us, -ii care înseamnă fată (fiică), fiu sau (la plural) copii de ambele sexe. Privită din partea copilului, filiația exprimă calitatea de copil al unor anumiți părinți. *Lato sensu*, filiația desemnează un șir neîntrerupt de nașteri care leagă o persoană de un strămoș al ei, un șir neîntrerupt de persoane între care faptul nașterii a stabilit legătura de la părinte la copil.
[43] *Stricto sensu*, filiația desemnează legătura de descendență dintre un copil și părinții lui, mai precis raportul de descendență dintre un copil și fiecare din părinții lui (Filipescu I. P. 1996. *Tratat de dreptul familiei*, București: Editura All, p. 274).

căsătoriei ca „liant al societății" în detrimentul familiei[44]. Însă, „educația morală" fiind bazată pe rațiune și nu pe Dumnezeu!!! Capacitatea căsătoriei de a consolida societatea rămâne și astăzi un ideal ... aproape de neatins! Această situație suportă nuanțări, sociologii familiei atragând atenția astăzi asupra înlocuirii „familiei conjugale" cu „familia parentală" prin *ideologizarea cuplului* și legalizarea uniunii libere și chiar într-un mod nefiresc, așa cum este cazul homosxualității.

O analiză comparativă între tradițional și modern evidențiază nu atât apariția unor noi structuri familiale sau a unor noi funcții, ci mai degrabă schimbări în „ponderea diferitelor tipuri structurale" dublată de „importanța și conținutul funcțiilor" pe care comunitatea sau societatea în ansamblu le așteaptă de la familie. Într-o prezentare sintetică, psihosocioantropologică, a distincției dintre familia tradițională și familia modernă, profesorul clujean Petru Iluț accentuează importanța a ceea ce domnia sa numește „primordialitatea obligațiilor și a afecțiunii."[45] Rezultatele comparației înscrise într-un tabel adaptat după Beth *et al.,* 1985[46], pot fi sintetizate astfel:[47]

a. Consangvinitatea și „legăturile de rudenie" reprezintă în familia tradițională lărgită atât „sursa principală a drepturilor și obligațiilor", cât și „obiectul privilegiat al afecțiunii";
b. Ruptura din rețeaua de rudenie (rețeaua parentală, în sens larg)" și „schimbarea de focalizare" de pe membrii rețelei de rudenie pe membrii din familia nucleară;
c. Analogia dintre tradițional și familia lărgită ori dintre modern și familia nucleară nu-și găsește întotdeauna un corespondent deoarece atât *familia lărgită* sau *extinsă*, cât și *familia nucleară* pot fi analizate din perspectiva *evoluției tradițional-modern*.

Dacă în cadrul cercetărilor de *antropologie culturală clasică* „relațiile de rudenie" și definirea *kinship*-ului ocupau un loc central, pentru a descrie și explica desfășurarea întregii vieți sociale, în prezent, deși relațiile de rudenie și chiar familia, „au pierdut din relevanța lor socială", se menține în mod constant preocuparea pentru studierea *parentalității* – „ca formă modernă a *kinship*-ului" - și a *familiei lărgite* sau *extinsă* cuprinzând pe lângă *familia restrânsă* și alte rude cu impact asupra vieții personale și comunitare Astfel, tematizarea din cadrul cercetărilor actuale de socioantropologie culturală asupra familiei au în atenție *diversitatea familială* „inter- și intraculturală" [48].

Interpretând *fenomenul secularizării* ca *strategie* care orientează opțiunile religioase și acționând totodată, într-un *sens negativ* asupra *kinship*-ului contemporan obținem următoarele situații ipotetice:

- Scăderea *identificării religioase* și a *referințelor religioase* din „memoria genealogică" prin *mecanismele laicizării* și a „subiectivității comunicative de *tip etic*"[49] (secularizarea „slabă");

[44] Sellenet Catherine. 2013. Traducere de Elena Cojocariu. *Parentalitatea pe înţelesul tuturor. Pertinenţe şi derivele unui concept.* Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Iași, p. 42.
[45] Petru Iluț. 2005. *Op. cit.,* p. 87.
[46] B. Beth; E. Markson; P. Stein. 1985. *Sociology*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
[47] Petru Iluț. 2005. *Op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.
[48] *Ibidem,* p. 12.
[49] Alexandru Ioan Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

- Proliferarea și orientarea identificării și identității religioase într-un sens *ne-creștin* respectiv, *ne-ortodox* pentru societatea românească (secularizarea „tare") și deci, *alterarea referințelor religioase* din „memoria genealogică".

În sens contrar, efectele negative asupra *kinship*-ului pot fi ipotetic depășite prin intermediul „secularizării-eveniment" ale cărei conotații pozitive cu privire la *revigorarea credinței* s-ar prezenta astfel:

- *Identificarea* și revenirea la *identitatea* religioasă creștin-ortodoxă prin „resacralizarea" *vieții familiale* și „desecularizarea credinței" la nivel *individual*.
- Relevarea factorilor favorizanți în cadrul *procesului de resacralizare* – pe de o parte, moștenirea spiritual-simbolică din perspectiva creștinism-ortodoxiei iar pe de altă parte, impactul unor *evenimente pozitive* sau *negative* (situații concrete de viață) care impun necesitatea identificării religioase în sens creștin-ortodox.

Ipoteza-cadru a studiului nostru pornește de la rezultatele recentelor cercetări realizate în Marea Britanie și SUA, mai puțin în România, care evidențiază *impactul comportamentului religios creștin* în general, și al celui *creștin-ortodox*, în particular în societatea modernă[50]. Coexistența și complementaritatea dintre creștinismul "de elită", elitist sau filosofic relevat prin "simbolistica culturală" și creștinismul "popular" căruia i se asociază o "simbolistică religios creștină" constituie un puternic "*tampon" cultural* (n.n.), respectiv creștin religios pe filieră ortodoxă pentru „simptomele" sau "mărcile" procesului secularizant din societatea românească actuală.

Ipotezele noastre se conturază în jurul ideii centrale a rolului jucat de *kinship* sau „rudenia spirituală" în *dialectica manifestării secularizării* ca proces cultural-istoric de realizare a „condițiilor credinței"[51] *creștine*. Astfel, componenta *cultural-religioasă* a descendenței inter-generaționale poate orienta *strategiile secularizării* fie într-un sens fie *negativ*, fie într-unul *pozitiv*.

a. *Kinship*-ul sau *parentalitatea în sens larg* incluzând „rudenia spirituală" prin *identificare religioasă* acționează ca un *filtru axiologic* (n.n.) care triază *opțiunile cultural-religioase* la nivel familial, personal și comunitar asigurând *identitatea culturală* și *religioasă* în general, *identitatea ortodoxă* în particular;
b. *Continuitatea kinship*-ului susținută de către „memoria genealogică" contribuie la "desecularizarea credinței" și la acumularea *capitalului religios creștin* („credite ontologice") care se constituie în *resurse* orientate către obținerea de stabilitate, armonie, pozitivarea relațiilor inter- și intra-familiale) de-a lungul generațiilor (trei sau patru generații în studiul de caz asupra ciclului familial);
c. „Secularizarea-eveniment" activează „creditele ontologice" potențând *fenomenul resacralizării vieții familiale* manifestat prin *reabilitarea în plan creștin-ortodox a persoanei*.

[50] Pentru detalii a se vedea Bogdan-Costin Georgescu. 2014. *Op. cit*., p. 15.
[51] Charles Taylor. 2007. *Apud* Alexandru Ioan Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit*., p. 209.

Ca simptome ale secularizării, manifestarea „opțiunilor teologice" sub forma pluralismului religios, a relativismului și sincretismului religios[52], găsește un teren favorabil în spațiul domestic, acesta reprezentând un loc al manifestării religiozității, în care drepturile omului, respectiv *dreptul la viață intimă, privată și de familie*, se întâlnesc cu „drepturile Lui Dumnezeu."[53] Aplicarea moralei creștine în cadrul familiei permite „manifestarea inedită a religiozității"[54], o renaștere spirituală și civilizație autentică impusă de nevoia religiei de a se recunoaște într-o „realitate naturală"[55], ceea ce permite o abordare pozitivă a „crizei familiale" prin posibilitatea accesării resurselor spirituale ale familiei sau a „creditelor ontologice" în vederea *resacralizării vieții socio-familiale.*

Identitatea religioasă este „una dintre componentele esențiale ale imaginii publice și imaginii de sine...", „valorile de tip moral-religios" reprezentând „resurse importante în construirea imaginii sociale a familiei" [56], în mod specific a părinților și copiilor. Actualizarea identității religioase are loc ca semn de apărare a propriei persoane sau „ori de câte ori individul se simte singur și nesigur pe sine."[57] Punerea în practică a moralei creștine – "trăitor întru Hristos" – se exprimă prin ceea ce pedagogia creștină denumește "educație moral-religioasă" sau "educație duhovnicească" în familie, *conduita etică* reprezentând expresia socială a manifestării efectelor directe în comunitate a acestui tip de educație. Practica religioasă este una de tip situațional, discret având o slabă dimensiune publică și instituțională vizând raportul situațional și intim cu „cele sfinte"[58] așa cum arată studiile interbelice și literatura modernă[59].

Cu cât raportarea la morala creștină în mediul familal, sub forma celor patru dimensiuni ale manifestării religiozității[60] – *intelectuală, ideologică, ritualică și experențială* – este mai pregnantă, cu atât crește nivelul conduitei etice în spațiul *familial și școlar* fiind asigurate *mecanismele responsabilizării parentale și filiale*. Drept urmare, depășind viziunea care pune accentul pe „culpa parentală", în special maternă[61], ca răspuns direct la *criza „familiei parentale"*[62] revine în actualitate „familia conjugală", de această dată, față de concepția lui Durkheim, la „educația morală bazată pe rațiune" adăugându-se *simbolistica religioasă* care valorizează prin semnificare și resemnificare *Taina Persoanei, Taina Cununiei* și a *căsătoriei* cu toate efectele care decurg în planul *responsabilității de cuplu*, a *responsabilității parentale* sau *filiale*.

Acknoledgement:

This paper is a result of a research made possible by the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed

[52] Pr. Ioan Bizău. 2002. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
[53] *Ibidem*, p. 34.
[54] Ioan Alexandru Tofan. 2011. *Op. cit.*, p. 211.
[55] *Ibidem*, pp. 223-224.
[56] Elisabeta Stănciulescu. 1997b. *Sociologia educației familiale*. Iași: Polirom, p. 191.
[57] *Ibidem*, p. 248.
[58] *Ibidem*, p. 318.
[59] A se vedea „modelul creștin și compromisul social" la Pr. Filoteu Faros, 2013. *Op. cit.*
[60] Pentru detalii a se vedea Mălina Voicu. 2011. „Religie", în Lazăr Vlăsceanu (coordonator). 2011. *Sociologie.* Iași: Collegium. Polirom, pp. 566-595.
[61] Elisabeta Stănciulescu. 1997b. *Op. cit.*, p. 385.

by the European Social Fund, under the project POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 – "Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment".

Note și referințe

RETHINKING CANADIAN CULTURE AS PART OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Abstract: In my paper I have analysed the process of becoming Canadian based on historical data and cultural politics in order to connect this diachronic perspective to the present day society's perception in terms of ethnicity, nationalism, social status and gender. The main aim is to demonstrate how divergent trends and ideas have been shaping Canadian identity during their competition for ascendency, in search of answers to the question of a regulating official ideology in a multicultural state. The forms of national and cultural representations have a political foundation that cannot escape controversial attitudes at the social life level, given the complexity of societal issues under debate. The collective struggles around them are meant to redefine cultural politics with its specific values in the hope to meet the expectations of the nation-state identification in the world. The discursive actions that I have focused on in my research work are a living proof of the dynamic and continual re-production of national identity in Canada, at the same time creating and also unifying diversity. The long debated racial commonality of French and English is another point of interest in joining components of nationality in theorising national culture. From this angle, non-Canadian people like me can understand better and more deeply Canadians' struggle to keep the distinction clear between American and Canadian culture while continually asserting their national identity.

Keywords: ***identity, representation, politics, multiculturalism, Canadianness***

The Canadian Identity, as it has come to be known, is as elusive as the Sasquatch and Ogopogo. It has animated—and frustrated—generations of statesmen, historians, writers, artists, philosophers, and the National Film Board... Canada resists easy definition. (Andrew Cohen 2007: 3).

If we think again and again why it is difficult to define Canadian identity in relation to its national culture, the analysis can only be subjective and selective due to the many reasons one may find. Realising this at an early stage of my research into the topic, I have decided to confine it to the major issues I am already dealing with, from the perspective of a European. To Canadians themselves, such standpoint is a look from outside their country, an insight into what we generally think it means to be Canadian and what is the impact of their culture to our consciousness. Starting from the uniqueness of Canada both as history, ethnical composition, cultural and linguistic diversity, this portrait is a very special one in the entire world, since I primarily focus on its distinctiveness from other countries it is often compared to, such as the United States. The result of the geographic position and historic heritage, Canadian identity is roughly considered shaped by three traditional factors: the British, French-English conflict and American ones. In the 20th century, immigrants of Asian, African and Caribbean nationalities have gradually shaped Canadian identity, a process that even today continues with the ongoing coming of immigrants in large numbers from either non-British or non-French backgrounds, which supplements the issue of multiculturalism to the analysis. Most debates over Canadian identity in contemporary times are mainly in political terms, defining Canada as a country guided by government policies that reflect cultural values. Other nations have also questioned their identity in recent years. Ethnicity is relevant to identification in connection with other concepts such as ethnic groups and ethnic identity. Canada is

therefore religiously and linguistically diverse, many dialects being spoken while beliefs and customs are preserved. These days, Canada has a diverse composition of nationalities and ethnicities as well as governmental policies promoting multiculturalism and interculturalism rather than cultural assimilation or a unified national myth. In Quebec, cultural identity seems stronger, many scholars considering Quebec culture as being distinguished from the English Canadian culture. In Canada, the large range of aboriginal, regional, and ethnic subcultures create a cultural mosaic. Wsevolod Isajiw in *Definition and Dimensions of Ethnicity: A Theoretical Framework* examines what national identity is and how it relates to concepts such as nation, race, ethnic groups, and nationalism. Throughout Canada's history, its culture has had a massive influence of European traditions, particularly French and British, and also of its own indigenous cultures. Over time certain elements specific of Canada's immigrant populations culture have been integrated into the mainstream Canadian culture. Population has also received the influence of American culture because of sharing the same language, as well as for the proximity and migration between these two countries (Isajiw 1992:5).

Canada is often characterised as a very diverse, progressive, and multicultural state. Its Government policies are social indicators of Canada's political and cultural values. Canada's federal government has had a great impact on Canadian culture with the programs and laws developed over time, protecting it by establishing legal minimums concerning Canadian content in mass media through institutions such as Canadian Radio-Television. As to the development of Canadian culture, this is an ongoing process closely connected to history. Canadian literature is an expression of both national identity and culture in the sense that many writers have addressed such issues. It is basically divided into French and English-language literatures, following the literary traditions of Britain and France. Canada's literature, whether in French or English, gives a glimpse of Canadian perspective on the country's position in the world, wilderness, regionalism, frontiers. Bliss Carman's poetry and the memoirs of Susanna Moodie and Catherine Parr Traill are vivid examples that have inspired successive generations of writers, from Leonard Cohen to Margaret Atwood.

Kertzer analysis of Anglophone literature highlights how nationalism and national identity are reflected:

> *We must continue studying how the nation is imagined: how it defines a body of writing as national; how it informs and validates that literature; how its clashing loyalties impassion citizens for good or ill; how it convokes and disperses communities; how it invokes and subverts the ideal of heroism; how it foresees a fusion of personal and social satisfactions (joy and justice); and how it gives a mission to literary criticism, including the mission to denounce nationalism in its vicious forms (Kretzer 1998:195).*

Starting with the mid-twentieth century, Canadian writers have looked into national themes for their readership. They tried to find a distinct Canadian voice in original writings, often regional since Canadian identity is closely connected to its literatures. The theme of national identity is a constant one, from Hugh MacLennan's *Two Solitudes* (1945) to Alistair MacLeod's *No Great Mischief* (1999). However, Canadian literature is not only categorised by historic and literary period of respective writings by also by province or region or by the socio-cultural origins of writers. We can regard Canadians as characters in the novels of

Margaret Atwood, Margaret Laurence, and Robertson Davies, the plays of Michel Tremblay, or the stories of Roch Carrier, Stephen Leacock's humour or the history of Donald Creighton. The question of the nation belonging sense at borderland appears in Michael Ondaatje's (1992) *The English Patient. "*Gradually we became nationless. I came to hate nations. We are deformed by nation-states" (Ondaatje 1992:138).

Margaret Atwood has a huge contribution to defining national identity of Canada, not only in non-fiction works, but also in novels. Many of them, such as *The Journals of Susanna Moodie*, *Alias Grace*, *The Blind Assassin* and *Surfacing*, can be called "Historiographic Metafiction" according to the definition of the postmodern literary theorist Linda Hutcheon. Therefore, Atwood regards Canadian literature as representative for Canadian national identity, expressed as relationship with nature, settlers history and adherence to the community. The garrisons image surrounded by wilderness as Northrop Frye describes Canada is similar in theory to the imagery in Atwood's *Wilderness Tips*: there are trees that are "hardly trees; they are currents of energy, charged with violent colour" (Atwood 1991:129). Canadian writers have been inspired by Canada's particular geography and climate to primarily adopt the theme of survival. *Surfacing* is one of Atwood most popular novels in Canada focusing on this productive topic.

> *Surfacing and Survival contribute to national discussions in Canada in a couple of well-known ways: from the integral link between Atwood's and Northrop Frye's writing to the ambiguous relationship between Canadians and Americans in Surfacing, these books have proven to be important to debates about Canadian identity and belonging (Dobson 2009: 27).*

It is also one of the most poetic novels she has written, by association with her poetry for having "a considerable thematic and stylistic territory" (Sherrill 1980: 97). This can be explained by the complex imagery and metaphors, expanding the theme of *The Edible Woman* about the female protagonist's alienation from social expectations, in a context created by a combination of issues related to ecology, nationalism and ancestry. These concerns were newly integrated in the feminist theory. Atwood combines feminism, ecology and nationalism to treat their common theme: guilt versus innocence. The reading of this novel is undoubtedly culture specific. Nationalism and feminism interact around autonomy and identity. The fight for autonomy is extended beyond sexual politics as Atwood addresses Canada's struggle to escape cultural domination by America. She often refers to notions of ideological imperialism, saying: "what we have done in this country is to use imported gods like imported everything else" (Atwood quoted in Graeme Gibson, Dissecting the Way a Writer Works": 19). This novel can be read as the double problematic of myth and national identity. Between myths and Freudian symbolism, this is a story of inadequacy and guilt which have manifestations such as revolt, isolation and despair, in the context of a degenerate contemporary civilization. This is in stark contrast to wilderness and simple life and also a parody of traditional romantic love that becomes obscenity in the new dimension of human experience, especially the female one. The stereotypical male "straight power" has "no conscience or piety" (Atwood 2003a: 127-128). Indeed, as Atwood writes in the introduction to *The New Oxford Book of Canadian Short Stories in English:* "we gave up a long time ago trying to isolate the gene for Canadianness" (1995:xiii). The concept of Canadianness and the

perennial Canadian question of national identity are related to the myths and stereotypes: the canoe, wilderness, frontier with America, unity between English and French Canada. Daniel Francis explains the notion of "myth" in his book *National Dreams,* where he states that "...myths are not lies, or at least, not always" (Francis 1997: 16). He has studied some of the Canadian myths and also the history behind the formation of them and I address the topics in his book as the main sources producing examples of Canadian myths for this study. "*Surfacing* is a deeply ambiguous and ambivalent book" (Dobson 2009: 28), with four main characters. The narrator is an unnamed woman, having a partner called Joe. They travel together with another couple, Anna and David, by car, to rural Quebec where the narrator's parents' home was until her father went missing mysteriously. "I can't believe I'm on this road again" she says (Atwood 2003a: 1). The narrator does not give details to her companions, keeping for herself all the suppositions she makes and subsequently, trying to interpret her father's sketches of Indigenous rock drawings and maps of the lakes in that regions. A number of tensions are revealed, both trans-national (between the Canadians and Americans) and intra-national (between the French and the English in Quebec on one hand, and between the Canadians and Indigenous people on the other hand). The narration is full of reference to the unnamed woman's past, that she has not been Joe's partner for a long time and she is uncomfortable with her own body, maybe because of the aborted child. A shift in the course of the narration occurs when her actual external search becomes more and more inward. Once with the sexist attitudes of men in her group and their trips into the wilderness, she begins to dissociate herself from them and from civilization, as a reaction to all that she dislikes or even hates in her life. The rhetoric of Canadian wilderness identity aligns with the current discourses of postmodernism and identity politics. In the novel, there are several references to jars, bottles and tin cans. These items represent methods of containing or imprisoning life: "I put the worms in a can and some dirt for them". They also represent the narrator's own emotional life which has been put into jars preventing her from being able to feel. The narrator seeks to regain her connection with archaic feminine wisdom, symbolized in the text by her mysterious mother. Her Father is also remembered as he was alive. In her mysterious powers, the mother is aligned with nature, hence after her death, the narrator sees her as a bird: "I squint up at them, trying to see her, trying to see which one she is" (ibid. 176). She is innocent, and consequently, like the slaughtered heron, a victim. The narrator concludes that: "The innocents get slaughtered because they exist" (ibid. 121-122). The use of simplified stereotypes, as for example "the loud American" and "the Canadian canoe/wilderness" constitutes an effective method that deals with issues concerning national identity. It has been often been suggested that anti-Americanism has primacy in Canadian nationalist ideologies. A close reading of Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing* produces several examples of American stereotypes as opposed to the Canadian ones. The image of Americans as loud and obnoxious is shown by the way in which they approach with their boat; "it rounds a point and becomes a roar, homing in on us, big powerboat, the white water veeing from the bow" (ibid. 60). The fact that the Americans have a big powerboat, and later they are described wearing "nifty outfits" points to the stereotype picture of Americans as wealthy people who show off. Further stereotypes appear in the passage where the Americans are described as being wasteful and disrespectful of regulations. "They're the kind who catch

more than they can eat and they'd do it with dynamite if they could get away with it" (ibid. 60).

Americanism that the narrator associates with technology, violence and destruction is the opposite of Nature, her refuge, which strangely leads to her ambivalent rejection of and likely return to society in the last parts of the novel because her clear divisions between what is pure and what is contaminated break down. As Donna Gerstenberger clearly states:

> *Atwood has left us in this novel more than a sociological record; there are here hieroglyphics by which human beings may find their ways beyond the old confining myths of nurture. She has engaged our attention at the levels of myth and language in a way that enlarges our conceptual horizons .... we should examine our world a little differently because we have experienced Surfacing (Gerstenberger 1976: 148-49).*

The novel shows this disruption of differences, in all ethical classifications. First she labels all that is negative as American, in contrast to a seeming pure Canadian society, gradually elements of American corruption penetrate the Canadian sphere, both as border crossing and symbolically. The narrator meets a hunter named Bill Malmstrom, who expresses his intention to buy her property for a group of Detroit-based outdoorsmen, the "Wildlife Protection Association of America," whose desire to kill animals reveals her anti-American biases. The narrator and her companions meet a pair of fishermen in a remote wild place while searching for her missing father, and assume from their appearance that they are Americans: "They had a starry flag like all of them, a miniature decal sticker on the canoe bow. To show us we were in occupied territory" (ibid. 115). They had killed a heron for no apparent reason, which made the narrator believe that "it must have been the Americans" who did it. The needlessly murdered heron comes to symbolize the victimization of the innocent, which is a theme that appears throughout the text. "I couldn't tell how it had been done, bullet, smashed with a stone, hit with a stick… They must have got it before it had time to rise" (ibid. 110). This image speaks of the cruelty of the "civilized" people against nature and the innocent. Actually, this idea is a continuation of the statement from the beginning of the novel: a "disease is spreading up from the South" and David calls them "the fascist pig Yanks", a very strong anti-American attitude.

To understand the Canadian cultural map was one of the central concerns in the time when Atwood came to prominence, being well-known that she promotes a politics of national identification in her writing:

> *If Atwood's vision of Canadian resistance in Surfacing requires untangling, however, it is in part because her protagonist's openness to difference is limited to that which is already within Canada. If the transnational now informs how literature in Canada conceptualizes itself, then cross-border influences may need to be thought differently. The problems that Surfacing has in maintaining its divisions between Canada and the United States illustrate the very conscious limitations of its vision, at the same time as it projects an ideal, imagined community. (Dobson 2009: 37).*

Since Quebec was so distinct, the marks of Americanization are expected to be much more visible than in English Canada. The narrator finds everywhere signs that the Quebec of her childhood has been violated by Americans and also by the Canadians who have assimilated the American values of material progress and disastrous ecological destruction:

the road to the village is straightened and shortened, the gas station is decorated with stuffed moose (a possible representation of the narrator's family in her youth), one of them waving an American flag and the village's economy only depends on catering to American holiday fishermen, businessmen in plaid shirts still creased from the cellophane packages and wives, if they come, who sit in two's on the screened blackfly-proof porches of the single-room cabins and complain to each other while the men play at fishing (Atwood 2003a: 10). At the beginning, the narrator assumes, just like David did, that the Americans are easy to identify in the wilderness. They are the ones who scare away the fish, break the game laws by catching far more than they can eat, and who always want all camping equipment to be automatic and collapsible. But in northern Quebec, Americanism does not reveal itself in terms of nationality, but as a state of mind. When the narrator's companions and the Ontario fishermen mistake each other for Americans, she realizes something quite obvious: it is impossible in North America to be non-American: "If you look like them and talk like them and think like them you are them ... you speak their language, a language is everything you do" (Atwood 2003a: 95). This is a kind of cathartic confirmation of the truth about her past. In terms of a cognitive mapping of the transnational space, the relationship between Canada and the USA may be regarded as a threat within the context of national debates:

> *[…] Canadians could always partake in the commercial-popular culture of the American West, they also had to reckon with their own West, Canadian myths of the frontier, the West and the North, and their close, one-sided political and economic relationship with the U.S. (Francis 1997: 77).*

The American frontier motif is read as an aggressive and colonizing compulsion, associated with the quest and contrasting with the Canadian survival motif, which is suggestive of passivity and victimization. "The pervasive menace, the Americans" (ibid. 139). The Canadians are "struggling to differentiate their identity from that of Americans" (ibid. 60). The Canadian Multiculturalism Act revaluates the meaning of Canadian identity.

> *The forces of continentalization continue to increase, yet Canadian culture remains - and, I believe, will remain - distinct and distinctive, the reflection of our unique sensibilities. (Gould, Karen L, Gaffield Chad 2003:215)*

According to Homi Bhabha, who exposes the fluidity and narrativity of national identities that characterises the way in which the nation-space can be best described. Bhabha's qualification of a nation as an edifice of ideological ambivalence as well as his view on the contingency of national meanings make us question the particulars upon which communities envision their borders, suggesting the steady deferral of a definitive national identity. Myths of an existing immutable national consciousness and a possible unified national culture disallow us to fully understand how the "*other* is never outside or beyond us" (Bhabha 1990: 4), while the cultural map is no longer overlapping the geographical one. This collective inability to comprehend is integral to nation-building and belonging.

"As much as the beaver or the Canada goose or the maple leaf, the canoe is presented as our link to the land, to the past, to our Aboriginal forebears, and to our spiritual roots" (Francis 1997: 129). It has a constant presence in the history and folklore of Canada. As Daniel Francis further asserts:

> *The canoe, and the story of transformation it embodies, does not belong solely to the Aboriginal people. They are also central emblems of non-Native Canadian culture. […] the canoe journey into the wilderness has been a consistent theme of our history and our culture (ibid.128).*

The canoe, tent and wilderness are all connected, as they speak of typical dimensions of the same world, subordinated to a specific mentality and way of living: "The rhetoric of canoeing reveals that the myth of wilderness continues to exert a strong attraction" (ibid. 149) as a contact with truth and freedom and an encounter with history and discovery of national identity:

> *The canoe trip is partly an attempt to recapture a past world. It is tinged with nostalgic regret at the loss of a simpler way of life. We believe our ancestors had a more authentic relationships with the natural world; the canoe trip is one means we have of trying to recapture it (ibid. 150).*

Again, the canoe is more like a mystical object than a vehicle of ordinary travel. Once embarked, people experience a revelation of their ancestral heritage bond and a feeling of belonging to both the visible and invisible world.

The trip by canoe is also dangerous and it requires a lot of skill, as any close interaction with nature and wildlife:

> *Neither of them had portaged before; we had to help them lift and balance the canoes. I said maybe they should double up, both of them under one canoe, but David insisted they could do it the real way. I said they should be careful; if the canoe slipped sideways and you didn't get out in time it would break your neck. (Atwood 2003a: 83)*

In *Anatomy of Criticism*, Northrop Frye reads the wilderness as a pastoral space of renewal and redemption, of "escape from society" (Frye 1985: 43). Frank Davey was obviously following the same pastoral pattern traced by Frye when he described *Surfacing* as a comedy "which begins in social disruption, sends its characters into a healing 'green world', and returns them to society capable of restoring it to wholeness". The quest reading of the novel remains the most popular, although different critics use it to different ends. Carol P. Christ, for example, emphasizes the spiritual aspects of the journey, and argues that in order to achieve spiritual enlightenment, the narrator "must choose the isolation of the visionary quest". Christ 1995: 120). The quest genre is based on the belief that the heroine can escape society and find self-definition in isolation, and as such, it is deeply rooted in a liberal concept of the self. By beginning *Surfacing* with a travel into the wilderness, Atwood takes her rightful place within the quest narratives tradition and enriching it with a new spiritual dimension. Ostensibly, the narrator's search for her father becomes a quest for her missing memories, which are the connection knot between her past and to her true self, in an attempt to find isolation since the trauma of an abortion made her regard the society as a dangerous place, characterized by aggression and violence, where "there is nothing inside the happy killers to restrain them" (Atwood 2003a: 122), and the narrator does not perceive herself as an agent, as a searcher as well as a survivor and a victim.

Atwood argued that "every country or culture has a single unifying and informing symbol at its core", which she identified as The British Island (a "sense of security"), The American Frontier (a "sense of adventure or danger"), and for Canada, survival:

Our stories are likely to be tales not of those who made it but of those who made it back ... The survivor has no triumph or victory but the fact of his survival; he has little after his ordeal that he did not have before, except gratitude for having escaped with his life. (Atwood 2003b:33).

The themes of authenticity and recognition permeate the entire novel. One of the concerns of the narrator is to discover the values that are real or indigenous to her as a female, as a Canadian and as an individual in order to become a "natural woman" (Atwood 2003a: 184).

The narrator's flight into the wilderness is an attempt to escape her entrapment within social guilt and recover her authentic, innocent self. The notion of an authentic self is minutely described by Taylor who deconstructs the modern ideal of authenticity, by analyzing the tremendous shift in belief from an external and divine morality to an internal moral truth that must be protected against adverse social influences.Canadian unity is depicted as a myth, in the falsehood sense she shows that two parallel societies exist in Canada. The content of certain statements made by the narrator, or the characters, also add to this conclusion. The protagonist of *Surfacing* exclaims: "This is border country" (Atwood 2003a: 30) while she travels to her childhood home in the wilderness of Canada's North. She means the division between English and French Canada.

The idea of the Canadians who want to distinguish their identity from that of the Americans' also exists in Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*, as in the example were two strangers mistake the protagonist and her friends for Americans. One of the strangers asks: "Say, what part of the States are you all from? It's hard to tell, from your accent". The protagonist replies: "We're not from the States," I said, annoyed that he'd mistaken me for one of them" (ibid. 122). The protagonist is irritated when she and her company are mistaken for an Americans. It is important for them that their Canadian identity does not merge with the identity of Americans.The narrator is more convinced of the fact that the rational society represented by her father is no more than a destructive force. She comes to believe that masculine culture has subordinated an innocent feminine nature. The lack of connection between characters transfers the situation to an indifference to the natural world that has resulted in the "dying white birches" (Atwood 2003a: 9) in the opening pages, the "fished out" lake (ibid. 32), and the hanged heron (ibid. 137–138). The narrator meditates over life and suffering in a way that is supposed to be illuminating to her:

Anything that suffers and dies instead of us is Christ . . . (ibid. 164–65).

In the novel's final sentence, "The lake is quiet, the trees surround me, asking and giving nothing" (ibid. 224) is a belief in the force of natural world where the narrator can "begin" and "trust" (ibid. 224). Thus, *Surfacing* stands for a powerful manifest for respect to the sacredness of all life forms of the Earth: "Anything we could do to the animals we could do to each other" (ibid. 143). The parody, irony, metafiction, and intertextuality and the deconstruction of national and social myths are typically postmodern. The ideas in Atwood's novel are an expression of a strong reaction against the consumerism and disrespect for the natural world that defines urban survival:

Canada, as a country with a complex colonial heritage, becomes a site in which liberation is envisioned through a project of nation-building, one in which it might be possible to identify dominant themes as a means of creating a collective identity. (Dobson 2009: 35).

Although the novel clearly favors nature over civilization, the Surfacer's transformation into the 'natural woman' is still unsettling. Indeed, it becomes difficult to read her transformation, as Atwood relies on images rather than logic to move the narrative forward. This emphasis on the land connects with Northrop Frye's famous pronouncement that the central question of Canada is not "Who am?" but "Where is here?" (Frye 1985: 220). She then makes her famous claim about refusing to be a victim, about taking responsibility. Atwood's work has been consistently seen as referring to the world around her, whether that world is specifically associated with Canada, or whether it is more concerned with contemporary gender relations or with other political positions. *Surfacing* is best read as a quest narrative, and again therefore dismisses it from further consideration. Generally, Canadian literature reflects the relationship between national identity and culture, as this issue still is under scrutiny.

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITY?

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Abstract: European identity is a concept that continues to provoke vivid debates. Much of the literature deals mainly in terms of historical or philosophical values and lifestyles common for Europe. Another part of the European speaks about identity as a process of literature addressing psycho- sociological or socio -political citizens' of attachment to the European and the political community. Sociological analysis of the identification of European citizens European political entity, detailed in the last decade through Eurobarometer provides a clearer view of the evolution of multiple identities and the process of shaping the European identity among citizens, based on the total cultural experience, social, legal, and subjective perception of the EU and the values promoted by it. Based on these considerations, we support the thesis that national identity is not contradictory with the feeling of belonging to the European Union, but rather everything that can be seen by analyzing the relationship with the European project in relation to nation building.

Keywords*: identity, european, national, eurobarometer, cultural experience, political entities, subjective perceptions*

Introducing the concept of identity in the sphere of European studies was the result of surveys, and more specifically Eurobarometer analysts who used it to explain multidimensional support and integrate indicators . Most of this research interrogate - directly or indirectly–existence of a process to identify the interviewees with the European Union , in other words noting the growing influence of history, European history on the opinions and behaviors of its citizens. Each of these works focus on different aspects of relationships that are established or not between the Union and European. Convergences are numerous and all underlines the problematic nature of the concept of "European identity".

As shown by Adrian Severin in his article *European identity - national-statal identity*, the European process - a process consisting of design and build a united Europe capable of exceeding state «Europe-market 'to become a' Europe -Power" - must be seen as a result of a two-way movement. On the one hand it is about moving West to the East European continent - actually called "enlargement" - and on the other hand we refer to the movement of a confrontational diversity of Central and Eastern Europe to the West.

Western Europe reached an identity characterized by political pluralism, social participation, respect for diversity, free and fair competition, rule of law and the primacy of human rights. These values are commonly synthesized as pluralistic/participative democracy, rule of law and human rights, to which must be added and so called "economic democracy" and the sanctity of private property and free formation of prices on the market. They include, of course, equal opportunity and secular character of the state. Western Europe has accumulated also vulnerability rooted in negative behavior patterns. Consumerism, selfishness and lack of labor market flexibility - consecutive an excess of social protection - are just some of them. In the Community structures (European Union institutions), their work adds bureaucracy, lack of transparency and accountable systems for the citizen. On the other hand, Central and Eastern Europe is characterized, still, by insecurity and poverty. So it is that

the trust of citizens from these countries in the Church and the Army goes before confidence in specific institutions of democracy in a secular state.

As things stand now, it can be said that "EU enlargement" (positive Western imperialism) be pseudo or quasi-globalizing obviously keeping us at the scale of the European continent. This design whereas the European integration only as a transfer of its model - the acquis communautaire - to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Past experience shows that "identification with the nation-state emerged only after a long cultural and linguistic homogeneity of citizens, wearing wars, establish rights and obligations of citizens, build a picture of the nation equipped with symbols and rituals, the existence of common enemies and the gradual emergence of the education system and the media "(Guibernau, 2004, p. 140). European identity (and citizenship, by the way) can not be based on a homogenization that would cancel diversities, be they linguistic, cultural or legal, as fundamentals can not claim the existence of a common past or geographic boundaries clearly marked.

By coordinating policies and activities of Member States, the European Union confers a particular interest to the mechanism which facilitates the mutual relations between European citizens. Such a mechanism is rebuilding practices related to European citizenship and how access rights and goods is outlined. These practices are formulated as a "dichotomy" nation-state - the EU and involves the introduction of a new type of actors in the defense of fundamental individual rights in a European context. European identity is a precondition of how citizens assume a state of solidarity to foster positive integration. European membership as a form of integration, thus contributing to a social union within and between democratic European societies.

One of the strongest identities, both individual and group or community level, remains national identity. Data that identifies members of a national community with the nation define a set of similarities of interests, beliefs or rules of life, shared by all persons belonging to that group. Identity can become stereotyped in everyday speech, although national identity have difficulty conceptualizing (Stefanescu &Velicu, 2006, pp. 16-17). National identity expresses attitudes, mentalities and behaviors of individuals belonging to the collective results of a national state. Modernist and postmodernist doctrines put into question the appropriateness of the national state, on the premise of national or local integration in supranational structures such as, for example, the European Union.

National identity lies as a matter of utmost relevance in countries integrated for decades in all structures of the European Union, the fundamental process of rethinking the current europeanized society. National identities will be redefined through a complex process of renegotiating the place of national cultures in the global identity. "Ethnicity and globalization do not exclude each other, on the contrary, are complementary processes of the contemporary world" (Schifirneț, 2009).

How wrote, a century ago, C. Radulescu-Motru, national identity proved its actuality both through its own concept - politicianism, explaining processes in countries that have recently joined the modernization, and by applying logical postulate of identity in society study. This postulate illustrates the identical meaning of concepts, which should be reflected in replacing old habits and practices, instinctive religious beliefs, with the trust in dialogue

and reasoning. Western peoples identity result from the consciousness control of social relations, previously covered by customs, traditions and superstitions. In the West acts "a social identity cooperation, based on spiritual skills: political and moral, scientific and artistic creations are the work of a thread of continuity. The sense of responsibility is rooted in the soul of every citizen. Citizen deliberating on state affairs, because there deliberation is possible and fruitful" (Radulescu-Motru, 1904, p. 128). Motru asserts the identity of skills and not the identity of terms.

Instead, the emerging European identity is based on shared consciousness of belonging to a political and economic space defined by capitalism, social welfare, democracy, rule of law and human rights. They are the pillars of a European identity built through cultural policies by applying Community law and the work of the European Court of Justice case law and by the wider political culture shared by all EU members.

From the history of the creation of nation states know that political identity requires two essential elements: awareness of citizens to belong to the same political structure, which has the power to make decisions for their lives, and the identification of these citizens with a common political project. European identity is a political category, not a cultural category. "What the EU is currently lacking is a sufficient level of identification of its citizens with the EU, seen as a system of organization to which they belong and whose members are" (Schifirneţ, 2009).

We can not comment adequate ratio between the European and national identity without involving in question Jurgen Habermas. In his last works - just remember*: Between Facts and Norms, The Inclusion of the Other, Post-National Estate, The Divided West and Europe, The Faltering Project* - theme through Habermas analyzes the possibility of democratic politics beyond the nation state.

Nowadays, even in developed countries, sovereignty can only be maintained in a particular form. The state is the citizens' sovereign people acting collectively and possess the monopoly of legitimate violence but at the same time, the European Union and other international organizations usually follows decisions together. As the Éva Biró-Kaszás, Habermas believes, however, that legitimacy can not be formulated as an analogy federal democratic states, in contrast to the Hoffa's universal federal state because the process is simultaneously individual and collective actors. For example, the UN Charta specifies that the basic principle is the equality of sovereign states, but also the United Nations Security Council has the right to meddle in state affairs, if this is required by human rights. "On this basis, we believe the global organization community» States and citizens ". Similarly, the Brussels Convention has submitted the draft European Constitution in the »name of states and citizens of Europe»" (Habermas, *The Divided West*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, p. 135, cited Éva Biró-Kaszás, 2011) . Habermas label their own conception as a "global domestic policy without universal government", and this requires a global society without center politically constructed, and the "global governance would remain for state institutions and procedures at levels that are above nations and at levels they traverse them" (Habermas, *The Divided West*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, p. 135, cited Éva Biró-Kaszás, 2011).

According to Habermas's model of discourse, post-national estate really can mean the transformation of the role the state level, and not just labeling a political tendencies, social:

"The learning faster to new channels and direct interests of" governance without government ", the faster they can change the traditional means of diplomatic pressure and military intervention to exercise" soft "power" (Habermas, *The Divided West*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, p. 176, cited Éva Biró-Kaszás, 2011). The daily experience of mutual dependence and debate of its regular international contact helps people to internalize the laws and the political awareness of belonging to a great community. Habermas believes that this is very important for the EU to succeed, because solidarity felt at this intermediate level, which crosses nations, can generate a larger scale solidarity. Moreover, universal society can not function without political built of this intermediate level. The forming of the European Union is considered by Habermas as a model for building universal society of citizens.

Moving, however, from political philosophy to reality immediate actuality, we can ask the question again in relation to what might lose national identity as a result of such political integration? It affects it, some political integration of national values?

European values are systematized invoked by forming an EU coding system comprising:

• internal rules of each state, human rights, conceived as an expression of the principle of subsidiarity;

• EU countries participating in the international system of human rights protection;

• specific tools developed within the EU. Extra-national center of gravity of the system resulting from the membership of all EU member states in the Council of Europe.

More specifically, there is an amount of tools which help EU implements integration of national identities in European identity, without seeking to make a first robbery. Agents that promote the process of Europeanization:

• Initiatives such as Erasmus and Socrates education that promotes student exchanges between Union countries, promoting trans-European friendship through cultural exchanges and freedom of movement;

• Structural Funds and common policies in agriculture have provided financial support for eligible projects and helped to build a cohesive economic profile of the Union;

• The European Union flag (with the twelve golden stars on a blue background) is now met all over the countries, from state institutions to projects financed by advertisements that marks the Structural Funds, and sights;

• EU anthem, "Ode to Joy" by Beethoven, a celebration of humanity as an entity united in diversity, the famous verse of Schiller's "Alle Menschen werden Brüder" ("all men are brothers"). Anthem is sung without lyrics because of the multitude of official languages;

• The standard format of the European passport, which is a marker of a formal affiliations;

• The introduction of a centralized statistical system by Eurobarometer and Eurostat;

• introduction of the Euro as unified currency;

• cultural cohesion programs such as "European Capital of Culture".

But in the context of globalization, new technology and consumerism, mass communications, are seen as a homogenizing force that undermines national identity. In such circumstances, the national idea and nationalism were forced to change, to evolve towards national imaginary, using as a benchmark Benedict Anderson and his "imagined

communities". How to define national imagined this space? What are its features? There are four levels to consider:

1. First, we have the "story" of a nation, which is formally transmitted (through educational curricula) and informally (through myths of traditions). Symbolic elements such as the classic nation-state institutions (see Parliament), currency, state religion (see the role of the church in Ireland, Italy, Spain, etc.), media (national traditional channels such as BBC) - are all essential ways of defining a national identity.
2. Secondly, we use symbols such as flags, national anthems, national sports, or other less formal, such as food.
3. Thirdly, and essential to our discourse, we have the idea of nation as territorialized geographical area with rich connotations.
4. Fourthly there is the idea of nation and "the Other". Note here that one of the strongest markers of identity of a nation is to define it by what it is not. Drawing mental or symbolic borders is as, if not stronger, than drawing state borders.

The dynamics of globalization thus creates some type of post-national scenario, where local identities are expressed while simultaneously interacting with supranational actors. Regionally, this trend translates into the coexistence of two levels of identity, namely the national and European (in this case), the latter being heavily supported at the political and social policies, programs developed by nationally or supranational. However, conclusions on a common European future are optimistic. The common will of European states can implement the tools to develop a European identity built around a common cultural background, historical past, intercultural communication in a framework in which to consider not only the goals but also points departure (represented by the set of values and attitudes that are found both at the individual and community level national).

Despite seniority political statements on European identity, sociological analysis of the identification of European citizens with European political entity does not materialize really only since the 2000s, with the introduction of the concept of identity in the polls. Analysts Eurobarometer used this concept to explain multidimensional support and integrate indicators (Belot, 2010) also aims to emphasize the subjective dimension of European construction.

On the other hand, sociological analysis of the meaning of European identity, thorough in the last decade through Eurobarometer, provides a clearer view of the evolution of multiple identities, the process of shaping the European identity among citizens, based on the summum of cultural experiences, social, legal, but also on the subjective perception of the European Union and the values promoted by it. So reports the European Commission enshrined the opinion of citizens on Europe include a part entitled European identity, aiming to keep track of the percentage of EU citizens who self-describes as Europeans. Trying to strengthen European identity, beyond the symbolic, meant both increasing the involvement of citizens in decision-making actively and more emphasis on their views through the Eurobarometer.

European Union seeks to provide a framework for understanding different European identity compared to specific nation-state. Although it is assumed that self-identification as a European sense of belonging comes directly from national, this does not mean that European

identity is constructed in the same manner as national identity but rather involves a convergence of national and European feelings, persistent identities National simultaneously with the development of a form of attachment to the European Union. Moreover, the identification with Europe involves maintaining strong links and complex national identification. This is particularly evident for the new Member States that joined the European Union, given that the process does not imply the adoption of a European identity already formed, but rather adding to each new Member State or elements of its national identity identity European (Schifirneţ, 2011a, p. 27).

In the context of accession negotiations lasted nearly 10 years, and Romania's joining of the European Union was achieved on January 1st, 2007, Romanians are satisfied that the accession process was completed legally and over 60% of them feel more secure due to the fact that Romania is a member of EU, according to Eurobarometer 67 (Spring 2007, p. 22). Instead, they are apprehensive regarding their future in the new "system". The only concrete that Romanians consider relevant for European integration impact on society and everyday life is visa-free travel to Europe (54% of Romanian considers this aspect, according to Eurobarometer 70, Autumn 2008). But over time, Romanians were forced to accept that the freedom of movement within the European Union involves building another image on national identity and hence European identity.

Assuming the Romanian European identity is a work in dynamic and Romanians attitudes and opinions about Europe are studied by Eurobarometer surveys in general, but also within national research. Although Europeans became "legally wrong", the Romanians see themselves more as members of a national state as European citizens, especially in the first years after accession. According to a research on identity in Sibiu, conducted in 2007, Romanians identify themselves first of all as Romanian (Dragoman, 2008). Only 4% of respondents said they have a European identity compared to 33.6% who identify with the national level. Romanians can not yet perceive a European identity, as a result of joining the European Union that would limit national sovereignty (p. 74) .While, awareness of belonging to the European community was consolidated among Romanian citizens, a fact revealed by the data Eurobarometer 71.3 (Spring 2009, p. 7), from which it follows that in mind Romanians European identity seems to reproduce it on the national essential elements: being born in Romania and Europe (49% versus 47%) to feel Romanian or European (38% versus 36%) and Romanian cultural traditions and European share (40% versus 33%).

Before the financial crisis to impact politically, economically and socially among Member States, European identity was considered a solution for legitimizing the European project in relation to various issues affecting the European Union. The economic crisis has put its mark on the views of European citizens but about the legitimacy of belonging to the European community, becoming less willing to assume part of this community. Therefore, the economic crisis has caused a certain extent and identity crisis, since economic prosperity, the main asset of European construction, remained only a promise for new member countries, at least in the short term. In these circumstances, some Europeans began to show some disorientation regarding the EU's future and its ability to bring welfare entities. The fact that the Union no longer perform was reflected in the inverse correlation between negative economic expectations and confidence of European citizens in the EU. Also during the

economic crisis decreased the percentage of citizens from countries that identify with the European Union, according to Eurobarometer. If in 2007, 42% of European respondents identified themselves only with the national state in 2010 this percentage increased to 46% (Eurobarometer 73, vol. 2, 2010, p. 113). As regards the Romanian, the percentage of people identifying themselves only with Romania was 50%, well above the European average (p.114.).

One possible explanation for the reluctance to taking Romanians European identity that binds their hopes or expectations on improving the social situation proved unrealistic. According to the study expectations and requirements for the European Union, more than half of Romanian (53.1%) say that their situation has worsened compared to the situation before Romania joined the EU in 2007 (Schifirneţ, 2011b, p. 74) . As such, the economic crisis led to a decreased availability of Romanians consider themselves Europeans, while the percentage of people who claim membership in the political community is a good thing for Romania decreased over time according to the Eurobarometer, 2007-2010 . Compared with 2007, when 71% of Romanian positively appreciated of membership of the European Union Eurobarometer data 72 (autumn 2009) show that the percentage of Romanians who believe this has dropped to 64%. Given this perception recorded before the economic crisis to make their presence felt by lowering the living standard Eurobarometer 73 (spring 2010) indicates that only 55% of Romanian claim that is a good thing that Romania is part of the Union European and national unuistudiu as of 2011, 46.3% of the Romanian May welcomes the inclusion of Romania in the European community (Schifirneţ, 2011b, p.76).

On the other hand, lower living conditions for transnational might create a sense of solidarity between European citizens affected by the crisis and thus to more European identity. This is because positive experiences and exigencies of Europeans living together with favorable conditions constitute European identity. Year 2012, at the European level, marked a return to hope that the road to prosperity will be resumed, and the global economic crisis will eventually find a solution. Against the backdrop vulnerabilities economic, social and political, mental occurred Europeans an identity reconfingurare at national and European level. The only European citizens identify with the national state drops to 38 percent in 2012, while increasing those who see themselves as having an identity "National and European '(41% in 2010, 46% in 2011 and 49% in 2012) (Eurobarometer 77, Spring 2012, p.24).

Although the economic and financial crisis has generated tension between national and European identity, the two types of identity continues to be associated in such circumstances because of shared European values such as rationalism, individualism and democracy. According to Eurobarometer 75 (spring 2011), more than half of Europeans (ie, 52 percent) believe that their country has benefited from membership of the European Union, while 40% say they have a positive image The European Union, an increase of two percentage points compared to the Eurobarometer 74 (Autumn 2010). As regards the Romanian them, 56% had positive views about the image of the European Union, a percentage well above the European average.

According to the study conducted in 2011 by C. Schifirneţ (which takes questions from Eurobarometer surveys in order to make comparisons), Romanians have different concerns to the European Union, but the loss of national identity and national culture, 42

percent, is only 6-7 places in the hierarchy resulting from the research (p. 83). This perception is confirmed by the answers given by the Romanian on the significance of the European Union: freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union, cultural diversity, democracy, the euro (50% of options exceeding answers). Loss of cultural identity gained far fewer percentages (32%), which shows that Romanians associate the EU with cuts in cultural and national symbols (p. 88). At European level, the risk of losing cultural identity is mentioned only 12 percent of EU citizens, according to Eurobarometer 75 (spring 2011).

National identity symbols (anthem, flag, borders, currency, common past etc.) influence the feeling of belonging to a nation, which is why the EU has tried to promote the symbols used by national states to trigger a European identity among its citizens the same purpose. But Eurobarometer data show that European identity is perceived by EU citizens more in comparison with evidence, such as social welfare and democratic rules, and less symbolic and emotional charge elements that underpin national identity. For Romanian as otherwise-for most Europeans, among the constituent elements of European identity are values such as democracy and freedom (37%, 10 percentage points less than the European average), the Euro (36%) and culture (26 %), slightly below the European average values, according to Eurobarometer 82.4 (2014).

National identity reconfigures globalization through multiculturalism, while European identity is in constant training and transformation since the company is developing and needs of citizens are becoming more and more complex. As such, economic and social transformations determined from the Community citizen to become aware of the problems arising from cohabitation to other Europeans, but also the benefits of European Union membership. Although the sense of attachment (Eurobarometer 79.5, 2013) is significantly more pronounced against their own country (91%) compared to the feeling of attachment to the EU (48%), we find that there is already a European identity, despite Eurobarometer reveals European citizens' identification with the nation-state first and second with European Union / Europe. While not equal intensity, national and European identities are compatible, co-exist and can be activated depending on the context in which the European citizens are.

As age increases in the Union, Romanians tend to become more pragmatic in assessing their status as European citizens, with their own way of relating to the European Union. According to Eurobarometer 79.5 (2013), the majority of respondents in Romania (43%) believe that their fellow citizens feel "more European" than 10 years ago, which shows that Romanians are increasingly willing to take on European identity that hope better for them and their country.

From our point of view, national and European identity interact in a complementary manner, and the economic, political and social dictates passing at some point in the foreground. Although, European identity is generally seen as a fragile construction, which is still in its infancy, institutional generated, data from Eurobarometer surveys attest that European citizens in general, and Romanians in particular, feel part of both communities.

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HYBRID WAR, OLIGARCHIC DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN ASPIRATIONS

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Abstract: Ukraine and Moldova have signed the Association Agreement with the EU and aim at EU Membership. However, they face big challenges: the hybrid war (in Donbas) and frozen conflict (in Transnistria), poverty and corruption, an oligarchic system in economy, politics and media. The Enlargement fatigue in the EU, the anti-immigration trend, the World economic crisis and the limited toolbox of the EU in Foreign Affairs impose restrictions to EU actions. EU should support in Ukraine and Moldova some smart policies of concrete achievements.

Keywords: ***EU, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, oligarchy, AA/DCFTA***

European aspirations, but external and internal challenges

Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldova have signed the Association Agreements/DCFTA with the EU (2014), started their partial implementation and aim at EU Membership. They have already market economies (even if not enough functional and not competitive) and democratic regimes (even if not at EU level). They can learn good lessons from the experience of the Central-European countries (like Poland and Romania) which became EU Member States. Poland and Romania also started as a post-communist State, signed Association Agreements with the EU, implemented reforms and joined the EU, in 2004 and 2007. Poland was more successful in implementing its reforms and policies and is maybe the most active New Member State in the EU. However, Ukraine and Moldova face bigger challenges than Poland and Romania in their transition and in their paths towards EU integration. Ukraine and Moldova are challenged by Russian pressure, including the hybrid war (in Donbas, but not only there) and the frozen conflict in Transnistria, lack of clear EU membership perspective, the oligarchic system in economy, politics and media, corruption and poverty, "homo sovieticus" mentalities in politics and in doing business, as a result of Soviet heritage. Thus, the implementation of a reforms agenda will be a long and complex process.

Russian pressure and hybrid war

Ukrainian and Moldovan reforms have a strong external enemy - Russia, a situation that spared the Central-European countries in the 1990s.[1] In the 1990s Russia was weaker and less aggressive than in 2013-2015. Russia is strictly against the EU and NATO membership of Ukraine and Moldova. More than that, in 2015 Russia develops its own Eurasian Union integration project, as geopolitical instruments of Kremlin's influence over ex-Soviet republics. Now Putin states that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation ("odin norod"), that "Russian World" covers many ex-Soviet republics, that Russia can develop its own relations

[1] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.

with BRICS and other players in the world outside Western influence and based on other values (like nationalism, paternalism, traditional family etc).[2]

What Russia wants is to re-establish its power in the world and hegemony in ex-Soviet area. Russia asks for equality with World Powers, but does not accept the equality in relation with the smaller countries in its neighbourhood. Russia claims that NATO Enlargement and EU Enlargement disrespected Russia's interest. **By saying that, Russia itself disrespects the interest of smaller countries which wanted to join NATO and EU.** What Putin wants is to generate in Russia a war-time attitude of the Russian society, in order to mobilise the society around him and consolidate his power.[3] Indeed in 2014-2015 Putin won a huge popularity, by presenting NATO and EU as a threat, the Ukrainian Government as a "fascist" one and by annexing Crimea to Russia (a land full of historical and identity symbolism).

The Eurasian Union has little to offer to Russia's neighbours, because the Russian economy is not enough modernised and competitive. But Russia is powerful and can badly punish its neighbours which would try to escape from its hegemony. Russia has a wide range of instruments to destabilise Ukraine and Republic of Moldova and disturb the process of transformation, such as gas prices, conflicts in Donbas and Transnistria, corruption, investing in its "own" political representatives (Renato Usatii, Plahotniuk etc), takeovers of strategically important companies, access to markets in the Eurasian Union (e.g. for Moldovan wine), possible restrictions to mobile workers from Ukraine and Moldova.

Russia is determined to keep Ukraine and Moldova vulnerable and dependent and to block their process of European integration. "A military conflict is rarely helpful in dealing with transformational challenges; rather, it serves as an excuse to keep things frozen and wait for better times". [4] The strategy of Russian President Vladimir Putin to wear out Ukraine through a low intensity war in Donbas is rational because it creates a good excuse for Kyiv to wait. Transnistria and Gagauzia problems are also used by Russia to block Moldova.

In the current context of Cold War II, Russia started again to use **hybrid warfare"** with modern technologies. The hybrid warfare includes several elements: cyber-attacks, the 5th column, special operations and intelligence forces (GRU and Spetnatz), media propaganda, isolating the enemy, paralysing the enemy (both psychologically and physically), pre-emptive depopulation, economic pressure, energy pressure, and artillery to achieve imperial goals.[5] The new Cold War is really hot in the Eastern Ukraine. However, the Russian Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Grushko stated that Russia is not involved in any hybrid war in Ukraine. By contrary, in his opinion **NATO and EU organise hybrid warfare against Russia:**

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[2] Costea, Maria, *The Crimean Crisis, National Identity and Territorial Integrity. Moscow's and Brussels' Arguments in 2014,* in vol. *Globalization and intercultural dialogue: multidisciplinary perspectives* (ed.: Iulian Boldea), Tîrgu-Mureş: Arhipelag XXI Press, 2014, p.330-338, http://www.upm.ro/gidni/?pag=GIDNI-01/vol01-Pol . Putin views: „odin norod", „Russian World" etc in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxTLkCl6fBA

[3] *Speeches at the conference:* "25 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Security Challenges in a New World Order and Strategic Insights from the Cold War", organised by *The German Marshall Fund of the United States* on Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at Residence Palace, Rue de la Loi 155, Brussels.

[4] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.

[5] *Speeches at the conference:* "25 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Security Challenges in a New World Order and Strategic Insights from the Cold War", organised by *The German Marshall Fund of the United States* on Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at Residence Palace, Rue de la Loi 155, Brussels. [See further info about "the hybrid warfare" on http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/Russia-Ukraine-crisis-war/EN/index.htm and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvZ0Q9ZonFg]

economic sanctions, Western propaganda and war readiness exercise in Baltic States etc. Grushko stated that Minsk Agreements should be implemented, but Ukraine does not implement them; Kiev does not withdraw its heavy weapons from Donbas. [6]

The events in Ukraine crises put in a new light **the utility of NATO Enlargement and EU Enlargement.** NATO and EU have ensured and will ensure the stability and the prosperity of the European continent. It was the political will of Central European States (including Poland and Romania) to join NATO and EU. Those States were right, anticipating that Russia will come back and will threat them. Other European countries have the same right to join NATO and EU. The European countries need strategic insurance, not only art 5 of NATO Treaty. [7]

The EU was shocked to see that Russia is not only a trade partner, but an aggressive geopolitical actor. As the Russian economy is not enough modernised or competitive, the main exports of Russia are energy and weapons. [8]

The war is bad for business in Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Ukraine's economy is very negatively affected by this hybrid war and risks to collapse before any big decline of Russian economy. The West is in economic crises and does not want to pay too much for Ukraine. The risk of social explosion and political crisis is huge in Ukraine. In such a situation it is difficult to implement the EU standards envisaged by the AA/DCFTA. Ukraine needs peace and stability first.

No EU membership clear perspective

Unfortunately, in 2015 Ukraine and Moldova have no clear EU Membership perspective. EU does not define Ukraine and Moldova as Enlargement countries, but as ENP countries. The EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova Association Agreements are useful and strong frameworks, but they do not offer the reward of EU Membership for Kiev's and Chisinau's pro-European efforts and sacrifices. Without an EU perspective, there is not enough reward for reforms. That is a big problem, and many pro-EU persons are disappointed in these countries. Their aim should be to develop their countries at EU standards with associated membership status, knowing that they could be EU MS when their countries will be prepared and when the EU will be prepared. Georgia is in exactly the same situation as Ukraine and Moldova from this point of view. Poland's and Romania's mobilisation to implement the reforms were driven to a large extent by the clear perspective to join the EU and NATO. [9] The EU and NATO were seen as strong, prosperous and prestigious organisations by majority of the Polish and Romanian citizens, as by the citizens of all Central-European countries. NATO is not so popular in Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and other ex-Soviet republics, because of the long-time repeated Soviet and Russian propaganda. The idea of achieving EU Membership is popular among many Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian citizens. But this

[6] Speeches at the conference: *Europe's Security Order – De-Construction or Re-Construction?* The event was organised by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, on Tuesday, 31 March 2015, at the Goethe Institute, Rue Belliard 58, 1040 Brussels.
[7] *Speeches at the conference:* "25 Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Security Challenges in a New World Order and Strategic Insights from the Cold War", organised by *The German Marshall Fund of the United States* on Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at Residence Palace, Rue de la Loi 155, Brussels.
[8] Ibidem.
[9] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.

idea is not popular in Western EU Member States, where the EU Enlargement fatigue and anti-immigration trend are obvious. Now EU is under the pressure of the World economic crisis, which triggered the disappointment of the citizens, anti-immigration trends, pressure of Eurosceptic movements and Enlargement fatigue in the EU Member States. The Enlargement fatigue reflected in the political positions of the EU Member States imposes restrictions to EU actions. Such restrictions are imposed also by the limited toolbox of the EU in Foreign Affairs, which was emphasised during the current conflict in Donbas. The EU prepares a new ENP, a new Foreign Policy Strategy[10], a new Trade Strategy, but their effectiveness will depend on the political will of different EU Member States.

Oligarchic capitalism and oligarchic democracy

Several EU officials and experts stated that after Euro-Maidan, Poland in particular constitutes a good pattern for Kyiv's reforms. In 1991, Poland and Ukraine started their transformations from a roughly similar development level.[11] They had had a similar GDP per head in 1991. Now Polish GDP per head is three times higher than in Ukraine.[12] Moldova followed an experience largely similar to those of Ukraine. According to Eurostat, in 2013 GDP per capita in EU-28 (25700 Euros per inhabitant), which was 9 times higher than in Ukraine (3014 Euros per inhabitant) and 15 times higher than in Moldova (1686 Euros per inhabitant).[13]

Ukraine and Moldova tried to implement reforms, like Poland and Romania did. The results were terrible in Ukraine and Moldova: hyperinflation, contraction of production, unemployment, poverty. Poland and Romania went through that as well. But the state institutions in Poland were deeply reformed, there was a strong civil society to help make that transition, and Poland kept the distance between politicians and business. That never happened in Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, where **"the state has been captured by the oligarchic interests".** [14]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the new rich clans appeared (often originated in old nomenklatura), captured the economy and developed their economic and political power, becoming oligarchs. These oligarchs invested in political parties and media. In this legal way they have bought political legitimisation, and in fact have "captured" the Ukrainian and Moldovan states, central, regional and local administration, companies, parts of the media and

[10] EC, *Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU launches a consultation on the future of its relations with neighbouring countries,* Brussels, 04 March 2015, **http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4548_en.htm**

[11] Judy Dempsey, *The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy,* Carnegie, Brussels, April 16, 2015.

[12] Johannes Hahn, *How to help Ukraine's Economy Reform and Grow,* Speech at Bertelsmann Stiftung event, Brussels, 15 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4786_en.htm . Judy Dempsey, *The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy,* Carnegie, April 16, 2015. The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report,* Vienna, April 2015. http://wiiw.ac.at/wiiw-study-analyses-economic-support-and-reform-agenda-for-ukraine-n-85.html. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is long respected for its analysis of Europe's Eastern neighbours. This report inter alia rejects the notion that Poland's shock therapy reforms of the early 1990s, which helped consolidate that country's post-Communist transition, could be applied to the Ukraine of today.

[13] Eurostat, *ENP East countries. Key economic statistics,* 2014 edition, Bruxelles. These figures are based on current price euro series and as such do not reflect any difference in price levels between countries.

[14] Camil Kalus, An appropriated state? Moldova's uncertain prospects for modernisation, OSW, 2015. Judy Dempsey, *The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy,* Carnegie, April 16, 2015. The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report,* Vienna, April 2015.

some political parties (or regional organisations of parties). The oligarchs' powers are based on quasi-feudal relations in the country's regions, with "friendly" officials and businessmen involved. "The conduct of the state's economic policy has been *directly* controlled by the business 'moguls' whose fortunes derive, primarily, from shameless—and unpunished—looting of public assets, extortion of huge underserved subsides, etc." [15] The economy declined and the poverty extended in large parts of the population. The oligarchs are not interested in the rule of law, in fight against corruption, in fair competition. At a smaller scale this phenomenon of oligarchs (called "moguls" and "local barons") was partially present also in Romania in the "transition" period.

After 1989 Romania and Poland had an easier situation, because they faced the ruins of communist institutions and a sentiment of no-return to the old regime has started to dominate the public opinion. Ukraine and Republic of Moldova face bad capitalism in an oligarchic system that corresponds well to both the pre-modern past of the manor economy and authoritarian-paternalist *homo-sovieticus system*, which left a much stronger mark there than in Poland or Romania. [16]

In Poland a "shock therapy" was implemented in the transition towards democracy, market-economy and euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine's and Moldova's citizens suffered two decades of "shock without the therapy", when the oligarchic system developed. Many citizens are scared by the social cost of liberal reforms and nostalgic about the stability of the communist time. [17]

Possible solutions for Dismantling Ukraine's and Moldova's Oligarchic systems

How can Ukraine and Moldova achieve even moderate success under such circumstances? Ukraine needs a way out of the severe crisis into which it has been pushed by the war and macroeconomic destabilisation. Kyiv needs the suspension of military conflict in Donbas (the so-called Minsk II agreement) to work. Even a frozen conflict (like in Transnistria) is relatively better than an active conflict. But any solution to the conflicts largely depends on Russia, Ukraine, USA and EU.

We should acknowledge that oligarchs will remain an important political and economic factor in Ukraine and Moldova for some time to come. "There is probably no other way around them than to offer them a "bold line" and give them a chance to become "good" oligarchs, accepting of the new rules of the game and engaging in the process of change. So, in principle it is the same method Poland applied towards the nomenklatura (apparatchiks)." [18]

However, a comprehensive strategy against oligarchic capitalism is needed in Ukraine and Moldova. Its constitutive element is the fight against corruption and an efficient, independent judiciary. So far, the popular Corruption Perception Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International places Ukraine 142nd out of 175 states in the World. Moldova is

[15] Judy Dempsey, *The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy,* Carnegie, April 16, 2015. The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report*, Vienna, April 2015.
[16] Sebastian Plociennik, Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition? in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.
[17] Ibidem.
[18] Sebastian Plociennik, Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition? in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.

in the same area. This indicates how much is left to be done. [19] Several spectacular measures were taken in Ukraine (including tele-justice and arresting of some high officials during a government meeting and removing of an oligarch (Kolomoisky) from Naftogaz and from position of governor of Dnepropetrovsk Region (in March 2015). However, anticorruption policy should be systematic and perseverant, avoiding selective justice and avoiding using justice in political fight.

Another element in this fight should be the development of a business-friendly policy in Ukraine and Moldova, openness to foreign companies and new local businesses, particularly medium-sized firms. Their expansion could help disperse the power of the oligarchs and speed up the democratisation of governance. Transparent rules should make easier the competition easier for newcomers against well-entrenched oligarchic conglomerates. [20]

Ukraine and Moldova should put together a **coherent package to attract foreign direct investment** and by setting up **business and industrial parks** with clear ownership rights, good infrastructure as well as the **support of the competent local/regional administration**. They need to develop a **long-term modernisation strategy** including an **industrial policy** to improve competitiveness and restructure sectors.[21]

This business-friendly approach must be complemented by a social aspect: a strong policy against income inequality. [22]This should be a lesson learnt from Poland's and Romania's transitions. Even the Vienna Institute criticises now the insufficient social protection of the citizens in Central-Europe. The impact of IMF inspired policies on ordinary Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens should be carefully considered so as **not to erode the necessary reform support**.[23] The governments of Ukraine (and Moldova to a lesser extent) adopted large price increases for gas, heating and electricity. The risk of social explosion is huge in Ukraine and will fuel government crisis.[24]

Problems to be solved in doing business

According to new analysis by the EBRD in partnership with World Bank (BEEPS V), published in 2015, the top three business environment obstacles identified by Ukrainian firms were political instability (because of uncertainty in relation with Russia and the EU); corruption; and competitors' practices in the informal sector[25]. Large firms, young firms and manufacturing firms were more concerned about access to finance than the practices of informal sector competitors. In BEEPS IV, tax administration was in third place. Closely tied to politics, **corruption** also remained a major issue. The informal payments that firms reported paying to secure government contracts drastically increased from 3.8% to 14.2% of

[19] Ibidem.
[20] Ibidem.
[21] The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report,* Vienna, April 2015,
[22] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.
[23] The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report,* Vienna, April 2015, http://wiiw.ac.at/wiiw-study-analyses-economic-support-and-reform-agenda-for-ukraine-n-85.html.
[24] Content Consulting, *Ukraine is moving to Social Explosion,* April 19, 2015.
[25] EBRD&World Bank, *The business environment in the transition region,* 2015 http://ebrd-beeps.com/reports/

contract value. Overall, firms had to pay on average 5.0% of their annual revenue as informal gifts to public officials "to get things done" – by far the largest payment among the covered countries. [26]

The business environment in Republic of Moldova also identified corruption and political instability (due to the fragility of the Government coalitions since April 2009, preventing the country from passing judicial reforms as big challenges), and workforce skills. [27] Large firms also felt constrained by electricity issues, while young firms placed labour regulations among the biggest obstacles. In BEEPS IV, the three major constraints were access to land; workforce skills; and access to finance. [28] Since BEEPS IV the severity of **corruption** for Moldovan firms has significantly increased, moving from eighth place in BEEPS IV to first place in BEEPS V. Moldovan firms were much more likely to report that an informal payment was expected than an average firm in eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. Lack of skilled workers is a point of concern for firms, because "nearly 285,000 of Moldovan migrants live in Russia (about 8% of the total population), 170,000 in Ukraine and 90,000 in Italy". [29]

EU possible step by step Strategy: quick rewards for quick reforms

Ukraine and Moldova will not be able to go through the transformation without external support, both in dealing with Russia and in implementation of the reforms. Meaningful support should involve a credible political strategy, which should better define the status of associated membership to the EU and give it obvious substance. EU should continue to acknowledge the European choice of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

No symbolic political statements about EU membership are needed, but concrete achievements on the field to bring Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia closer to EU standards, including the standard of life. We can agree with PISM expert that on an operational level this means **implementing a variety of projects in Ukraine and Moldova that require quick reforms but which are combined with quick rewards in the form of financial assistance and access to EU benefits.** This is actually a silent, technocratic extension of the association agreements areas of energy, transport, agriculture and education. [30]

The financial and material assistance of the EU and IFIs for Ukraine and Moldova should be strongly **tied to the progress on dismantling the oligarchic interests**. This will require **legal system reforms**, the severance of **relationships between business and politics**, proper taxation of oligarchic assets and confiscation of illegally amassed wealth.[31] In our opinion, the EU institutions should promote manage the projects, not the Ukrainian and Moldovan corrupt authorities. The EU will use the existing instruments, which will be flexibilised in the new ENP and will collaborate with IFIs and possible donors. Such a

[26] Ibidem.
[27] Ibidem.
[28] EBRD&World Bank, *The business environment in the transition region*, 2015 http://ebrd-beeps.com/reports/
[29] Ibidem.
[30] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.
[31] The Vienna Institute for Economic Studies, *How to stabilise the economy of Ukraine. Final Report*, Vienna, April 2015.

strategic financing and planning could be called "Marshall Plan" only metaphorically. "A Marshall Plan for Ukraine" is proposed by the Vienna Institute. [32]

Vienna Institute also proposes to "f**orgive a large part of Ukraine's external debt** and allow the Ukrainian National Bank enough foreign exchange reserves to move to a more stable exchange rate regime". ***33*** However, in our view, the external creditors of Ukraine would refuse such a request/suggestion, as happed in the case of Tsipras government in 2015.
Vienna Institute suggests "a **delay of the full implementation of the DCFTA** and hence temporarily shield the fragile domestic market from the EU import competition, while still maintaining free-market access to the EU and the CISFTA, as currently arranged." [34] Actually the EU refused such a delay demanded by Yanukovych in 2013 (under the Russian pressure), but accepted it when it was demanded by Yatsenyuk Government in 2014, under an increased Russian pressure (in the context of Russian hybrid war in Donbas). The President Juncker stated that the implementation of DCFTA will start by the end of 2015. Vienna Institute also proposes that "l**onger transition periods as regards approximation to the EU regulations** should be negotiated in order to ensure orderly adjustment to a more competitive market environment". ***35***

Apart from fostering EU integration, Vienna Institute suggests to Ukraine to "**restore, as much as possible, trade relations with Russia** and the Russian-led **Eurasian Economic Union** (EAEU) via **trilateral negotiations"** [36]. The Commissioner Hahn is right when he very clearly answer to this suggestion: "The Association Agreement, along with its trade part, with the European Union leaves Ukraine free to determine its own trade policy. Ukraine already has preferential trade relations with the members of the Eurasian Economic Union within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area. These are perfectly compatible with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and there is no reason why they should not be maintained.So, the EU-Ukraine bilateral DCFTA does not impose a false choice on Kiev." [37] We can add that this statement is true also for Moldova and Georgia.
Regarding the suggestion of "trilateral negotiations" (EU-Ukraine-Russia), the idea was clearly proposed by Yanukovych in 2013, under Russian pressure, but refused by the EU. In 2015, under an increased Russian pressure (including the hybrid war), the EU really pursues such trilateral negotiations. A round of trilateral trade talks with Ukraine and Russia took place in Brussels on 20 and 21 April. However, Russia should not have a veto right over EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova relations and that is essential. Anyway, the legitimate trade concerns of Russia should be discussed and taken on board.

However, if Ukraine or Moldova were to join any customs union, this would not be compatible with concluding a bilateral DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine or with EU-

[32] Judy Dempsey, The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy, Carnegie, April 16, 2015.

[33]Ibidem.

[34] Ibidem.

[35] Judy Dempsey, The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy, Carnegie, April 16, 2015.

[36] Ibidem.

[37] Johannes Hahn, *How to help Ukraine's Economy Reform and Grow,* Speech at Bertelsmann Stiftung event, Brussels, 15 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4786_en.htm

Moldova DCFTA. A customs union (like the Eurasian one) has a common external trade policy (for example a common external tariff) and an individual member country can no longer have a sovereign control over its external trade policies.

Conclusions

There is a long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic system.[38] It is going to require an enormous political and economic EU commitment to turn Ukraine around. And it is going to take a long, long time. It will be a longer process than in the case of the EU members Bulgaria and Romania. In Ukraine and Moldova, the pro-European civil society does everything possible to keep justice reform, transparency and the fight against corruption at the top of the political agenda. That was the case in Romania and Poland. Without the rule of law and a strong civil society, sustainable political and economic reforms are not possible. That is an important lesson emphasized by Carnegie's expert Judy Dempsey. [39]

The EU should be involved, because what can be lost is stability in Central Europe. The EU still needs a ring of friends and not a ring of fire. An unreformed Ukraine and Moldova may turn into failed states, exporting conflicts and millions of refugees to the European Union. The EU Member States should learn from the lesson of the ex-Yugoslavia of the 1990s. Even more, the threat of expansion of Kremlin's hegemony and of its hybrid war should be contained. Finally, a successful Ukraine and Moldova with democracy and a prosperous free market economy would pose a direct challenge to Putin's "managed democracy," with a potentially contagious effect.[40]

The EU should promote a smart power policy in the ex-soviet area to deal with the huge challenges there. Not symbolic promises, but concrete achievement on the field are needed. The EU should diversify its list of partners in those countries, including more stakeholders and targeting the citizens. The aim of Ukrainians and Moldovans should be to develop their countries at EU standards with associated membership status, knowing that they could be EU MS when their countries will be prepared and when the EU will be prepared.

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[38] Judy Dempsey, The Long Road to Dismantling Ukraine's Oligarchic Democracy, Carnegie, April 16, 2015.

[39] Ibidem.

[40] Sebastian Plociennik, *Can Ukraine mimic Poland's transition?* in PISM, no 5 (107), March 2015.

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ACQUIRING ROMANIAN CITIZENSHIP – WAY TO ACQUIRING EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

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Abstract: On the belief that the citizenship is the legal and political bond between the man and the state, this study comes to develop this concept beyond the conventional borders, towards the notion of supranational or transnational citizenship. The analysis addresses the historical evolution of the legislation on Romanian and European citizenship, the means by which the citizenship of Romania and subsequently of the EU may be acquired, as well as the legal effects deriving from this status. The conditions and procedures by which a foreign, non-Community citizen becomes an EU citizen are even more important as the European law does not stipulate an own system of granting citizenship, the status of EU citizen deriving automatically from the citizenship of a Member State.
The European citizenship does not replace in any way the national citizenship but rather adds to it, through a system of rules and rights completing the conceptual framework outlined by the national level. As a consequence, the status of European citizen involves both the national rights and an additional set of rights, from the range of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and stand in the local and European Parliament elections, the right to good administration, the right of access to documents, the European Ombudsman, the freedom of movement and residence and the diplomatic and consular protection.

Keywords: ***European Union, citizenship, integration, globalization, procedures.***

The concept of citizenship

In order to perform an analysis on the Romanian or European citizenship institution, the concept of citizenship must first be defined. According to some authors, the citizenship is a contract comprising a set of reciprocal rights and duties between the citizen and the state[1], whereas for others the citizenship is the political and legal bond between the individual and the collectively organized state, regarded as an organic integration within the community[2]. Undoubtedly, the citizenship is a fundamental right of the individual, from which civil and constitutional rights and obligations arise. In the light of the classical doctrine of statehood, the state, as entity, through bureaucracy, protects its citizens in various forms, which are reflected in the legal sphere as the relationship between identity on the one hand (especially with regard to the relationship between nationals and foreigners), borders, and the operating frame of the bureaucracy, namely the rule of law, ensuring the conceptual and operational frameworks of this relationship.[3]

[1]Constantin Iordachi (coord.), *Reacquiring the Romanian Citizenship: Historical, Comparative and Applied Perspectives* (bilingual edition), Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2012, p. 20.
[2]Gheorghe Iancu, *Constitutional Law and Political Institutions*, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2004, p. 83.
[3] Elspeth Guild, *EU Citizenship and Migration Law*, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 1-2, *apud* https://books.google.ro/books?id=DjBCjC_2yIYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=european+citizenship&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=223UVPysBIXuUPWIgMAB&ved=0CFEQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=european%20citizenship&f=false, on 4.02.2015.

The historical evolution, from the right to be a citizen of a certain category of persons to the current provisions on national and transnational citizenship, as in the case of the European citizenship, saw major transformations in the field of the rights of the individuals. *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* adopted on 26 August 1789 records the debut of the modern democratic system in which, at least declaratively, *equality* between citizens, *freedom* of movement and expression, as well as *brotherhood* are the elements which make the society function.[4]

Despite the fact that the idea of citizenship is intensely debated, especially in the light of its social implications, it clearly defines the status of the individuals which are or are not members of a society. This shows a focus in relation to the idea of equality, which is why citizenship involves the acquisition of this notion in the light of reporting its purpose to the range of civil, political and social rights. For example, the mentioned rights represent traditional components of the *state of welfare,* the simple identification with them developing a sense of belonging to the state.[5]

In terms of historical course, the concept of 'European citizenship' is not new. The idea of establishing a new type of citizenship is an aspiration taking shape since June 1940, when Charles de Gaulle, Winston Churchill and Jean Monett viewed this conceptual framework in the context of the Franco-British Union. However, *de facto,* the European citizenship as we understand it today is a recent concept, legally consecrated within the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.[6] The phrase 'European citizenship' did not exist in this form from the beginning. A first approach referred to the notion of 'Europe of citizens', term which gradually evolved and substantiated. A first step was the approach of the Adoninno Committee established under the auspices of the Council of Fontainbleau in 1984, an occasion which gave rise to a perspective pursuing 'humanizing the communitarian experience'.[7]

The timeliness of the concept, as well as the contemporary discourse on the idea of citizenship, especially the European citizenship, reflect the numerous changes in direction and, thus, evolution, of a Europe challenging its resources towards a much more democratized facet, in which the participation of citizens looms large, this being considered the key mechanism of functioning of the concept of 'European citizenship'.[8]

The Romanian citizenship

[4]Andrei Tinu, Cătălin Boboc, *Introduction to the evolution of Romanian citizenship legislation,* in the International Conference *Law between modernization and tradition:implications for the legal, political, administrative and public organization,* Bucharest, 21-23 April 2015, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 434-435, ISBN 978-606-27-0222-9.

[5] J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988, in Percy B. Lehning, *European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity*, Working Paper Series in European Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, University of Wisconsin, p. 5, *apud* http://spanport.lss.wisc.edu/sites/uw-madison-ces.org/files/lehning.pdf, on 04.02.2015.

[6] Cristina Vintilescu, *European citizenship between past and future*, in 'Sfera Politicii', no. 116-117, *apud* http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/116-117/art6-vintilescu.html, on 04.02.2015.

[7]*Ibidem.*

[8]Ditta Dolejšiová, *Introduction: Europe, citizenship and young people*, în *European Citizenship in The Process of Construction*, Council of Europe, June 2009, p. 10, *apud* https://books.google.ro/books?id=tpMueuYB_eMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=european+citizenship&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=mWLTVOSECIn6UIjVg9AF&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=european%20citizenship&f=false, on 04.02.2015.

In Romania, the law on citizenship originates in a constitutional text referring to the right to naturalization of foreigners and the conditions to be met by the latter to become Romanians, text included in the Constitution of 1866[9]. Subsequent to this initial moment, the law on citizenship underwent numerous changes, all of them being strictly related to the historical evolution of Romanian society as a whole. 149 later from that originating moment, the Romanian citizenship are regulated by Law no. 21 of 1991. It stipulates that the Romanian citizenship is the bond and belonging of a natural person to the Romanian state, that Romanian citizens enjoy the protection of the Romanian state and that they are equal before the law.

After Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007, to speak only about the Romanian citizenship became not only inappropriate, but also incorrect, as at that turning point in the recent history of our country all the Romanian citizens became European citizens. Today, the Romanian citizenship became, for many, a tool for access to the Western world.

The means of obtaining the Romanian and hence the European citizenship are: by birth, adoption or upon request. For the first two situations, the things are simple: the acquisition by birth, as a direct effect of the legal principle originating in philosophy *jus sanguinis*, means that the individual born from at least one Romanian parent, irrespective of the place of birth, is a Romanian citizen, and the acquisition by adoption, foreign or stateless child acquires the Romanian citizenship by adoption, if the adopters are Romanian citizens or, where only one of the adopters is a Romanian citizen, the citizenship of the adopted minor shall be jointly decided by the adopters. Depending on the age of the adopted, his or her consent may be needed, as appropriate[10].

The foreign persons who do not fall under the two situations described above may obtain the Romanian citizenship if they meet certain conditions stipulated by the Romanian Citizenship Law. In order to obtain this right, the applicant must be born and reside, upon the date of application, in Romania or, although not born on this territory, legally residing in Romania for at least 8 years or, if married and living with a Romanian citizen, for at least 5 years from the date of marriage[11]; proves loyalty to the Romanian state by actions and behavior, does not initiate or support actions against the rule of law or national security and declares to never have performed such actions; has reached the age of 18; has legal means for a decent living secured in Romania, under the law regarding foreigners; is known for good conduct and has never been convicted in the country or abroad for a crime making him unworthy of being a Romanian citizen; knows the Romanian language and has elementary Romanian culture and civilization notions, sufficiently to integrate into society; knows the provisions of the Romanian Constitution and the national anthem.[12]

After filing the application for Romanian citizenship, accompanied by supporting documents, the President of the Citizenship Commission sets the term to which the necessary conditions for granting the Romanian citizenship shall be verified and also orders the request

[9]*Constitution of July 1, 1866.* Official Gazette 142, electronic format provided by LEX EXPERT.
[10]Art. 5 and art. 6 of *Romanian Citizenship Law no. 21 of March 1, 1991*.
[11]These periods may be reduced by half if the applicant is an internationally recognized personality or is the citizen of a EU Member State, or the applicant has acquired the refugee status according to the law in force or has invested in Romania amounts exceeding 1,000,000 euro.
[12]Art. 8 of *Romanian Citizenship Law no. 21 of March 1, 1991*.

of data from the partner institutions to verify the conditions of 'good behavior'[13]. If the applicant meets all the conditions, he or she is scheduled to an interview where the Romanian language skills, knowledge on the Romanian culture and civilization, legislation and national anthem are tested. The aspirant to the Romanian citizenship is checked on basic knowledge of history and geography of Romania, constitutional law and also rules of coexistence in the Romanian society and European values.

Shall the applicant be declared admitted to the interview, based on the approval of the Commission, the President of the National Citizenship Authority issues the order of granting the Romanian citizenship, following that, within 3 months from the date of notification of this order, he or she will take the oath of allegiance to Romania. Basically, this is the moment when a foreigner acquires the Romanian citizenship and along with it, the European one. Of course, that is, if he or she is not a citizen of an EU Member State.

The European citizenship

The first regulation on the EU citizenship was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. Thus, Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Treaty stipulates the idea of establishing a citizenship of the Union[14], this perspective being completed by the fact that *'an EU citizen is any person holding the nationality of a Member State'*[15]. Five years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam reconfigures the concept adding, in terms of its content, the fact that *'the EU citizenship complements and shall not replace the national citizenship'*[16], the Member States observing the fundamental rights and democratic values as laid down in the domestic fundamental regulations, as well as in the international legal regulations, respectively conventions to which they are party: European Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter, etc.[17]

Therefore, the European citizenship can be seen through a bivalent perspective so that, in terms of the status of rights, it contributes to shaping and observing the conceptual framework provided by the European Union, which is basically a community of law, an entity of political nature whose interests are unequivocally placed in the social-economic area.

However, in another vision, the concept offered for analysis may be viewed as a political institution, being *'the expression of all political or intergovernmental negotiation processes, interpretations, community impulses and social mobilization"*[18]. Equally, the legal institution shall designate, by extension, a group of legal norms with a common regulatory object, so that the concept basically reflects the permanent legal bond between a natural person and a state or a Union, such as the European citizenship, as appropriate. This bond, understood both as a political and legal binder, is expressed through the sum of mutual rights and obligations between a person and a state, pre-existing or formed, having a special

[13] `The condition of good behavior' is a generic name for the conditions stipulated within art. 8 let. b and let. e of Romanian Citizenship Law.
[14] *The Treaty of Maastricht*, *apud* http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf, on 04.02.2015.
[15] Ioana Nely Militaru, *The EU Citizenship under the Treaty of Lisbon* in The Legal Tribune, Vol. I, No. 1, June 2011, pp. 3-4, *apud* http://www.tribunajuridica.eu/arhiva/An1v1/nr1/art%204.pdf, on 04.02.2015.
[16] *The Treaty of Amsterdam*, point 9, p. 27, *apud* http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf, on 04.02.2015.
[17] Ioana Nely Militaru, *op.cit.*, f.p.
[18] Cristina VINTILESCU, *op. cit.*, f.p.

character, reflected in the encumbrance of the person with such prerogatives, irrespective of the space factor.[19]

Therefore, as stated in the doctrine, it is difficult to outline a profile of the European citizenship in terms of exact coordinates, which is generated by the evolving nature defining the structure, placing it in a dynamic which allows a continuous transformation. This format of the European citizenship appears as a hybrid, given the atypical nature, encompassing both the prerogatives granted by *jus sanguinis* and the civil ones, but does not relate to these in an exclusive manner, which shows its own particularity. As for the explicit regulation of the concept, the Treaty of the European Union states, as mentioned above, the existence *de facto* as well as the prerogatives of the European citizenship within art. 17, so that the first differentiation in the relationship between the domestic and European citizenship occurs. This approach is grounded on the fact that, basically, the European Union shows legal personality, which raises a question on the existence of a *de facto* citizenship, given that it is grounded on a pre-existing legal basis.[20]

We are therefore dealing with a first argument on the differentiation needed between the concept of 'European citizenship' and the traditional concept on the domestic citizenship. A first step in the creation of this statement concerns the manner of granting the European citizenship, manner distinct from the one existing on national level. Thus, the first occurs within the Member States in the absence of a predetermined agreement or collusion of those targeted, the special prerogative of this construction having a political purpose, namely to reduce the democratic deficit and establish a European identity.[21] The European Union does not exclusively hold the prerogative of granting citizenship, the nationality issue being left to the Member States, placing the status of citizenship in a relationship of dependence with the Member States. In relation to these allegations, Stephen Hall believes that the actual content of the Treaty of Maastricht expressly states that the landmark of nationality was excluded from the reserved area of the EU Member States. Equally, the Treaty of the European Union transposes these regulations according to the Community law, as well as in relation to the fundamental rights and freedoms.[22]

At the same time, under case law, in 1990, the case *Micheletti* exhaustively ruled that at that time, no concrete definition of the idea of Community citizenship, concept nowadays known as 'European citizenship'. This perspective was grounded on the fact that *'acquiring the European citizenship is placed in strict dependence to the member states, which act as a*

[19]Ioan Muraru, Elena Simina Tănăsescu, *Constitutional Law and Political Institution*, 14th Edition, Vol. I, C.H. Beck, 2011, p. 114.
[20]Kristīne Krūma, *EU citizenship: unresolved issues* in RGSL Working Papers, No. 22, Riga, 2004, p. 5, *apud* http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/images/stories/publications/RWP22Kruma.pdf, on 04.02.2015.
[21]*Ibidem*, p. 6.
[22] Stephen Hall, *Nationality, Migration Rules and Citizenship of the Union*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p.9, in Kristīne Krūma, *EU Citizenship, Nationality and Migrant Status*, *apud* https://books.google.ro/books?id=ffXXAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=Stephen+HALL,+Nationality,+Migration+Rules+and+Citizenship+of+the+Union&source=bl&ots=E3iI4lvE1c&sig=VAuugUKPFnFrTNA-emrcnzGM2ow&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=JpXUVNZpzKtTnOGA2AM&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Stephen%20HALL%2C%20Nationality%2C%20Migration%20Rules%20and%20Citizenship%20of%20the%20Union&f=false, on 04.02.2015.

guardian of the European citizenship, being the key decision factors in relation to who may be entitled to acquire the benefits of the transnational citizenship'[23].

As regards to the relationship between the domestic and the European citizenship, it must be mentioned that the status of European citizen involves both the rights normally conferred to the citizens of the Member States and an additional set comprising, according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, namely: the right to vote and stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament, the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections, the right to good administration, the right of access to documents, the European Ombudsman, the freedom of movement and residence and the diplomatic and consular protection.[24] In addition to this set of expressly regulated rights in the benefit of European citizens, in the virtue of the normative acts expressly stipulating them, it is necessary to mention that these are grounded on the principle of equality in rights, which is the prerogative of the entire European construction and a fundament of the applicability of the founding principles of the EU with regard to the individuals, as main exponent of the entire European community.

As the very Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states in its Foreword: *'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity [...] placing the individual at the heart of its activity, establishing the citizenship of the Union and creating a space of freedom, security and justice'*[25]. Therefore, the sources of validation and confirmation of the European citizenship refer to the equality, freedom and, implicitly, democracy of the EU citizens, aspect taking shape in the context of a competitive and stimulating Europe towards its citizens, which is a model of society based on *'individual rights and building social cohesion'*[26].

Conclusions

If the Romanian citizenship is particularly defined as the legal and political bond between a citizen and the Romanian state, defining the European citizenship is a much more complex approach, this being a more abstract notion. However, we may conclude that the European citizenship symbolizes, as a whole, *'the community of objectives and means intervening between the Member States of the European Union, namely the peoples of these states"*[27]. This derives from the central idea underlying the European construction, which is to ensure peace and grant freedom to citizens to live under common rules and institutions.[28]

The European citizenship complements the domestic one, aspect supported by the fact that nationals of the EU member states benefit from a dual citizenship. However, clarification is required regarding this claim, so in terms of European citizenship, it exercises its

[23]*Case C-369/90, Judgment of the Court of 7 July 1992. - Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria*, *apud* http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61990CJ0369, on 04.02.2015.
[24]*Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*, Title V: *The rights of the citizens*, *apud* http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:ro:PDF, on 04.02.2015
[25]*Ibidem*, Foreword.
[26]Cezar Bîrzea, *The European citizenship*, Politeia, Bucharest, 2005, p. 191.
[27] Cristina Vintilescu, *op. cit.*
[28]*Ibidem.*

prerogatives under the union law, which is of strict and immediate application, while in a subsequent approach, the domestic citizenship reflects its implications under the auspices of the domestic law.[29] As regards the rights of the EU citizens, these may be seen in an evolutionary perspective, this showing the power to adapt the legal framework to the incidental needs within the community, under the development and evaluation of certain situations. The rights and freedoms found in European documents confirm the status of European citizen and grant it with a unique perspective, in the light of the specific rights elaborated in the context of citizenship.

Although it initially was an idea, the core of the European citizenship fed on the desire to bring together citizen in a common system of values and perspectives, in the virtue of a living standard and common European identity, an issue which subsequently became reality, conceptualizing into the idea of 'European citizenship', together with the rights and freedoms it brings.

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BEHIND THE WAR CURTAINS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE IRAQ CONFLICT -THE GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEROGATORY DECISIONS

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Abstract : In the realm of decision-making policies, America's challenging hegemony of leadership has reached, with the Iraq war and its pre-conflict situation, a peak that no longer granted the country its alleged full supremacy. This resolution is grounded in support of the transatlantic relations and, more exactly, on the debate-generated sphere of dispute that resulted from former President Bush's foreign policy preference. It is in vain to assert that with the dawn of the Iraq war, the United States of America will have reached a consensus in relation to the giants of political governing, just as it is pointless to evaluate the present situation as the finite product of long-term political planning.

In order to perceive the reasons for nowadays stagnant and discouraging military actions, it is salient to interpret the European, American and Iraqi role-playing distributions in the arena of global politics. For this reason, the present paper aims at discussing the prerogatives of American foreign policy within the field of the Iraqi implications and its impact on the transatlantic relations, as well as Bush's conundrum in accounting for his leadership programs towards the American representation. Also, it debates the hidden implications that served as decisive factors for the presidential imposed politics, while, at the same time, it tries to explain why the American people were deluded into supporting their country's attack strategy.

Keywords: ***transatlantic relations, foreign policy, Iraq war, decisive leadership, multilateralism***

Unleashed intentions: Bush's tactics towards a selfish foreign policy leadership

The premises for what has come to be nowadays considered world's "most disputed war"[1]- the Iraq war- remain, despite the intensive lobbying promoted in favour of peace adoption, somehow affairs of private knowledge. Obviously, the roots of the American-Iraqi conflict stem back to the pre-Bush administration, becoming more obtrusive and nuanced with the September 11 terrorist attacks. It is obvious that with the infamous attacks on New York's World Trade Centre the world has witnessed the eve of a more coercive politics towards whatever appears as threatening. Naturally, this can be regarded as an instrument of the American over-protectorate, but it may very well hint at unveiling a revengeful tactics of the world's leader political enterprise.

To place Bush's decisional choices regarding the initiation of war against the Middle East Al Qaeda terrorists on the basis of neoconservative ideology is, even to Fukuyama[2]'s approach, far fetched. The president's attempt to overcome any possible chain-threats on the American people was conceived as an immediate cluster of policies which, apparently, served as a protective shell. However, what Bush and his administration failed to understand was that, by embracing the utmost politics of isolationism and hastened decisions, America will face the disaster of disbelief and will fail to promote its asserted moral values. By doing so, they neglected that the world was not entirely made up of American ideology, but rather, that it was constructed by "means of mutual commitment and clutching together"[3].

[1] **Kupchan, Charles A.,** *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, New York ,Knopf Publishing House, 2002, p. 351

[2] Advocate of the Bush administration up until the Iraq war, Fukuyama argues that the shift of policy making towards a warring leadership is derogatory. By blaming the presidential faulty decisions, Fukuyama asserts that contemporary American foreign policy needs to be rescued from the fall into stereotypical hatred and in order to do so; one must firstly act promptly in view of filling the created gaps.

[3] **Roberts, Alasdair,** "The War We Deserve" in *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2007

This tactics of "decisive leadership, which follows through in policies regardless of opposition"[4] served as a primary instrument in the wrecking of transatlantic relationships. How was Bush's doctrine a means of "decisive leadership"? one may ask. The answer stays in the diplomacy standards with the rest of the world that the President held after the 9/11 attack and in the decisions he took so as to impede any potential threats. Naturally, it was no time for socializing or continuing to promote an unaffected attitude in respect to the Middle East, as the American people required some form of feed-back that their country was put under protection. And so it was. But at what cost?

The immediate European reaction to the terrorist attack was as expected: a politics of sympathetic actions sustaining the country's moral. It took several speeches and a newly-born politics of revenge to shatter the European school of thought in two separate camps. With Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice and Collin Powell as key figures of the American administration engaged in the presumptive warfare programme, Europe was somehow caught on the wrong foot regarding their ally status. Obviously, with Bush's statement that "success in Iraq could begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress toward a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated" [5] the European states began to diminish their willingness to support the American state in view of the fact that the new foreign policy was clearly a war initiative. This led to the separation of European support[6] into that of promoters (Great Britain, Spain, Poland and Italy) and into that of opposing forces (France[7], Germany and Russia).

Needless to say, this separation was not in the least in conformity with what the European Union aimed at- unity and communion- , whereas America's position augmented and became more and more threatening for third-parties such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Hidden behind this "if you build it, they will come doctrine"[8] that Bush used as "campaign logo" stood a general understanding that the American presidency was not willing to take into account the allies' opinions if they didn't fit into their action plan. It was also the case with UN and NATO, both failing to reach a consensus on what to do about Iraq, to whom Bush paid little attention, even if, his allies(Tony Blair, for instance) continuously argued in favor of gaining the UN approval. In fact, this entire semantics of war scared peaceful European promoters, especially since they interpreted the American offensive also as a means of politics of expansion-similar to the "divide and conquer" policy.

Of course, President Bush's statements at key moments before and during the war increased the general state of panic in the world: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. . . . [This] country will define our times, not be defined by them."[9] But there was more to the "old-European"[10] backing away than the simple threatening American discourse conveyed as a means of gaining allies. In fact, what France and Germany understood beforehand was that the American tactics of implementing a warrior foreign policy in the Middle East would only reach a dissent rather than a consensus with the Muslims. Particularly, where Bush saw a nearing threat regarding Hussein's presumed holding of weapons of mass destruction (though, according to the UN report

[4] **Gordon, Philip H. and Shapiro, Jeremy**, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq,* McGraw Hill Companies: 2004,p. 71

[5] **Gordon,** op. cit., p. 51

[6] This separation was amplified by the Vilnius 10 and the Letter of Eight, as public statements in support of the American enterprise, of which France, Russia and Germany weren't even informed.

[7] At the beginning, however, France presented itself as a liable supporter of Iraq intervention, as it could economically benefit from the resourceful retributions. With the growing pathos for what appeared to be a serious war, the French diplomats clearly stated their opposition to the American way of handling the situation and insisted on the UN evaluations of WMD presence as a neutral arbiter.

[8] **Gordon**, *op. cit*, p. 125

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 179

[10] With the Letter of Eight and Vilnius 10, Cheney and Bush referred to Europe as the Old part-France, Germany and Russia, whereas the promoters of USA were entitled the New-Europe.

there was no evidence to support such a belief), the Europeans managed to pierce through the core of the problem. Their objection was that if US continued the warring strategy and initiated conflict in the Middle East, they would only facilitate the "recruitment tool for Al-Qaeda and fuel extremism, while any cooperation between Ba'athists and Al-Qaeda was implausible"[11].

The deterioration of transatlantic relations was also the outcome of distinct ideological approaches towards foreign policy with regard to world reference. This way, while Javier Solana argued that "A common thread is that we Europeans are instinctive multilaterals and want the US to be more committed to multilateral solutions", Condoleezza Rice's response was that "Multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves."[12] The emphasis is, thus, on the fact that US foreign policy is somehow individualistic and less inclined towards multilateralism, whereas Europeans are open in respect to reaching compromises and covering a larger sphere of interest. It was hard, however, to avoid the collateral views that appeared on the basis on this transatlantic rupture, since Americans largely perceived the European politics of neutralism as anti-American. Naturally, the sort of anti-Americanism they accused Europe of practicing was a far softened version of the Muslim approach, but it remained as a black-hole in American-European relations.

Eventually, there is no conclusion to the disputed situation created by President Bush's hastened decision making policy, as the remnants of the contradictory debates over Iraq have not been cauterized. In fact, what Old-Europe brought in its defense was that their foreign policy towards America was in fact biased regarding Bush and not the entire country, being rather "anti-Bush than anti-American"[13]. The question that arises is whether there was still any possibility to save the transatlantic alliance and promote the values of peaceful foreign polices. The only reasonable answer that seemed to solve this mystery is that Americans should have corrected their individualistic approach in relating to others and assume the risk that, being such a super-power, United States must act only after a thorough evaluation of the consequences they might bear on the rest of the world.

Understanding the implications of the "Axis of Evil"[14]- Extreme Determinism in Fighting a War for the Pursuit of Interest

With an already diminishing power in the world supremacy, the Unites States of America gradually faced the danger of lack of trustworthiness at the level of national sustaining actions. Obviously, when the Iraq war became rather a prolonged version of revenge, Americans began digging behind the façade of the postulated war reasons and pertained that they have been tricked into believing lies. Of course, it was a war on terror, which granted legitimacy to at least the scope of the war, but in fact, how many of the conflict objectives have been solved? Another pillar of public warfare maintenance was Bush's stated intention to restore order in the Iraq-Iran conflicts, as people were blinded by the false-charity action that veiled the purpose of the Iraq war. This "idealistic Wilsonian crusade to reshape the Middle East in the American image"[15] failed both in factual enterprise and in moral interpretation.

There are many arguments to show the biased implications that served in Bush's decision making process regarding the Iraq war, some being utter analysis of pre-war situation. This way, it was said that "Bush started the war against Iraq in order to detach attention from the critical situation in domestic affairs and redirect his forces to a factual action"[16] or that "the Bush administration knew that the peak oil crisis

[11] **Peterson, John and Pollack, Mark**, *Europe, America, Bush :Transatlantic Relationships in the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge 2003, p. 83
[12] Quoted in **Wiessala, Georg,** *The European Union-the Annual Review 2001-2002* in *Journal of Common Market Studies*
[13] **Fukuyama, Francis**, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy,* Yale University Press, 2007,p. 162
[14] "Axis of evil" refers to the nomination Bush made in respect to Iraq.
[15] **Fukuyama,** *op.cit.*, p. 213
[16] **Pelletiere, Stephen**, *Iraq and the International Oil System: Why America went to War in the Gulf*, Maisonneuve Press, Paris, second edition, 2004, p. 27

probably posed strategic dangers far beyond those publicly acknowledged. The dollar's role as the world's reserve currency was also tied with oil. So they had to act in consequence."[17] Indeed, the idea of a war initiated for the pursuit of interest (oil, in this case) appeared to be a vicious circle from which America couldn't get out. There is no doubt that behind the ideology that inflicted the idea of warfare stood matters of political and economic liabilities. However, the way in which Bush administration abused of such means is translated directly in the disastrous consequences hanging in Middle East air.

It is interesting to note how Iraq remained in fact a third-party witness at this war initiative, since the main actors were America and their European allies, engaging in long debates related to strategies and tactics. And it is perhaps even more interesting to see how the American people remained significantly detached from the war court-yard, as their support for the domestic affairs remained practically inexistent. "In Bush's war, there was no role for private citizens. It was not to leave a pampered public undisturbed, however, but to enhance the unilateral power of the presidency. A participatory war on terror might expose the president's national security policy to the inconvenience of democratic responsiveness."[18] Of course Bush took the risk of being the scape-goat of warfare policies, but, on the other hand, he was fully aware that convincing the people that taking control of the situation without people's implications was in his advantage. And because Americans are desperate for strategies instead of neutral compromises, the country was ready for action.

However, the war on terror or the oil war was also a "counter-insurgency one"[19], which was particularly hard to fight because one needed to wreck enemy and, at the same time, leave the population untouched. Naturally, this required extraordinary political judgment and targeted force, elements the American part lacked or intentionally left aside. In fact, if Americans manage to obtain victory in Iraq they immediately gain on many other plans, such as winning supremacy on oil market and, consequently, global economy. But there are also losses attached to this long-dreamt victory. One such minus would be the immense cost involved in reconstructing the shattered Iraq. With no more European allies to help in sharing the expenses of post-war support, the United States was forced to deposit large funds that could have been otherwise used in the advantage of the American domestic issues.

Left alone in the war for power supremacy, Bush found no strength to put an end to the burning problem of Iraq, nor did he manage to stop the terrorist threat. The grim aura that then surrounded American foreign policy left little freedom of action to the forthcoming chief of state, apart from that of "immediately withdrawing American troops and weapons from Iraq territories and granting them more support in their state expression."[20] So what kepy Bush from backing off his offensive in Middle East since there was no obvious perspective of winning? A hypothesis could be that fear stands behind this prolonged war, in the sense that "if the Iraq venture ends badly, there will be ample blame to go around the administration."[21] Also, a sudden withdrawal from Iraq was tantamount to Bush's need to recognize his defeated game- a tough choice for a stubborn and proud president. To a higher extent, America risked the danger of lessening its power and being blamed for any future misdemeanors in the Middle East, as well as for losing credibility in nearing alliances.

Conclusion: What next? Imagining a new world

Needless to say, the implications that were at stake regarding war finality comprised a global analysis. Strategies initiated by the United States, regardless of the decision outcome, were bound to affect both Middle East representatives and European spectators. If, one the one hand, Iraq was kept under American dominance, more serious conflicts could have arisen from moderate Muslim riots and Ba'athists

[17] **Phillips, Kevin**, *American Theocracy: the Perils of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money,* Viking Publishing Ltd., London, 2006, p. 114
[18] **Roberts**, *op.cit*., p. 3
[19] **Fukuyama**, Op. cit., p. 182
[20] **Preble, Christopher**, *Exiting Iraq: Why the US Must End the Military Occupation and Renew the War against Al Qaeda*, Cato Institute, Washington: 2004, p. 18
[21] **Walt, Stephen**, *The Blame Game*, in ***Foreign Policy,*** November/December issue, 2005

acceptance of Al Qaeda terrorism. To make matters worse, anti-Americanism could climb to such high levels, that authorities would have been faced with massive destructions and hatred manifestations around American-supporters. On the other hand, however, abruptly ending the war without any previous alliance treaties could have resulted into a severely affected American domestic economy and a derogatory position on the oil market hegemony.

With these issues it goes without saying that the current American president entered a bombed terrain, on which he had to immediately appease conflicts and, at the same time, maintain safe conditions on home fronts. To have take an incorrect decision would have been tantamount to wrecking what Americans tried to build since their Revolution: democracy and freedom of action. Since nowadays logo "God Bless America" could very well turn into a prayer for expiating sins, the ultimate conclusion is that America's unique attempt to regain control over the matter must come attached to their being more open-minded and careful when emitting global decisions and more focused on pluripespectivism rather than individualism.

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DISCOURSE OF GENDER IN NEOLIBERAL POLITICS

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Abstract: This paper would critically dissect how and why neoliberal discourses are gendered (but also sexually configured) through historically and diverse specific conventions and rules, how gender is made intelligible in order to better serve neoliberal ideals of marketisation, privatisation, deregulation and flexibilisation. The study would apply a "gender lens" to the analysis of political processes and by deploying the insights gained from feminist theory. Also, it provides a gendered account of the ways in which liberal rights, and ideas of democracy and justice, have been absorbed into the political agendas of women's movements and states.

The issue of gender has a salient place in neoliberal world and is one of the most salient social cleavages (a factor that divides society). It indicates the vast range of cultural meaning attached to that basic difference. It might also play a fundamental role in social hierarchies, explaining why some people enjoy greater status or respect than others. Like all theoretical tools and discourses, the theory of gender is always interpreted by persons within particular social contexts and with particular orientations in the social world.

The issue of gender is automatically a political issue because it involves the unequal distribution of resources between the two genders, arising out of male domination of the political system which allows men to allocate to women the heavier burden of labour and the more menial tasks, but to men more leisure and the larger share of rewards and benefits. Gender is not something that is inside a pre-extent essence, waiting to find bodily expression. There is no inner truth, awaiting authentic or proper realization in bodily or material acts. In the context of increasing hegemony of neoliberal ideology, states are shrinking their developmental budgets, seeking new ways to economize and gender policies are of course implicated of these changes. How does gender affect political understanding?

Keywords: ***Neoliberal, Gender-blind, marketisation, development, Feminism***

1. Conceptualisation of Gender

Gender is a fluid, flexible and a contested concept. It is a large theme as well as a multilevel phenomenon. Its effects can be seen at all levels of social life. In the last three decades many diverse strands of scholarly inquisition have converged to produce a more complex understanding of gender as a cultural phenomenon. The term used to be seen as the "psychological, social, and cultural aspects of maleness and femaleness" (Kessler and McKenna 1978:7). As Judith Howard and Jocelyn Hollander argue, "gender is a slippery term" (1997: 10); for Harriet Bradley "gender is a very diffusive and all-embracing concept" (2007: 5). D. Glover and K. Kaplan aptly put it, "a busy term" (2000: ix), meaning that it is widely used, in many differing contexts. Part of the "slipperiness" and "busyness" arises from the fact that this is a highly politically charged concept (Bradley 2007). In fact, as Joan Acker notes, "although the term [gender] is widely used, there is no common understanding of its meaning, even among feminist scholars (1992: 565)". It is seen, not as structurally determined, but as the outcome of women's and men's actions under historically specific conditions. The concept of gender is already lived experience, gestural, corporeal, and cultural mediated and historically constituted (Chanter 2006). As Iris Marion Young concluded in her

essay "Modernity, Emancipatory Values, and Power," "Gender is . . . a set of ideational and social structural relationships that people move through, rather than attributes they have attached to their persons" (2005: 493).

The multiplicity of views and perspective of gender does not have to result in disorder and disarray. The field's conceptual and theoretical diversity can be a source of enrichment rather than fragmentation.

It is a way of explaining as well as describing social relations. It denotes disparate and mainly hierarchical divisions between men and women, which is embedded in social institutions and practices. On the international stage, it is everywhere (Meade and Wiesner-Hanks 2004). The focus of gender as implicated with sexual differences allows for an understanding of the political and social aspects of sex, rather than seeing sex and gender as separate and distinct (Woodward 201).

In the 19th century, James Stephen and John Stuart Mill wrote influential essays on the question of equality that found a place in the standard of classic texts of political thought. Their essays assist us to comprehend the issue from the point of view of thinkers who either ignored women or expected women to be subsumed within the collective identity of men. Today the study of gender entails us to solicit how women concerned with political life understood the question of equality and to see the discussion of the question as incomplete until their perspectives are considered (Conway, et al. 1987).

The concept of gender as it is used in the social science thinking contemporary era is relatively new. The word has a much longer history, while the academic use of the term is largely a creation of the Women's Studies Movement of the 1970s and 1980s. D. Glover and K. Kaplan (2000) argued that the term gender was first employed in the 1960s in the then growing area of psychology and sexology of sex. One book that sprang from this tradition, psychologist Robert Stoller's *Sex and Gender: On the Development of Masculinity and Femininity* (1968), is cited by them as the first study to formulate fully the distinction between gender and sex that was commonly used by the feminist scholars of the 1970s.

One perspective of gender, which is not the sociological perspective, is that gender is somehow essential to being male/female, i.e. gender is both static and innate. In this view, gender refers to characteristics of the individual person, assumed to the biological in origin. The perspective is known as the "essentialist perspective". This account of gender as it rests on the assumption that there is an 'essence' of man/woman that determines behaviour in spite of socialisation (Shepherd 2010). Although some fewer theorists supported this viewpoint at the end of the 20th century, sometimes the underlying assumptions of social-Psychological research are consistent with this notion (Vannoy 2001).

While the language of sex and gender was not developed until the 1960s, one could map the distinction between sex and gender onto some of the developments that preceded it. The pioneering French Feminist Simone de Beauvoir (1949), famously claimed in her seminal study *The Second Sex*, "Women are made, they are not born". People construct themselves as masculine or feminine. This proclamation was challenging traditional patriarchal beliefs by differentiating between the two spheres that would later be labelled sex and gender. The distinction and the idea itself that "man" and "woman" are more social creations than biological creatures were salient in the development both of feminist understanding of

women's oppression and political strategies for change (Edwards 1989). Feminism is especially concerned to challenge one of the crucial elements of modernism: the anthropocentric definition of knowledge (Hekman 1990).

2. Gender Discourse after Second Wave of Feminism

In the 1960s the study of gender shifted to an importance on socialisation rather than biology. Feminists of the "second-wave" took up the debate about biology by distinguishing between biological sex and social and cultural gender. The number of theorists proposed a sharp division between "gender" and "sex". Sex refers to the biological apparatus, the difference between the male and the female human animal – our chromosomal, anatomical and chemical organisation. Gender was the social fact, the difference between masculine and feminine roles, or men's and women's personalities (Connell 2002: 33). "Gender" is masculinity and femininity and "sex" is male and female, what it means to be a man or a woman.

By gendered, one understands the division of people into two differentiated groups, 'men' and 'women' and the organization of the major aspects of society along those binaries. Gender is a social construct, a product of culture, not nature. Its differences are typically imposed through contrasting stereotypes of 'masculinity' and 'femininity'.

Gender divisions not only infuse the individual's sense of self, intimate relationships and families, but also structure work, law, politics, medicine, education, the military, religions, and culture. It is a system of power in that it privileges some men and disadvantages most women. It is constructed and maintained by both the dominants and the oppressed because both ascribe to its values in personality and identity formation and in appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour. Gender is hegemonic in that many of its foundational assumptions and ubiquitous processes are invisible, unquestioned, and unexamined (Davis et al. 2006). This distinction was considered a conceptual breakthrough. The variability of gender, as opposed to what Ann Oakley identified as the 'constancy' of sex, is what made gender so central to the feminist program.

The term gender is not simply a system of classification, by which biological males and females are separated, sorted, and socialised into equal sex roles. It also expresses the universal inequality between men and women. When we speak about gender we also speak about hierarchy, power, and inequality, not simply difference (Kimmel 2011).

The British feminist and sociologist Ann Oakley (1972) saliently pointed out how different societies define femininity and masculinity in different and opposite ways and she also discusses how far observable differences are based on psychology and biology and how far on cultural conditioning. Oakley's work was salient in pointing out how the apparent certainty of sex had been used to shape a social category – gender – which was subject to change. She argued that sex might be anatomical and corporeal but gender, that is, masculinity and femininity, were cultural and thus fluid and could be changed and reconstructed.

The relation between sex and gender has been construed as necessary by the tradition of patriarchy. To say that sex and gender are necessarily related to one another is to say that one causes or determines the other. Nature or sex is causally determinative of gender (Chanter 2006: 16). The basic idea here is Sigmund Freud's most famous line 'Anatomy is Destiny'. A

large number of people believe that the differences in male and female anatomy are decisive and provide the basis for the differences in men's and women's experiences.

An American radical and feminist philosopher Mary Daly, in *Gy/ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*, developed new ways of critiquing and challenging male dominance or what she called "male stream thought". The sex/gender division was vital to many early feminist studies throughout the 1980s. A valuable outline of this approach comes from the historian Joan Scott, "gender is a social category imposed on sexed body" (1988: 18). However, she noted, this division between biological sex and socio-cultural gender has been increasingly contested. Once again, this contestation could be seen to arise from the politics of sexuality and gender. One of the first challenges to arise from the problems of the sex-gender binary came from that of biologist Lynda Birke (1986), who argued that sex and biology were not themselves static and fixed categories. It was not only gender that was socially shaped, but the human bodies change in interaction with the social environment.

At one end of the spectrum there are those whose explanations of the subordination of women focus primarily on the biological difference as causal in the construction of gender (Susan 1978) and at the other end there are those who argue that biological difference may not even lie at the core of the social construction that is gender (Collier and Yanagisako 1992); the views of the vast majority of feminists fall in between these extremes. The rejection of biological determinism and the corresponding emphasis on gender as a social construction characterize most current feminist thinking.

Feminists have drawn on the important work of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, whose crucial book, *The History of Sexuality* (1980), emphasised the way in which different sexual categories and identities developed in different centuries, largely because of the work of psychologists, medical scientists and other experts. According to Foucault, the concept of "the homosexual" as a form of fixed sexual identity did not appear until the 19th century; before then, the practice we now call "homosexual" was just part of an array of sexual activities in which men and women might engage. Thus, for Foucault, sexuality too, is a construction. Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher, argues that all forms of binary categorisation are in themselves oppressive. His philosophical method of deconstructionism (the breaking down of binary categories) was very attractive to a new generation of feminists who were influenced by the ideas of postmodernism and post-structuralism.

Other interpretations of gender have challenged the adequacy of the sex/gender distinction, arguing that the idea sex is a natural fact, is not self-evidently true but is itself a culturally constructed notion. An alternative to this understanding of sex as natural and gender as cultural is Judith Butler's influential theory of 'gender performativity' (Bevir 2010). The work of Judith Butler (1990, 1991 and 1993) is a vital contribution to the post-structuralist gender theory. Butler develops her analysis of gender via Foucault, Freud, Derrida, Lacan and the French feminists. She sees physiological sex, as well as gender, as socially constructed phenomena. Her work is particularly significant in challenging the boundaries between gender/sex through explaining how sex is too socially constructed and made meaningful through the scientific as well as social discourses that construct it.

She argued that there are no fixed foundations of gender categories and therefore of feminist strategies. Judith Butler argued in *Gender Trouble* that sex is not prior to gender; rather, sex "ought to be understood as an effect" of cultural constructions of gender (1990: 6). Butler argues that we should understand sex and gender in terms of performativity; in our daily lives we repeatedly 'do gender', act out being a man or woman in ways that give the illusion of fixity and stability: "gender is the repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being" (1990: 33). Performativity theory is a more thoroughgoing version of social constructivism. As a lesbian, she argues that the main route to gender emancipation is through challenging the rules of performances to create "transgressive" gender activities and identities. Thus, she advocates drag and cross-dressing, adopting individualised and mixed forms of sexual identity, as ways in which we can break down binary thinking on gender. Drag, for Butler, exposes the fallacy of the dominant belief in an original or primary gender identity. Butler's theory suggests that "rather than being the expression of sex, or the cultural production of sex . . . gender, in fact, regulates the notion that sex is the natural condition of the human body" (Butler 1990: 177). So the feminists challenge the enlightenment concept of rationality and truth. According to some writers, gender identities might even disappear; thus Judith Grant has argued that "The aim of feminist politics is the end of gender and the creation of new human beings who are self-determining and fully participate in the development of their own constantly evolving subjectivity" (Grant 1993:183)

3. Gender and Neoliberal Politics

Gender and neoliberalism are two different concepts, used differently, depending on disciplinary orientation. Gender interconnects with neoliberalism in a number of ways. The 1980s and 1990s saw the demise of authoritarian regimes in many parts of the world. This revitalised the discourse over participatory and democratic governance and gave a major impulse to human rights agendas. The last two decades of the 20th century also saw the ascendance of neoliberal agendas in many parts of the world, with regressive social and economic consequences. This has placed significant constraints on the substantiation of human rights in general and women's rights in particular (Molyneux and Razavi 2002).

Neoliberalism refers to a set of ideas and practices centred on an increased role for the free market, reconfiguration of state welfare activities and flexibility in labour markets. The ideology of neoliberalism rose to prominence in the 1980s under the Reagan administration in the US and Thatcher's premiership in the UK. It expanded its economic reach globally through international organizations such as the IMF, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank (Gill and Scharff 2011). David Harvey, in his seminal book *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, argues that "the theory proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free trade and free markets" (2005: 2). It is a political philosophy and ideology that affects every dimension of social life (Giroux 2004). Neoliberalism is a pervasive discourse in development economics and policy-making, based on the assumed centrality of privatisation, marketisation, deregulation and flexibilisation

(Griffin 2010). It developed in Europe and the USA in response to global changes that challenged the domination of western institution (Duggan 2003). Wendy Larner (2000) has argued that neoliberalism is both a political discourse about the nature of rule and a set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals. It goes hand in hand with capitalism and its major focus is to generate more profit. During the 1980s and 1990s there were three broad perspectives of gender studies: radical feminism, liberal or equal rights feminism and Marxist/materialist feminism.

Marxist feminists modelled sexual repression as a facet of class power. They focused on labour relations and the economic base of society, and a revolutionary approach in which the overthrow of capitalism was seen as essential to the dismantling of male privilege (Beasley 1999: 60-1). Marxist feminists expose the class nature of women's oppression. By contrast, radical feminists saw gender as the primal source of social inequality. For liberal propensity, gender is a form of discrimination relating to ascribed biogenetic differences of the sex (Bradley 2007).

The 1980s were also notable for the moral and political dominance of the New Right, headed by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the accompanying deployment on a global basis of neo-liberal economic policies. The period has been witness not only to the prioritisation of gender inequality and poverty as two of the most challenging barriers to economic and social justice in a globalising world, but also to their progressive intertwining (Chant 2010). The gap of poverty escalated profoundly. The literature that emerged in the early 1990s shows the gender blindness of neoclassical economics and the markedly negative effects of neoliberal policies on women (see Elson 1992; Sparr1995). One of the salient essays of Neil Davidson's (2013) in International Socialism gives the history of neoliberalism its required extent and historical intricacy. He shows neoliberalism to be both (a) a set of political policies to enable capital to accumulate and to smash the working class and its organizations and (b) a new economic strategy of capital accumulation adopted after the crisis of 1973–1974. In a neoliberal world, men, especially those who are geopolitically, economically, ethnically, and racially privileged, persist to dominate institutions of authority and power worldwide.

Gender and the politics are mutual in nature; Joan Scott refers in her article, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis", to "the particular and contextually specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics." (1986: 1070). Gender constructs and transforms political inequalities. Political institutions, laws, and political practices produce gender. As Lisa Baldez argues in her work "Intersectionality," because "gender never [. . .] operates independently of other aspects of political life [. . .] it is misleading to think of gender as an autonomous category of analysis" (207: 229). One of the leading scholars on the subject, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, argued in his well-known article, "Transnational Feminist Crossings: On Neoliberalism and Radical Critique": "Neoliberal states use gender-and-development discourse to underwrite a retrenchment from radical feminist politics – delegitimising and domesticating such politics. The state is thus made "postfeminist" before feminists achieve gender justice! ...This shift in vocabulary from feminism to post-feminism and from race (and racism) to post-race (and post-racism) in

popular culture was meant to signify a movement beyond "old" forms of domination and inequality like racism, sexism, and (hetero) patriarchy" (2013: 972-973).

Centred on the achievability of economic 'development' through the social embedding of the market, neoliberal discourses have rather effectively communicated certain culturally constructed truths and knowledge on a worldwide scale as simple 'common sense', dominating both globalisation discourse and modern development policy-making (Griffin 2007; 2010).

The models of democracy that developed appeared to have universal appeal, but in fact they concentrated on the public sphere and the interests of men. Feminist discussions about democracy have developed along a number of lines. One of these critiques liberal, universalist models of democracy as involving masculine values, for example "a psychology of competitive self-interest in material things, rationality and individualism" (cited in Monoro 2005: 185).

In the early 1990s there occurred a quite remarkable shift in the feminist approach to the study of gender. The practitioners and scholars refer to this as the "postmodern turn". M. Barrett and A. Phillips (1992), regarded as one of the earliest commentaries on this development, argued in their book *Destabilising Theory* that this effectively amounted to a 'paradigm' shift, i.e., an inclusive alteration in the way theorists began to comprehend what gender is (ontology) and how gender should be studied (epistemology). Today's society is not simply either modern or postmodern, and that women, especially, occupy a variety of worlds, traditional (as wives and mothers), modern (as workers and citizens) and postmodern (as consumers and participants in contemporary culture), each with its own oppressions, opportunities and politics (Coole 1993: 222).

4. Does Gender Still Matter?

Why study gender? The basic premise of this section is that gender matters in social life. It is complex and changing over time. It matters as a source of collective and personal identity (Woodward 2011). It is one of the organising principles of the social world. The concept of gender organises our self-concepts and identities, structures our interactions and one of the basis upon which the resources and powers are allocated. Moreover, gender is a pervasive and tenacious force; its existence extends across space and time (Wharton 2005). It matters because gender is central to our sense of who we are. It constitutes to matter because the evidence that is organised on the basis of gender demonstrates structural inequalities between men and women. The persistence of gender inequalities makes gender particularly important to activists and to policy makers (Woodward 2011). Gendered roles and identities of modernity continue to shape contemporary political and social practices. That would undermine endeavours to achieve full equality for women (Fleming 1997).

The conception of gender also matters in the ways that it shapes social interaction. Social interaction seems to entails sex classification. As Ridgeway argues: "it is striking that people are nearly incapable of interacting with one another when they cannot guess the other's sex" (1997: 219). That the recognition of someone as male or female assists social interaction testifies to this category's power in social life. Gender remains a central organising principle of modern life, "in virtually every culture, gender difference is a pivotal way in

which humans identify themselves as persons, organize social relations, and symbolize meaningful natural and social events and processes" (Harding 1986: 18).
Gender matters because its study concerns the scrutiny of norms and standards in the global political economy that many hold to be true, essential and universal but a committed critique of which reveals to be power-laden, regulatory and highly restrictive (Griffin 2010).

Conclusion

World is dominated by neoliberal neo-patriarchy. So, the gender inequalities and gender divisions have developed in enormously varied parts of the world. The rising bureaucratisation and complication of societies, the emergence of centralised states and the appearance of neo-liberal capitalist production mutually constituted the most important structural factors that account for historical development and persistence of the gender division and gender inequality (Frader 2004). The object/subject dichotomy that eliminates women from realm of the subject has had an unfathomable effect on the status of women in the contemporary time. Their sexual and reproductive choices are still constrained; and the lives of many are restricted or ruined by the fear or reality of male violence.

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IS GLOBALIZATION A ZERO-SUM GAME?

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Abstract:The purpose of this paper is to make a brief analysis of the relationship between non-governmental organizations and international intergovernmental organizations in the current context of globalization. Today, the political systems are much more democratic, the civil society (NGO-s with high international credibility) is better organized, both at international and national levels, and the information technology favourisis free expression of opinions which are, almost instantaneous, spread all over world. In order to be not loosers in the globalization process, both the politicians and the majority of the civil society from the most developed countries have to make an intense and sustained effort of cooperation and solidarity.
Therefore, o solution could be, on one hand, the avoiding of restricting of the enormous growth potential and, on the other hand, the convergence of the income of globalization and technological revolution, while it is building a fairer and more solidary world, in which there are no winners and losers.

Keywords: ***globalization; equity; civil society; democracy.***

1. Globalization, global governance and global actors

Globalization is the process of functionalization of the global economy which, in the global society, is able to create global decision structures for solving the global problems.
The absence of a peace agreement in classical terms establishing the rights and obligations of winners and losers create additional problems for setting the new rules. The evolution of international law coincided with the winners formalizing values and interests .

There are politicians and media representatives presenting globalization in a very optimistic way in which all will benefit and the world will develop in harmony.

It can be appreciated that globalizatio, as today's dominant phenomenon, is the pillar of the new world order that unites us in mutual interdependence. Strengthening the non-state actors while diluting sovereignty of states, changed, significantly, the distribution of power. For instance, in the top 100 world entities more than half are non-state actors. The most important processes that perpetuate the globalization trends are manifested in the production and services (particularly financial) field and the fundamental initiativing power is represented by the multinational or transnational companies that are the pillars of globalization.

So, besides nation-states, it could be added functions of new actors such as civil society organizations oriented transnational, global companies, hedge funds, the free movement of financial capital , transnational interest groups , global auditors, etc.
While globalization has led to observing the trend of solidarity among world states in solving problems of global concern (pollution, demographic flows, terrorism) yet, it has not developed a systematic and institutionalized cooperation between states. This aspect allowed the installation of an international economic order in which labor was replaced with law.

According to some Romanian authors, on medium and long term, globalization will be subject to challenges and global challenges , expressed increasingly by global threats such as: continuing democratic deficit in many areas of the world; gradual removal of the matrix of existence of human civilization and the natural development; increased socio-economic polarization effect in extended stability and inability of governments to cope with globalization fully.

As social practice, globalization has the function to institutionalize global society and the expected solutions for overcoming the consequences of the first modernity was built on cleavages .

The social component generates global identity, of post-national type, and commission local diversity compensatory mechanisms (institutional version of civil society).

From the political point of view, globalization practices global governance as a function supranational and local, marking the consacration of extra state actors with responsibilities and rights.

Colatrella argues that "Global governance is a set of institutions and relations among political actors that transforms the relationship between national states ant their territorial citizensries, and alters the relations of power between different state agencies... They are (the institutions, n.n.) instead a means of determining the orientation of national states and their policies by limiting the " thinkable" ideological and policy options available to them to those favorable to capital."

After the Cold War, the international system has been in continuous change: from unipolar one, characterized by the supremacy of the United States, to a multipolar one, defined by the existence of several power poles, to strongly globalized one that includes new networks characterized by new forms of interaction, diffusion of power, non-governmental actors multiple global interdependence and complex new challenges. . The world integration into an economic system and power relations dominated by US led to financial globalization and accelerated the internationalization of markets and products and activities.

An interesting oppinion comes from Thomas Friedman who puts the antithesis "cold war system" with "globalization system" in his recent book "The Lexus and the Olive Tree". According to Friedman, the current era of globalization which has replaced the Cold War is in fact an international system with its own attributes. Friedman defines globalization system by integrating markets, countries and technologies at an unprecedented rythm. Globalization is driven by free market capitalism. Friedman believes that globalization exerts a dominant and homogenizing, culture, which has its own defining technologies, its own demographic models (rapid movement from villages to cities) and their power structure based on trilateral relations: (1) between states, (2) between states and global markets and (3) between states and individuals.

According to the Joseph Nye, the power capability development (conversion capability, strategy, cooperation) of the international actors implies the ability to convert resources into results. Nye shows that there is a power conversion by the concept of smart power (smart) that is defined by the ability of an actor to combine soft and hard power resources in an effective strategy. Therefore, globalization has forced states to rethink the concept of power. Moreover, the information revolution has reduced communication costs

due to increased Internet usage. Consequently, it was open networking organizations and individuals access to the international agenda.

In this regard, it is clear that in a dynamic and complex international system as the international system of the XXI century, the structures and interactions are in constant evolution has power contextual character.

2. The globalization of poverty. Qualification of human capital and migration flows - as opportunities of globalization

Unfortunately, globalization is largely perceived as being to increase the gap between rich and poor even further impoverishing them on those who are already poor, thus before this, the persistence of poverty and inequality appear to be due failure globalization and not vice versa.

It is not an accident that some countries were left aside , nor the result of an unsuccessful integration opportunities presented by the global economy. It seems rather to be due to lack of certain fundamental institutional characteristics: a skilled workforce, a government representative and coherent, a developed civil society , which all are required to make globalization work.

Globalization increases competition between countries to attract foreign capital to grow their economies - in the form of foreign direct investment or portfolio investment in loans and receivables - and to acquire foreign technology facilities and higher human capital, inputs essential for achieving greater development .

Obviously, those countries with consolidated democratic institutions – e.g. political, legal and good and effective legal and recognize and protect private property, economic freedom, security, legal contracts , cohesion and public safety - and those that emphasize economic policies on education and training and open international business tend to acquire more foreign investment, technology and human capital than countries lacking such institutions and democratic politics.

Speaking of competition , the main winners are consumers around the world, because the price of goods , services will tend to decline and will result in increased purchasing power, in fact, their real income.

Education and productivity of workers in developing countries will increase and so will their salaries , their consumption and their exports . Migration flows , increasing from developing countries to developed ones allow immigrants to increase their human capital and their incomes and also to send remittances to their families , by raising the purchasing power and consumption in their home countries .

No doubt that it is universal and beneficial aspect of globalization. Most people in the world, in so far as consumers and the borrower can benefit from lower prices for goods and services , lower levels of interest rates, easier access to education, training and technology and a free option migration .

Consumers in countries where there is a higher coefficient of globalization and a higher level of competition , e.g. in developed countries and many developing countries that are open to competition, will benefit more than consumers in other parts . However , most of the skilled workers in developed countries will benefit from globalization, since it can adapt quickly to new technological revolution and the internationalization of production and

distribution and may specialize in industries or services with input- competitive greater technological sites that allow them to increase their relative productivity and wages .

By contrast, lower - skilled workers in developed countries will have a greater probability of being net losers, because of the difficulties they face in adapting to new technologies and internationalization of production and will be forced to accept lower productivity and jobs lower wages if their labor markets are more flexible.

As we showed, globalization refers to global economic integration of many formerly national economies into one global economy, mainly by free trade and free capital mobility, but also by easy or uncontrolled migration (Daly, 1999).

Historical experience shows that migration is the most powerful tool in reducing income inequality, lower unemployment by developing countries and increasing transfer inflows years of migration.

Finally, the vast majority of workers in developing countries will gain from globalization. Many of them will cease to be unemployed or underemployed their qualifications and who work should receive higher earnings because their working companies will export a larger volume of goods and services in developed countries which will work to increase demand to meet the demands of production.

On the other side, many workers in developing countries will also avoid emigration since they will find jobs locally , as globalization intensifies lifting their contribution to labor content and exported goods and services receiving higher flows capital.

To sum up, globalization consists of reducing barriers to movement of labor and, the increase of migration flows , providing more opportunities for workers in many developing countries to improve their income or their chance of finding a job in other countries.

As the analysis shows that there are more winners than losers from globalization. Most people earn in that it borrows and consumes very few lose as productive workers and capitalists in developed countries in developing countries .

3.Political influence in globalization

Under globalization has worsened an old problem, that the assertion of national identity (social and cultural) with its political expression (rule). And the current political environment evolves.

Political systems are more democratic, civil society is better organized, both nationally and internationally, in the form of powerful NGOs, and information technology allows them to freely express their opinions and be heard immediately worldwide.

For this reason, it is crucial to avoid becoming losers in globalization increasing (e.g. the difference between earnings and possible losses as consumers as producers), or at least potential losers should be helped to overcome problems so that no group of people or countries are not excluded from globalization or suffer its negative consequences instead of enjoying the benefits of globalization.

Both politicians and civil society in most developed countries must make a huge effort of cooperation and solidarity to avoid this happening . They should also , as governments in developing countries to make a huge effort on all fronts, democratic, institutional, social and economic to attract capital and investment required to produce more , to develop their trade flows exterior and be converging in income, developed economies. .

The most important way to protest is through international NGOs that are the result of creating civil society in developed countries and increasing competition that „participatory democracy”" due to the growing use of new communication technologies development, imposes increasingly on " representative democracy . "

While the credibility and legitimacy of elected politicians, decreases slightly increases the NGOs and other civil society organizations and associations. The new IT revolution makes it grow " participatory democracy " NGOs , given that it can freely express their views via the Internet, and no longer need their protests to be approved media owners to be able to express.

The first and main economic disagreement with some NGOs is that many of them consider that globalization is a " zero -sum game " , which is a great error . Every country in the world that participate in international competition development can benefit from it, although the final result will be the same for all . The roots and causes of a better or worse adaptation to change are well known: the quality of political institutions, social and economic factors of production facilities , education levels , human capital and physical capital and macro and microeconomic policies applied in each country .

There are several categories of NGOs protesting at meetings of international organizations. The first cathegory is represented by those who have already earned international credibility because they are a global service company, either by helping to reduce poverty, which is still at unacceptable levels, either by avoiding or denouncing environmental abuses that are increasing or improving consumer awareness on products of poor quality or dangerous to health or eventually just because they try to make a better world for all and less unequal. These NGOs tend to act with a known higher degree of efficiency, transparency and accountability than others.

Many of them are present as participants in the talks with IMF and World Bank also helps to policy making companies, governments and international organizations on aid for economic development , poverty reduction, debt reduction and environmental protection.

A second cathegory, as Guillermo de la Dehesa indicates, is formed of more radical NGOs, oppose almost without discrimination, to all genetically modified food and are thus at odds with companies and governments who see it as a way to increase food production in both developed countries and in the developing and reducing hunger in poor countries situations .

From this cathegory, many of them, totally, oppose even the World Bank and IMF existence because reckon that some of their policies are counterproductive and does not help the less developed.

Another cathegory are small NGOs and small groups of protesters that have no clear objective , apart from the anticapitalist and no clear funding. These small organizations tend to be more aggressive and violent than those mentioned above and the cause of great concern, both for institutions and for the contested respectable NGOs .

The companies now show greater corporate social responsibility towards the environment, governments are trying to increase levels of trade and to assist less developed countries to agree to the reductions in their claims and international organizations are more focused on the battle to reduce poverty and increasing trade.

As such, appear to be necessary to increase, where possible, collaboration with respectable NGOs and try to find practical ways to eradicate poverty relief by providing greater support and assistance to countries or individuals that are more adversely affected by globalization or they could enter into globalization and reap its fruits .

As De la Dehesa concluded, the majority of poor countries are not victims of globalization, but they victim of the lack of globalization. That's why, policymakers must give assurances that globalization expands, absolutely, over all.

The challenge for the XXI century is undoubtedly finding a way to use the extraordinary benefits that globalization and the current technological revolution bring , creating institutions to increase international solidarity and give us the opportunity to overcome the effects of somewhat unpleasant , which still exists present moment on savings and on people. Only by taking such effects into account will be able to avoid such a negative reaction to globalization and the emergence of a period as grim as in the period between 1914 and 1945 by two world wars and a major crisis .

The problem is to avoid restricting the enormous potential for development and income convergence of globalization and technological revolution , while it creates a world that is fairer and exercising a greater degree of solidarity, there is no losers.

Improving attitudes towards work, increasing knowledge and work ethic action, otherwise we will have to accept, according to Vladimir Volkoff , that not all people are the same, not all the people are equal from the point of view of vocation, intelligence, attitude and their practical action to work to overcome difficulties , to take destiny into their own hands and to combat poverty.

Instead of conclusions

As we can see from the above study, the process of globalization has probably as many advocates as opponents and is considered as a factor that stimulates technological, economic and social development, as well as a cause of deepening the social and economic inequalities and degrading of national cultures.

Politics is affected by global economic interdependence but today should have a multiplicity of actors: the state, groups and even individuals, eg, international governmental organizations, NGOs , epistemic communities - scientists , foundations, etc.

Determined are coordination and cooperation between governments and supranational institutions, to minimize the possibility of abuse of power and violation of competition and ensure that the positive aspects that internationalization or globalization undoubtedly their companies are beneficial for all countries.

Because of globalization, rather companies than states will be major players in the global economy, but states will still have regulatory power to make this process a success and to reduce its possible negative effects on competition.

Thus, globalization needs , urgently , international organizations that deal with issues related to international finance, intellectual property, international competition, environment, health, terrorism, arms and drug trafficking and trafficking in women and children.

Globalization is not the cause of all evils in many countries, although it is blamed, but the main problems, are usually, internal order: poor governance, weak institutions and bad economic policies.

The rapid growth in communications, radio and television broadcasts and the Internet makes possible today to increase awareness of those who are excluded from it and poverty consciousness of those who are not affected by it .

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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TACKLING ANTI-VACCINATION

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Abstract: Children vaccination against incurable or dangerous diseases is optional in many countries with arguments ranging from human right aspects concerning the medical treatment to the "unadmitted" dangers of the vaccine. Per se the vaccination optionality is not a problem until a significant part of the population refuses vaccination. The latest measles epidemic in the USA is a clear example of the dangers that can emerge from an extended vaccination refusal. In a world where global efforts are being made, through international organizations such as WHO, UNICEF, UNDP or ONG's such the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, to eradicate diseases through vaccinations, individuals refuse, consciously, the immunizations on subjective grounds, jeopardizing public health. The article follows the international means used to control this practice and also some national rule enforcements in the field. Doing so, we will try to identify a viable way to, at least, contain the practice, internationally and nationally.

Keywords: global governance; international organizations; vaccination; national and international policy.

I. Global governance and vaccination

The global governance understood as a complex concept which comprises international actors such as states, international organizations and international non-governmental organizations, on one hand, and international law, on the other, represent an important subject of international relations with ramifications in many fields of study. The development of an international health system represents a mile stone in the fights against health concerns with trans-border implications. The global governance in health developed, as David Fidler points out, in the last 100 years, when due to the globalism effects a transition from national to global governance started in the mid XIXth century[1]. The transition was more or less accelerated depending on the configuration of the political international system and the major events that marked it.

One of the big concerns was related to infectious diseases and their trans-border spread. So, organizations were created in order to generate a propitious climate for international negotiations between states as well as finding solutions on international health problems.

Nowadays WHO is the major international organization that deals with problems related to health, in partnership with other organizations such as UNICEF[2]. A part of its mandate regards the communicable diseases as stated in the WHO Constitution [3] .Moreover the problem of communicable diseases and immunization appear as a major subject which needs to be addressed globally in order to reduce the risks of spreading diseases that can be avoided. In this matter the WHO develops strategies and policies in order to coordinate in a coherent manner states in implementing health policies[4].

The WHO, following the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) recommendations, developed, in its quality of global policy coordinator,*Position papers* on 24

[1] David P. Fidler, *The globalization of public health: the first 100 years of international health diplomacy*, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2001, p. 79.
[2]UNICEF immunization programhttp://www.unicef.org/immunization/ Accessed: 15.04.2015
[3] Constitution of the World Health Organization, 22 July 1946, http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf
[4] WHO, http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/governance/en/

vaccination procedures[5]. In these procedures WHO detailed the need and benefits of vaccination, the stages best suited for immunization and the current global stage in implementing a certain type of vaccination. Also WHO offers a database with immunization safety documents, which provides information on vaccines, from adverse effects to transportation and storage[6].

An important strategy is the Global Vaccination Action Plan 2011-2020, which building upon Global Immunization Vision and Strategy 2006–2015. The Action Plan sets forward a strategic framework meant to combine synergic efforts in order to reduce or eradicate vaccine-preventable diseases. Thus, the Action Plan refer to states efforts to comprise in the legislation, budget and vaccination policies the rules and principles set forward in order to eradicate certain diseases[7]. Also, the Action Plan points out the need for rising awareness on the right to receive vaccination[8]. But the main point is the references made to the need of a better communication in terms of immunization advantages and disadvantages, in an efficient manner, so that the strong "anti- vaccination lobby groups" can be persuaded in terms ofvaccine necessity or the dangers of the disease[9]. As a possible solution identified by the WHO, but with effects that must be yet studied, is the incentive offered for vaccination or conditional social benefits[10].

II. The anti-vaccination movement

The anti-vaccination movement does not represent a novelty in the national and international arena. From the starting point of the vaccination campaigns, until nowadays the idea to refuse vaccination appeared in different parts of the globe and in different stages of the historical evolution. Robert Wolfe andLisa Sharp analyses some trends in England and United States, pointing out that resistance to vaccination is not a new trend. The two authors present the *British Vaccination Act of 1840* which offered free inoculations for poor's and outlaws and the *Vaccination act form 1853* which made vaccination compulsory in Britain. Soon after the second law violent riots started in several towns and the *Anti-Vaccination League* was created in London which focused on the infringement of personal liberty and choice[11].

In the US similar associations were formed such as Anti-Vaccination Society of America in1879[12].

In France the contemporaneous anti-vaccination movement spread in base of a vaccination case related to hepatitis B vaccine[13]. Even if lawsuits were introduced previously claiming the link between vaccination and some diseases, judges were reluctant to give a verdict in favor of this claims[14]. But, after a French court decided that there was a link between the vaccines and demyelinating disease, anti-vaccination movements spread and become more vocal[15].

In Nigeria was registered an interesting movement of vaccination refusal, based on political and religious reasons. In Nigeria in 2003 after the vote, the Baptist retired General Olusegun

[5]WHOvaccine position papers http://www.who.int/immunization/policy/position_papers/en/
[6] WHO http://www.who.int/immunization/documents/safety/en/
[7]WHO, Global Vaccination Action Plan 2011-2020,http://www.who.int/immunization/global_vaccine_action_plan/GVAP_doc_2011_2020/en/, p. 36-37
[8] *Idem*
[9]*Idem*
[10]*Idem*
[11]Robert M Wolfe, Lisa K Sharp, Anti-vaccinationists past and present, British Medical Journal,nr. 325(7361), 2002, pp. 430–432
[12]*Ibidem*
[13] S. Tafuri, M.S. Gallone, D. Martinelli, R. Prato, C. Germinaro, Addressing the anti-vaccination movement and the role of HCWs, Vaccine, nr. 32(2014), pp.4860-4865
[14]Jean-SébastienBorghetti, Litigation on Hepatitis B Vaccination and Demyelinating Disease in France: Breaking Through Scientific Uncertainty?, on line http://www.udg.edu/Portals/89/Filosofia%20Dret/textos%20seminaris/Borghetti_Litigation%20on%20Hepatitis%20B%20Vaccination%20and%20Demyelinating%20Disease%20in%20France.pdf, accesed 05.05.2015
[15]S. Tafuri, M.S. Gallone, D. Martinelli, R. Prato, C. Germinaro, *op.cit.*, pp.4860-4865

Obasanjo won the election against his Muslim opponent. This lead to the claim that the Polio vaccine was contaminated with anti-fertility drugs meant to sterilize the Muslim girls[16].

The anti-vaccination movement is also called in some states and on internet sites anti-vaxxers. The movement developed in time through the media and internet and through non-governmentalorganizations. The most affected countries are the USA, Europe, Japan, Australia[17].

The new anti-vaccination movement, unlike the past associations mentioned before, benefit from the internet in order to spread its ideas. Generally they use three five of means to spread information:

- Socialnetworks such as Facebook and other similar pages
- Web-pages to post materials, more or less documented, and thus spread the information.
- Meetings regional, national etc.
- Newspaper articles
- TV shows in the extent media group invite advocates form this group.

Lately numerous articles appeared related to this subject, some pro[18] other against[19] vaccination. Also, TV shows started to invite advocates from this movement such as the case of ABC who was criticized for inviting anti-vaccination advocates in it shows[20].

III. Local and regional governance in pro- vaccination / no-vaccination

In the European Union(EU) the Vaccine European New Integrated Collaboration Effort (VENICE)[21], undertakes efforts to generate an integrated system of consultations regarding different European vaccination practices. In the second VENICE Report some key facts regarding the legal practice in making certain vaccination mandatory and other not. The report identifies four types of vaccination requirements: "mandatory vaccinations for all; mandatory vaccinations for those at risk; recommended routine vaccinations for all; recommended vaccinations for those at risk"[22].From the data collected it resulted that some states apply a mandatory system on certain vaccines such as polio (12 countries[23]), diphtheria, tetanus(11 countries[24])andhepatitis B(10 countries[25]).

[16] Judith R. Kaufmann, Harley Feldbaum, Diplomacy and the Polio Immunization Boycott in Northern Nigeria, Health Affairs, volume 28, no. 4, p. 1091

[17]S. Tafuri, M.S. Gallone, D. Martinelli, R. Prato, C. Germinaro, *op. cit.*, pp.4860-4865

[18]Nuria Sheehan, The polio vaccine killed my father. But that's not a reason to oppose vaccines, The Washington Post,12.02.2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/02/12/the-polio-vaccine-killed-my-father-but-thats-not-a-reason-to-oppose-vaccines/ , accessed 04.04.2015, Robert Stoker, Refusing vaccination is anti-social, not irrational, The Washington Post, 10.02.2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/10/refusing-vaccination-is-anti-social-not-irrational/ Accessed 02.05.2015; Lindy West To the anti-vaxxers: please don't give measles to my tiny, helpless future baby, 03.02.2015,The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/society/commentisfree/2015/feb/03/anti-vaxxers-vaccination-nature, Accessed on 20.04.2015

[19]Associated Press in Lake Oswego, We are not anti-science': mothers defend right to not vaccinate children, The Guardian, 22.02.2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/22/anti-vaccine-mothers-explain-measles-backlash acessed 05.04.2015,

[20] John Quiggin, Anti-vaxxers: so friendless that free speech is enough to defeat them, The Guardian, 08.01.2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/08/anti-vaxxers-so-friendless-that-free-speech-is-enough-to-defeat-them , Accessed on 20.04.2015

[21] VENICE websitehttp://venice.cineca.org/the_project.html

[22]VENICE II report, p. 12,http://venice.cineca.org/Report_II_WP3.pdfAccessed: 15.04.2015

[23]M Haverkate, F D'Ancona, C Giambi, K Johansen, P L Lopalco, V Cozza, E Appelgren, Mandatory and Recommended Vaccination in the EU, Iceland and Norway: Results of the VENICE 2010 Survey on the Ways of Implementing National Vaccination Programmes, Eurosurveillance, Volume 17, Issue 22, 31 May 2012, on web http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=20183 Accessed 10.05.2015

[24]*Ibidem*

[25]*Ibidem*

The Report also pointed out that the penalty for choosing not to vaccinate is different from country to country. Some choose a more strict system that stipulates criminal charges to more light which even give the option to not vaccinate[26].

In Australia the anti-vaxxers started to generate problems for the government, because of the large number of persons that opted not to vaccinate their children. Because of that the government changed the legal framework and, even if vaccination was not made compulsory, the Australian administration chooses to cut welfare for the ones that refuse vaccination[27].

In Singapore the Infectious Disease Act enacted by the Parliament in 1976 has as objective the control and eradication of diseases. An important part of the Act is the vaccination policy, especially related to children. In order to prevent vaccine preventable diseases the vaccination of the young is compulsory[28].

Early this year the international media pointed out that in Pakistan several persons were arrested because they refused the polio vaccination for their children. The local authorities stated that they had more than 13.000 refusal cases, and WHO point out that Pakistan has a high incidence of polio cases[29]. The measure was taken in a desperate attempt to solve the polio problem in the northern region, controlled by Al Qaeda and the Talibans who attacked medical personal earlier.

Country	Compulsory Yes/No	Enforcement method
Pakistan	Yes	Criminal charges-jail
Australia	Yes	Social welfare cuts
Singapore	Yes	Criminal charges-fine
USA	No	Increased health insurance cost
UE	Yes/No	Different from state to state and on the type of vaccination

Examples of various approaches on vaccination enforcement policy

IV. Discussions

The problem of anti-vaccination exists in many countries, existed in many historic periods and their motivation is different from a region to another. The legal rules sometimes, even if the law provides a system with mandatory vaccination, are inefficient. The lack of effectiveness cannot be entirely attributed to bad policies or bad policy management. Sometimes the social and political situation dictates a certain status-quo that need to be addressed not trough health policies but political actions meant to ensure the security of a certain territory, country or region.

Truly the major problem globally remains the access to vaccine in poor countries with scarce resources, low economic development and bad political management.But as the anti-vaccine movement gathered many followers in recent years international and regional organizations, states, non-governmental bodies must start taking serious actions in order to prevent global pandemics especially in the case of vaccine preventable diseases. The WHO started taking into account the need for a more solid approach to the anti-vaxxers through a better communication strategy, which should point out the strong points but also the week points of vaccinations, and via a legislation reform. So maybe a more concise policy is needed in respect to this problem in the light of the recent problems in USA with the measles epidemic.

Legally the system differs from one country to another. In extreme situation a legal reform that introduces the compulsory vaccination is needed, and must be considered as an option. In other

[26] *Ibidem*

[27] Robert Ferris, Australia cuts off government welfare for anti-vaxxers, CNBC, 14.04.2015, http://www.cnbc.com/id/102585421 Accessed on 16.04.2015

[28] Singapore Government, Health Promotion Board, http://www.hpb.gov.sg/HOPPortal/health-article/482 Accessed on 20.04.2015

[29] WHO, Status Report, July-December 2014,part of the program *ProgressAgainstthePolioEradicationandEndgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018*,cp.7-8http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/AnnualReport/2014/GPEI_StatusReport2014Jul-Dec.pdf

cases the conditioning of social benefits or other form of benefits on the vaccination is an option, as the Australia case shows. Also, the UE report points out that even if different systems exist regulating vaccination, the effectiveness of the mandatory vaccination must be still studied. In some European countries even if the vaccination is not mandatory the rate of non-vaccination is low. So, in the end, a part of the problem is the collective mentality regarding the importance and benefits of vaccination. In states where the access to vaccination is still low such as certain African states or India the idea to of vaccination is not regarded as such a burden. And maybe this is the key element in fighting the anti-vaxxers, namely effective communication, social involvement and transparency. Also a better use of the modern means of communication must be found.

The balance between personal rights and collective rights need to be still clarified and applied in consequence even in the UE. In the initial form, J. Locke talked about the idea of liberty in the following manner: the liberty exist till the point that my liberty does not affect the liberty of others. In this context the right to non-vaccinate should not affect others right to health and even life. The Universal Charter of Human Rights states in article 3 the right to life and article 25 states the right to health[30]. So these rights should be sacred not only for the individual but also for the majority.

V. Conclusions

In the light of the new development regarding the anti-vaccination movement new measures must be taken globally but also at a national level. The measure should comprise legislation amendments that have in mind the general interest not only the individual one. As a start the solution presented by the WHO regarding the linkage of social benefits to vaccination seems a feasible solution. Also better communication is needed, and more so when most of the advocates do not possess medical training.

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VOTING IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA[1]

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Abstract: *In the history of democracy, the right to vote, long disputed and set in several stages, has occupied a significant role. From the income based vote, drastically limiting the number of participants, to the universal suffrage, the election within communities, whether local or national, has produced heated theoretical, institutional and practical debates.*
The paper focuses on issues that every responsible citizen should meditate and, more so, the researchers involved in the specific fields: the significance of the vote; content of the right to vote; consequences of the act of voting; the exercise of the right to vote limitation.
As evident from the title, the study of the right to vote will be related to a specific period, the post-communist, marking an evident qualitative distiction of voting during the previous era.

Keywords: ***the right to vote, voting, post-communism, Romania***

1. De ce votăm?

Întrebarea presupune o mare varietate de răspunsuri, pendulând între idealul democrației deliberative și justificarea legitimității regimurilor totalitare, fie că este vorba de decizii, fie că se referă la desemnarea reprezentanților care, ulterior, pe perioada mandatului, vor delibera cu privire la problemele guvernării.

Cetatea ateniană în timpul lui Pericle (sec. V î. Hr.) a cunoscut participarea cetățenilor la treburile publice sub forma unei democrații directe. Materializarea acestei participări era sub forma votului.

În cursul istoriei, dreptul de vot a fost condiționat de avere, statut social sau educație. După al doilea război mondial, expresie a principiului egalității în drepturi, din punct de vedere instituțional, dreptul de vot și-a conturat principalele caractere: universal, direct, secret, liber exprimat și egal. Exercițiul dreptului la vot, recunoscut formal prin constituțiile naționale, este însă fundamental diferit în statele democratice față de cele totalitare.

O sinteză remarcabilă în conturarea conceptului „democrației deliberative" surprind modelele teoretice contemporane ideale ale participării la procesul decizional. Voi prelua din studiu condițiile pe care trebuie să le satisfacă o procedură deliberativă și caracteristicile acesteia.

Sunt formulate următoarele condiții:

a) Toți membrii trebuie să fie egal îndreptățiți să voteze cu privire la modalitatea de soluționare a problemelor colective, fără a fi necesară unanimitatea.

b) Înaintea votării este necesară deliberarea asupra soluției preferabile.

[1] **This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/133675, "Innovation and development in structuring and representing knowledge through doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships" (IDSRC – doc postdoc) project.**

c) Deliberarea trebuie realizată în urma unui dialog liber și deschis între membrii comunității, în cadrul unui forum centralizat sau în variate contexte descentralizate.

Procedura deliberativă ideală are următoarele caracteristici:

a) Participanții se consideră angajați numai față de rezultatele deliberării și de precondițiile acesteia, asumându-și, în același timp, acțiunea în conformitate cu rezultatul.

b) Părților li se cere să ofere argumente în sprijinul sau împotriva propunerilor vehiculate.

c) Participanții posedă un statut legal în raport cu fiecare etapă a deliberării: stabilirea agendei, acceptarea formală a argumentelor și contraargumentelor. Șansele de a contribui la deliberare nu sunt influențate de distribuția existentă a puterii și resurselor.

d) Deliberarea tinde către stabilirea unui consens motivat rațional. Nu se ajunge la consens, se aplică regula majorității.

În timpul comunismului, pentru majoritatea electoratului, este de presupus că motivația principală în a vota era frica. Cum teoreticienii dreptului au avut tendința de a considera votul ca pe o „sarcină de interes obștesc” și nu ca pe un drept constituțional, cei care nu votau se puteau aștepta la sancțiuni mai mult sau mai puțin drastice din partea aparatului de partid. Participarea la vot nu era justificată întrucât niciuna din condițiile de mai sus nu era îndeplinită. Practic, votanții nu aveau ce alege, fiind propusă o singură listă.

Primele alegeri după 1989 au împărțit electoratul, lipsit de experiența democratică, cu excepția persoanelor mai în vârstă, care participaseră la alegerile interbelice, în susținătorii unei tranziții lente, cu păstrarea la conducerea țării a celor din eșalonul al doilea, și adepții unei tranziții radicale, având drept scop instituționalizarea democrației. Frica s-a perpetuat ca motivație. De această dată însă pericolul era văzut în revenirea la guvernarea anterioară celui de-al doilea război mondial, așa cum fusese aprofundată în decursul celor 45 de ani de comunism. Discursul celor care au preluat puterea a valorificat imaginea negativă a „burgheziei și moșierimii”, construită prin intermediul culturii și a științelor socio-umane (burghezia exploatatoare care se va întoarce și va cumpăra țara, pericolul maghiar, moșierimea care-și va recăpăta averea și va transforma țăranii în sclavi). O altă motivație a fost relativa bunăstare instaurată: reducerea săptămânii de lucru la cinci zile, mărirea salariilor, liberalizarea comerțului. Fascinația libertății votului a constituit a treia motivație. În fine, o minoritate a conștientizat importanța votului ca exercițiu democratic, cu atât mai mult cu cât urma a fi aleasă adunarea constituantă, având, pe lângă funcția legislativă ordinară, și prerogativa elaborării și adoptării unei noi constituții.

Alegerile ulterioare, desfășurate după consolidarea partidelor politice, începând cu 1992, au diversificat motivația electoratului, de la interesul imediat, materializat în așa-numitele pomeni electorale, până la credința în programele politice ale partidelor orientate către valorile occidentale. Cetățenii, treptat, au început să conștientizeze importanța participării la guvernare prin alegeri sau referendum.

2. Expunerea textelor constituționale reglementând dreptul de vot, cu scurte comentarii doctrinare

Am ales prevederile Constituţiei din 1965, modificată în 1986, şi din 1991, modificată în 2003.

Constituția din 1965, modificată în 1986

Art. 25 (1) Cetăţenii Republicii Socialiste România au dreptul de a alege şi de a fi aleşi în Marea Adunare Naţională şi în consiliile populare.

(2) Votul este universal, egal, direct şi secret. Au drept de vot toţi cetăţenii care au împlinit vîrsta de 18 ani.

(4) Dreptul de a depune candidaturi aparţine Frontului Democraţiei şi Unităţii Socialiste, cel mai larg organism politic permanent, revoluţionar, democratic, cu caracter reprezentativ, care constituie cadrul organizatoric de unire, sub conducerea Partidului Comunist Român, a forţelor politice şi sociale ale naţiunii noastre socialiste, a tuturor organizaţiilor de masă şi obşteşti, pentru participarea întregului popor la înfăptuirea politicii interne şi externe a partidului şi statului, la conducerea tuturor domeniilor de activitate.

(5) Alegătorii au dreptul de a revoca oricînd pe deputat potrivit procedurii prevăzute de lege.

Într-o definiție doctrinară socialistă, dreptul era ansamblul de norme generale de conduită, ce exprima voința de stat a clasei dominante, iar, în condițiile victoriei depline a socialismului, voința tuturor oamenilor muncii, a întregului popor, sub conducerea clasei muncitoare, care reglementa, potrivit interesului acestora, relațiile sociale, și a cărei respectare era susceptibilă de a fi asigurată prin forța coercitivă a statului.

Dreptul de a alege înseamna posibilitatea garantată de lege tuturor cetățenilor de a participa la desemnarea organelor reprezentative ale statului, căruia îi corespundea obligația organelor de stat, organelor și organizațiilor obștești, precum și a cetățenilor care aveau sarcini și atribuții în organizarea și desfășurarea alegerilor, de a crea și asigura condițiile pentru exprimarea voinței alegătorilor. Exprimarea voinței alegătorilor constituia însuși actul votării.

Deputații puteau fi revocați în cazul în care nu-și îndeplineau îndatoririle ce le reveneau sau când, prin fapte contrare eticii și echității socialiste, pierdeau încrederea alegătorilor din circumscripția în care fuseseră aleși. Dreptul de a propune revocarea deputatului aparținea Frontului Democrației și Unității Socialiste, și era exercitat din proprie inițiativă sau la cererea organizațiilor care îl compuneau ori a alegătorilor, pe circumscripții electorale.

Dreptul Frontului Democrației și Unității Socialiste de a depune candidaturi pentru alegeri era considerat o măsură de profund și autentic democratism, deoarece Frontul Democrației și Unității Socialiste era cel mai larg organism politic permanent, revoluționar, democratic, cu caracter reprezentativ, cadrul organizatoric de unire sub conducerea Partidului Comunist Român, a forțelor politice și sociale ale națiunii noastre. În paleta de măsuri menite să adâncească democratismul sistemului nostru electoral se înscria și posibilitatea propunerii mai multor candidați pentru fiecare circumscripție electorală.

Subliniindu-se rolul conducător al unicului partid, eventuala opțiune se manifesta doar în privința persoanei. Practic, persoanele erau impuse la nivel de partid astfel încât actul votării nu avea decât un caracter pur formal.

Alegătorul vota în camera sau în cabina de vot, lăsând nesters în buletinul de vot numele candidatului pe care-l votează şi ştergând numele candidaţilor pe care nu-i votează. În cazul în care alegătorul lăsa nesterse numele tuturor candidaţilor înscrişi pe buletin, se considera vot „pentru", în favoarea, aceluia dintre candidaţi pentru care a votat cel mai mare număr de alegători din circumscripţie.

Constituţia României din 1991, modificată în 2003

Art. 34: (1) Cetăţenii au drept de vot de la vârsta de 18 ani, împliniţi până în ziua alegerilor inclusiv.

Art. 38 din Constituție prevede dreptul fundamental de a alege în Parlamentul European.

Art. 62 (1) Camera Deputaților și Senatul sunt alese prin vot universal, egal, direct, secret și liber exprimat, potrivit legii electorale.

Art. 74 (1) Inițiativa legislativă aparține ... unui număr de 100.000 de cetățeni cu drept de vot.

Art. 81 (1) Președintele României este ales prin vot universal, egal, direct, secret și liber exprimat.

Art. 90 (1) Președintele României, după consultarea Parlamentului, poate cere poporului să-și exprime, prin referendum, voința cu privire la problemele de interes național.

Art. 95 (3) Dacă propunerea de suspendare din funcție este aprobată, în cel mult 30 de zile se organizează un referendum pentru demiterea Președintelui.

Art. 163 Constituția intră în vigoare la data aprobării ei prin referendum.

Art. 151 Revizuirea este definitivă după aprobarea ei prin referendum.

Dreptul la vot se încadrează în categoria drepturilor politice, acele drepturi care au ca obiect exclusiv participarea cetățenilor la conducerea statului, încrise de regulă în constituțiile naționale.

Caracterele votului nu au fost menționate și nici obiectul votului, așa cum se întâmpla în constituțiile socialiste. Caracterele votului pot fi însă deduse din principiile aplicabile drepturilor și libertăților fundamentale: universalitatea și egalitatea. Celelalte trei caractere sunt menționate în legile speciale sau în prevederile constituționale referitoare la exercitarea de vot: caracterul direct, secret și libertatea de exprimare a votului.

Egalitatea votului presupune că fiecare cetățean are dreptul la un singur vot pentru alegerea unui anumit organ de stat, pe de o parte, iar, pe de altă parte, că decupajele electorale (circumscripții, colegii) sunt egale ca număr de cetățeni. Asigurarea singularității votului se realizează prin înscrierea cetățeanului pe o singură listă electorală, prin deţinerea unei singure cărţi de alegător etc. Egalitatea decupajelor electorale este realizabilă în cazul scrutinurilor majoritar uninominale. Scrutinul proporţional de listă presupune reglementarea normei de reprezentare, un număr abstract la care se împarte numărul de locuitori dintr-o anumită unitate administrativ-teritorială care formează un decupaj electoral.

Caracterul direct al votului exclude posibilitatea delegării acestui drept unei alte persoane.

Caracterul liber exprimat al votului presupune facultatea alegătorului de a-și manifesta sau nu, în mod liber, opțiunea pentru o anumită listă, candidat sau o anumită opțiune vizând

o problemă care ține de guvernare. O limitare a libertății de exprimare a votului poate fi instituirea obligativității (Grecia).

Exercitarea dreptului de vot este strâns legată de garantarea și respectarea altor drepturi și libertăți fundamentale, între care se disting libertatea conștiinței, libertatea de exprimare și dreptul la informare.

Încălcarea dreptului la vot prin votul multiplu (egalitatea votului și caracterul direct) sau prin dezinformarea/informarea greșită și manipularea electoratului, având la bază discriminarea, cu excederea cadrul legal (libertatea de exprimare a votului), vor fi ilustrate în cele ce urmează, la punctele 4 și 5.

3. Comportamentul electoratului după 1990 a fost influențat de exercitarea dreptului de vot în perioada anterioară

La începutul anilor 1960, Gabriel Almond și Sydney Verba au cercetat legătura dintre cultura politică și sistemele democratice, dezvoltând o teorie a culturii civice care conține un grad ridicat de încredere în rândul populației și un sprijin temeinic pentru formulele democratice, în ciuda nemulțumirii față de diverși reprezentanți ai puterii.

Cultura politică a majorității covârșitoare a electoratului din România nu includea, sub nicio formă, o reprezentare asupra formulelor democratice care cuprindeau, ca valori principale, pluralismul și instituțiile politice. Dimpotrivă, analizând textele constituționale redate mai sus, valorile în care credeau românii erau unipartidismul și persoana conducătorului. Un reputat politolog observa că, din punct de vedere istoric, românii sunt pregătiți să accepte un tratament mai rău din partea propriilor conducători decât vecinii lor din alte state balcanice. Fiind dependenți de stat într-o proporție foarte mare, sentimentul civic a fost întotdeauna slab, ceea ce a determinat ca democrația să fie întotdeauna firavă. Esența democrației – participare și sentiment al includerii cetățenilor – este încă, în mare măsură, absentă în România.

Aprecierea valorilor promovate/profesate de formațiunile politice care au participat la alegeri a fost reflectată în opțiunea electoratului pentru una dintre aceste formațiuni. Exclud argumentul lipsei opțiunilor motivat de faptul că există o relație directă între caracteristicile electoratului și calitățile clasei politice, în sensul că cele din urmă sunt o reflexie destul de fidelă a primelor. Nu trebuie neglijată nici interdependența. Prin urmare, eficiența tehnicilor de campanie electorală, pe de o parte, și a efectelor actului de guvernare, pe de altă parte, apreciate sau respinse de către votanți, oferă o perspectivă asupra motivațiilor acestora în exercitarea dreptului constituțional.

România nu și-a format niciodată o elită care să combine apărarea propriei poziții cu un efort autentic și susținut de a îmbunătăți situația și perspectivele populației. Românii au fost văzuți mai mult ca niște supuși decât ca niște cetățeni de către regimurile de culori politice contrastante care s-au perindat la conducere.

Ralf Dahrendorf susținea că, dacă monopolul partidului este înlocuit doar de victoria maselor, totul va fi pierdut destul de curând, pentru că masele n-au structură și nici permanență... Problema cheie este cum să umpli golul dintre stat și oameni – uneori, precum în România, un gol de dimensiuni înspăimântătoare – cu activități care, prin autonomia lor,

creează surse de putere. Până atunci, constituirea libertății, sau chiar a economiei de piață, socială sau de alt fel, va rămâne suspendată în aer.

În țările cu o experiență redusă a procedurilor democratice există și posibilitatea manipulării maselor de indivizi creduli și adesea dezorientați, de către aventurieri cinici sau oportuniști, iresponsabili, care pot exploata nemulțumirile și frustrările colective în scopul de a pune mâna pe putere.

Ideologia se vădește mult mai tare decât cultura, exact pe dos decât credea Huntigton, și aceasta nu trebuie să ne mire, pentru că nicio societate nu a dus atât de în profunzime ingineria socială precum cea comunistă.

Limitele prezentului articol impun abordarea destul de succintă doar a o parte din aspectele perpetuării culturii politice dezvoltate în anii comunismului după ce, din punct de vedere formal, România a fost consacrată ca stat de drept democratic în care pluralismul este recunoscut ca valoare constituțională.

4. Alegerile din 1990 și 1992 - inegalitatea dintre FSN și partidele istorice

În cursul constituirii Frontului Salvării Naționale, Ion Iliescu a anunțat că, după o scurtă guvernare de tranziție și organizarea primelor alegeri, formațiunea politică se va autodizolva. Nu a fost așa. În schimb, la sfârșitul lunii ianuarie 1990, invocând voința populară, FSN a făcut publică intenția de a participa la alegeri. Firavele partide istorice au protestat prin organizarea unei ample manifestații în capitală pe 28 ianuarie 1990. O zi mai târziu, într-o atitudine foarte asemănătoare cu practicile fostului partid comunist, FSN a răspuns printr-o contramanifestație.

Constituirea primului organ deliberativ după decembrie 1989, Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională, a dezavantajat partidele care formau opoziția. Jumătate din membri proveneau din FSN, iar cealaltă jumătate a revenit partidelor politice înființate/reînființate. Multe dintre acestea însă promovau politica partidului majoritar, comportându-se ca sateliți ai acestuia. În aceste condiții, reflectarea opiniei minorității în decizii era practic nulă.

Finanțarea partidelor s-a făcut discrimatoriu. În timp ce FSN-ul avea la dispoziție fondurile partidului comunist, partidele istorice și-au constituit bugetul, în principal, din donații și cotizațiile membrilor.

Televiziunea națională, implicată activ în evenimentele din decembrie 1989, a avut o contribuție importantă la construirea imaginii principalilor actori, dintre care menționez pe Ion Iliescu și Petre Roman. Lipsa alternativei și un program limitat la două ore pe zi în timpul regimului Ceaușescu au determinat o apetență dezvoltată pentru televiziune ca mijloc de informare și divertisment. Prezentul demonstrează rolul foarte important al acesteia în conturarea opțiunilor electoratului și, de aici, fie interesul clasei politice pentru o „alianță” cu acționarii societăților care dețin posturi de televiziune, fie interesul acestora din urmă de a înființa partide și de a candida în alegeri (Dan Voiculescu, Dan Diaconescu, Sebastian Ghiță).

Alegerile din 1990 au fost câștigate cu o majoritate covârșitoare de FSN, care, prin măsurile/lipsa măsurilor importante și necesare ulterioare și-a răsplătit/consolidat electoratul – constituiri de proprietate pentru suprafețe de 0,5 ha; mărirea salariilor; refuzul întocmirii

unor inventare clare ale averii naționale; finanțarea haotică a unor domenii economice neperformante.

Chiar în minoritate, partidele de opoziție au încercat să creeze premisele unor alegeri viitoare corecte.

În privința organizării alegerilor, după o primă rundă de discuții, atât parlamentarii puterii, cât și cei ai opoziției au căzut de acord asupra datei. Problema majoră era însă influențarea electoratului de către candidații la președinție. În vreme ce parlamentarii puterii susțineau păstrarea sistemului din 1990, partidele opoziției unite au pledat în favoarea decalării alegerilor, motivat de practicile democratice occidentale.

Apoi, tot în 1992, s-au făcut presiuni pentru modificarea legii finanțării partidelor politice. La 9 ianuarie 1992, FSN a respins propunerea de lege pentru finanțarea partidelor politice sub pretextul lipsei banilor, care erau necesari pentru plata indemnizațiilor persoanelor cu handicap, a salariilor profesorilor, și finanțării mineritului din Valea Jiului. În privința mass-media – televiziunea română – s-a cerut schimbarea conducerii.

Alegerile din 1992 au numărul voturilor nule: incultura electoratului; anularea intenționată a buletinelor de vot de către membrii birourilor electorale; 15% pe listele speciale.

Guvernului României (Henry F. Carey, 1995) a susținut că deficiențele tehnice și administrative apărute la organizarea alegerilor nu au influențat în niciun fel rezultatele, probleme apărute și contestate fiind minore. Una dintre acestea, numărul mare de buletine de vot anulate (10%) s-a datorat votării mai multor formațiuni politice pe același buletin de vot. Motivația a fost asemănarea între simbolurile electorale și confuzia în ceea ce privește votarea propriu-zisă, ca în cazul CDR și partidele formate din grupul etnic al țiganilor. Una dintre concluziile observatorilor a fost că buletinele de vot pentru CDR au fost ștampilate a doua oară (Dan Petreanu, Associated Press).

Implicarea serviciilor de informații în alegeri prin manipulare, intimidare, cosmetizarea sondajelor a fost sesizată de către observatori și politologi. Mulți dintre sociologi au fost informatori, colaboratori sau chiar ofițeri acoperiți ai securității. Colaborarea a continuat și după 1989, fie pe cale activă, fie prin șantaj.

Pavel Câmpeanu (1993) a identificat principalele categorii de votanți și caracteristicile acestora:

a) votanți FDSN: proporție mai scăzută de participanți la acțiunile din decembrie 1989; văd, de predilecție, în ruptura din decembrie o revoluție; au despre perioada postrevoluționară o reprezentare mai ezitantă; accentul dominant al acestei reprezentări este consimțirea; referențialul general al acestei reprezentări este aspirația către continuitate/discontinuitate; starea de spirit generală este preponderent conciliatoare; puterea nouă este percepută ca o alternativă operațională a celei vechi, de unde nevoia de a o sprijini; impulsul spre personificarea soluțiilor își găsește obiectul printre actorii care dețin puterea, Ion Iliescu;

b) votanți CDR: proporție mai ridicată de participanți la acțiunile din decembrie 1989; văd, de predilecție, în ruptura din decembrie 1989 un complot intern; au despre perioada postrevoluționară o reprezentare mai fermă; accentul dominant al acestei reprezentări este disocierea critică; referențialul general al acestei reprezentări este aspirația către

discontinuitate; starea de spirit este preponderent vindicativă; puterea nouă este percepută ca o prelungire rectificativă a celei vechi, de unde nevoia de a o combate; impulsul spre personificarea soluțiilor nu-și găsește obiectul printre actorii care conduc opoziția.

În turul al II-lea al alegerilor prezindențiale din 1992, Ion Iliescu nu a ezitat să folosească, în mod negativ, imaginea creată de regimul comunist şi pe care o avea electoratul despre perioada interbelică, printr-un afiș cu următorul conținut: „Vreți paraziți monarhici, bișnițari odioși, trădători și cozi de topor? Votați Cheia! Vreți repetarea genocidelor, uciderea țăranilor și a muncitorilor, sub patronajul monarhiei și al partidelor istorice burgheze? Votați Cheia! Doriți o dictatură de dreapta, fascistă, conducători răzbunători, moșnegi sclerozați în Parlament și în guvern, condamnări în detenție cu vărsări de sânge, neonazismul în acțiune, așa cum s-a mai întâmplat? Votați Cheia!”

În ce măsură a contribuit acest tip de mesaj la câștigarea alegerilor este greu de stabilit, însă Ion Iliescu a obținut un procent de 61,4%. Ca partid, Frontul Democratic al Salvării Naționale (FDSN) a fost adunat în grabă după scindarea FSN, în primăvara lui 1992. El a avut norocul să se confrunte cu o opoziție de slabă valoare, lipsită până și de cea mai elementară abordare profesională a campaniei electorale. Convenția Democratică din România a continuat să facă o greșeală fundamentală comparându-l pe Iliescu cu Ceaușescu. Toți alegătorii trăiseră epoca lui Ceaușescu și, având ca punct de referință România de dinainte de 1989, au văzut că deosebirile dintre cei doi cântăreau mai mult decât asemănările. Așadar, opoziția a contribuit la creșterea imaginii lui Iliescu prin aceea că l-a comparat cu predecesorul lui.

5. Timpurile apropiate

Liviu Dragnea a fost acuzat de procurorii DNA că ar fi organizat un sistem naţional de influență prin care ar fi fraudat votul la referendumul din 12 iulie 2012, de demitere a președintelui Traian Băsescu, prin votul multiplu, turismul electoral și falsificarea de semnături. Scopul a fost asigurarea unei prezențe la vot de 60% pentru validarea referendumului.

Infracțiunile avute în vedere au fost: folosirea influenței sau autorității de către o persoană care deține o funcție de conducere într-un partid, în scopul obținerii pentru sine sau pentru altul de foloase necuvenite; asociere pentru săvârșirea de infracțiuni; instigare la violarea, prin orice mijloace, a secretului votului de către membrii biroului electoral al secției de votare ori de către alte persoane; instigare la promisiunea, oferirea sau darea de bani ori alte foloase în scopul de a determina alegătorul să voteze în cadrul referendumului.

Alte modalități de modificare a rezultatului referendumului ar fi fost denaturarea pe listele suplimentare a ultimei cifre a CNP-ului unor persoane a căror semnatură a fost falsificată pe listă, pentru a nu permite programelor de calculator specializate să identifice votul multiplu, falsificarea de semnături în numele unor persoane decedate, ce au rămas înscrise pe listele electorale, falsificarea de semnături ale multor alegători plecați din țară în momentul referendumului, votul exercitat de minori și de persoane cărora le-a fost interzis dreptul la vot printr-o hotărâre judecatorească penală, neaplicarea autocolantelor cu mențiunea "VOTAT" pe cărțile / buletinele de identitate ale votanților.

Pe 15 mai 2015, Liviu Dragnea a fost condamnat la un an de închisoare cu suspendare. Deși nu mai ocupă nicio funcție de stat sau în cadrul partidului, PSD încă îi recunoaște calitatea de lider, având încă puterea de a influența deciziile politice.

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IDENTITY CRISIS IN THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

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Abstract:The phenomenon of international migration has brought changes at the economic, social, familial level and at the space and identity level. The fact that the world of international migration has a chaotic dimension, based on various causes, modalities, implications and effects-consequences; it reverberates on the individual and collective identity, causing a crisis at the identity level. Such identity crisis manifests itself through the change that occurs at the level of all components involved in the phenomenon of migration, and with repercussions on the whole society. Social relations and interaction with the destination society are those who somewhat put their mark on the individual identity, defining his autonomy and his perception of the living world. The simple movement and integration of the individual into the migration community draws from itself, with small steps, change in general and, in particular, identity-shifting, and globally, from groups, small communities to communities and societies as a whole and produces an identity crisis. In this article we want to highlight the changes at individual and collective level as a result of the phenomenon of international migration and to highlight the short and long term effects of these changes that are found in a perpetual identity crisis.

Keywords*: identity crisis, international migration, change, individual, community, society*

Pe fondul migrației internaționale se produc schimbări identitare, colective și individuale, care influențează direct sau indirect, imediat sau într-o perioadă mai lungă de timp întregul mers al societății. Schimbările apar odată cu decizia de emigrare, de la integrarea și adaptarea în mediul țării de migrație. Odată integrat, individul asimilează noi valori, principii, mentalități, stil de viață, îndepărtându-se în timp de ceea ce-l definea inițial ca si cetățean al țării de origine. Pe fondul acestor schimbări identitare individulale se produc schimbări colective, grupale, societare, care în timp influențează puternic întreaga societate, producând în cele din urmă schimbări identitare globale. Pentru a detalia aceste aspecte, articolul de față va analiza fenomenul migrației internaționale și implicațiile la nivel individual și colectiv, schimbările identitare în condițiile emigrării, și nu în ultimul rând criza identitară care se formează și se perpetuează sub influența schimbărilor identitare.

Migrația internațională și implicații la nivel individual și colectiv

Migraţia internaţională în general şi migraţia internaţională a forţei de muncă în special a luat o mare amploare în ultimii ani şi a devenit un fenomen de mare interes în domenii precum sociologie, demografie, economie, antropologie etc., dar şi pentru pentru unele instituţii şi organizaţii naţionale şi internaţionale cu interes în ce priveşte spectrul socio-uman, politic şi economic. Migraţia internaţională este un fenomen de mare amploare în ultimii ani și reprezintă mobilitatea persoanelor care pleacă din ţara de origine în vederea stabilirii în mod temporar sau definitiv într-o altă ţară şi apare ca reacţie la schimbările economice, de structură socială şi de calitate a vieţii.

Migraţia internaţională a forţei de muncă, care este descrisă ca fiind „deplasarea de persoane singulare sau de grupuri, familii în afara graniţelor naţionale, în speranţa unor condiţii de trai mai bune."(Albu, Alexandru; Roşu, Hamzescu Ion, p. 11.), este în esenţă

procesul de trecere a forţei de muncă dintr-o ţară în alta, în vederea desfăşurării unei activităţi în afara ţării, urmând ca emigranţii să fie retribuiţi de persoane fizice, juridice sau de alte organisme pentru care desfăşoară activităţile respective. Oamenii au asociat de cele mai multe ori actul migraţiei cu realizarea unor aspiraţii de viaţă, noi posibilităţi, îndeplinirea unor idealuri, ţeluri sau oportunităţi, care de altfel au avut anumite implicaţii şi consecinţe la nivel individual şi colectiv. La nivel individual, decizia de migraţie este rezultatul evaluării raţionale de către individ a beneficiilor şi costurilor migraţiei la muncă în străinătate, comparându-le cu câştigurile în condiţiile în care ar rămâne în ţara de origine. La nivel colectiv, decizia de migraţie este luată de membrii grupului la iniţiativa unui lider de grup, în urma analizării costurilor şi beneficiilor în situaţia de emigrare şi/sau în cazul rămânerii în locul de origine.

În ultimii ani, s-a înregistrat o creştere a migraţiei permanente şi a migraţiei forţei de muncă temporare ca urmare, „pe de o parte, a intensităţii fazei de expansiune de la sfârşitul anilor ’90, iar, pe de altă parte, a dezvoltării tehnologiei informaţiei şi comunicaţiei, sănătăţii şi educaţiei, sectoare care necesită forţă de muncă înalt calificată.” (Tudorache Carmen Mihaela, p. 97, www.ectap.ro) În acest context, s-au resimţit anumite schimbări şi mutaţii la nivel individual şi colectiv. În privinţa implicării în muncă, principalele mutaţii înregistrate ca urmare a fenomenului migrator sunt: „diminuarea mobilităţii forţei de muncă; imigranţii manifestă interes în obţinerea unui loc de muncă stabil, chiar dacă uneori mai prost plătit; orientarea forţei de muncă străine spre sectorul serviciilor, inclusiv pe seama refuzului ofertelor de muncă în sectoare industriale primare, tradiţional avute în vedere de cei care nu au membri de familie sau prieteni care să-i ajute să se integreze în societatea de destinaţie; implicarea întreprinderilor mici şi mijlocii în susţinerea imigrării forţei de muncă, uneori prin acţiuni la limita legii; creşterea ponderii femeilor în activităţi economice, iniţial mai ales în servicii casnice.”(*Ibidem*)

Migraţia internaţională a forţei de muncă este mult mai bine evidenţiată odată cu analiza cauzelor care au determinat-o şi a consecinţelor la nivel individual şi colectiv. În decursul timpului, au existat emigranţi care s-au deplasat în arii geografice noi ca urmare a unei situaţii economice precare, a unor persecuţii culturale şi religioase sau datorită unor condiţii politice adverse. Cei mai mulţi dintre factorii care influenţează fluxurile migratorii au fost cei economici (foamete, şomaj, venituri insuficiente, lipsa terenurilor agricole, lipsa unei locuinţe etc.). Fluxurile migratorii determinate de asemenea cauze sunt prin structura lor voluntare, dar există, de asemenea, şi cauze involuntare (transferare forţată a unor populaţii dintr-un continent în altul, războaie, expulzare, calamităţi naturale etc.). Cu privire la efectele migraţiei internaţionale, acestea sunt atât pozitive, cât şi negative. Cu privire la cele negative, raportat la migraţia forţei de muncă „pe de o parte, sunt „dispariţii” care afectează imediat forţa de muncă pentru că indivizii ce pleacă aparţin acesteia, iar pe de altă parte, sunt „dispariţii” al căror efect se va manifesta în viitor, atunci când indivizii ce pleacă ar fi devenit parte a forţei de muncă. ”(Zamfir, Cătălin; Stoica, Laura (coord.), p. 292). Acest aspect este legat în special de plecările cu efect imediat, ale acelor persoane cu vârstă activă ce fie au un loc de muncă, la care renunţă pentru realizarea actului de migraţie, fie sunt în căutarea unuia mai motivant din punct de vedere al remuneraţiei şi nu numai. Punând accent pe termenul de „dispariţie”, efectul cel mai evident pentru ţara de origine este de pierdere a forţei de muncă.

Cu privire la efectele pozitive, acestea sunt remarcate pe plan economic, prin contribuţiile financiare ale emigranţilor care aduc completări şi profit la economia naţională. Trimiterea periodică, de către emigranţi, a unei sume de bani în ţara de origine este importantă în egală măsură atât la nivel naţional, cât şi gospodăresc.

La nivel individual, efectul pozitiv este remarcat prin faptul că emigranţii îşi pot găsi un loc de muncă în funcţie de aptitudini şi calificare, de cele mai multe ori obţinând un salariu mai mare decât în ţara de origine, ceea ce poate duce la o îmbunătăţire reală a situaţiei materiale. În ce priveşte dreptul la libera circulaţie la muncă în străinătate, avantajele sociale şi fiscale acordate lucrătorilor emigranţi sunt aceleaşi cu cele ale cetăţenilor ţării respective, iar în cazul în care emigrantul îşi aduce familia, şi membrii ei beneficiază de aceleaşi avantaje sociale. Emigranţii pot urma anumite cursuri de formare profesională, iar experienţa şi cunoştinţele acumulate în străinătate vor putea fi valorificate în cazul reîntoarcerii acestora în ţară. Cu privire la efectele negative, acceptarea unui loc de muncă în străinătate de către un emigrant face incertă evoluţia profesională pe termen mediu şi lung. Astfel, lucrătorii imigranţi sunt de multe ori dispuşi la „compromisuri în ceea ce priveşte tipul de activitate pe care urmează să o desfăşoare în străinătate raportat la studiile, calificările şi aptitudinile dobândite în statul de origine. Întreruperea activităţii specializate are un impact negativ asupra continuităţii profesionale, precum şi asupra abilităţilor necesare pentru practicarea profesiei respective la întoarcerea în ţară.”(Tudorache Carmen Mihaela, p. 97, www.ectap.ro)

În ce priveşte angajarea într-un post temporar, fără asumarea unor acorduri bilaterale în domeniul securităţii sociale, la întoarcerea în ţară emigrantul poate întâmpina dificultăţi la valorificarea vechimii în muncă dobândite în străinătate sau la beneficierea de anumite programe de securitate socială. De asemenea, lucrătorii emigranţi nu se informează, sau nu sunt informaţi suficient, cu privire la drepturile, oportunităţile, condiţiile de viaţă şi de muncă existente în ţara de migraţie, acest lucru având repercusiuni la nivel individual.

Schimbări identitare ca urmare a migraţiei internaţionale

Orice individ este supus schimbării în funcţie de mediul social şi grupul de apartenenţă. El nu se naşte, ci devine membru al unei societăţi, iar din punct de vedere social se constituie în experienţa zilnică care impune tipificare şi auto-tipificare. Formarea identităţii unui individ are la bază socializarea prin imitaţia unor modele de referinţă, însuşirea de norme, valori, interacţiunea cu alte medii şi structuri sociale, recunoaşterea şi integrarea în alte grupuri sociale, apărând la un anumit moment interiorizarea şi transformarea individului. Astfel, identitatea unui emigrant se produce în relaţia cu alţi indivizi, fiind puternic influenţată de procesul de interacţiune unde se realizează un schimb de informaţii, păreri, opinii, convingeri între indivizi. Schimbarea identitară apare odată cu decizia de plecare în străinătate şi se face remarcată pe tot parcursul fluxului migratoriu, evidenţiindu-se pe întregul proces o serie de factori sesizaţi prin metode statistice, sociologice, demografice: „influenţa asupra migrantului a costurilor rupturii de locul natal şi de viaţa pe care o duce în mod normal; gradul de izolare în societatea de destinaţie şi raporturile pe care le mai are cu ţara de origine; măsura în care migranţii sunt însoţiţi de membri de familie sau persoane apropiate; influenţa exercitată de locul de origine şi de cel de destinaţie; comunicarea migrantului cu ţara de origine şi percepţia pe care el o transmite conaţionalilor săi; volumul şi importanţa migraţiei pentru statele receptoare şi pentru cele de origine.”(Rusu, Valeriu, 2003, p. 32)

Astfel, prin procesul de migrare, individul suportă anumite pierderi, directe sau indirecte: pierderea locului în care s-a născut, a prietenilor, a rudelor, a mediului cu care era obișnuit, pierderea într-o anumită măsură a limbii materne, element esențial în definirea identității, pierderea spațiului socio-cultural, determinant pentru formarea identității, pierderea sentimentului de apartenență, de siguranță. Toate aceste pierderi sunt compensate într-o anumită măsură de posibilitățile și oportunitățile din țara de migrație, însă, pentru a se bucura de ele, emigrantul trece prin mai multe etape, de adaptare, asimilare și integrare care vin cu noi presiuni sociale, relaționale, culturale și identitare asupra emigrantului. Astfel, interacțiunea, specificitatea, diversitatea și dinamica determinată de fenomenul migratoriu, implică asumarea unor identități multiple, supuse diverselor procese și influențe, care se modifică în raport cu schimbările din societatea de primire. Procesul de integrare este o premisă a multiplicării și schimbării identităților individuale și colective.

Emigranții suferă schimbări identitare odată cu integrarea și adaptarea în țara de migrației. Aceste schimbări sunt identificate la nivelul mentalității, stimei de sine, principiilor de viață, stilului de viață, percepțiilor și valorilor, imaginii și percepției despre sine, imaginii și percepției despre familie și comunitatea de origine, culturii și religiei, atitudinii și comportamentului, relaționării și raportării la ceilalți, atitudinii față de muncă și față de profesie etc. De asemenea, sunt identificate schimbări în reprezentarea și imaginea naționalității, raportat atât la mediul țării de migrație, cât și la cel de origine. Aceste schimbări sunt considerate „normale", având în vedere că emigranții aparțin unui nou mediu social, cu o nouă cultură și civilizație, au alte repere sociale/existențiale, au alte relații sociale și un alt grup de apartenență, învață noi strategii de muncă, adoptă un nou mod de raportare la societate și la propriul sine. De altfel, toate aceste schimbări sunt reflectate și regăsite în următoarele dimensiuni identitare:

- *identitatea individuală* - prin schimbarea mentalității, stimei de sine, principiilor de viață, percepțiilor și valorilor, stilului de viață, imaginii și percepției despre sine, imaginii și percepției despre familie și comunitatea de origine, imaginii și percepției despre viață, prin schimbarea meseriei/profesiei;

- *identitatea socială* - prin schimbarea grupului de apartenență, prin îndepărtarea de grupului de referință, prin modificarea relațiilor cu familia și comunitatea de origine, prin schimbarea atitudinii și comportamentului în societate;

- *identitatea națională* - prin detașarea de sentimentul de patriotism și schimbarea atitudinii și reacției față de propria naționalitate și față de țară;

- *identitatea culturală* - prin schimbarea atitudinii față de tradiții și față de cultura națională, prin schimbarea unor elemente culturale și religioase (sau chiar a religiei);

- *identitatea familială* - prin schimbarea rolurilor și responsabilităților familiale și modificarea funcționalității familiei; (Viorica-Cristina, Cormos, 2011, p.266)

Schimbările apărute la nivelul identității se fac resimțite în timp și influențează în mod direct individul, dar și mediul din care face parte acel individ, influențează colectivitatea și bunul mers al activităților din cadrul acesteia, iar la rândul lor, din interacțiune și reacțiune își fac apariția alți factori de influentă care contribuie la criza identitară globală prin care trece societatea contemporană.

Criza identitară- formare și perpetuare sub influența schimbării identitare

Criza identitară apare în toate existențele și la toate vârstele și este însoțită de zdruncinarea credințelor vitale, a valorilor puternic interiorizate, a modelelor care servesc ca bază pentru existența ordinară. În ce privește fenomenul migrației internaționale, criza identitară apare odată cu decizia emigrantului de a pleca în străinătate. Schimbarea identitară se produce într-o măsură mai mare sau mică, în funcție de o multitudine de factori, punând o amprentă puternică asupra anumitor generații, națiuni - afectând în mod direct culturile, valorile, principiile etc., formându-se în totalitate o criză identitară. În vederea conturării *Teoriei identitar-migraționiste* (*Ibidem*, p.263) sunt consemnate aspecte legate de schimbarea identitară: aceasta se produce în timp, în funcţie de o serie de factori conjuncturali şi de personalitate; determină decizia şi nu contextul social în care se află emigrantul; este dimensiunea cauzală a deciziei; conduce la decizii diferite pe anumite dimensiuni identitare; poate fi limitată prin implicarea instituţiilor de referinţă. „Orice schimbare este generatoare de „mici crize": ea necesită o muncă „asupra sa", o modificare a anumitor deprinderi, o perturbare a rutinelor anterioare. Trebuie să înveți din nou, uneori să o iei de la capăt." (Dubar, Claude, 2003, p.157)

Teoria identitar-migrațională evidenţiază faptul că schimbarea identitară apare la trei tipuri de emigranți:

- *emigrantul I* este cel care odată cu intrarea în ţara de migraţie, tinde să îşi acopere nevoile de bază, fiziologice, de siguranţă şi ambientale, prin căutarea unui loc de muncă, a unei locuinţe şi a noi relaţii sociale în care să-şi poată găsi sprijinul (cunoştinţe, biserică etc.);

- *emigrantul II* este cel care, prin etapele de adaptare, integrare şi asimilare urmăreşte să îşi îndeplinească nevoia socială, de cunoaştere şi a stimei de sine. În această etapă emigrantul se integrează şi se afiliază unui nou grup social, învaţă noi elemente culturale şi se implică în procesul de cunoaştere a noului mediu, a culturii şi civilizaţiei;

- emigrantul III este cel care a trecut prin procesul *de schimbare identitară od*ată cu schimbarea mentalităţii, principiilor de viaţă, percepţiilor, normelor şi valorilor, reprezentării sociale şi naţionale, prin implicarea în noua viaţă socială şi profesională etc. (Viorica-Cristina, Cormos, 2011, p.266)

Aceste schimbări pot fi analizate ca și crize identitare reacționale care au urmat unui eveniment neprevăzut sau în urma unor acțiuni neașteptate care tranșează cursul timpului trăit și provoacă anumite pierderi, perturbări relaționale și o schimbare a subiectivității. Ele vizează în special ceea ce este mai profund și mai intim în raportul său cu lumea, cu ceilalți, dar și cu sine. Sinele este cel agresat, umilit, simțindu-se „orfan de identificările sale trecute, rănit de credințele sale încorporate, rușinat adesea de sentimentele celorlalți față de „sine însuși". Aceste crize sunt identitare pentru că ele perturbă imaginea de sine, respectul, definiția însăși pe care persoana și-o dă „sie însuși". (Dubar, Claude, 2003, p.159)

Pe fondul acestor crize identitare individuale se produc crize identitare la nivel global. Orice criză identitară individuală trimite la legături „primare" ale existeței. A te pomeni „singur cu tine însuți", sentiment cu care se confruntă de cele mai multe ori emigranții, presupune a te pomeni singur cu legăturile primare. Pentru a umple golul generat de pierdere, revenim la sursele Eului nostru, un Eu fuzional, comunitar, reinventat, regăsit ca acel timp al contopirii cu părinții, familia, comunitatea și grupul de apartenentă. Însă distanța cauzată de

emigrare crează un gol între sinele individual și Eul de la origini, acest lucru determinând o și mai mare criză identitară, individuală și colectivă. În acest sens, există o abordare sociologică a crizelor identitare care constă în a înțelege „în ce fel aceste crize rezultă din șocuri biografice legate de procese sociale și în ce fel ele implică, odată cu dificultățile materiale, o punere în cauză, într-o măsură oarecare radicală, a unui „model identitar", a unui sistem de credințe (depre sine, despre ceilalți, despre lume) socialmente construit, mai ales, a definițiilor (imagini, respect) de sine devenite insuportabile pentru alții, ilegitime penrtu sine, negative pentru toată lumea."(*Ibidem,* p.161)

Individul "în criză" este un subiect social care trebuie să regăsească referințe, repere, o nouă definiție despre el însuși, despre ceilalți și despre lume. Aceste noi repere permit treptat încorporarea unei alte configurații identitare, a „unui alt aranjament între formele "comunitare" și "societare", între "identități pentru celălalt" și "identități pentru sine". (*Ibidem,* p.163) Orice schimbare de configurație identitară trece prin tipul respectiv de criză care însoțește în general momentele de răscruce în istoria și existența umană.

În concluzie, toate aceste schimări identitare apărute la nivel individual și colectiv se înglobează într-o criză identitară, pentru început la nivel idividual, iar în timp la nivel global. Aceste crize determină o perturbare a relațiilor, a comunicării între rude, prieteni, membrii ai familiei - între cei cu același "sânge" - o înghețare a sentimentelor, atașamentelor și o deteriorare a culturii, tradițiilor, valorilor, principiilor și nu în cele din urmă a rădăcinilor identitare. Pe acest fond al perturbărilor și schimbărilor identitare vor suferi generații repetate, depărtându-se din ce în ce mai mult de origini și reproducând mecainicist noile imagini, reprezentări și percepții vizavi de realitatea socială existentă.

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ROLE OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION IN PROMOTING WORLD PEACE

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Abstract: The present paper is a study on the role of inter-cultural education in promoting world peace. There are numerous cultural practices in the world and their presence makes the beauty of the world civilization. However, the lack of strong inter-relationship among cultures has given bone of contention among the various groups of people. The peace of the world has been disturbed, affecting the development of the world, the benefic relations among people and their visions for a united human family. There is need to promote better understanding among the peoples, there is the need to promote intercultural understanding around the world. With better intercultural communication which may be provided by intercultural education, peace could be promoted in the world. The present paper analyzes the role of intercultural education in promoting world peace. Numerous suggestions have also been put forward for promoting world peace through intercultural education around the world.

Keywords: ***clash of civilizations, intercultural education, globalization, migration, world peace***

Introduction

Intercultural education is one of the important emerging approaches to bring unity among people of different cultural backgrounds. This approach can be used to bring unity at the local, national and international levels. The present paper has taken intercultural education in international perspective or at the macro level. This macro level study can be used both at the national and local levels, with modifications as per the requirement. Seeing intercultural education at the international level is due to our fast moving world where the various cultures of the world have come nearer and nearer to each other. Time and space are losing relevance due to the development of highly sophisticated communication and transportation technologies. According to the definition of OECD (1993), globalization is understood as "the phenomenon by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and the flows of capital and technology." (*apud* Al-Rodhan, 2006: 9)

The comings of various cultures have given rise to many problems and prospects. The prospects are the integration of the economies and the creation of bigger borderless market and unhindered exploitation of the resources of countries. The creation of borderless employment is another phenomenon related to globalization. The migration of millions of people from one corner of the world to another has sustained many economies with required human resources. As per the data of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "In 2013, the number of international migrants worldwide reached 232 million, an increase of 57 million, or 33 per cent, compared to 2000. Most international migrants reside in the developed regions (59 per cent). Europe hosts the largest number of international migrants (72 million), followed by Asia (71 million) and Northern America (53 million). (United Nations, 2013)

The migration of people has also created problems for the people living in another cultural set up. The problem of adjustment with the people of other cultures, the rhetoric of

'nationalist' in the conservative political set up, the loss of identity in society and the competition with other people based on cultural identity, all these have led to the appearance of different types of confrontation among people. Many countries of Europe, such as Germany, France, or Denmark are witnessing various confrontations among their communities.

The confrontations among the people of various countries have been approached from many perspectives. Scholars like Huntington have seen this in the light of the 'clash of civilizations or cultures.' According to Huntington "The issues on which countries divided along civilizational lines included: universality versus cultural relativism with respect to human rights; the relative priority of economic and social rights including the right to development versus political and civil rights; political conditionality with respect to economic assistance." (Huntington, 1996: 198) Some other scholars have seen the confrontation in the context of political hegemony, while others have seen the confrontation in terms of market and resources rivalry, or in the context of religion.

This paper has taken culture as a main source of confrontation among people and has discussed the role of intercultural education in lessening this confrontation in order to promote worldwide peace.

Intercultural education "involves educational policies and practices by which the members of different cultures, whether in majority or minority positions, learn to interact constructively with each other. As a minimum, intercultural education requires majorities to learn about the minorities and their cultural and traditions while minorities must similarly learn about other minorities in the same society as well as about the majorities." (Eide, 1999: 23)

Intercultural education is important for the world peace when the world is moving very fast in the direction of an economic, social, political, and cultural integration. The cultural variation represents an important cause in the confrontation of people at local, national and international levels. At the local level, around the world, there can be identified confrontations among people, such as the violence in many European countries on the line of race, religion etc. At the national level, many countries are facing the problem of confrontation of people within the country, such as the situation in the Arab world. At the international level, there are many confrontations going on, particularly due the intervention of the western countries in the affairs of other nations. There are numerous incidents of reaction and confrontation between the migrants and the citizens of the countries and, in such cases, violence is eminent and is a threat to world peace.

The paper has studied the role of intercultural education in solving the problems of confrontation to bring peace in the world.

Question of Study:

The following questions have been raised to understand the role of intercultural education in promoting world peace.

I. Which cultural approach can ensure peace in the world - a single cultural approach or a multicultural one?
II. How can intercultural education promote world peace?

III. What can be done to promote world peace through intercultural education?

Relevance of study

Peace is important for the development of the world since it ensures the economic activities, political participation, social interaction and cultural integration among the people; it ensures a better relation among the people and nations. On the basis of the study, it has been found that those areas which maintain peace have registered high growth and development, while those areas where peace has not been maintained, registered low growth rate and development. As per the report of the World Bank "The death, destruction, and delayed development due to conflict are bad for the conflict affected countries, and their impact spills over both regionally and globally. A country making development advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7 percent of GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict."7 Refugees and internally displaced persons have increased threefold in the last 30 years.8 Nearly 75 percent of the world's refugees are hosted by neighboring countries. (World Development Report, 2011: 5)

There are many causes of confrontation among the people. These causes may be economic, political, social and cultural.

The present paper has taken the multidimensional approach of culture to understand the causes of confrontation among the people around the world. Globalization has given rise to the migration of the people from one corner of the world to another, along with their cultures, technologies, economic means and institutional perceptions. Immigrants' different cultural backgrounds have created the problem of adjustment, preservance and dominance, which led to manifold forms of confrontation among the people.

The interference of major powers in various parts of the world has also created the problem of confrontation, particularly caused by the Western interference in the Muslim world. The people of the Muslim world have taken military intervention to check terrorism as political intervention and cultural invasion on Islamic cultures and civilization. This has given a wrong impression to the people of Muslim world against the western world.

The changing geo-political condition of many regions in the world and their new status as emerging countries constitutes another cause of confrontation. The deliberate attempt by some emerging powers to demonstrate their own cultural hegemony and thus countering the influence of other cultures in their own countries has created misunderstanding and has determined mistrust and a negative approach towards each other. This can be seen in the case of American-Chinese, American-Russian, American-Muslim world, American-Iranian, Israel-Arab relations.

In such conditions, there is the necessity for a better understanding among the people of different cultures, for the initiation of discussion and dialogue to understand each other. Intercultural education can help in understanding different cultures by providing basic knowledge of each other's cultures.

In the light of the existent confrontation among people, the present paper will help to lessen this situation by explaining the role of intercultural education in promoting peace. According to Eide, intercultural education "requires the development of respect, mutual tolerance and co-operation. Respect and tolerance must be based on common recognition of

general human rights as the basic framework which is applicable to all and which must be respected by all whether in a majority or minority position." (Eide, 1999: 23)

Methodology of study

The present study is based on descriptive and analytical methods. The basic assumption about the paper is that it has taken a multidimensional approach to 'culture' as a main source of confrontation among the people around the world. Another assumption is that culture must be considered in its 'dynamic' nature, changing with the passage of time when interacting with other societal factors; therefore it is neither an exclusive phenomenon nor a stagnant.

Discussion on the question

The questions which have been raised above need explanation in order to understand the role of intercultural education in promoting world peace.

Single Culture or Multicultural Approach

One of the main reasons of confrontation among the people around the world is the trend of domination by one group of people over another group of people in political, cultural, social and economic terms. There may be many reasons for the efforts of domination. In the present time, some groups of people may see the various trends like globalization, democracy, or modernization of the world with suspicion, interpreting them as the means of domination of a particular group over the world. They see democracy as a political domination; modernization – a way to westernize the society by the adoption of the western values only; globalization - to dominate and change the economy and culture of the world. According to Water (2001) "Globalization is the direct consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonization and cultural replication. It is also bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it has ramified through political and cultural arenas. However, it does not imply that every corner of the planet must become Westernized and capitalist but rather that every set of social arrangements must establish its position in relation to the capitalist West - to use Robertson's term, it must relativize itself." (Water, 2001: 6). These are the reasons why many regions of the world have been engulfed in violence, particularly Muslim countries. These regions are not conceiving these trends as a natural process of development but a projected process of development of the world by a particular group or countries.

There are some regions where the people have accepted the trends of modernization, democratization and globalization as natural process of development, regions that are relatively calm and peaceful. They are trying to adjust their own society, culture, economy and polity to the line of the new trends. As a result they have not reacted against the trends and are relatively more peaceful than other reacting nations. According to the survey of EOS GALLUP EUROPE (2004) the acceptance of globalization among the European countries is as follows: "Netherlands 78%, Ireland 71%, Germany 71%, Italy 67%, France 63%, United Kingdom 60%, Sweden 58%, Austria 52%, Spain 51% and Greece 47%." (European Commission, 2004).

On the other hand, there are many regions where people neither have interacted nor allow interacting with the new trends of the world. They want their own culture, tradition, society, economy and polity to remain a model for them. They are neither reacting nor assimilating, but working on the principle of 'isolation'.

In the light of above discussion there are two ways to approach people of the world. One approach is 'homogenization' to dominate the world with forceful application of the trends, particularly in case of culture. In this approach, there is no place for other models of culture, economy, society and polity. As a result, all those people who disagree with the disappearance of their own models will stand against this trend. The case of Muslim countries is one such example, where trends of modernity have been checked by orthodoxy and violence is going on uninterruptedly. The Chinese opposition to modernity is based on cultural ground as well, while Japan has modernized but not at the cost of its culture. According to another approach to the dominant culture, a model is made 'perfect' without any forceful emulation. Individuals follow it seeking perfecting themselves and becoming more advanced. In this case, there is less chance of confrontation among people, since culture does not become a source of contention but a source of inspiration.

The second approach is not to dominate but collaborate with the others, to ensure the world peace. This is called 'heterogeneity', which can be useful in a multi-cultural society. In this approach all the cultures of the world should be considered important in their own regions and need to survive and flourish. This approach requires a better understanding among the people of different cultural backgrounds, while people of one culture should be familiar with the cultures of the others as well. In the present time, due to globalization, this is a fast emerging trend in many regions of the world. However, while in some countries it is successful with integration and assimilation, in others it is posing problems since the dominant tendency is one of 'separation' and 'isolation'.

Intercultural education for World Peace

In a world where globalization is in full swing and country after country turns into a multicultural society, intercultural education becomes very important since it can be the promoter of mutual understanding among people belonging to different cultural backgrounds. According to Portera (2008) "The intercultural education approach represents the most appropriate response to the challenges of globalization and complexity. It offers a means to gain a complete and thorough understanding of the concepts of democracy and pluralism, as well as different customs, traditions, faiths and values." (Portera, 2008: 488).

Intercultural education can help every model of culture to bring peace and unity. In the case of a single culture approach, intercultural education can provide the pros and cons of eliminating other cultures. This can present a better study of other cultures as it is stated that "Intercultural education represents a key factor for efficient interaction and quality coexistence of members who culturally differ. Therefore, intercultural education plays a special role in pluralistic societies." (Becirovic, 2012: 139)

In the case of 'domination through perfection', intercultural education can present the various aspects of cultures in a comparative way to provide a better understanding of each culture. Intercultural education not only gives the point of differences among cultures but also

the point of collaboration. In the present time, due to globalization, there has been created a lot of misunderstanding among the people of different cultural regions, a situation that has given sharp reaction and violence in the world. Many scholars have also strengthened this sort of thinking of confrontation among the people. Huntington's thesis, "Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order" states that "The Islamic challenge is manifest in the pervasive cultural, social and political resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world and the accompanying rejection of western values and institutions. The Asian Challenge is manifest in all the East Asian civilizations-Sinic, Japanese, Buddhist and Muslim-and emphasizes their cultural differences from the west and, at times, the commonalities they share, often identified with Confucianism. Both Asian and Muslim stress the superiority of their cultures to western culture." (Huntington, 1996: 102). The Islamic countries are reacting to modernity and other trends due to considering all these trends as "Western Projects", not accepting them as a process of advancement and development. As a result, they are reacting sharply and consider them deliberate attempts to interfere in the internal matters of the Muslim world. At this point intercultural education can help to understand the stages of cultural development and remove the misunderstanding among the people.

Cultures need to collaborate in order to ensure peace at a global level. For this to happen, people need to know the various aspects of cultures e.g. nature, key elements, and aspirations of the cultures. Intercultural education can provide the basis of cultures to collaborate with each other and thus a wider understanding and respect among the people. Through broad curriculum and methodology, intercultural education can produce broad minded individuals who would be ready to work for the unity among the people of different cultures to ensure the world peace.

In the present time, the causes of clashes among the people are disrespect, inequality, superiority complex, pseudo nationalism etc. People of one culture may consider other cultures inferior, uncivilized, or uncultured. As a result, the people of those other cultures react sharply and make the cause of unrest in the region and world. Intercultural education can remove misconceptions and provide better ground of interaction among the people by presenting the importance of various cultures in their own set up and perspectives. The guidelines of UNESCO declare that "Education shall be directed to the full development of human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial and religious groups, and shall further develop the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace." (UNESCO, 8)

In many parts of the world, the process of globalization has created misunderstanding and determined facing many challenges in the integration of economies, polities, societies and cultures. The resistance due to misunderstanding is turning globalization into confrontation, particularly at the cultural level. This confrontation needs to be minimized, and this can be done through the understanding of the point of views of various cultures. Intercultural education can provide the solution of confrontation.

Many countries of the world, particularly the western countries, are turning into multicultural societies. As a result these countries are facing problems of adjustment in the new set up. The local and national cultures are changing which does not suit the old age

traditions and customs in which the people of these countries were used to live. As a result, the confrontations between the 'migrated' and the 'host' are on rise in many European countries. The confrontations are affecting the economic, social and cultural advancement of these countries, the solution being the understanding of the cultural background of the 'migrated' by the 'host' and vice versa. Intercultural education can provide the common cultural ground for peaceful co-existence to both host and migrated and lessen the confrontation for world peace.

What can be done?

To ensure the peace of the world one needs to adopt new approaches towards the countries, people and regions of the world. A single culture approach to dominate the world can be successful by means of power, but it cannot be durable. The Roman and Islamic civilizations tried to do so in the past but failed and as a result, the empire they built declined due to reaction of the people of other cultures. In the present times there is need to see the resistance of the people around the world in this context as well.

There is the need to understand the importance of variation in culture, society, polity and economy around the world. The regions of the world are different from each other; therefore, the resources, the economic systems, political systems and cultures are equally different. There is the need to understand that variation, particularly of culture. The variation in cultures could imply a bigger demand for different goods and services, which might be against the interests of a particular group of people, as such groups want the monopolization of markets of particular goods and services which they are producing. This group of people is unable to meet the demand for so many things demanded by various cultures. So, instead of enlarging their production for various good and services, they are trying to change the cultures of the world to meet their economic interests. This sort of thinking is also a source of confrontation among the people. There is the need that the importance of every culture should be understood in context of various peoples, regions and nations.

There is the need to produce a class of people who believe and work for the unity of the people around the world. The curriculum of schools, colleges and universities should be given due importance for intercultural education among the students who later on could advance the cause of humanity irrespective of creed, colour, culture, religion etc.

Intercultural education can promote the peace in the world by providing better understanding and diffuse the tensions among the communities and nations. The need of time is to give due importance to all cultures in their own areas and among the people. This would solve the problems arising due to multiculturalism of many nations where, due to suppression or negligence of one culture, hatred and confrontation among the people are created. The case of Europe which is receiving a large number of migrated people from various cultural backgrounds is an example where in recent time many anti-immigrant movements have been launched. These movements should see the necessities of their nations from the point of view of economy, polity and society.

Europe is right now standing at a crossroad. The population, which is essential for a better economic development, is falling. To sustain the economies of many countries, there is the necessity of robust population policies to enlarge the population by the citizens of the

nation or allow the migration of the people from other cultures. In the first case, the population of Europe can have hegemony of their own cultural life but in the case of migration, Europe has to accept the multicultural society which has its own problems and prospects and with which Europe is not entirely familiar. In the case of the migration of people, Europe has to deal with the migrated people on the large scale, through intercultural education.

Conclusion

The development and advancement of the world and the people need peace, which can be ensured through lessening the confrontation among people on the basis of race, religion, region, language, culture etc. The present world is moving very fast in economic, social, political and cultural affairs. Globalization has brought both opportunities and challenges for the nations around the world, while the constant movement of the people has given rise to multicultural societies. The expansion of a borderless economy has created the problem of unemployment, poverty, inequality etc. Due to these challenges particularly the migration of people has given rise to confrontation among the people and in many places the violence is on rise, which is not good for the peace of the world, on which rests the development of the world.

There is the need to bring the confrontations among people at such a level where there would be no threat to the world peace. For this, misunderstandings among people on many levels must be reduced or ended. Intercultural education can play an important role in removing misunderstandings among the people and bringing them to collaborate with each other to ensure the peace and development of the world. Intercultural education needs time to be taught in schools, colleges, universities, societies, working places; policy making bodies and persons running governmental and non-governmental organizations must also be the promoters of such an educational endeavour. There is no doubt that intercultural education can ensure peace in the world; the main condition for that is that the people should be sincere to spread intercultural education in the world in order to meet the challenges posed by the socio-economic and cultural trends.

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TRENDS OF IMMIGRANTS INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract: The integration of minorities resulting from immigration is conditioned by positive attitudes towards the ethnic and racial groups, by reducing prejudices and by the receiving society which has to accept the idea of cultural diversity. Race, racism, ethnicity are widely debated terms, often controversial. As far as racial and ethnic discrimination is concerned, we may say that it is assimilated into the history of migration by public reactions towards immigrants or by controlling migration flows. The host countries are not socially homogeneous, thus the integration does not follow the same social form, but, in any case, its purpose is the elimination of certain legal, cultural and linguistic obstacles considering that integration process has a triple legitimisation: economic, social and political.
The purpose of the paper consists of presenting the challenges involved in diminishing the restrictions in the migration process by presenting the importance of theoretical approach of migration theories, and, in this regard, it seems that it is not enough only to declaratively eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination from the immigration policy. An equally important task is to take into consideration that which is required in order to correct the injustices of the past and to draw certain beneficial integration policies both for endogenous and for exogenous people. The normative theorists who debate the ethics of migration and especially those who try to defend a certain form of the right to exclude potential immigrants, have an extremely important role in issuing a framework of non-discrimination for the immigrant minorities.

Keywords: ***migration, discrimination, theories of migration, integration***

Introduction

The concept of *migration* could be defined simply as the movement of population across the border of a state in order to set its residence (Geddes 2003:7). In a broader view, in legal terms it involves the mandatory requirement of residence establishment in the country of destination, this movement is seen by the states receiving the population as *immigration* and by the states from which the population leaves as *emigration.* Conceptually, *migration* cannot be defined only from this basic, simplified and reductionist perspective taking into account that there exist many types of population mobility crossing the borders of one state and each type may be analyzed and explained from different perspectives. The establishment of the type of migration is based on the existence of several analysis criteria for this phenomenon: national territory (internal migration), time factor (short, medium or long-term), degree of constraint (free migration, forced migration) number of people (individual, collective or group migration), legal status of migrates (legal, illegal migration), aim and determining causes (work, studies, family integration) (Rotariu 2009:150-154).

Philippe Legrain, the author of the book *Aftershock. Reshaping the World Economy after the Crisis*, believes that migration can no longer be explained as the movement of

population into one direction as long as it has appeared lately mostly as a temporary phenomenon that should be properly reflected in the current debate (Legrain 2010:238). Practically, the way of defining the concept of *migration* therefore becomes an arbitrary decision, specific to a certain period of time (Dobson, Koser, McLaughlan and Salt 2001: 25). Briefly, international migration can be defined as a permanent or temporary movement of people across borders of states, increase of migration during limited periods and increase of circular migration and also labor migration through work contracts for various periods of time exemplify the "fineness" of the distinction between permanent and temporary migration (Geddes 2003 :8).

Theories of Migration and Perspectives of Migrants Integration

It is evident that the phenomenon of migration has always existed and our approach falls within the analysis paradigm of S. Glides stating that migrations became *international* after the establishment of national states; the 19th century therefore consolidated the terminology of the phenomen (Gildas 2002 :1-4). In support of this argument, we can add the views of Castles and Miller (2003) who stated at the beginning of the second millennium that undoubtedly we live in the age of migration. It forces the social science specialists into studying the complexity of migration from different perspectives: demographic, anthropological, geographical, economic, social, political, legal, etc. All these fields enable us to understand „migration theories in a multidisciplinary approach", as Brettel and Hollifield explain in their book *Theories of Migration. A Multidisciplinary Approach.* (Table no. 1).

Table no.1 Migration Theories in a multidisciplinary approach

Field	Research Questions	Level of analysis	Dominant theories	Sample hypothesis
Anthropology	How does ethnic identity influence and change the cultural effect of migration?	Micro/individuals, groups, associations	Rationalist, structural and transnational	Social networks help to maintain cultural differences
Demography	How does migration affect migration of population?	Macro/population	Rationalist (borrows a lot from economics)	Migration has a major impact on the size of population and a minor one on its structure by age
Economics	What explains the propensity for migration and its effects?	Micro/individuals	Rationalist: cost-benefit and behavior based on the relation between utility and maximization	Insertion varies depending on the level of human capital of immigrants
Geography	What explains the spatial patterns of migration?	Macro, meso and micro/individuals, groups, associations	Rationalist, structural and trans-national	Integration depends on ethnic networks and patterns of residents
History	How do we understand immigrants' experience?	Micro/individuals and groups	Avoids theory and testing hypotheses	Does not apply
Law	How does law influence migration?	Macro and micro/political and legal system	Institutional and borrows from all social sciences)	Rights create stimulating structures for migration and integration
Political Science	Why states face difficulties in migration control?	More macro/international and political system	Institutional and rationalist	States are often dependent on interests supported by pro-immigrants

Sociology	What does insertion and exclusion explain?	Macro/ethnic groups and social classes	Structural and institutional	Integration varies depending on social and human capital

Source: Brettel and Hollifield (2008)

First migration studies appeared in the 19th century when Max Weber wrote about Polish migration (1892) and Ravenstein proposed the migration laws. Ernest Georg Ravenstein (1885, 1889) initiated the analysis of migration by formulating „laws of international migration", an approach further developed by specialists from different areas of social sciences that tried to explain social, cultural, economic and political consequences of migration. The common feature of these studies was approaching processes of migration as single and bi-directional flows (emigration, immigration or return migration). In turn, these flows are caused by a series of isolated factors of political and economic nature, such as the *push-pull factors* type (Lee 66:47-57). Zelinsky later presents migration as a stage development, a process caused by the development of societies and their inclusion into international economic circuits (1971). Hania Zlotnik suggests an analysis of migration that includes: economic and sociological theories, mobility transition theory, contribution of political sciences and also a systemic approach (Zlotnik 2003:55-78).

The economic analysis is based on four theories: neoclassical, new economy of migrants, dual labour market and world systems theories. Neoclassical theories explain migration as a consequence of payment differences of workers in different national states. Migration becomes a process of redistribution of workers in areas lacking economic potential but increased availability of labor force for areas with economic potential but with no labor force. According to this model, the decision to immigrate is exclusively dominated by the supply and demand logic and it should appear after a process of rational analysis of economic opportunities. The criticism of this model is related to the individual decision to immigrate, as it is often influenced by political, cultural and economic factors and not by a process of rational decision of social agents (Phizacklea 1998:21-37).

Approaches provide nuances to classical economic theory aimed to emphasize the human capital theory by means of cost-benefit ratio, as well as using the behavioral model (Boyle, Halfacree, Robinson 1998). Costs are represented by expenses generated by the travel to destination, living expenses, loss of household and emotional discomfort of the immigrant. Benefits are given by the workplace at new destination and there are also cultural, social and community benefits in the new community. On the one hand, this approach analyzes the actors involved in migration, and, on the other, it provides a structural and risk analysis. Migrants supported by the household got o areas with low risk, dominating the rural-urban migration. The effects are local disequilibrium generated by the lack of resources in family where there are no migrants. This theory is criticized for insufficient analysis of risks in countries of destination as especially irregular migration involves multiple risks for migrants.

Structural models present migration „as a result of social organization at the macro level land it is believed that certain contexts and forms of socio-economic organization generate migration" (Anghel and Horvath 2009:33). New economy of migrants has at its core the family group that focuses both on increase of income and risk minimization, opposite to neoclassical economic theory that was centered around the action of individuals. This model is easy to identify in Romania, where during communist period, the rural-urban commuting

compensated the income from agriculture of survival and after 90s, work-related temporary migration has been a way of reducing negative effects caused by considerable reduction of the industrial sector and economic downfall.

The *push-pull* model emphasizes the „structural factors" that lay at the foundation for the decision to migrate. For instance, high unemployment, violating the rights of individuals, natural disasters have been the push factors that make the individuals immigrate to other, more attractive destinations in terms of economic, social, cultural and geographical conditions. Pull factors have been represented by a set of employment, educational, professional training and other opportunities.

Table no. 2 Push-pull factors

Push factors	Pull factors
Decline in national resources or decline in demand for certain goods: closure of some mines, decreased timber production and decreasing agriculture; Rising unemployment due to the incompetence of management, changing needs of employees or automation needs; Ethnic religious or political discrimination; Cultural alienation from a community; Limited employment or marriage prospects; Departure due to natural or humanitarian disasters;	Increased employment opportunities; Higher income opportunities; More opportunities for education and specialization; More friendly environment and better living conditions; Migration caused by dependence on a person who has already migrated (family reunification); Richer environment in terms of cultural, intellectual life or entertainment.

Source: adapted from Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson (1998) apud Anghel and Horvath (2009)

Features of labor market – more specifically labor force demand from the country of immigration – lay the foundation of the *dual or segmented labor market theory* (Piore 1979). The labor market is divided into two sectors: a primary labor force market including well-paid, stable jobs and a second sector of jobs with opposite features (poorly paid, unstable, etc.). Often, in economically highly developed societies, individuals do not apply for jobs on the secondary labour market viewing them as inappropriate for their social status and they prefer long-term unemployment. The secondary labor market therefore is left to migrant population.

World-systems theory that is based on the approach of Immanuel Wallerstein, analyzes migration in the context of world economic relations (Wallerstein 2005). The development of capitalism at the global scale and the effects produced by the continuous movement of capitals and the transformation of economies in different states causes permanent fluctuations of demand on the labor market that are regulated by the migrating population.

The theory of transition mobility was initially developed by analyzing the evolution of mortality and fertility phenomena, later Wilbur Zelinsky introduced the phenomenon of migration (Zelinsky 1971:221). The fact that structural theories are generally argued by means of economic factors, could be the main criticism, also supplemented by the absence of the analysis of social agents involved in migration, namely, the individuals. The contribution of

political science has been supported by Hania Zlotnik, mainly in terms of the role played by the national states in migration.

For a broader view of migration, *integrating theories* have been used to analyze both the structure and the social agents involved in migration, one of the most important being: the social networks theory, the institutional perspective and the cumulative causality. Social networks theory explains how migration is caused by migration networks, what contributes to "migration chains permanence" (Anghel and Horvat 2009:36). The importance of networks for the migration from Romania has been researched by several authors, being representative the studies of Dumitru Sandu (2010), Remus Gabriel Anghel (2008, 2009). Social networks are based on some "constitutive elements" (Anghel şi Horvath 2009:37-39): *big initial investment* that gradually decrease by the „standardization of strategies" and „increase of the number of migrants"; *the effect of learning* determined by the accumulation of information and its dissemination; *coordination* and other activities that could lead in time to moving from secondary labor market jobs to the primary ones; *adaptive aspirations* develop in time and this way networks become the only means of migration for individuals from the community of origin; appears the *possibility of inefficient configuration:* migrants may obtain disadvantaged social positions or even may become victims of "other networks", criminal, prostitution or human trafficking networks; *path dependency* makes migration be influenced by previous events; *existence of multiple equilibrium* offers to potential migrants different opportunities given by different networks; *closure effects* are generated by high costs of settling in one place that would make the decision of network relocation difficult to make.

Cumulative causality shows the ability of migration to reproduce itself by the way in which changes in the community of origin determine a process of its perpetuation (Massey, Goldring, Durand 1994).

Regarding the respect of the right of minorities resulting from immigration, there are theories that analyze anti-racist and anti-discriminatory policies that may be included into three main groups: theories that focus on economic competition between aliens and immigrants, theories that underline the cultural conflicts between the two groups and studies that present the impact of international relations and bilateral agreements regarding the control over immigration. Husband believes that that the first category of theories explains racism by means of competition between ethnic groups for limited resources whether for jobs or personal or public wealth (Husband 2000:225-234). In Money's view, theories concentrated on economic interest present immigration politics as a result of preferences of businesses with host companies or, in other words, these preferences are linked to different economic impact displayed by immigrant groups with the host society (Money 1999:26). According to Fetzer, theories related to *class politics,* to *economic self-interest* involve a threat towards the economic wealth of aliens (Fetzer 200: 5-23).

Theories focused on economic competition involve a double perspective: a marxist and a non-Marxist one. The first approach supported by Castels and Kosack (1997), Bovenkerk (1992) *et al* is based on the fact that economic factors and the political process based on the idea of class generate immigration politics. Based on this approach, capitalist societies import migrant workers so that they can exercise a downward trend to pressure of increasing salaries and, consequently, the employees' income increases and the influence of

the working class decreases. By encouraging racism, the influence of the working class diminishes. The internal politics and pluralist models ensure the manifestation of a state as a neutral ground for societal interests: interest groups and parties. In the context of economic competition, employers and unions are main interest groups. Besides, both Marxist and pluralist approaches sustain that employer's offers and fluctuations in economy and on the labor market influence the immigration control policies. Piore also analyses the economic system and the struggle between different groups and classes in the explanation of immigration, rejecting though some Marxist argument (Piore 1979:42-43).

The second group of theories that underline cultural differences present racism as a spontaneous response of the endogenous population to what is different, unfamiliar, up to rejecting customs, traditions of the exogenous population (Husbands 2000). Also in this approach, racism may be explained starting from moral and symbolic challenges and up to the analysis of rational status quo of the involved societies. These theories underline the primacy of cultural values and often consider that national identity is a key condition in defining immigration policies (Money 1999:6-7, 7-30). Fetzer develops the „marginality theory" that focuses on the impact of cultural differences between natives and immigrants and the "contact theory" that underlines the impact of the percentage of „foreign-born" population. The marginality theory sustains that recession decreases the opposition towards immigration and immigrants. Brubaker believes that the analysis of *national identity* states that the history of each country, mentality related to citizenship and nationality shape immigration policies. This type of analysis may lead to minimizing the importance of other factors, such as the external and situational ones. It also explains the differences in approaching immigration and citizenship policies by relating to different mentalities of states regarding national identity, as for example the difference between colonial states that widely accept immigration and the ethnic states that have a tendency to reject it. This assumption also supports the difference between homogenous and heterogeneous countries and also the difference between the states establishing citizenship based on „jus sanguinis" or „jus soli".

Trends of Immigrants Integration

Teitelbaum (1997), Mitchell (1989, 1992), Bach (1990), Zolberg (1993), Koslowski (1998) make references to the third type of studies focused on the impact of international relations and bilateral agreements regarding immigration control policies. Some studies close to the *realist* approach argue that the conflict potential between the states has influenced immigration policies, while other studies that adopt the *neoliberal, institutional* approach refer to the role of national and international institutions in facilitating the cooperation between the states regarding the immigration control policies.

The development of a new economy and perspectives regarding the approaches to immigration and development have been consistent with the third tendency in migration studies and, namely, "the transnational change" in the study of location and integration of immigrant communities in the host countries (Glick Schiller, Basch şi Blanc-Szanton 1991, Castles and Miller 2009, Faist 2004). There has been a growing recognition of increasing opportunities of migrants and their families to live trans-nationally and adopt transnational identities (Vertovec 1999, Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003). This is linked to improved technical possibilities of migrants to develop ties with their communities of origin by means

of mobile phones, fax, satellite TV and the Internet and send money through global banking systems. This fact allows more and more immigrants and their families to develop a kind of double feeling and devotion, travel between the two states, interact with people, work and do business simultaneously in different places. It is true that immigrants in late 19th and in the 20th centuries kept close trans-national ties but probably the technological revolutions have developed the area of immigrants and their families as to increase the opportunities to live constantly trans-nationally.

Hein De Hass (2005) consider that this trans-nationalization of the life of immigrants generated assimilation models of migrants' integration and also generated a modern concept of nation-state and citizenship. The result is that the precise dichotomy between "origin" or "destination" and categories such as "permanent", "temporary" immigration and "repatriation" has been harder to establish in a world dominated by the lives of immigrants constantly travelling and committing to two or three societies or communities (De Haas, 2005). He believes that this has fundamental effects for the study of migration and development as it involves integration into host societies and commitment to communities of origin that cannot be replaced but they can be complementary. It has been considered for a long time that the integration of migrants would coincide with the gradual weakening of ties with the communities of origin and that "permanent" migration would inevitably be a "loss".

In any case, empirical studies have shown that migrants can maintain trans-national ties for long periods and that these ties can even become trans-generational. Also, these studies show that the commitment of migrants to countries of origin is not dependent on their return and that it could be kept by sending money and ideas by telecommunication means, visits and oscillating forms of migration. Visits to countries of origin and repatriation, money sent back home, trans-national business and investments and political involvement in the countries of origin reflect trans-national character of the life of migrants. The fact that migrants often maintain long-term ties with their countries of origin and that their integration does not necessarily exclude or can even encourage a trans-national commitment puts under a sign of doubt the statement that the departure of migrants should automatically be a loss. The sustainability of transnational ties is supported by the financial means, the money sent back home repeatedly, trans-national marriages and by the involvement of migrants into social, cultural and political life in their countries of origin. Therefore, the immediate interpretation of the commitment of migrants to their countries of origin as a manifestation of their failed integration may be incorrect. To the contrary, a deeper commitment of migrants to the host countries does not necessarily lead to a lesser commitment to their countries of origin as also the contrary is possible. (Snel, Engbersen şi Leerkes, 2006).

Conclusions

We may conclude that integrating current migration into a theoretical and objective level of research (normative and institutional) involves the adoption of a set of rules through a joint effort of all EU member states and by means of European immigration policy managed at the supranational level. This seems to be a "saving solution" for the shortcomings in the field of immigration revealed over time: from the lack of clear provisions in the international law related to the respect of the rights of migrant populations to the institutional and political inability of the European Union to approach firmly the status

of constantly moving individuals from the EU or third countries. It is obvious that a supranational commitment to joint policy in the field of immigration could generate disadvantages, or even economic or other types of loss to different states of the European Union and often declared optimism in supporting such a policy has not benefited from the pragmatism needed for its implementation. In the end, successfully "integrated" migrants have increased their financial and human resources that could allow them to make investments or take part in public life in their countries of origin

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GLOBALIZATION – NEW DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: SOCIETAL SECURITY

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Abstract: The relevance of international security has become, in the context of increased globalization, increasingly disputed worldwide. The pros and cons have been widely theorized by analyzing the effects and changes in the international system, the status of the nation and its representatives, citizens, representatives of national value model.
The challenge of globalization, both at state level and at the individual level is to find a fair balance between the preservation of identity and community spirit and structural compliance of survival in the current system of globalization emphasized.
Complex architecture of international security, in the context of increased globalization and integration of complex processes, are closely inter-related and inter-dependent multidimensional process - political, military, economic, societal and environmental – with the international society and its institutions, centered in order to prevent crises and international conflicts, to generalize reconciliation, dialogue and peace and to find a common global identity.

Keywords: ***Globalization; International Security; Global Society; Identity; Societal Security*.**

1. Introducere

În societatea contemporană actuală, o influență deosebită o are globalizarea sub toate formele sale, economică, informațională, socială, culturală sau prin efectele sale asupra mediului înconjurător. Astfel, fie cuprinsă în activitățile complexe financiar-bancare și de comerț, fie distinct de acestea, globalizarea a jucat un rol important în stimularea schimburilor economice, în dezvoltarea comunicațiilor dar și în evoluția noilor dimensiuni societale și identitare.

Globalizarea este o construcție multidimensională aflată în plin proces evolutiv și integrator la nivel economic, financiar și tehnico-informațional și are în centrul său o anumită concepție și structură de guvernare, în care sistemul democratic și drepturile omului, toleranța și comunicarea, solidaritatea și coeziunea socială ar trebui să reprezinte cele mai importante valori comune, ca premise principale ale unui model de dezvoltare global durabil. Societatea internațională a evoluat de la un complex de societăți culturale bine definite identitar și spațial, către o posibilă societate globală, în care relațiile transfrontaliere și socio - economice se intensifică, ca urmare a procesului de globalizare.

Amenințările la adresa securității internaționale acoperă acum domenii globale și au devenit mult mai periculoase ca urmare a "beneficiilor" globalizării: tehnologie, comunicare, mobilitate, dar și a altor aspecte mai puțin controlabile. Aceste evoluții combinate cu extinderea interacțiunilor economice contribuie la acutizarea problemelor statale și societale.

2. Provocarea Globalizării: Aspecte și dimensiuni

Procesul globalizării, considerat a fi fost declanșat la sfârșitul secolului al XIX- lea, pe fondul dezvoltării schimburilor economice internaționale, a cunoscut etape majore de-a lungul ultimului secolului, cel mai important fiind considerat „cel de-al treilea val al globalizării",

declanșat de tranziția spre democrație și economie de piață, care a înlocuit izolaționismul relațiilor perioadei Războiului Rece.[1]

În 1989, căderea Cortinei de Fier a presupus deschiderea piețelor, accentuarea liberalizării economice și financiare, o nouă dimensiune a dreptului la muncă, evenimente care au schimbat radical arhitectura sistemului internațional. Consolidarea economiei de piață s-a datorat politicilor economice și extinderii economiei de piață la scară globală. Acestea au constituit efectul conjugat a următoarelor forțe motrice: importanța ideologiei neoliberale ca doctrină economică și a inovației tehnologice, dar și a revoluției demografice și intensificării comerțului.[2]

La nivelul relațiilor internaționale, globalizarea a înlocuit Războiul Rece ca arenă de desfășurarea dezbaterilor privind principiile de dezvoltare ale societății umane, națiunilor și organizațiilor internaționale. Globalizarea a devenit problema cea mai importantă și mai analizată la momentul actual, constituind nu doar un fenomen, ci un proces de tranziție continuă spre un nou model de dezvoltare bazat pe o nouă structură a rețelelor.[3]

Noile realități conturate în sfera relațiilor economice internaționale, au determinat la nivel teoretico-analitic, emiterea supoziției că economia mondială evoluează spre un nou model de globalizare, indus de noile forțe care acționează ireversibil precum noile tehnologii din domeniul informaticii și telecomunicațiilor, piețele financiare, comerțul și strategiile marilor corporații transnaționale bazate pe operarea rețelelor de servicii. La momentul actual, se consideră că suntem implicați sau martorii, cristalizării unei economii globale bazate pe rețele, pe măsură ce are loc tranziția spre un sistem de interdependențe, de interconectări bazat interdimensionări complexe.[4]

În general, noile forțe economice internaționale tind să detroneze importanța politicului la nivel decizional și să se substituie statelor, instituțiilor și organismelor acestora. Influențele piețelor economice și financiare se extind continuu asupra tuturor activităților sociale și culturale schimbându-le atât la nivel structural cât și funcțional.

Mai mult ca oricând, economicul subordonează politicul, atât de elocvent, încât discursul despre democrație și libertate riscă să devină unul de aparență. Piețele financiare, pe care s-a generalizat acțiunea capitalismului liberalizat, sunt tot mai puternice în raport cu voința statelor și opțiunile populației la nivel statal, astfel încât se poate sublinia faptul că nimeni nu se mai poate izola de impactul globalizării.[5]

La nivelul individual de percepție, destructurarea lumii contemporare, a statului în special, cu repere sale cunoscute – statul național, progresul și consensul social, solidaritatea grupurilor și bunăstarea socială – are loc rapid și progresiv, iar noile forme de organizare se identifică cu dificultate la nivel funcțional, într-o perioadă de tranziție greu de delimitat.[6]

În contextul globalizării, eroziunea puterii statale include aproape toate aspectele economiei și societății, de la pierderea controlului producției naționale în favoarea firmelor

[1] Bari, Ioan, *Tratat de economie politică globală*, Editura Economică, București, 2010, p. 16.
[2] Gilpin, Robert, *Economia mondială în secolul XXI*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2004, p. 130.
[3] Bari, Ioan, *op.cit.*, p. 17.
[4] Lungulescu, Liviu, *Statul și globalizarea economică*, Editura Centrului Tehic - Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009, p. 52.
[5] Lungulescu, Liviu, op. cit., p. 59.
[6] Gilpin, Robert, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.

transnaționale, până la problemele reprezentate de degradarea mediului sau alte probleme economico-sociale.

Limbajul globalizării a fost deseori asociat conceptelor și proceselor negative: criză, amenințări, riscuri, efecte adverse, criză politică, dezordine, dezintegrare, marginalizare, explozie demografică, poluare, criză financiară, dar alte aspecte, toate acestea devenind expresii ale incapacității evoluției destinului ca ființă națională.

Asistăm la o schimbare de abordări conceptuale de identificare și încadrare în acestă eră istorică pe care o trăim și resimțim vizibil în toate domeniile de activitate. Lumea cunoscută a devenit un tot unitar, în care interacționează forțe diverse și nu se pot prevedea consecințele care vor rezulta din combinarea cauzelor, factorilor și efectelor acestor schimbări.[7]

Thomas L. Friedman demonstra faptul că „pământul este plat" și „în curs de nivelare" ca urmare a globalizării și a exploatării tensiunilor antiglobalizare dintre „Lexus" și forțele „măslinului", dintre globalizare și integrare economică și identitate și naționalism.[8]

Ținând cont de direcțiile și efectele globalizării, putem remarca următoarele caracteristici: accentuare a interdependențelor; expansiune a dominației și dependenței centru-periferie; omogenizare a societății; reacții de divesificare în interiorul comunității globale; unificare a discontinuităților spațio-temporale.[9]

Globalizarea, sublinia Zygmunt Bauman, este „destinul implacabil spre care se îndreaptă lumea, un proces ireversibil care ne afectează pe toți în egală măsură și în același mod".[10] Globalizarea divide și unește în egală măsură, cauzele diviziunii sunt corelate cu cele care promovează omogenitatea, pentru că „a fi local într-o lume globalizată este un semn de inadecvare socială și de degradare".[11]

Globalizarea poate fi interpretată și analizată ca un sistem structurat din cinci subsisteme sau dimensiuni: economică, politică, socială, culturală și de mediu.[12]

Astfel, *dimensiunea politică* se referă la internaționalizarea și instituționalizarea structurilor politice; *dimensiunea economică* presupune deschiderea relațiilor economico-financiare la scară globală; *dimensiunea socială* antrenează o reconfigurare a societății și identităților; *dimensiunea culturală* investește în convergență culturală, mobilitate și fluxuri informaționale iar *dimensiunea de mediu* insistă pe rezolvarea problemelor de protejare a mediului înconjurător.[13]

Dimensiunile globalizării se referă și la atributele spațio-temporale și organizaționale ale interconectărilor globale. Astfel, extinderea rețelor globale, intensitatea și impactul interconectărilor globale definesc dimensiunile spațio-temporale, iar infrastructura globalizării (transporturi și rețele informaționale), instituționalizarea rețelelor globale și a exercitării puterii; formele stratificării sociale; modurile și modelele dominante de interacțiune globală.

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[7] Khanna, Parag, *Lumea a Doua*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 19.
[8] Friedman, Thomas L., *Pământul este plat*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, pp. 24-25.
[9] Dumitrescu, Sterian, (coord.), *Economie Mondială*, Editura „Independența Economică" Pitești, 2006, pp. 141-143
[10] Bauman, Zygmunt, *Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale*, Editua Antet, Oradea, 1999, p. 5.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[12] Dumitrescu, Sterian, (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 144.
[13] *Ibidem*, pp. 144-148.

Unipolaritatea lumii contemporane, caracterizată prin tendința de unificare civilizațională, de către noile forțe ale economiei, piețelor deschise, comerțului, tehnologiilor și comunicațiilor, a supradimensionat evoluția societății în asamblul ei și a inițiat replica individualității la nivelul social-cultural, etnic și religios, cu accent pe revoltă și reacție.[14]

Au apărut noi actori și noi forțe pe scena internațională, care au renunțat la imobilism sau slabă reacțiune, în principal cele care privesc identățile naționale, etnice și religioase, care în contextul procesului globalizării lumii actuale, caracterizat de un vector centripet al unei culturi internaționale, opun un vector contradictoriu centrifug, cu accente cultural-tradiționale și identitar-naționaliste.[15]

Dualitatea procesului globalizării, care face pe de o parte ca societatea să se integreze, să devină din ce în mai unită din punct de vedere identitar, iar pe de altă să se fragmenteze și să se diferențieze din ce în ce mai mult, stă la baza manifestărilor anti-globalizare, a luptei dintre civilizație și cultură, generată din dorința de a deveni o singură civilizație, suprapusă peste dorința de a-și putea păstra diversitatea culturală, identitatea națională, etnică sau religioasă.[16]

3. Un cadru de analiză: Securitatea

Mediul de securitate global este o componentă vitală a sistemului internațional, bazat pe relațiile dintre state în interiorul cărora se poate manifesta stare de securitate sau insecuritate, atât la nivel individual, cât și la nivel local, regional sau internațional.

Sfârșitul Războiului Rece și noua ordine unipolară a impus modificarea percepției societății umane asupra tipurilor de amenințări la adresa securității lor. Se poate afirma cu certitudine că, la început de secol XXI, pericolele şi ameninţările la adresa securităţii tind să devină din ce în ce mai difuze, mai puţin predictibile dar şi multidimensionale.[17]

Din aceste motive, a crescut nevoia de cooperare internațională, multe dintre pericolele şi ameninţările menţionate neputând fi rezolvate în cadrul tradițional al securităţii naţionale. Elaborarea unei viziuni comune asupra securităţii este posibilă numai prin conştientizarea faptului că multe dintre actualele provocări sunt, de fapt, rezultatul existenței unor riscuri și vulnerabilităţi comune ce necesită soluţii de aceeaşi natură.[18]

În funcție de dimensiunile securității, analiza referentului sau a vulnerabilităților și amenințărilor, au fost emise mai multe definiții de-a lungul evoluției istorice. Definiția cea mai importantă aparține lui Ole Weaver, care definește securitatea ca fiind „ceea ce se numește în teoria limbajului un act de vorbire... afirmarea însăși constituie actul vorbirii.”[19]

În aceeași direcție realistă se înscriu și opiniile lui Barry Buzan, care consideră că în privința securității „discuția se poartă în jurul urmăririi absenței amenințării și se referă în

[14] Bari, Ioan, *op. cit.*, p. 73
[15] *Ibidem*, pp.74-75.
[16] Dumitriu, Alexandru Ioan, *Realități și perspective ale mediului de securitate*, Editura Universitară, București, 2010, p. 92.
[17] Cioculescu, Șerban Filip, *Terra Incognita?*, Editura Militară, București, 2010, pp. 55-56.
[18] Duțu, Petre, *Mediul de securitate în contextul globalizării și integrării regionale*, Editura Universității de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2007, p. 149.
[19] Buzan, Barry, *Popoarele, Statele și Teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, p 29.

primul rând la soarta colectivităților umane, și abia în al doilea rând la securitatea personală a ființelor umane individuale."[20]

În opinia lui Constantin Gheorghe Bălăban, „conceptul de securitate poate fi echivalat cu „absența pericolului" sau „absența amenințărilor la adresa valorilor dobândite", iar cel de insecuritate cu sintagma „prezența pericolului".[21]

Conform Dicționarului de relații internaționale „securitatea poate fi absolută, cu alte cuvinte absența oricărei amenințări este echivalentă cu securitatea completă și invers; într-un sistem de relații de amenințare totală, într-un sistem de ostilitate implacabilă, se poate ajunge la insecuritate sistematică"[22].

Edward Kolodziej definește securitatea ca fiind „o formă specială de politică – o specie a genului mai general al politicii, toate aspectele legate de securitate sunt probleme politice"[23]. În termenii aceluiași autor, securitatea poate fi gândită ca o acțiune a reprezentanților, cu unicul scop de a-și proteja interesele, subliniind faptul că „asemenea politicii, securitatea este un fenomen care continuă să fie creat de intenția sau acțiunea umană"[24].

Teodor Frunzeti identifica faptul că la nivel global „mediul internațional de securitate a evoluat după 1990 în sensul creșterii complexității și interdependențelor din relațiile internaționale, drept urmare stabilitatea internațională nu poate fi astăzi concepută decât în baza cooperării în multiple planuri la nivelul comunității internaționale și mai ales, prin intermediul dialogului în cadru instituționalizat"[25].

Mediul internațional de securitate presupune mai multe nivele de analiză: sisteme internaționale, subsisteme internaționale, unități, subunități și indivizii „elememente de bază ale analizei sociologice"[26].

De asemenea, Barry Buzan a stabilit sectoarele analizei de securitate după cum urmează: *securitatea militară* - interacţiunea pe două nivele a ofensivei armate şi a capacităţii defensive a statelor şi a percepţiilor unui stat asupra intenţiilor celuilalt; s*ecuritatea politică* - stabilitatea organizaţională a statelor, a sistemelor de guvernare şi a ideologiilor care le conferă legitimitatea; s*ecuritatea economică* - accesul la resurse, finanţe şi pieţe necesare să susţină nivele de trăi acceptabile, dar şi puterea statului; *securitatea societală* - sustenabilitatea tiparelor lingvistice tradiţionale, a culturii şi a religiei, identităţii naţionale şi tradiţiilor; s*ecuritatea mediului* - conservarea biosferei locale şi globale că principalul sistem de susţinere de care depind toate activităţile umane[27].

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[20] *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[21] Bălăban, Constantin Gheorghe, *Securitatea și dreptul internațional. Provocări la început de secol XXI,* Editura C.H.Beck, București, 2006, p. 14.
[22] Evans, Graham, Newnham, Jeffrey, *Dicționar de Relații Internaționale*, Editura Universal Dali, București, 2001, pp. 501-502.
[23] Kolodziej, Edward A., *Securitatea şi relaţiile internaţionale,* Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 36.
[24] *Ibidem.*
[25] Frunzeti, Teodor, *Studii strategice și de securitate,* Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006, p. 105.
[26] Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză*, Editura CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2011, pp. 19-20.
[27] *Ibidem*, pp. 22-23.

4. Securitatea Societală: Perspective

Conceptul folosit cel mai des în analizele de securitate, în special ale dimensiunilor non-militare, este acela de securitate umană, pentru că subiectul şi obiectul de referinţă al securităţii este individul uman, iar starea de securitate a indivizilor trebuie să constituie punctul de pornire al oricărui studiu din acest domeniu, indiferent de nivelul analizat, naţional, zonal, regional sau global[28].

Omul reprezintă elementul esenţial al oricărei forme de organizare socială, iar gradul de realizare a securităţii acestuia se reflectă în securitatea grupului din care face parte. Alexandra Sarcinschi definea securitatea umană ca fiind ,,o stare ce exprimă percepţia absenţei riscurilor, pericolelor şi ameninţărilor la adresa existenţei, valorilor şi intereselor indivizilor umani, dar şi procesele de gestionare a acestei percepţii şi a formare a sa"[29].

În anul 1993, Programul Naţiunilor Unite pentru Dezvoltare a publicat Raportul anual asupra dezvoltării umane, în care a introdus noţiunea de securitate umană, care în anii următori, a devenit un reper pentru un nou model de securitate, o nouă paradigmă a securităţii[30].

Conform viziunii ONU, societatea umană trebuie să se înscrie rapid într-un proces de transformare, al cărui rezultat să fie pe de o parte transferul centrului de greutate de la securitatea teritorială la cea a oamenilor, iar pe de altă parte, transferul mijloacelor de realizare a securităţii de la achiziţia de armament la dezvoltarea umană sustenabilă[31].

Problema securităţii umane se referă, de fapt, în practica de zi cu zi la insecuritatea umană, întrucât existenţa vulnerabilităţilor, riscurilor, pericolelor şi ameninţărilor ne face să conştientizăm nevoia de securitate. Astfel, cauzele insecurităţii umane afectează gradual toate nivelurile societăţii şi produc reacţii internaţionale, în contextul în care securitatea unui actor este dependentă de securitatea altuia, de aici luând naştere nevoia de cooperare internaţională multilaterală.[32]

Agenda securităţii societale a fost stabilită de diferiţi actori internaţionali, iar cele mai importante ameninţări la adresa securităţii societale sunt: *migraţia* - poporul este invadat sau diluat de influxuri şi este schimbat de o transformare în alcătuirea populaţiei; *competiţia orizontală* - schimbări din cauza influenţei culturale şi lingvistice generate de extinderea culturilor vecine; *competiţia verticală* – existența unui proiect de integrare sau secesionist, regionalist; *depopularea* - din cauza bolilor, a războiului, foamei, dezastrelor naturale.[33]

Din cauza transformării caracteristicilor mediului internaţional de securitate, relaţia dintre diferitele dimensiuni ale securităţii s-a schimbat, în sensul modificării priorităţilor, dar şi a punerii în valoare a noi dimensiuni.

Securitatea este multidimensională, dar tradiţia istorico-politică a mediului internaţional de securitate, a preferat accentuarea dimensiunii politice, militare sau economice, neglijând până la a desconsidera dimensiunile societale şi de mediu, fapt care a

[28] Stoina, Neculai, Baboş, Alexandru, *Studii privind problematica securităţii contemporare*, Editura Academiei Militare, Sibiu, 2006, p. 103.
[29] Sarcinschi, Alexandra, *Dimensiunile nonmiltitare ale securităţii*, Editura Universitătii de Apărare Carol I, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 7.
[30] *Ibidem*, p. 8.
[31] Goldstein, Joshua S., Pevehouse, Jon C., *Relații Internaționale*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 381.
[32] Buzan, Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[33] Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.

condus, în contextul relaţiilor internaţionale a sfârşitului de secol XX şi început de secol XXI, la o permutare în vederea revalorificării, a importanţei securităţii naţionale definită prin securitate societală şi componentele sale.[34]

Acest fapt s-a datorat şi necesităţii imperioase de a privi şi înţelege aspectele sistemice ale securităţii la nivel global. Teoretizările mediului de securitate, au relevat o paradigmă funcţională şi multidimensională, de revalorificare a securităţii societale şi a modelului valoric naţional, redefinită într-o manieră optimistă, drept o securizare a culturii.[35]

Securitatea culturală este, pentru Mălina Ciocea, parte a unei securităţii societale aflate în plin proces de integrare regională şi globală, în care graniţele statal-naţionale îşi păstrează importanţa, redefinindu-se în acelaşi timp, în contextul globalizării.[36]

În contextul securizării modelului valoric naţional, securitatea culturală este identificată ca parte activă a arhitecturii modelului valoric naţional şi a modelului valoric societal global. De altfel, aceasta se axează pe necesitatea imperioasă a securizării modelului valoric naţional, ca parte identitară unică în angrenajul global al actualului mediu de securitate, dar şi prin prisma impactului direct asupra securităţii naţionale şi respectiv a securităţii individuale.[37]

Securitatea culturală este văzută şi înţeleasă ca o stare identitară definită de vulnerabilităţi şi riscuri concertate în jurul „principiului mental" construit dincolo de elementele naţionale teritoriale, etnice şi lingvistice, prin apelul făcut la memoria colectivă necesară pentru a putea sintetiza procesul cultural identitar-naţional, redimensionat în contextul globalizării.[38]

Mecanismele globalizării au acţionat dual, accelerând simultan, pe de o parte, ruptura faţă de ordinea tradiţională anterioară, iar pe cealaltă parte, schimbarea de perspectivă prin promovarea noului model de securitate naţional bazat, pe modelul valoric societal, prin care practic identitatea comportamental-valorică se manifestă.[39]

Astfel se subliniază rolul securităţii societale şi individuale în „atingerea stării de securitate naţională" pentru că „dacă identitatea dă substanţă naţiunii, securizarea identităţii, prin păstrarea modelului valoric, va fi o securizare a naţiunii".[40]

Statul, indiferent de forma sa, maximal sau minimal, nu există din punct de vedere sistemic fără raportarea continuă la mediul de securitate internaţional şi la relaţiile de interdependenţă bazate pe fluxurile şi mecanismele globalizării, în care spaţiul şi timpul identitar - individual, naţional sau global - sunt universale şi comprimabile. Această raportare permanentă crează diferite scale de analiză a securităţii, globale, regionale, naţionale, care exprimă, de fapt, relativitatea complexă a securităţii, indiferent de dimensiunea ei politică, militară sau societală, coroborată cu securitatea relativă a obiectului de securitate.[41]

[34] Buzan, Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
[35] Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *op. cit.*, p. 175
[36] Ciocea, Mălina, *Securitatea culturală. Dilema identii în lumea globală*, Editura Tritonic, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 22.
[37] *Ibidem*, p. 23.
[38] Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[39] Stiglitz, Joseph, *Mecanismele globalizării*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2008, p. 241.
[40] Ciocea, Mălina, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
[41] Buzan, Barry, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

În contextul proceselor care afectează securitatea societală, obiectul de referinţă este identitatea colectivă supusă permanentelor schimbări cu efecte sociale. Procesul de securizare societal care se impune trebuie să devină un dialog la nivel intern şi extern între actorii internaţionali şi societate sub forma unui „act de vorbire despre securitate", care să conducă la eliminarea tensiunilor generate de dihotomia securitate individuală, securitate societală şi securitatea sistemului internaţional.

5. Concluzii

Observăm că la nivel global interdependenţele s-au dovedit mai mult decât economice, implicând şi aspecte politice, sociale, culturale şi chiar militare. Ca o consecinţă a globalizării, ea însăşi o sursă de tensiune între beneficiari şi cei dezavantajaţi de efectele sale, interesele actorilor naţionali sau regionali, au devenit inseparabil legate de cele ale actorilor internaţionali, de stabilitatea şi securitatea internaţională.

Astăzi, securitatea la nivel internaţional nu mai poate fi definită decât prin interdependenţa termenilor drepturilor omului, interesului naţional, cooperării sau competiţiei internaţionale, integrităţii teritoriale, bunăstării statului, dar şi a vulnerabilităţilor, pericolelor, ameninţărilor, riscurilor la nivel individual, naţional, regional sau global.

Frontierele teritorial - geografice şi geopolitice devin, pentru securitatea societală, mai puţin relevante, atât timp cât se pot identifica alte frontiere identitare, precum, graniţele culturale şi graniţele valorice, subliniind faptul că esenţa culturală a unei naţiuni este dată de valorile etnice, religioase şi lingvistice, tradiţii şi spiritualitate comună, practic de valorile culturale în cvasitotalitatea lor.

Din punctul meu de vedere fundamentarea valorică a securităţii societale trebuie să se realizeze, prin securizarea modelului valoric naţional, un construct identitar reglementat de norme şi valori subiective colective, aceasta, cu atât mai mult cu cât, securitatea societală este dificilă de definit datorită limitelor sale valorice *hard* şi *soft* specifice, atât securităţii naţionale, cât şi securităţii umane.

Mulţumiri

Această lucrare este rezultatul cercetării făcută posibilă prin sprijinul financiar oferit prin Programul Operaţional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, cofinanţat prin Fondul Social European, în cadrul proiectului POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400, cu titlul "Tineri cercetători de succes – dezvoltare profesională în context interdisciplinar şi internaţional".

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USSR'S „THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING " AND ITS EFFECT UPON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN 1989

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Abstract : „Perestroika" and „glasnosti" will substantially contribute to USSR's reformation, favorising a „new political thinking" in the field of international affairs. The concept of „European Common House " was about to become one of the strategic objectives of Mihail S. Gorbaciov's foreign policy and will influence the reconfiguration of international affairs in 1989. The diplomatic treaties for the unification of Germany and the amplification of the economic, political and monetary integration process of European Economic Community member states, having as the main objective the birth of European Union of today, were favoured by the USSR's leader and his „new political thinking" in the international affairs field. In the context caused by the USSR's strategic glacis collapse, the president François Mitterrand will start to accelerate his policy of European unification.

Keywords: ***Gorbaciov, URSS, SUA, Bush, perestroika***

„Perestroika" şi „glasnosti" aveau să contribuie în mod substanţial la reformarea URSS-ului, favorizînd o „nouă gândire politică" în domeniul relaţiilor internaţionale. Conceptul de „Casă Comună Europeană" avea să devină unul dintre obiectivele strategice ale politicii externe ale lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov şi va influenţa reconfigurarea relaţiilor internaţionale în anul 1989. Tratativele diplomatice pentru unificarea Germaniei şi amplificarea procesului de integrare economică, politică şi monetară a statelor membre ale CEE, având drept ţintă naşterea UE de astăzi, au fost favorizate de această „nouă gândire politică" în domeniul relaţiilor internaţionale a liderului URSS. În contextul oferit de prăbuşirea glacisului strategic al URSS, preşedintele François Mitterrand va începe să accelereze politica sa de făurire a unităţii europene. În contextul politico-economic de la începutul anilor '80, amplificat de pierderea „Liniei X"[1] şi creşterea, astfel, a decalajului tehnico-ştiinţific dintre Occident şi URSS, secretarul general al CC al PCUS, Iuri V. Andropov, a ajuns la concluzia că, dacă evoluţia Uniunii Sovietice continua conform programului, atitudinilor, mentalităţilor şi prejudecăţilor existente, baza economică[2] prin care

[1] Planurile liderilor sovietici privind evoluția URSS cu ajutorul informațiilor tehnico-științifice (S&T) aveau să fie serios zdruncinate, dacă nu chiar împiedicate, de succesul unei operațiuni de contraspionaj a Aliaților Occidentali cunoscută sub numele de Operațiunea „FAREWELL". În perioada martie – decembrie 1981, colonelul Vladimir Ipolitovici Vetrov a oferit contraspionajului francez (DST) peste 4.000 de documente ultrasecrete ale Direcției T (S&T) a KGB-ului, precum și numele a 422 de agenți sovietici din 15 țări occidentale. Colonelul V. I. Vetrov nu a cerut niciodată nimic DST-ului în schimbul serviciilor aduse Franței și, implicit, Lumii Libere, însă spera doar ca, atunci când va reuși să fugă din URSS, să i se acorde posibilitatea unei existențe decente pe teritoriul francez. **„Cât privește motivațiile sale, nu s-a confesat niciodată în puținele întâlniri clandestine cu el. Nostalgia Franței?"**, adnota sovietologul Thierry Wolton, cu referire la acest episod din istoria secretă a Războiului Rece. Operațiunea „FAREWELL" desfășurată de către DST cu avizul „discret" al CIA, în perioada martie 1981 – februarie 1982, a permis expulzarea, la 5 aprilie 1983, a 47 de ofițeri de informații sovietici din Franța și lichidarea, astfel, a rețelei de informații tehnico-științifice a KGB („Linia X"), acest fapt având efecte negative pentru economia și cercetarea productivă sovietică.

[2] La mijlocul anilor '80, peste 40% din utilajele aflate în industria sovietică aveau un grad de uzură care depășea 50%, la care se adăuga și uzura morală accentuată. Planul cincinal 1981-1985 nu avea să fie îndeplinit la niciun indicator, iar investițiile se orientau **„mai mult spre construirea de noi obiective, cu costuri foarte ridicate, neglijându-se modernizarea celor existente"** (Apud Vasile Buga, **Apusul unui Imperiu. URSS în epoca**

se dorea dominarea lumii[3] avea să se prăbuşească[4]. Iuri V. Andropov a ajuns la conştiinţa[5] necesităţii unei reforme complete a sistemului şi putem vorbi de faptul că el este părintele „perestroikăi"[6]. Mihail S. Gorbaciov avea să-şi afirme noile principii şi metode de politică externă, cu ocazia unei conferinţe ţinute, în mai 1986, în faţa funcţionarilor superiori din Ministerul de Externe al URSS: *„În prezent trebuie să învăţăm cât se poate de repede a transpune ideile şi orientările în acţiuni concrete şi s-o facem având mereu în minte - atât în lucrurile mari cât şi în cele mici - obiectivele mometului şi perspectivele strategice. (...) Este neapărat necesar a evalua cu precizie situaţia şi a stabili planuri concrete. Trebuie acordată mai multă atenţie elaborărilor, previziunii evenimentelor, trebuie sesizată orice posibilitate de creştere a eficacităţii, facultăţii de manevră raţională şi a dinamismului global al politicii noastre externe"*[7]. **Noua linie de politică externă**[8] **inaugurată la Kremlin reprezenta aplicarea la politica internaţională a strategiei ideologului comunist italian Antonio Gramsci, respectiv renunţarea la cucerire prin intermediul luptei de clasă şi recurgerea**

Gorbaciov. 1985-1991, Editura INST, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 12). Totodată, starea morală din societatea sovietică şi din sânul PCUS se înrăutăţea permanent, apăruseră semne care indicau înmulţirea fenomenelor de corupţie şi luare de mită, de jefuire a avuţiei publice, de abuz în serviciu etc.

[3] Preşedintele Franţei, François Mitterrand, îi va explica premierului britanic Margaret Thatcher, într-o convorbire telefonică din 24 ianuarie 1984, referitor la perspectivele de viitor ale URSS: **„După părerea mea, până la sfârşitul secolului, imperiul sovietic se va prăbuşi. Tinerii aşteaptă mai mult de la consum. Iar poliţia nu poate împiedica consumul. Trebuie să-l promovezi şi să te deschizi. Şi atunci vor apărea lucrurile noi. URSS-ul nu va mai putea păstra distanţa. Eu nu voi mai vedea acest lucru, dar în anul 2000 totul va fi diferit. Numai armata va mai putea încetini declinul când imperiul va începe să se rupă. Din acea clipă, modernitatea va invada societatea lor. Conducătorii au încetat să-şi mai omoare opozanţii. Este slăbiciunea lor!"** (Apud Jacques Attali, **François Mitterrand aşa cum a fost,** Editura Historia, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 227 - 228).

[4] În ianuarie 1983, *Directorate of Intelligence al CIA* realiza un studiu (***A Research Paper***) intitulat *„Pierderea de viteză a industriei sovietice, 1976 - 1982"* în care se preciza: **„În timp ce încearcă să revigoreze creşterea economiei sovietice, noii conducători avându-l în frunte pe secretarul general Andropov trebuie să se confrunte cu o serie de probleme deosebit de dificile în industrie. Creşterea industrială, care s-a aflat în declin după cel de-Al Doilea Război Mondial, a scăzut într-o manieră uimitor de rapidă în perioada 1976 – 1982. Creşterea anuală a producţiei industriale era, în medie, de peste 9% în anii '50, de 6,4% în anii '60 şi de 5,9% în anii 1971 – 1975. Pentru anii 1976 – 1980, creşterea anuală nu a fost decât de 3,2% şi a scăzut la 2,4% în 1981 – 1982. Scăderea brutală a productivităţii – adică a eficacităţii articulaţiei dintre muncă şi capital – este încă şi mai dramatică. În pofida unor eforturi considerabile, sovieticii au fost incapabili să blocheze această deteriorare (...) Perspectivele unei redresări a situaţiei pentru anii '80 nu sunt deloc bune"** (Apud Catherine Durandin, **CIA în război**, Editura Incitatus, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 205).

[5] **Raportul de la Novossibirsk** (1984) redactat de către un grup de cercetători universitari sub coordonarea sociologului Tatiana Zaslavskaia, la cererea lui Iuri V. Andropov, a fost publicat în numărul 28 al revistei *Survey*. În raport se releva faptul că în URSS **„planificarea hipercentralizată submina vizibil orice progres, iar societatea era scurt-circuitată de mult prea desele conflicte interne"** (Apud Teodora Stănescu-Stanciu, *Efectul Gorbaciov şi statele Europei Central-Estice*, în **CLIO 1989**, Anul IV, nr. 2/8, 2008, p. 8).

[6] În *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, din 28 decembrie 1990, Filip D. Bobkov, fost prim-adjunct al preşedintelui KGB, mărturisea că, **„încă din 1985, KGB-ul a înţeles limpede că URSS nu se mai putea dezvolta fără perestroika"** (Apud Thierry Wolton, **KGB-ul la putere. Sistemul Putin**, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008**,** p. 25). Oleg Hlobâstov, fost consilier al ideologului PCUS, Mihail A. Suslov, va scrie: **„Am văzut cum trebuie lucrurile în ceea ce-l priveşte pe Andropov (...). Însă, oricât de puternic a fost acesta, înţelegea că nu putea reuşi decât graţie unei trădări secrete a ţării de către Comitetul Securităţii Statului"** (Apud Hélène Blanc, Renata Lesnik, **Prădătorii de la Kremlin (1917 – 2009)**, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2011, p. 162)

[7] Mihail Gorbaciov, **Memorii**, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 135.

[8] Într-un document strict-secret al MAE sovietic se menţionau, cu referire la criza din spaţiul ţărilor socialiste şi poziţia de urmat a URSS, următoarele: **„Trebuie să pornim de la faptul că folosirea forţei militare ca parte a relaţiilor noastre cu statele socialiste...este total exclusă, chiar şi în situaţiile extreme (cu excepţia agresiunilor externe asupra aliaţilor noştri)"** (Apud Victor Sebestyen, **1989. Prăbuşirea Imperiului Sovietic**, Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 221).

la strategia şantajului, nu prin forţă, ci prin slăbiciune, în parte reală, în parte simulată, pentru a-şi asigura ajutorul şi simpatiile occidentale[9]. În martie 1987, Mihail S. Gorbaciov avea să declare în faţa membrilor Biroului Politic: **„Sarcina importantă este utilizarea potenţialului ştiinţific şi tehnologic vest-european. (...) Nu să separăm Europa Occidentală de Statele Unite, ci mai degrabă să îndepărtăm Statele Unite de Europa”**[10]. Trebuie să remarcăm faptul că programul politic lansat de Mihail S. Gorbaciov a dus în final, vis-à-vis de NATO şi Occident, la ceea ce avea să-i declare politologul rus Gheorghi A. Arbatov, în 1989, unui general american, în timpul unei vizite la Bonn: **„O să facem un lucru nemaipomenit, o să vă lipsim**[11] **de duşmanul vostru!”.** Referindu-se la acele clipe de început ale mandatului lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov, diplomatul Serghei Tarasenko scria: **„Trebuia să devenim un stat «normal». Nu mai puteam juca rolul unui stat sălbatic. Din toate punctele de vedere, ne loveam de un zid...În opinia publică mondială eram la nivelul unor barbari. Eram temuţi, însă, în acelaşi timp, nimeni nu ne respecta...Eram «imperiul cel rău»”**[12]. În iulie 1985, Andrei A. Gromîko, ministrul de Externe al URSS, a fost înlocuit în funcţie cu Eduard A. Şevardnadze.

În ianuarie 1986, Mihail S. Gorbaciov va lansa celebra ***„Propunere din ianuarie”***, care va lua prin surprindere cancelariile diplomatice şi opinia publică internaţională: sovieticii propuneau eliminarea rachetelor cu rază medie de acţiune din Europa şi, totodată, a tuturor armelor nucleare până în anul 2000. Observatorii atenţi ai relaţiilor internaţionale, cu precădere cele sovieto-americane, reţinuseră faptul că Mihail S. Gorbaciov încerca să impună planul său de dezarmare complexului militaro-industrial sovietic, în pofida **„unei armate ai cărei comandanţi mai vârstnici condamnaseră cu îngrijorare reducerea forţei militare sovietice”**[13]. Pe 18 ianuarie 1989, Henry Kissinger, fost secretar al Departamentului de Stat al SUA, aflat la Kremlin, îi propunea lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov, cu acceptul preşedintelui Bush[14], organizarea unor întâlniri şi negocieri la nivel înalt (SUA - URSS) pentru a se ajunge la realizarea unor înţelegeri - unele formale, altele informale -, vis-à-vis de limitele celor două mari puteri în promovarea intereselor proprii în Europa de Est. După plecarea emisarului de taină al Casei Albe, Mihail S. Gorbaciov avea să se consulte, conform declaraţiilor oficiale, cu

[9] Fostul disident sovietic Vladimir Bukovski concluziona: **„Tentativa pentru a face Europa «socialistă» şi pentru a pune potenţialul ei industrial în slujba cauzei socialismului a fost marea problemă a politicii externe sovietice încă din epoca lui Lenin: de asta depindeau şi supravieţuirea URSS şi succesul oricărei experienţe socialiste”** (Apud Vladimir Bukovski, **Judecată la Moscova**, Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 399).

[10] Thierry Wolton, **op. cit.,** p. 42.

[11] Phil Giraldi, şeful staţiei CIA din Barcelona, scria: **„Tragedia fundamentală este una spirituală. Cei mai mulţi dintre ofiţerii tineri pe care îi cunoşteam eu au demisionat. Erau cei mai buni şi mai străluciţi. 80 sau 90% din oamenii pe care îi ştiam eu, aflaţi în culmea carierei, şi-au făcut bagajele. Nu mai exista motivaţie. Se pierduse entuziasmul”** (Apud Tim Weiner, **CIA. O istorie secretă**, Editura Litera, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 451).

[12] Victor Sebestyen, **op. cit.**, p. 140.

[13] Gerd Ruge, **Mihail Gorbaciov**, Editura Doina, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 242.

[14] O primă rundă de discuţii între Henry Kissinger şi preşedintele Bush a avut loc pe 18 decembrie 1988 şi viza obţinerea unor garanţii sovietice ferme privind neutilizarea forţei pentru a se reprima reformele sau liberalizarea Europei de Răsărit. Occidentul urma să promită că **„nu va exploata nici una din schimbările economice sau politice care vor surveni acolo, în detrimentul intereselor «legitime» ale securităţii Uniunii Sovietice”** (Apud Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **La cele mai înalte nivele**, Editura Elit, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 27).

consilierul său personal pentru Europa de Est, Gheorghi H. Şahnazarov, care îl va sfătui să sprijine planul lui Kissinger[15]

În contextul noilor transformări din arena relaţiilor internaţionale, Bettino Craxi, prim-ministru al Italiei în exerciţiu şi preşedinte al Consiliului European, a vizitat Moscova după venirea lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov la putere, şi a dat semnalul unui nou început în relaţiile dintre Comunitatea Economică Europeană (CEE) şi Blocul Estic. Mihail S. Gorbaciov avea să declare după întâlnirea cu liderul politic italian, că este timpul **„de a organiza relaţii reciproc avantajoase între CAER şi CEE în chestiuni economice”**[16]. Liderul de la Kremlin comunica, totodată, faptul că **„în măsura în care ţările CEE acţionează ca o «entitate politică», noi suntem gata să căutăm un limbaj comun cu ea şi asupra problemelor internaţionale”**[17]. În iunie 1985, secretarul CAER, Viaceslav Sîciov, i-a comunicat oficial preşedintelui Comisiei Europene, Jacques Delors, că organizaţia pe care o reprezintă doreşte să stabilească relaţii oficiale cu CEE. Relaţiile dintre CEE şi URSS, secondată de Blocul ţărilor socialiste, aveau să se dezvolte, în perioada imediat următoare vizitei lui Bettino Craxi la Moscova, mai mult pe tărâm economic decât politic. Jacques Delors avea să declare, la 17 ianuarie 1989, în Parlamentul European, că, la întâlnirea la vârf de la Rhodos (2 – 3 decembrie 1988) a Consiliului European - el **„şi-a exprimat regretul personal că, faţă de cooperarea economică, celei politice i se făcea puţin loc, iar cei Doisprezece nu doreau să cadă de acord asupra unor poziţii comune sau să ia iniţiative unite în dialogul Est-Vest”**[18]. Abia la 24 aprilie 1989, Consiliul Afacerilor Generale al Miniştrilor de Externe din ţările membre ale CEE a decis că trebuie să existe o abordare coerentă a politicii CEE faţă de Europa de Est. În cadrul Consiliului European de la Madrid, din 26 - 27 iunie 1989, liderii politici ai ţărilor membre ale CEE **„au reafirmat deplina valabilitate a abordării cuprinzătoare, integrând aspectele politice, economice şi de cooperare pe care Comunitatea Europeană şi statele ei membre le urmează în relaţiile lor cu URSS şi cu ţările din Europa Centrală şi de Est”**[19]**.** Liderii politici europeni şi-au reafirmat hotărârea lor şi a statelor membre ale Comunităţii Europene **„de a juca un rol activ în sprijinirea şi încurajarea schimbărilor pozitive şi a reformei”**[20]. La întâlnirea „G-7” de la Paris din 14 -

[15] Secretarul de stat James Baker a oferit, în mod discret, informaţii presei despre planurile lui Kissinger privind o înţelegere sovieto-americană asupra Europei Răsăritene. *New York Times* îi informa pe cititorii lui, în cursul zilei de 28 martie 1989, că secretarul de stat american „reflecta” la *„Planul Kissinger”* cu anumite rezerve**. „Cred că este important ca orice fel de idee de acest gen, în măsura în care va fi urmată, să fie urmată cu grijă, în aşa fel încât să nu ni se reproşeze că ne-am aşezat împreună cu Uniunea Sovietică la masă şi am început să modelăm Europa Răsăriteană”,** îi va declara James Baker corespondentului diplomatic al ziarului, Thomas Friedman (**Ibidem,** p. 72). Cancelariile occidentale din spaţiul CEE vor protesta şi vor solicita explicaţii administraţiei Bush. Marea Britanie a comunicat prin Sir Antony Acland, ambasadorul britanic la Washington, că Guvernul Majestăţii Sale era ferm împotriva **„oricărui târg între Statele Unite şi Uniunea Sovietică cu privire la Europa Răsăriteană” (Ibidem,** p. 73). Supusă presiunilor diplomatice ale aliaţilor din NATO, administraţia Bush va comunica, prin intermediul secretarul de stat adjunct Lawrence Eagleburger, că *„Planul Kissinger”* era interesant ca exerciţiu intelectual, însă **„dacă există vreun merit în propunerea lui Kissinger, acela este că ne oferă ocazia să ne gândim la implicaţiile unor schimbări dramatice în Europa Răsăriteană” (Ibidem**).

[16] Karen E. Smith, **Politica externă a Uniunii Europene**, Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 61.

[17] **Ibidem.**

[18] **Ibidem,** p. 88.

[19] **Ibidem,** p. 91.

[20] **Ibidem.**

16 iulie 1989, CEE s-a manifestat ca principalul actor al relaţiilor Occidentului cu Blocul Estic reformator. Liderii „G-7" au decis că politica faţă de reformele aflate în derulare în Europa de Est urma să se subsumeze următoarelor trei scopuri: *1) ajutorul CEE intenţiona să faciliteze reformele economice; 2) reformele urmau să ajute fiecare ţară din Europa de Est să se integreze în economia mondială* şi *3) crearea unei nou cadru de securitate europeană regională*.

Cu ocazia vizitei pe care cancelarul federal Helmut Kohl o va efectua în URSS, în octombrie 1988, Mihail S. Gorbaciov îi va declara că **„înțelege sentimentul poporului german"**[21] referitor la lipsa unității depline și, totuși, se pronunță **„pentru o îmbunătățire a colaborării între Republica Federală și RDG în cadrul dezvoltării în continuare a relațiilor Est-Vest"**[22]. Vizita secretarului general al PCUS în RFG, în perioada 12-15 iunie 1989, avea să reprezinte clipa când cancelarul Helmut Kohl a simţit că aude **„răsunând paşii lui Dumnezeu trecând prin evenimente"**[23]. În Declaraţia Comună dintre RFG şi URSS, semnată la finalul vizitei, se menţionează faptul că **„omenirea se află în pragul mileniului trei în faţa unor sfidări istorice"**[24] ce pot fi soluţionate **„numai împreună"**[25], de către toate statele şi popoarele, ceea ce presupune **„o nouă gândire politică…"**[26]. Cei doi şefi de stat apreciau în Declarația Comună că **„Europei îi revine un rol de prim rang în modelarea unui viitor paşnic"**[27] şi că această evoluţie trebuie să fie sprijinită, în ciuda **„divizării de decenii a continentului"**[28]. Cancelarul Helmut Kohl îl va suna pe George H. W. Bush, pe 15 iunie 1989, pentru a-i comunica că secretarul general sovietic este foarte interesat de existența unei relații bune cu președintele american, iar cancelarul Kohl îi propunea lui Bush să vină în întâmpinarea lui Gorbaciov și, **„din când în când să-l informeze direct, din proprie inițiativă, pe Gorbaciov, într-o problemă sau alta"**[29]. Președintele François Mitterrand considera că unitatea Europei Occidentale depindea de relaţia franco-germană, astfel încât în timpul întâlnirii cu cancelarul Helmut Kohl, din 25 mai 1985, pe un vapor de croazieră, în Bodensee, lacul Constanze, îi declarase: *„Axa politicii franceze este Europa, iar axa Europei este prietenia franco-germană"*[30]. **În contextul oferit de prăbuşirea glacisului strategic al URSS, François Mitterrand va începe să accelereze politica sa de făurire a unităţii europene.**

Pe 30 mai 1989, după încheierea unei reuniuni a Consiliului NATO, președintele George H. W. Bush va ţine un discurs în sala Rheingold, din Mainz, în care va vorbi despre o **„Europă liberă și întreagă"**[31] și va cere organizarea de alegeri libere și pluralism politic în

[21] Helmut Kohl, **Am vrut unitatea Germaniei**, Editura Institutul European, Iaşi, 1999, p. 45.
[22] **Ibidem.**
[23] Cancelarul german Otto von Bismarck declara: **„De unul singur nu poți realiza ceva, poți doar aștepta până când auzi răsunând paşii lui Dumnezeu trecând prin evenimente; atunci să-i sari înainte şi să-i apuci colţul mantiei, asta-i tot!"**.
[24] Helmut Kohl, **op. cit.,** p. 50.
[25] **Ibidem**.
[26] **Ibidem**.
[27] **Ibidem**.
[28] **Ibidem**.
[29] **Ibidem**, p. 51.
[30] Jacques Attali, **op. cit.**, p. 259.
[31] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, **Tratatul de Uniune Sovietică,** Editura Civitas, Chişinău, 2005, p. 299.

Europa de Est, precum și **„o Europă mai puțin militarizată”**[32]. Președintele SUA va declara: **„Nu poate exista o Casă Europeană Comună atâta timp cât locuitorii ei nu sunt liberi să se miște dintr-o cameră în alta”**[33]. Președintele Bush anunța Kremlinul că SUA **„se angajau să țină cont de «interesele legitime de securitate» ale Uniunii Sovietice, să ridice restricțiile existente la exporturile de tehnologie în URSS și să conlucreze mai strâns în planul protecției mediului înconjurător”**[34] în schimbul creării unui sistem politic pluripartid și al alegerilor libere în zona de influență sovietică. Discursul președintelui american avea să fie studiat, în dimineața următoare, de către Gheorghi H. Șahnazarov care va considera că **„toate condițiile lui Bush puteau fi îndeplinite”**[35]. Polonia și Ungaria erau libere, în opinia Kremlinului, să facă ce doresc și nu exista **„niciun motiv pentru care** *Solidaritatea* **să nu poată veni la putere”**[36], singura excepție fiind Germania, care era **„un caz special”**[37].

Pe 10 iulie 1989, președintele SUA a început un turneu diplomatic în Europa în cadrul căruia va vizita Polonia, Ungaria și, mai apoi, Parisul pentru o nouă reuniunea a „G-7”. **„Indiferent ce se va întâmpla în această călătorie, cu siguranță nu va fi un turneu victorios în urma căruia să mă bat cu pumnul în piept...Nu vreau să par agitator sau provocator. Nu vreau să le complic viața lui Gorbaciov și celorlalți. Nu vreau să-i pun bețe în roate lui Gorbaciov”**[38], va declara președintele Bush colaboratorilor săi apropiați înainte de aterizarea la Varșovia. În timpul zborului spre Paris, la întâlnirea „G-7”, președintele Bush va recunoaște faptul că ritmul reformelor din Europa Răsăriteană **„îl uluise de-a dreptul”**[39], însă **„de fapt, conducerea Uniunii Sovietice și liderii din aceste țări”**[40] făcuseră posibil totul. În cursul dimineții de 15 iulie 1989 se va deschide reuniunea „G-7” de la Arcadă (numită azi Arcul lui Mitterrand), într-un imobil din noul cartier La Défense al Parisului. „G-7” a protestat modest împotriva represiunii chineze din Piața Tien An-Men, a hotărât ca ajutorul financiar destinat Poloniei să fie coordonat de Comisia Europeană, a promis un ajutor pentru reducerea datoriilor africane și mexicane, un sprijin financiar pentru ridicarea de baraje în Bangladesh, a lansat inițiative importante împotriva spălării de bani etc. Reunificarea germană nu a fost luată în discuție[41].

În cursul dimineții de 18 iulie 1989, președintele Bush îi va scrie o scrisoare lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov în care va insista pentru obținerea acordului liderului sovietic pentru o întâlnire

[32] **Ibidem.**
[33] **Ibidem.**
[34] Anneli Ute Gabanyi, **Revoluția neterminată**, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1999, p. 39.
[35] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 122.
[36] **Ibidem,** p. 123.
[37] **Ibidem.**
[38] Victor Sebestyen, **op. cit.,** p. 281.
[39] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 136.
[40] **Ibidem.**
[41] Pe 1 septembrie 1989, François Mitterrand îi va explica premierului Margaret Thatcher că el nu se opunea reunificării germane, cu condiția de a se reconfirma intangibilitatea frontierei polono-germane. **„Niciodată Gorbaciov nu va accepta o Germanie unită în NATO. Iar americanii nu vor accepta niciodată ca RFG să iasă din NATO. În acest caz nu trebuie să ne neliniștim: să spunem că ea va avea loc când vor decide germanii, dar știind că cei doi mari ne vor proteja”,** mărturisea președintele Mitterrand (Apud Jacques Attali, **op. cit**., p. 276). În interviul acordat lui Pierre Verluise (**La réunification allemande et les relations franco-allemandes)**, publicat în septembrie 2002 pe site-ul www.diploweb.com, generalul (r) Vernon Walters declară că președintele Bush a acceptat, în noiembrie 1989, să susțină activ reunificarea Germaniei, însă fără o neutralizare a acesteia (A se vedea: *http://www.diploweb.com/La-reunification-allemande-et-les.html*).

la cel mai înalt nivel, **„fără mii de asistenţi care privesc peste umărul nostru** (al lui Bush şi Gorbaciov – n. n.), **fără informările omniprezente”**[42] şi fără mass-media. Scrisoarea olografă cu antetul Casei Albe a fost predată peste zece zile consilierului militar al lui Gorbaciov, mareşalul Serghei Ahromeiev, cu ocazia vizitei acestuia în Biroul Oval. Mihail S. Gorbaciov a primit-o din mâna consilierului său militar şi a fost convins că era timpul pentru o discuţie faţă în faţă cu preşedintele Statelor Unite. La jumătatea lui august 1989, Jacques Attali, consilierul special al preşedintelui Mitterrand, va veni cu o propunere extrem de îndrăzneaţă: crearea unei instituţii europene care să adune toate ţările de pe continent, inclusiv URSS, convins fiind că **„această instituţie ar trebui să fie în acelaşi timp o bancă şi un forum pentru a pune în practică un proiect politic comun pentru toate aceste ţări: o adunare continentală”**[43]. Preşedintele François Mitterrand va accepta sugestia consilierului său special, însă nu va fi de acord cu lărgirea CEE înainte ca ea să fi devenit o realitate politică.

Populațiile din cele trei State Baltice vor organiza, la 23 august 1989, o serie de manifestaţii politice în favoarea independenţei Statelor Baltice, inclusiv emoţionanta **Cale Baltică**. Oficialii administraţiei Bush vor considera că nu este în interesul Statelor Unite să încurajeze în mod public dorinţa de ieşire din URSS a balticilor, deoarece **„se temeau** - adnotau Michael R. Beschloss şi Strobe Talbott - **ca o mişcare bruscă de separatism să nu degenereze în violenţă şi, posibil, în război civil, în care caz s-ar putea ca porţiuni mari din teritoriul Uniunii Sovietice să se rupă, lăsând armele nucleare sub un control nesigur**”[44]. Pe 21 septembrie 1989, ministrul sovietic de Externe, Eduard A. Şevardnadze, se va întâlni la Casa Albă cu preşedintele Bush şi cu consilierul său pentru securitate naţională, Brent Scowcroft, iar în urma discuțiilor au stabilit că este bine să se menţină un status-quo în privinţa Blocului Răsăritean şi, totodată, liderii SUA nu vor face declaraţii şi nu vor urmări o politică care să vizeze accelerarea destrămării Tratatului de la Varşovia. Administraţia de la Casa Albă nu va sprijini nicio forţă centrifugă care ar fi putut sfâşia în bucăţi URSS-ul.

Premierul Margaret Thatcher îi va remite lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov, cu ocazia vizitei pe care o va efectua la Moscova în septembrie 1989, o scrisoare din partea preşedintelui Bush prin care liderul de la Casa Albă îl asigura pe secretarul general sovietic de faptul că: *1) sprijinea fără niciun fel de rezerve perestroika; 2) nu era alarmat de previziunile sumbre privind reformele din URSS care păreau să eşueze* şi *3) politica SUA faţă de Europa de Est nu reprezenta o ameninţare pentru URSS iar administraţia americană* **„nu va încerca să profite de dificultățile ivite acolo”**[45]. În cursul zilei de 25 octombrie 1989, Mihail S. Gorbaciov, aflat în vizită oficială la Helsinki, va declara public că Uniunea Sovietică **„nu avea nici un drept, nici moral, nici politic”**[46], să se amestece în evenimentele aflate în curs de desfăşurare în Europa Răsăriteană şi presupunea că **„nici alţii nu vor interveni”**[47]**.** Purtătorul de cuvânt al MAE sovietic, Ghenadi Gherasimov, va declara reporterilor că *Doctrina Brejnev* a murit şi că în locul ei va fi proclamată *Doctrina Frank Sinatra*.

[42] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 139.
[43] Jacques Attali, **op. cit**., p. 275.
[44] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 148.
[45] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, **op. cit.,** p. 300.
[46] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 191.
[47] **Ibidem.**

În paralel cu aceste eforturi politico-diplomatice sovieto-americane pentru remodelarea relaţiilor internaţionale, cancelarul Helmut Kohl sosea la Paris, pe 24 octombrie 1989, pentru a cina cu preşedintele François Mitterrand. Cei doi lideri de stat erau îngrijoraţi de evoluţiile politice din Europa Răsăriteană, precum şi de cele ale Uniunii Sovietice, de posibila reunificare germană şi viitorul politic şi economic al CEE. **„Problema dumneavoastră nu poate fi rezolvată decât în cadrul Europei"**[48], va declara François Mitterrand[49]. Pe 2 noiembrie 1989, în timpul întâlnirii la vârf semestrială franco-germană, François Mitterrand va declara în faţa mass-media: **„Nu mă tem de reunificare...Nici un om politic european nu trebuie să mai facă de acum înainte raţionamente fără a le integra acest element"**[50]. Cancelarul Helmut Kohl îi va scrie preşedintelui Statelor Unite, George H. W. Bush, pe 28 noiembrie 1989, cu referire la întâlnirea la nivel înalt sovieto-americană care urma să se desfăşoare la Malta: **„Vă rog foarte cordial să nu fiţi de acord la Malta cu nicio decizie care ar putea limita marja de acţiune a politicii noastre în problema germană"**[51].

Summit-ul de la Malta (2 - 4 decembrie 1989) s-a desfăşurat în condiţiile unui amplu efort de reconstrucţie a sistemului de relaţii internaţionale ca efect al politicii de *perestroika* şi *glasnosti* a lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov. Discuţiile de la Malta[52] l-au convins pe Mihail S. Gorbaciov de faptul că *„politica lui de slăbire a strânsorii împotriva Europei Răsăritene* - scriau Michael R. Beschloss şi Strobe Talbott - *va elibera forţe contrare, eventual distrugătoare din această zonă"*[53], astfel încât *„vest-europenii nu vor fi în stare să înfrângă şi să controleze singuri aceste forţe"*[54] şi va fi nevoie de ajutorul Statelor Unite. Referindu-se la **„problema germană"**[55], Mihail S. Gorbaciov a declarat: **„În ceea ce priveşte problema Germaniei, am o politică prudentă şi precaută"**[56]. Ghennadi Gherasimov, purtătorul de cuvânt al Ministerului de Externe sovietic, avea să declare la finalul Summit-ului: **„Am înmormântat Războiul Rece pe fundul Mării Mediterane"**[57]. Pe 4 decembrie 1989, la Bruxelles, preşedintele George H. W. Bush a ţinut un monolog despre rezultatele summit-ului de la Malta, alături de alte monologuri ale aliaţilor europeni din NATO, până când a răbufnit adevărata problemă care preocupa cancelariile diplomatice europene: reunificarea germană şi viitorul noului stat reunificat. **„Ce e de făcut cu Germania de Est? Unde vor fi frontierele**

[48] Jacques Attali, **op. cit.**, p. 277.
[49] În cursul zilei de 25 octombrie 1989, François Mitterrand va dezvălui agenda sa de priorităţi: *1) lansarea conferinţei interguvernamentale care să ducă la crearea monedei unice europene; 2) adoptarea Cartei sociale europene; 3) crearea unei confederaţii şi a unei bănci cu care să fie susţinută evoluţia ţărilor din Răsăritul Europei*. A se vedea: Loredana Baltes, *François Mitterrand un preşedinte controversat*, în **Magazin istoric**, Anul XLV, serie nouă,nr. 3 (528), martie 2011, p. 72 – 76.
[50] Jacques Attali, **op. cit.**, p. 279.
[51] Helmut Kohl, **op. cit.**, p. 128.
[52] A se vedea: *Malta. Decembrie 1989. Stenograma sovietică a întâlnirii de la Malta (I)*, în **Caietele Revoluţiei**, nr. 2 (40)/2012, p. 54-60; *Idem (II)*, nr. 3 (41)/2012, p. 45-52; *Idem (III)*, nr. 4 (42)/2012, p. 31-40.
[53] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 231.
[54] **Ibidem.**
[55] Preşedintele Franţei era angrenat într-un complicat joc politico-diplomatic a cărui miză era unitatea europeană în care cancelarul Helmut Kohl trebuia să-i cedeze lui François Mitterrand. **Lansarea negocierilor privind crearea Uniunii Europene, recunoaşterea frontierelor cu Polonia şi confirmarea denuclearizării Germaniei** reprezentau cele trei condiţii necesare fără de care François Mitterrand nu dorea să discute cu Mihail S. Gorbaciov despre „reunificarea germană". A se vedea: Ulrich Albrecht, *Marile Puteri şi reunificarea Germaniei*, în **Lumea**, Anul XIII, nr. 5 (157), 2006, p. 28 – 35.
[56] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, **op. cit.,** p. 222.
[57] **Ibidem,** p. 233.

Germaniei? Germania reunificată va mai rămâne în NATO?"[58], a întrebat François Mitterrand. Răspunsul a fost dezamăgitor şi îngrijorător în acelaşi timp. **„Nu pot vorbi decât în numele RFG. Germania reunificată va trebui să decidă pentru ea însăşi"**[59], a declarat cancelarul Helmut Kohl.

În cursul zilei de 6 decembrie 1989, la Kiev, Mihail S. Gorbaciov va preciza, referitor la reunificarea germană, după discuţiile cu François Mitterrand, că Germania **„trebuie să se reunifice, dar în cadrul unei Europe mari"**[60]. Președintele François Mitterrand va propune, pe 31 decembrie 1989, crearea unei Confederaţii europene care să cuprindă şi URSS. Pe 4 ianuarie 1990, François Mitterrand va declara, în prezenţa cancelarului vest-german Helmut Kohl, la o conferinţă de presă: **„Trebuie organizată o perspectivă pentru toate ţările care vor adera la democraţie şi care nu vor putea, dintr-un motiv sau altul, să adere la Comunitatea Europeană care nu se poate mări la infinit"**[61]. Istoricul şi diplomatul rus Valeri L. Musatov, referindu-se la *„noua gândire politică externă"* a lui Mihail S. Gorbaciov, va consemna: **„Justificându-şi propria politică, M. Gorbaciov susţine că este acuzat pe nedrept, că el ar fi predat Europa de Est, lăsându-le libertatea popoarelor respective. Nu le-a putut opri, ele aveau dreptul la libertate. În fapt, evoluţia evenimentelor, neprevăzută de el, a dus la rezultatul ce trebuia aşteptat: ţările Europei de Est s-au separat de Moscova, la nivelul conducerii superioare a acestora creştea dorinţa de despărţire, e adevărat, nu în formele dramatice pe care le-a luat destrămarea URSS. Regiunea a luat calea schimbării orânduirii sociale, mergând în direcţia SUA şi a Europei Occidentale. Justificându-se, M. Gorbaciov i-a spus lui Helmuth Kohl, în iulie 1991:** *«s-au săturat de noi. Dar şi noi ne-am săturat de ei»***"**[62].

[58] Jacques Attali, **op. cit.**, p. 287.
[59] **Ibidem.**
[60] Jacques Attali, **op. cit.**, p. 288. Istoricul George-Henri Soutou scria în 2007: **„Într-adevăr, prima reacţie a lui François Mitterrand a fost aceea de-a încerca să frâneze reunificarea germană, care, în viziunea sa, ar fi compromis statutul Franţei în Europa. Pentru asta, el conta în special pe procesul supranumit «2+4», prin care erau desemnate negocierile între cei Patru şi cele două Germanii. În februarie 1990, el credea că în formula «2+4», reunificarea va dura ani de zile. Pe de altă parte, el a încercat iniţial să insereze reunificarea în construcţia unei Europe Mari, care să includă URSS. (...) De aici propunerea sa din 31 decembrie, referitoare la o Confederaţie europeană care să cuprindă URSS; în acelaşi spirit, el voia să dezvolte structurile de securitate din Europa între cele două tratate pentru a încadra reunificarea, ceea ce ar fi mers în acelaşi sens cu conceptul de Casă Comună a lui Gorbaciov, după cum îi şi spune acestuia, în mai 1990, la Moscova. În concepţia preşedintelui Republicii, această Europă Mare ar fi fost facilitată de căderea comunismului sovietic de tip clasic şi de apariţia în URSS şi în Europa de Est a unui comunism reformat compatibil cu socialismul democratic al Europei occidentale"** (Apud Pierre Verluise, **După douăzeci de ani de la căderea Zidului. Europa reconfigurată**, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2009, p. 123). În octombrie 1989, François Mitterrand a ţinut un discurs la Valladolid prin care a îndemnat popoarele din Răsăritul Europei să **„nu respingă «valorile socialismului»" (Ibidem**, p. 124).
[61] **Ibidem**, p. 123.
[62] **Ibidem.**

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HUMAN SECURITY – A RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZED INSECURITIES

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Abstract: This article analyses the genesis of the human security paradigm as a response to globalized insecurities, understood in terms of "world risk society". Globalization enhances the transnational interconnections and determines the ubiquity of risks, which affect the individuals worldwide. The human security doctrine is a response to the negative effects of globalization, encompassed in the risks and threats to the individual. Using qualitative research methods, the article identifies the change in approaching security, from state centred security to the individual as the referent of security. This mutation is a reply to the negative externalities of globalization after the end of the Cold War.

Keywords: ***globalization, human security, insecurity, security studies, world risk society***

1. Introduction

The international system is in a time of "bewildering connectivity and advancing political complexity" (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2011, 39), a fact which increases risk and insecurity. The proposed research model stands on the premise that the human security paradigm represents a response to the world affected by increased and multi-layered threats to security induced by globalization. The theoretical dimension, represented by the world risk society thesis, summarizes the threats and risks generated by globalization. Thus, the aim of this article is not to make a diagnosis of the negative effects of globalization. The current analysis contextualizes the change in the security studies from state security towards an individual centered conception of security within the risks embedded by the process of globalization.

The article is organized in three parts and conclusions. In the first section the literature review on the subject is presented. The second part represents a short diagnosis of the international context after the end of the Cold War and the effects of globalization. The last section defines human security, analyses its genesis as a response to the effects of globalization and the implementation and operationalizing of the paradigm. The sections are followed by conclusions.

I. Literature review

The theoretical framework that contextualizes the new security approach after the end of the Cold War is encompassed in the world risk society thesis. The most important literature on risk society is Ulrich Beck's (1992, 1994, 1998, 2009) theorizing of this concept. The theory, completed by Anthony Giddens and John Adams, describes that the development of society became, in the new realities, "a theme and a problem on itself" (Beck 1992, 8). The world risk society description of reality is debatable in the "liquid modernity thesis" developed by Zigmunt Bauman.

Human security is a broadly approached subject in the international relations literature. The present literature review focuses on the most important authors who were

relevant for the study I conducted. Mary Kaldor (2005, 2007, 2009, 2012) is one of the most preeminent scholars that analyses, defends and promotes in literature the concept of human security. Her studies illustrate the possibility of ensuring human security as an international community variable, and the necessity of the world to move away from nationalist thinking towards a concept of human security. Other important theoreticians of human security are Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007), who place the security of the individual on the same place as the security of the state. They investigate and describe the human security paradigm, establishing its connections with conflict prevention, human development and human rights. In addition, Hayden (2004) observes that the old approach to security cannot encompass the security of the individual, a fact that generates, as Ștefanachi (2011) mentions, the normative judgements of security. Myhten and Waklate, in the book *Beyond The Risk Society: Critical Reflections On Risk And Human Security* (2006) make a comprehensive discussion of risk and its place in contemporary discourse concerning the human security paradigm. The current research reiterates and completes the results of this study.

While the globalization phenomenon was widely approached in international relations and political science literature, the relation between human security and globalization was also analysed, as McGrew and Poku's analysis (2006) and Battersy and Siracusa's book *Globalization and human security* (2009) show.

II. The international context after the end of the Cold War – effects of globalization

II.1. The end of the Cold War – new security environment

The end of the Cold War represents a temporal threshold for understanding the changes within the international system, the dynamics of globalization and the leverages that led to a reshaped understanding of security. The new international context, animated by globalization, emphasized the network of threats, vulnerabilities and interdependence that affected the system, the state and the individuals. Apart of traditional sources of threats, other forms of organized violence, such as militias, gang violence, organized violent ethnic groups, local resource-related violence and violence linked to trafficking, and violence animated by global ideological struggles affect the security environment (World Bank 2015, 211). The World Bank emphasizes that these forms of violence are self-replicating and endemic, unless are tackled in a systematic manner.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War demonstrated the demise of the unidimensional approach of the complementarity of nationalism and internationalism in terms of security, because the state proved to be in some cases the agent of humanitarian catastrophes (Mazower 2012, 379). As Mazower observes, the international community after the end of the bipolar world changed its structural focus, from warfare coalitions, to an "unprecedented expansion of the UN's responsibilities and powers in the humanitarian realm" (Mazower 2012, 379). This fact can be explained through the decrease in the number of inter-state conflicts and the increase in intra-state conflicts.

II.1. Approaches and effects of globalization

Globalization has no unique accepted definition. In large terms, it is understood as the increasing worldwide interconnectivity between society, institutions, cultures and individuals (Patman 2006, 4). Nonetheless, globalization is a highly debated phenomenon, with maximalist (hyperglobalist) and minimalist (skeptic) conceptions. The position adopted in this paper is moderate-hyperglobalist and transformationalist, because we accept that the state diminishes its prevalence on ensuring security, but in the same time we consider that it maintains an important role on the security equation, in ensuring the security of the individual.

Scott observes that globalization is perceived as a negative phenomenon, because it is criticized for being "an unstoppable historical force in the face of which politics is helpless" (Scott 1997, 2). This fact reveals an increasing insecurity climate and the demand for a revisal of political approach in order to protect society against negative externalities of globalization. Among the negative effects of globalization, which are induced by economic disparities, one can mention: increasing poverty, political refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants. In the same time, as Basch observes, education, health care and environment are also affected by privatization and open markets (Basch 2004, 6). Thus, taking into consideration the fact that globalization is irreversible, multidimensional and complex, in this paper it is not demonized as the origin of risks and threats, but rather it is analyzed as a *de facto* phenomenon, whose negative externalities should be tackled.

Globalization is correlated with the decrease of state sovereignty and with the change in the security environment. Through the multitude of risks implied, it determines the mitigation of the demarcation line between international and national security, and it reveals the current increased interdependence between all security levels. Therefore, the individual cannot be neglected from the equation of security.

II.2. Globalization of risks – the world risk society

The world risk society theoretical framework helps in contextualizing the realities of globalization, which determined a paradigm shift in approaching security and the new conjunctures of international cooperation. According to Beck, the world risk society is a consequence of modernization, derived from irreversible threats (Beck 1992, 13). The concept of risk, which is inextricably related to reflexive modernization, is defined as a systemic manner of approaching the hazards and the insecurities encompassed in the process of modernization (Beck 1992, 21).

Concerning the relation between globalization and modernity, Giddens affirms that "modernity is inherently globalizing" (Giddens 1990, 33). Further theorizing risk, authors name contemporary society "second modernity" (Beck, 1992) or "society of fluid modernity" (Bauman 2000, 23). Therefore, in the post-Cold War period, the proliferation of risk rose "fundamental concerns about the relationship between individuals, institutions and society" (Mythen 2004, 4). Bauman highlights that, in this context, there is a duty and a necessity to approach individualized risks, because their origins are socially produced (Bauman 2000, 34). Furthermore, Bauman states that, in the liquid modernity era, the state should renounce on or delegate its role as the main provider of security (Bauman 2000, 184).

III. Human security – reflection of the globalized world

The perception of risk in the dynamics of post modernity represented a challenge for the ontological security and for the national state (Beck and Levy 2013, 9). The change in Security Studies after the end of the Cold War started with the increasing importance awarded to the multi-layered concept of security proposed by the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School suggested a five pillars concept of security, based on the military dimension and also implying economic, political, social and environmental aspects (Buzan 1991). The model had its limits, because it perceived the state as the main security referent. Therefore, a further approach to security was necessary. Referring to security outside the state-centric approach, the opportunity for normative judgements of security emerged (Ștefanachi 2011, 410). The post-Cold-War realities demonstrated that it was practically impossible "to protect and enhance human freedom and well-being exclusively through the traditional paradigm of national security" (Hayden 2004, 35). This concern constituted the ground on which the requirement of focusing on the individual as the referent of security was initially put forward. The human security concept emerged in this conjuncture of practical-theoretical vantage, which was legitimated by the realities of globalization, encompassed in the world risk society theory.

The human security paradigm was initially enunciated as an international conducing line in the UNDP *Human Development Report* of 1994. The Report argued that "human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity" (UNDP 1994, 22).

The human security paradigm, as described in the 1994 Report, has four fundamental characteristics: (1) human security is a universal challenge and concern; (2) its components are interdependent; (3) it can be sooner accomplished using prevention than subsequent intervention; (4) human security is centred on the individual (UNDP 1994, 22-3). The paradigm values the individual as the referent of security and is in strong correlation with the human development agenda. It focuses on the empowerment of the individual, aiming to "allow individuals the pursuit of life, liberty, and both happiness and justice" (Liotta and Owen 2006, 40). These objectives are encompassed in the formula *freedom from fear and freedom from want*, as it was fostered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1994, 24).

The core argumentation for the emergence of the human security doctrine was developed taking into consideration the "breathtaking globalization of prosperity side by side with a depressing globalization of poverty" (UNDP 1994, 1). The UNDP 1994 Report emphasizes the *raison d'être* of the universal people-centered concept of security: bringing "humanity together through a more equitable sharing of global economic opportunities and responsibilities" (UNDP 1994, 3) in the context of the globalization of threats. Among these threats, which transcend the national borders, the Report mentions: famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, global poverty and environmental problems, drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation (UNDP 1994, 2).

The threats to human security are classified in the 1994 Report, non-exhaustively and without mutually exclusion, in: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community,

and political threats (King and Murray 2002, 589). This multi-layered concept of security represents a quasi-holistic approach to the risks and threats implied by the globalization process. Therefore, the broad human security perspective is, as Martin and Owen mention, "useful in mandating a role in global security governance in the face of a blizzard of simultaneous threats" (Martin and Owen 2010, 220).

The human security paradigm creates at least two fundamental changes in understanding international relations. Firstly, the individual security replaces the territorial security and secondly, the human-centred security takes the place of the obsolete security as understood in the narrow terms of military (UNDP 1994, 24). Based on these changes, the human security paradigm induces an "upowardly extention", from the nation to the international system; a horrizontal extension, as presented above, from the military issues to a wide range of domains; and "creates a politic responsibility to ensure security from states to international institutions, subnational authorities, nongovernmental organizations, public opinion or markets" (Ștefanachi 2011, 419).

Through this change of paradigm, the individual and the interest of humanity as a collective became the main focus of security, aiming at freedom, peace, safety and empowerment (Ștefanchi 2013, 14). In addition, Mazower identifies that an erosion of sovereignty was correlated with this emphasis of the old rhetoric of universal ethics (Mazower 2012, 380). The enhancement of human-centered doctrines which appeal morality and a common responsibility for the international community is identified in the principle of responsibility to protect, built on the human security rhetoric.

Within the world risk society, and on the fundaments of the human security and humanitarian intervention approach, the R2P doctrine was, as Luck observes, simultaneously the product and the catalyst in changing international attitudes and priorities (Luck 2010, 355).

In analyzing the correlation between risks induced by globalization and the human security paradigm, Battersby and Siracusa's (2009, 24) view on a "polymorphous" understanding of risks is essential. The authors highlight that people and communities face ubiquitous risk, generated by food shortages, economic hardship, crime, disease and human rights abuses (Battersby and Siracusa 2009, 24), which the human security paradigm tries to tackle. Thus, human security focuses on early warning of conflicts and risks, trying to diminish the incidence of situations that affect the individual's security (Battersby and Siracusa 2009, 29).

Despite the diminishing in the importance of place in the context of globalization, due to the fact that "global economic relations transcend time and space" (Battersby and Siracusa 2009, 30), human security acknowledges that place, identity and nation remain important features for ensuring freedom from fear and freedom from want for the individual. Therefore, although the paradigm is universal in aim and principles, it is context specific and can respond to a high diversity of particular situations that endanger individuals worldwide.

III.1 Effects and operationalizing of human security

Since its emergence, the human security concept became a conducting organizing concept in economics, public health and development of security communities (King and

Murray 2002, 589). It also became an issue for foreign and international agenda. For instance, the Group of Eight (G8) foreign ministers declared in June of 1999 that they were "determined to fight the underlying causes of multiple threats to human security" (King and Murray 2002, 585). The Commission on Human Security was created in 2001 for developing a human security operational tool addressing the global security threats. Moreover, it became one of the conducting principles for the Organization of African Union, which included human security in its Constitutive Act. The European Union proposed in 2004 the report *A human security for Europe*, which raised the inspiration to create a Human Security Rapid Response Force, and in 2007, the document *A European Way of Security*, also based on human security principles. ASEAN emphasized the human security in the document *ASEAN Vision 2020* and in the ASEAN Charter, while the Pacific Island Forum was one of the first organizations that adopted human security as a code of conduct. According to the social construction of reality constructivist thesis, through these mechanisms and institutionalizations, the human security paradigm was reified and started to socially transform reality.

The last two and a half decades after the end of the Cold War registered a decrease of violent acts, as counted in the number of interstate wars, civil wars and the number of the deaths from civil wars (World Bank 2015, 208). Moreover, the implementation of regulations for pursuing perpetrators determined a slight improvement for respecting human rights. As the World Bank statistics present, since 1990, 67 former heads of states have been prosecuted for mass human rights violations.

Although the human security paradigm represented a critical juncture in the international discourse on security, its practical implications had little effect on ensuring security in situation of crisis when masses of people found themselves in imminent threats. The postmodern period of the international system was often characterized by the "clumsy handling of the delicate and complex issues" of the NATO politicians (Bauman 2000, 191) and of the international community, in general. The principle of responsibility to protect ensures that the sovereign states have the responsibility "to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation". On the other hand, it also reflects the responsibility of the international community: "when they (states) are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of the states" (ICISS 2001, viii). The ICISS Report internalizes the human security paradigm as one of the "virtues" of R2P, because "it focuses attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance" (ICISS 2001, 15). Therefore, the international community receives the compulsory duty to intervene for protecting endangered individuals, as a response to the risks and threats induced by globalization. Thus, the implementation of this principle is a shortcoming and the subject of large debates at the international level.

Conclusions

This article analyzed non-exhaustively the relation between globalization and human security. The main highlights of this qualitative research emphasize that the human security doctrine emerged as a response to globalization. Nonetheless, human security represents in

itself a driver that interconnects worldwide actors. Globalization enhances the transnational interconnections and increases the possibility of international shocks and security risks (Battersby and Siracusa 2009, 37). Therefore, there is a need for a new governing approach for these challenges. The human security paradigm could represent a solution for tackling these challenges. Thus, the reality of its implementation leaves space for discussions on the capability of the human security strategy to encompass and to respond to all the risks implied by globalization.

Further research should analyze the commitment of international actors to the human security strategy. Moreover, further analyses could approach the evolution and the results of actions taken under the human security doctrine in order to address the risks embedded by globalization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: "This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675"

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THE IMPACT OF PARENTS' MIGRATION ON CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND

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Abstract: Opening the boarders and the poor Romanian economy made more and more families have chosen to look for jobs abroad. The abandonment of one or both parents has become a social phenomenon. Parents' migration have a big impact on the family's functioning especially on children. Once gone, the relationship between children and their migrant parents change substantially. The absence of the parents generate a big lack of affection, love, educational structures in the children's development. The family builds the models in child's life. Being private of parental affection, left in the supervision of inappropriate people has a big impact on developing the abandonment feeling and further, as a result, generating delinquency problems. Considering the high amplitude of the phenomenon and the deep impact it has on children's behavior, this article presents the migration from a couple of points of view, as well as its new approaches. We can also distinguish a new consequence of the phenomenon- high rates of delinquency among children left behind by their migrant parents. The following article discusses the causes of this problem with the focus held on the migration effects, the evolution of it and on the educational role that the transnational family should have.

Keywords: ***migration; phenomenon; transnational family; children; juvenile delinquency.***

Introducere

Acest articol face o introducere în spațiul migrației, punând accent pe importanța fizică a părinților emigranți în viața copiilor, pe atenția și grija familială pe care părinții ar putea-o oferi fiind prezenți alături de copiii lor. Articolul tratează perspective teoretice ale familiei transnaționale. Totodată, abordează o problemă actuală a migrației românilor și anume delincvența juvenilă în rândul copiilor rămași fără supravegherea unuia sau ambilor părinți. Articolul prezintă modul în care migrația părinților schimbă dinamica relației părinte-copil.

La momentul actual, migrația este văzută ca un fenomen social în România, care afectează în principal copiii rămași acasă, care au unul sau ambii părinți plecați la muncă în străinătate.

Migrația forței de muncă a românilor în Europa se produce imediat după căderea regimului comunist, începând cu anul `90. Deschiderea granițelor țării, aderarea României la Uniunea Europeană**,** economia scăzută, „liberalizarea accesului la piața muncii în 2014"(Beciu, 2014: 235), determină tot mai mulți români să migreze în căutarea unui trai mai bun în țările Uniunii Europene. Plecarea unuia sau ambilor părinți dintr-o familie la muncă în străinătate, se creionează ca un fenomen social. Acest fenomen capătă o amploare şi mai mare în zonele mai sărace ale ţării, unde întregi comunităţi migrează lăsând în urmă un număr foarte mare de copii. Migrația este deseori văzută ca o cale de a scăpa de sărăcie, observăm acest lucru în jurul nostru, în familiile noastre, în mediul în care lucrăm sau în vecinătate.

Migrația reprezintă un mijloc de a opta pentru un standard de viață mai bun, atât pentru cei care migrează, cât și pentru membrii familiei rămași acasă. Cu toate acestea, realitatea migrației de astăzi ridică provocări serioase pentru familie şi membrii acesteia. Copiii fiind cei mai afectați în urma migrației, prin separarea de unul sau ambii părinți. În

urma plecării părinților la muncă în străinătate, comportamentul copiilor se schimbă. Migrarea părinților, determină o serie de schimbări negative asupra funcționalității familiilor afectate de acest fenomen, și în mod special asupra copiilor rămași acasă. Astfel, apar multe cazuri de comportamente delincvente în rândul minorilor. În prezent, specialiștii trag un semnal de alarmă asupra gravității acestui fenomen, migrația părinților fiind văzută ca o problemă socială a prezentului.

1. Rolul familiei în protecția și educația copiilor

În perioada copilăriei este greu să știi ce este bine, ce este rău, ce ai voie să faci și ce nu ai voie să faci. De aceea există familia. Familia influențează, formează și modelează persoana umană, ea contribuie la formarea copiilor ca viitori adulți. Familia constituie unul dintre cele mai complexe microsisteme sociale, este modelul pe care copilul îl vede încă de la naștere, după care se formează și de care are nevoie toată copilăria. Întreaga dezvoltare a umanității este legată de constituirea și evoluția formelor de colectivitate umană, „dintre care, una dintre verigile sociale cele mai importante și mai vechi în asigurarea continuității și afirmării depline a ființei umane o reprezintă familia" (Irimescu, 2011: 1).

De multe ori fie că ne place sau nu, trebuie să ne bucurăm că avem părinții aproape. Mulți nu au această șansă, motiv pentru care familia trebuie să fie văzută ca un mediu de formare pentru copii, nu ca o îngrădire a libertății acestora. Familia reprezintă „laboratorul" în care oamenii, membrii societății, se formează și își petrec o parte importantă a vieții lor. Este „cadrul în care se transmit valori și norme sociale" (Răduț, 2009: 32- 33) este instituția ce-și pune amprenta de neînlocuit asupra formării personalității oamenilor, asupra modului de raportare a acestora la ei înșiși, la semenii lor, la societate în ansamblul ei. Este cea dintâi formă de colectivitate pe care omul o cunoaște imediat după naștere, de aceea impactul pe care îl are este semnificativ pentru fiecare.

Iolanda și Nicolae Mitrofan (1991: 111) consideră familia o „matrice genetică în care se plămădesc modelele primelor relații umane, ale primelor relații cu sex opus, primele comunicări și atitudini fundamentale față de semeni și de viață".

Așadar, familia este și rămâne de-a lungul întregii existențe sursa primordială a satisfacerii nevoilor emoționale, de dragoste, de siguranță, de afiliere socială, de respect față de sine. Sentimentul de securitate și împlinire afectivă pe care îl poate crea conviețuirea familială, alimentează întreaga conduită a individului în cursul dezvoltării și împlinirii sale personale. Familia reprezintă principala sursă de sprijin pentru copii atunci când aceștia au anumite nevoi. Mereu părinții au încercat să vină în sprijinul copiilor în satisfacerea oricărei necesități. În cazul multor părinți din România, lipsa banilor, este una dintre nevoile cele mai mari.

Pe fondul economiei scăzute din România, a lipsei locurilor de muncă, mulți părinți trebuie să facă față solicitărilor zilnice, nevoilor financiare de care se izbesc, motiv pentru care unii aleg calea străinătății. În ultima perioadă tot mai mulți părinți ajung să își lase copiii acasă, alegând să migreze în străinătate pentru a oferi familiei rămase acasă un trai mai bun, o rezolvare a problemelor financiare, o acoperire a nevoilor.

2. Fenomenul migrației părinților și copiii rămași acasă

În ultimul deceniu, în România, tot mai mulți copii simt lipsa unuia sau ambilor părinți, pe fondul migrației părinților. În cele mai multe cazuri, la început pleacă doar un singur părinte, după o perioadă de timp este urmat și de celălalt. Cea mai mare parte a populației din România, în urma crizei economice a rămas fără loc de muncă. Pentru a putea întreține familia rămasă acasă, părinții aleg să muncească în țările Uniunii Europene, în vederea obținerii unei sume de bani (Călin, 2006: 41).

Migrația are o istorie lungă și continuă în multe regiuni ale lumii. De multe ori migrația apare din motive economice familiale. Migrația este „procesul, care are loc atunci când părinții migrează singuri sau cu alți membri ai familiei„ (Phoenix & Bauer, 2012: 491).

Potrivit Interntional Organization for Migration , migrația este văzută ca deplasarea unei persoane sau unui grup de persoane peste granițele țării sau în interiorul aceleași țări. Este o mișcare a populației, care cuprinde orice fel de mișcare a persoanelor, indiferent de cauze (International Organization for Migration). De aceeași părere este și Alina Cruceru, care vede migrația ca pe o „schimbarea a domiciliului stabil al unei persoane în cadrul aceluiași stat sau dintr-un stat în altul" (Cruceru, 2010: 1).

Migrația depinde foarte mult de dorința creării unei bunăstări economice a emigranților. Țările de primire a imigranților români, cele mai vizate sunt Spania, Italia și Germania (Adserà & Tienda, 2012: 6).

Migrația internațională (temporară sau permanentă) este un fenomen care a crescut în ultimii ani în România și a afectat structura familiei și funcționalitatea în general. Ea are, de regulă, un impact negativ asupra minorilor care rămân în țară, în grija unui părinte sau a altor rude (Păduraru, 2014: 31). Bunăstarea copiilor nu depinde numai de resursele economice ci în mare parte de îngrijirea părintească. Migrația îmbunătățește sau diminuează oportunitățile de viață ale copiilor și tinerilor.

Conform celei mai recente comunicări din partea ANPDCA (Agenția Națională pentru Protecție a Drepturilor Copilului și Adopție), instituție care deține rolul monitorizării acestui fenomen, sunt peste 82.464 de copiii rămași fără unul sau ambii părinți în urma plecării acestora la muncă în străinătate. Dintre aceștia, 26.406 sunt copii care provin din familii în care ambii părinți sunt plecați la muncă în străinătate, 47.154 sunt copii care provin din familii în care un părinte este plecat la muncă în străinătate și 8.904 sunt copii care provin din familii în care unicul susținător este plecat la muncă în străinătate. Aproape 2500 de copii dintre cei cu părinții plecați se află în sistemul de protecție socială (Salvați Copiii România, 2017: 1). Cu toate acestea, numărul real al copiilor afectați este mult mai mare, luând în considerare că nu toți părinții declară că muncesc în străinătate. Ruperea legăturii cu părinții îi face pe copii vulnerabili, fiind expuși riscului de abandon școlar și infracțional.

Emigrarea românilor, are un impact mult mai mare decât preconizează autoritățile. Primele victime ale acestui fenomen sunt copiii, starea emoțională fragilă îi expune la riscuri ridicate. Doi din trei copii care au părinții plecați la muncă în străinătate se simt privați de afecțiunea părinților. Acești copii, conform psihologilor și sociologilor, vor dezvolta la maturitate o stare emoțională problematică (Huditeanu, 2001: 112).

Plecarea părinților la muncă în străinătate reprezintă un „moment de schimbare a modului de funcționare a familiei, de rupere sau modificare a relațiilor din interiorul familiei, de modificare sau anulare a mecanismelor de rezolvare a situațiilor conflictuale". În urma

emigrării părinţilor copiii trăiesc un sentiment de „dezorientare”, rezultat din confruntarea cu noua situaţia la care sunt expuşi (Luca & Gulei, 2007: 14). Mulţi copii care au părinţii plecaţi la muncă în străinătate, prezintă deseori, comportamente de frustrare, au parte de libertate în exces, fiind supravegheaţi foarte puţin sau deloc. Etichetaţi drept „copiii rămaşi singuri acasă”, aceştia suferă din punct de vedere emoţional, se simt adeseori abandonaţi şi adoptă comportamente extreme pentru a atrage atenţia asupra lor. Aceşti copii, sunt mai expuşi riscului de abandon şcolar, riscului de a comite acte delincvente, precum şi excluziunii sociale.

Aşadar, plecarea părinţilor la muncă în străinătate a dus la crearea unor situaţii negative în cazul celor mai mulţi copii. Structura familiei modificându-se în urma despărţirii părinţilor de copii, formându-se, astfel, familiile transnaţionale.

3. Conceptul de familie transnaţională

Separarea spaţială şi temporară dintre părinţii şi copiii rămaşi acasă, a dus la apariţia familiilor transnaţionale. Aceste familii migrează în alte ţări cu scopul de a asigura un trai mai bun celor de acasă. Prin această mobilitate a forţei de muncă a părinţilor, sau a unuia dintre ei, copiii rămaşi acasă ajung să aibă un suport financiar solid, dar le lipseşte dragostea şi afecţiunea părintească. Acest lucru se întâmplă, deoarece părinţii de cele mai multe ori, pun pe primul loc câştigul financiar, mai presus de prezenţa zilnică alături de copiii lor (Lafeur , 2005: 91). Banii trimişi acasă contribuie la reducerea sărăciei, în schimb, copiii singuri acasă suferă în urma schimbărilor apărute în viaţa lor.

Dacă în mod tradiţional, familia presupune un grup de oameni care locuiesc împreună şi participă colectiv la îndeplinirea sarcinilor de bază, în cazul familiei transnaţionale se produce separarea părinţilor de copii prin mobilitatea forţei de muncă a părinţilor. În cazul familiei transnaţionale colaborarea membrilor există, fără ca aceştia să trăiască împreună.

Hitchcok Peter, (2003: 81) definea familiile transnaţionale ca „familii care trăiesc o parte sau cea mai mare parte din timp separat unii de alţii, şi totuşi ţin laolaltă şi creează ceva ce poate fi văzut ca sentiment de bunăstare colectivă sau unitate, chiar traversând graniţele naţionale”. Aceste familii prin mijloacele moderne de comunicare, “sunt ajutate să nu se piardă între două lumi, reuşind să îşi construiască un spaţiu social care să le permită să stea în unitate”. În cadrul acestor familii se pune foarte mult accentul pe comunicarea cu familia rămasă acasă, prin intermediul diferitelor mijloace de comunicare, prin asigurarea suportului financiar, oferindu-le îngrijire.

În perioada plecării la muncă peste graniţă a unuia sau a ambilor părinţi, rolul de îngrijitor pentru copii, este preluat de părintele rămas acasă, sau de altă persoană. Situaţia cea mai frecvent întâlnită, este aceea a lăsării copiilor în grija unuia dintre părinţi, a unei rude sau a prietenilor. În cazul în care copiii rămân acasă cu un singur părinte, se remarcă o deteriorare a relaţiei copiilor cu părintele rămas acasă, dar şi cu părintele plecat. Relaţiile copiilor cu îngrijitorii nu sunt suficient de apropiate. De multe ori, aceştia nu reuşesc să răspundă necesităţilor copiilor prin oferirea suportului moral, din cauza vârstei înaintate şi a stilului de comunicare. De asemenea, ponderea copiilor care au avut probleme cu poliţia este semnificativ mai mare în rândul celor care au părinţii plecaţi, comparativ cu cei care au părinţii alături (Luca, Pascaru & Foca, 2009: 9).

În cele mai multe cazuri în familiile transnaționale, copiii mai mari prezintă reacții de învinovățire a părinților, părintelui, din cauza faptului că au fost lăsați în grija altor persoane. Autoritatea parentală devine destul de sensibilă în aceste cazuri, pentru că relația dintre copii și adulți este destul de neclară. Pe de o parte copiii sunt învățați să își respecte, să asculte și să iubească părinții, pe de altă parte ei trebuie să asculte și să respecte ce spun cei care se ocupă de îngrijirea lor (Lafeur, 2005: 93). Relația copiilor cu părintele rămas acasă, precum și cu cel plecat se deteriorează. Structura afectivă a copilului este de regulă fragilă, în special la vârstele mici și sensibilă la orice schimbare. Schimbările frecvente în dezvoltarea copiilor pot pune în pericol dezvoltarea emoțională a acestora (Ivănuşcă, 2009: 15-17). Plecarea părinților peste hotare a modificat mult sfera relațională a copiilor, determinând schimbări importante în volumul și calitatea comunicării. În majoritatea cazurilor relațiile copiilor cu părinții plecați se răcesc în timp, această caracteristică menținându-se chiar și după revenirea părinților.

Pentru că mama și tata nu le sunt aproape atunci când ei au nevoie, acești copii își pierd siguranța de sine. În lipsa ambilor părinți copiii găsesc cu greu o persoană de încredere cu care să discute despre lucrurile care îi preocupă. Atunci când copiii se simte singuri, când nu pot comunica ori de câte ori doresc cu părinții, grupul de prieteni devine un loc unde ei se simt importanți și își împărtășesc gândurile. Deseori ei nu au cu cine să se sfătuiască, preferând comunicarea în grupuri mici de semeni, de obicei, cu cei care au aceeași experiență de despărțire de părinți. (UNICEF, 2006: 5-6).

Prin mobilitatea forței de muncă a părinților, copiii au parte și de sprijin financiar, astfel bunăstarea materială le oferă copiilor de regulă oportunități de dezvoltare, dar în același timp îi face mai vulnerabili. Unii colegi și adulți ajung să le invidieze situația financiară. De multe ori bunăstarea oferită de părinți nu este constantă, iar acești copii pot recurge de cele mai multe ori la acțiuni ilegale, pentru a menține nivelul de viață cu care s-au obișnuit (Luca, Pascariu & Foca, 2009: 12).

Supravegherea părinților este pentru unii o povară, pentru alții o necesitate. Trebuie să recunoaștem că de foarte multe ori fără protecția părinților minorii intră în situații din care nu știu să iasă. Atunci când îndrumarea lipsește, pentru că părinții nu sunt alături de copii, se ajunge adesea la comportamente deviante. Acolo unde la un singur pas greșit, ajungi să te izbești de o barieră care îți periclitează libertatea.

4. Delincvența juvenilă în rândul copiilor rămași „singuri acasă”

În multe cazuri, în momentul în care părinții pleacă la muncă în străinătate, îngrijirea și protecția copiilor este foarte mult neglijată. Zeci de tineri lipsiți de supraveghere, o iau adesea pe drumul greșit, pentru că nu are cine să se ocupe de ei. Din cauza lipsei unuia dintre părinți sau a ambilor, de cele mai multe ori tinerii ajung să adopte un comportament deviant. Ei încep cu o atitudine excentrică, care este caracterizată de gesturi ieșite din tipar, vestimentație diferită, dezordine comportamentală, până la comportamente disfuncționale sau aberante, ce se înscriu în aria delincvenței. În general, tinerii sunt dornici de libertate, în momentul în care părinții sunt plecați în străinătate, ei explorează această libertate. Primind o sumă lunară de la părinți, copiii se învață cu banii, lucru ce îi face să își dorească din ce în ce mai mulți. Dorința de a avea mai mulți bani, îi face mai vulnerabili în a fura, în a săvârși anumite spargeri, în a săvârși acte delincvente.

La momentul actual, în România, în rândul copiilor ai căror părinți sunt plecați la muncă în străinătate, s-a constatat o pondere mare a delincvenței juvenile, datorate lipsei controlului din mediul familial și sub influența negativă a grupului de prieteni (Luca & Gulei, 2007: 14). În multe situații grupul de prieteni, apare ca un înlocuitor al părinților. Anturajul pentru mulți ține loc de mamă și de tată. De multe ori, grupul de prieteni are o influență negativă, tinerii interiorizează valorile negative ale grupului ajungând la delincvență.

Fenomenul delincvenței juvenile, în prezent, este foarte dezbătut, fiind etichetat sub diverse forme: „copii cu tulburări de comportament, tineri inadaptați, copii problemă, minori delincvenți". Toți acești termeni se referă la minorii care, într-un fel sau altul, au ajuns în conflict cu normele morale și juridice, valabile pentru comunitatea în care trăiesc (Bartol, 2001: 58). Delincvența juvenilă, afectează în egală măsură familia, prietenii, comunitatea socială, nu doar victimele ci și agresorii. Infracțiunile comise de către minori au crescut și cunosc o diversitate largă, apărând mereu noi tipuri de infracțiuni.

Există multe studii, care dovedesc că impactul pe care îl are migrația asupra copiilor, de cele mai multe ori este negativ, copiii simțind un „grad de nefericire în copilărie", uneori manifestând relații dificile cu părinții și probleme cu educația (Smith, Lalonde & Johnson, 2004: 109). Mulți dintre copii au probleme cu somnul, prezintă o stimă de sine scăzută, un comportament agresiv, lucruri care se întâmplă din cauza lipsei afecțiunii, a lipsei prezenței fizice a părinților, a modelelor de orientare. În cazul copiilor mai mari, efectele plecării părinților sunt mai mari, acești încep să mintă, să devină agresivi, să își formeze un anturaj negativ, să renunțe la școală. Unii psihologi, susțin că există posibilitatea ca unii dintre acești copii să devină delincvenți atunci când cresc (Iluț, 2007: 32). Acești copiii, de cele mai multe ori, se simt abandonați. Această consecință, are urmări pe termen lung: dificultate de formare, dificultăți în legătură cu cei din jur, comportament agresiv (Bulai, 2006: 12).

Battistella și Conaco (1998: 132) au constatat că în cazul copiilor care au părinții plecați în străinătate, la un moment dat, vor apărea sentimente de anxietate, singurătate. Minorii pot deveni mai indisciplinați, adoptând un comportament delincvent.

Așadar, migrația are un impact negativ asupra copiilor rămași acasă. Aceștia dezvoltă în timp un comportament dezorganizat, nesigur, agresiv, manifestări care duc la comportamente delicvente ale copiilor rămași fără sprijin părintesc.

Concluzii

Acest articol aduce în prim plan impactul negativ pe care îl are migrația părinților plecați la muncă în străinătate asupra copiilor rămași acasă. Cei mai mulți părinți nu conștientizează pericolele la care își expun copiii, crezând că partea financiară, obținută într-o țară străină, poate înlocui prezența părintească din viața copiilor. Articolul subliniază importanța părinților în viața copiilor, familia fiind principala sursă de sprijin. Plecarea unuia sau a ambilor părinți la muncă în străinătate, presupune schimbări importante în viața de familie. Mulți minori resimt puternic plecarea părinților, percepând-o ca pe un abandon care le dă posibilitatea să facă ce doresc. Crearea sentimentului de abandon, poate duce la comportamente sociale neadecvate.

Concluzionând, familia constituie elementul principal de sprijin în dezvoltarea copiilor. Copiii se simt lipsiți de primejdii, se simt ocrotiți, simt că are cine să le îndrume pașii

spre viitor, atunci când au părinții aproape. În cadrul familiilor transnaționale lipsa fizică a părinților, face să lipsească elemente importante din îngrijirea și dezvoltarea copiilor, motiv pentru care mulți copii ajung la comportamente delincvente.

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LEGISLATION SYSTEMS REGARDING THE AIRING OF TV ADDS ADDRESSED TO CHILDREN. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Abstract: Currently called a "business philosophy that prioritizes the customer", marketing is a social and economic science. The most common means of communication used in marketing is advertising and the preferred means of transmitting information is the audiovisual channel.
Advertising is the most used part of publicity, because it proves to be effective beginning with the launch of a product or service and continuing with the customer loyalty and product repositioning. But now advertising has come to use means that negatively affect viewers, especially children, violating their rights. Children's rights most often violated by advertisements are stipulated in Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights Protection and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Therefore, in this paper, using the comparative content analysis, I will make an evaluation of the legislation in force regarding the TV advertising aimed at children, comparing the legislation in force in Sweden, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

Keywords: ***children's rights, sociology, advertisement, audiovisual, legislation.***

Introduction

Marketing has become today an "influence in everyone's life, the means by which people are given the standard of living" (Ph. Kotler, 1998). Named so far a "business philosophy that prioritizes customer" (Purcărea, 1999), marketing is a science which observes the way to get closer to the wishes of masses and especially the possibility for a company to prosper in the future. Marketing has evolved very fast alongside with the dynamics of the economy and society, so that the used techniques were perfected, adapted to the needs of the present. An important component in marketing, widely used, is the advertisement transmited through the audiovisual channel, as showed by the results of the studies. According to a report by Carat media agency for 2015, it predicts a growth of 4.6% compared to the 2014 global ad spending, reaching the sum of 540 billion dollars, also predicting that television will attract 42% of the advertising costs. The study "Television International Key Facts", the 2014 edition, conducted by the international company IP Netork, claims that time spent on television in the United States increased by 2 minutes every year, and at the European level eight minutes. According to the same study, US citizens spend on average 292 minutes a day, Romania being the first nation regarding the time spent in front of the TV, with an average of 326 minutes per day, followed by other European countries. The market research company Deloitte complements the above mentioned study and states that the most effective channel for promoting media is television.

Broadcast advertising is aimed at all age groups so that advertising to children is not something unknown. Marketing techniques have evolved in addressing to children and the effects of advertising on children are devastating to the health of the small consumers, both at physical and mental level. One of the negative effects of advertising is the advertising of products containing more sugars and carbohydrates, the main factors that predisposes and

conducts to obesity. To counter the effects that advertising has in triggering and sustaining obesity, the World Health Organization developed the Childhood Obesity Surveillance European Initiative (COSI) (WHO / Europe, 2005). Results from 2010 indicate that 24% of young people between 6-9 years are overweight or obese. As stated by Livingstone (Livingstone, 2001), obesity is now a major health problem in Europe. But the negative aspects do not just stop at this level, because small consumers need special protection to guarantee and preserve the first principle of the best interests of the child, followed by all other principles underlying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. For this reason, the European Union and other countries that do not belong to Europe, concern about the effects of advertising promoted through the audiovisual channel led to restrictive regulations on advertising directed at children. But regulations are applied different in the EU countries, although national implementations were carried by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive - AVMSD) since 2007.

1. Restrictive regulatory systems

Regarding the rules of the European Union there are some regulations that are concerned with the issue of advertising to children in general, but there are few regulation dealing with the issue of food advertising to children particularly (Garde, 2006). The main tool developed by the European Union is the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (European Commission, 2010), an evolution of the first project in this issue, "Television without Frontiers" in 1989 (revised in 1997 and replaced in 2007 with AVMSD). Other policies in the regulation of advertising are aimed at protecting consumers. Several legislative acts were adopted regarding this policy in the European Union, acts also including regulations on advertising, foods and labeling. Regarding the regulations on protecting minors, the European Union proves a particular concern regarding the safety of toys, but on advertising aimed at children, everything is treated at a general level. Clear and very strict regulations are set out for tobacco and alcohol products. In respect of other products or services of interest to children, such as sweets, confectionery and toys, regulations in the member states are not consistent, but rather with very different aspects. Differences in the regulation of advertising at European level cover a cross-border dimension of advertising to children; therefore, it is difficult for Member States to implement national regulations for foreign advertising agencies subject to the regulations of the country of origin.

According to the European Commission (2012), reports on the implementation at national level of AVMSD (2010) provide a number of important provisions. One is the European Union Audiovisual Media Services Directive no 13/2010. This Directive represents a central position of the legislation that regulates the television advertising directed to children. However, the Directive does not imply a uniform regulation in all Member States. Five European countries ban the advertisement aimed at children. While other states impose a partial ban on advertising in children's programs, or they impose restrictions with reference to the time when they could be viewed or restrictions for certain products. Other Member States forbid the presenting sponsors` logos in programs for children.

One of the most restrictive law systems is in force in Sweden, where broadcast TV advertising aimed at children under 12 is forbidden, as well as e-mails in order to promote

various products and services to children under the age of 16. There are also a number of trade agreements, including rules on toys that inspire and incite to violence. The Convention on the Rights of the Child stresses in general, the necessity for children's rights to be recognized, and the need for protection, and more specifically that the needs of children differ in various stages of childhood. Swedish legislation has adapted this idea and regulations vary according to age, but this is a weakness when it comes to rules of the European Commission (EC). However, the age up to which restrictions are imposed in RTVA (Radio and TV Act-Sweden) is quite high, which means that advertisement on objects of specific interest is denied to all children between 8 and 12 years (Lena Olsen, 2010). This could be seen as a lack of respect for the rights of these children, having regard to the EC rules that recognize the right to be informed. But the reason that was primary in taking the decision was that children under 12 years do not have the ability to evaluate information and for this reason they need special protection, which in such cases is seen as a priority, because the average age children are influenced by advertising in the same way as the smaller, although they recognize the difference between advertising and the viewed programs (John, 1999).

Another kind of restrictive regulation can be seen in Australia and New Zealand, conducted by different organizations, which over time have adapted the legislation to the needs of the population, noting that Australia has been adapting its legislation for the last 40 years. The legislations of the two states include frames specifically designed to protect children from the negative effects of advertising. In these countries, organizations` initiatives have proved a success in solving the problems faced by youth nutrition. The latest changes in the regulations that impose limits on both advertising broadcasters and those who create advertising in New Zealand involve: its dissemination within a strict timetable, conducted by age and TV station; dissemination to make a well-defined time frame; broadcast time limited at 10 minutes of commercials per hour, with a deviation of 2 minutes, according to the TV station and the place children occupy in terms of target audience of the show in which it is aired; advertising should be clear, recognized and well delimited by the programs for children, even within the international broadcasting satellite stations on the territory of New Zealand; no advertisement will be repeated more than twice per hour on a certain channel, for school children; the number of the advertisements will not be more than three, under the same conditions above; in the case of the international broadcasting satellite stations there will not be promoted licensed products in associated programs and there will not be induced feelings such as humiliation or frustration; all broadcasters are required to adopt the Regulation on Advertising Practice Code, which contains the Code of Advertising Practice for Children, the Code of Ethics, the Code of Advertising Practice and the Code for the people in the advertisements (New Zealand Television Broadcaster's Council). Australia also conducted a further review of the regulation, coming up with improvements regarding the ethics in the advertisement for children and the environment, but also regarding the use of terms related to discrimination and sexual connotations. (Advertising Standards Bureau, 2015).

However, despite these continuous efforts, there are voices denouncing the inefficiency of these legislative measures. A study conducted in 2014 by Louise Thornley *et al*. makes an analysis of the New Zealand Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) activities in relation to the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC). After analyzing

eight decisions on public complaints on advertising, there were observed the following issues: the implementation of the codes includes partial, unreasonable or inconsistent decisions taken by the board for complaints, the inability to implement changes to the codes and the inability to prevent the growing advertising for unhealthy food. Thus, say the authors, it proves that the ASA system is reactive; it has limitations regarding the sanctions, providing little incentives to restrict such advertising, lacking an independent monitoring. This analysis suggests that the system of disclosure standards in New Zealand do not fully protect children's rights by failing to act in the UNCROC vision and especially by not adequately addressing Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the UNCROC. Noting the degree of harm that an unhealthy food lifestyle has on children and the contribution of marketing in adopting an unhealthy nutrition, it is concluded that the legal requirements regarding food marketing aimed at children should be implemented globally. This would help governments mitigate the effects of one of the key factors in adopting an unhealthy food and will also allow them to fulfill their obligations to protect children's rights. It was also shown by this research that there is not offered an adequate protection for children aged between 14 and 17 years. (Louise Thornley, Louise Signal, George Thomson, 2014)

Another recognized state system created to protect small TV consumers is Canada, which has a long history on self-regulatory systems in the advertising industry, proving to be effective. Advertising for children in Canada is a marketing and communications field treated with greater accountability by institutions that protect children's rights. Known worldwide as one of the most comprehensive and complete systems of codes and standards in advertising for children, the Canadian system is frequently cited by various international countries and groups such as the World Health Organization. For over 40 years, Advertising Standards Canada (ASC) promoted responsible advertising and offered support in the industry, through the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards (CCAS). The organization has adapted to changing social values, as reflected in the recent revisions related to food advertising and advertising to children.

The Canadian Association of Broadcasters in 1971 created an additional code, the Broadcasting Code for advertising to children, administered by ASC. Since 1974, broadcasters have agreed to adopt the Code for Children as a condition for obtaining a broadcasting license. Also, another condition was the broadcast time of the advertising materials, which although internationally is set at a maximum of 12 minutes in an hour, broadcasters have voluntarily established a limit of 8 minutes in children's programs. In 1990, advertising companies founded a group that promotes responsible advertising of products and services for children and their families. The organization actively works in partnership with the government, educators, parents and experts to identify issues of concern in children's lives and to offer solutions for their protection. The latest initiative is Children's Healthy Active Living Program, conducted alongside with the well-known program realized within the school, TV & ME, which approaches the role of the media and their activities. When it comes to advertising to children, advertising, advertisers and media in Canada have treated this with great care and respect over the years, creating a number of safeguards to ensure that communication with children is done responsibly. After imposing the new rules of the program advertising, there have been conducted a series of studies including “The influence

of the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative: change in children's exposure to food advertising on television in Canada Between 2006-2009". There have been analyzed 27 advertisements running on TV stations in Toronto and Vancouver in 2006, 2009 and 2011.

The analysis showed a decrease by 4.5% of the spots aired on children stations and a 45% increase on mainstream stations. Overall, the level of advertising that children are exposed to increased by 16.8% in Toronto and 6.4% in Vancouver. Significant increases were noted for yogurt and snacks commercials in both cities, and for fast food in Toronto. Given the alarming increase in the number of commercials, despite the legislative initiative, it is obvious that we are facing an increasing aggressive marketing, especially the one that takes into account foods high in sugar, fat and salt, a situation which requires a constant reassessment of the legislative measures.

Conclusions

Restrictive systems, though much criticized, managed to protect children from the harmful effects of increasingly aggressive publicity. However, neither these systems prove to be sufficient, as some advertisers adopt aggressive behavior by developing new techniques to reach children, a situation which requires continuous adaptation of the legislation taking account of the developments in the advertising industry. We chose the legal systems in Sweden, Canada, Australia and New Zealand for this analysis because they are the closest to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, systems which should, in our view, be taken as models of best practices, with positive results.

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FIRST EXPERIENCE IN WORK OF ROMANIAN YOUTH – A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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Abstract: In this paper we try to start the first work experience. In our explanation we will use the careership theory (Hodkinson P., and Sparkes A., 1997) a sociological theory of career decision making. The purpose of this article is to test on the basis of two logistic regression models which are those factors (demographic and psychological) that predict the relative chance of successful employment among young people in Romania. Our data come from a longitudinal study on a sample of 1509 young people who were interviewed at an interval of two years. If the first wave of the survey, in 2012 when our sample were young students in twelfth grade high school, 76.6% stated that they will work in the next 2-3 years, in 2015 50.4% of the same young people say they have a work experience. What are the factors that influence the decision to start the work of this young people?

Keywords: ***careership theory, Romanian young people, first experience of work***

Introduction

Although the majority of today's young Europeans enjoy good living conditions, they are experiencing difficulties in education, employment, inclusion and health, which combined with financial problems, in terms of housing or transport, prevents them from becoming independent, to benefit resources and opportunities to manage their own lives, to participate fully in society and to make decisions in an independent manner (EC, 2009). Transitional period is often described as characterized limited employment opportunities, lack of skills and work experience are a substantial obstacle to entering the labour market. The low level of education or training often prevents young people from finding a suitable employment and increase the risk of their exclusion from the labour market (MMFPSPV, 2013). In the EU, about 5,5 million young people are unemployed, which means that 1 in 5 European citizens under the age of 25 years, is unable to find a job, although the would like to. The unemployment rate among young people is more than double compared to the other age groups and almost three times higher than in the case of those over 25 years old. Young people in this age group (15-24 years) are in education, but may be hired or not, there is an overlap between the labour market and education. In 2010, 7,5 million EU citizens between the ages of 15-24 years did not have a job and would not study or participate in training courses (ECa, 2015). In 2011, 12,9% of young people in the EU-27 were classified as NEETs (young people in the age group 15-24 years who are neither employed nor in any form of

education or training), with the most severe cases recorded in Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Italy, according to the EU Youth Report (EC, 2012). In Romania there has been an increase in the proportion of young people who are not employed and do not follow a program of education and training, from 13,3% in 2007 from 17,4% in 2011 (MTS, 2013). In 2012 it fell to 16,8% (EC, 2014a) as in 2013 it grew at 17,3% (EU Council, 2014). In 2014 the unemployment rate among young people (15-24 years) at EU level-28 was 21,9%, with 1,6 percentage points lower than that in 2013 and declining for the first time in six years after the start of the financial crisis in 2008. At the level of the EU-15 countries are faced with unemployment rates which exceeds the EU average including Romania (24%). The situation is worrisome in countries like Spain and Greece, where more than 50% of young people aged 15-24 years are without a job (52,4%) 53,2% respectively (Montaigne F., Strandell H., 2014). In Romania the number of young unemployed people was 72.300 in February 2014 (SPO), and the young NEET registered was estimated at 450.000 in the last quarter of 2012 (National Institute of Statistics of Romania) (EU Council, 2014), although in Romania doesn't exist a database with NEET young people's nor a nationally representative research relating to their situation. The EU institutions have launched programs aimed at young people since 1988, but in recent years, they have been intensified by a series of social policy and active measures taken both at EU level and in each Member State. The main document at present is the Europe Strategy 2020. Among the measures taken at European level in recent years include the „Youth Guarantee" an action that gives young people in EU countries a job or access to education and training or retraining programmes, within four months after finishing their studies, The European quality label for internship or first job Eures-actions intended to help 5.000 youths to find a job in another EU country (2010-2013); The Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci Programme, where over 130.000 internships in enterprises have been available in 2012 for young people who have been following University courses or training programmes; Erasmus for entrepreneurs, there are 600 internships enabling young entrepreneurs to acquire experience in a small enterprise in another country of the EU and European voluntary service where 10.000 volunteer opportunities were proposed by member countries (EU, 2014). Legislation relating to young people in Romania has been greatly enriched and improved, most of the important decisions and normative acts were adopted in the past 10 years, including volunteering Law (Law 95/2001), the Law on the system of unemployment insurance and stimulation of employment (Law No. 76/2002), the Youth Act (Law No. 350/2006), the Law on apprenticeship in the workplace (Law 279/2005, reissued in 2012), the

Law on pupils and students practice stimulation (Law 72/2007), The New Labour Code (2011) and National Education Law (Law No. 1 of 2011) (MMFPSPV, 2013). Romania currently has a National Youth Strategy 2014-2020. Romania has made some progress with regard to the recommendation to combat unemployment among young people. The authorities adopted in April 2013, a National Plan for employment of young people, which was followed by the legislative improvements related to on-the-job apprenticeship and a new law on on-the-job training. Therefore, by the end of 2013, about 30.000 young people have received a job offer, and 44.000 students have benefited from the programs of vocational guidance. In addition, two schemes have been introduced pilot type security for youth, for a total of 10.000 young people without high school diploma (EU Council, 2014). Romania has also created 27 pilot centers for youth Guarantee, with the aim to identify young NEET and to offer personalized service packages, however, the impact of these centers and their range remains unequal. Currently, the public services of employment of labour (SPOFM) develops an integrated data base with NEET and introduce new measures to support their early activation. The capacity of these services to reach young people, to support and to enable them effectively continues to be a challenge for Romania (EC, 2015- 11).

1. Careership theory – a sociological explanation for decision to start work

Analyzing data from interviews with young people Hodkinson and Sparkes (1997) have come to the conclusion that they make partially rational decisions being influenced by emotions and feelings. The decisions they take are pragmatic, they are based on that in the immediate vicinity of familiar persons and those of acquitances. Decisions are taken in interrelated manner, since they cannot be separated from the family, cultural background and life story of the young. Thus, they accept or reject a job based on the previous personal experiences or due to advice received from relatives, friends or neighbors, and their decisions are often opportunistic being reactions to perceived and encountered opportunities. The decisions often imply an acceptance of an option than a choice between several other choices. Feature theory or „matching the self with the occupation or work" as it called by Kidd (1984), the model of development of Ginsberg and Cooper (1951) and Super (1953, 1957, 1980) and social learning theory outlines the decision-making process on career as one planned, but Baumgardner (1977, 1982) and Miller (1983) argue that in reality people react to random opportunities. Roberts (1968, 1975) argues that the decisions are not determined by the individual but „opportunity structures" on the labour market, which are influenced by

industrial organization, government regulations and social class. Process of career decision making depends on a complex pattern of relations with stakeholders (youth, employers, training providers, trainers of career centers) and their various perceptions and reactions to official regulations. In the transition of the labour market, other players often hold more capital, and can wield more power than young people, and there are gamers who have the resources to determine the rules of the game. In the current literature regarding the transition to work, a common concept is that of „career path" (Furlong, 1992). Banks et al. (1992) argue that there are models of career advancement that they describe as paths. They depend largely on the characteristics of what the educated young people have, as well as social class, gender, ethnicity, geographical location and level of education. Strauss (1962) suggests that often we describe this „cognoscibility" according to one of the two metaphors: career and turning point. Although the route plan may change, they are seen as occasional aberrations when a person changes its runway, step by step (or quits!) from one scale to another. In many studies over the course of life, similar notions of turning points are often used. Denzin (1989) calls the „epiphanies", Antikainen et al. (1996) calls the events of life which change the learning, while Alheit (1994) speaks of „biographical discontinuity". Most of the studies using the idea of turning points and epiphanies (Strauss, 1962; Denzin, 1989; Antikainen et al., 1996) focuses on harnessing the turning points rather than periods interspersed with routines. However these turning points are inseparable from the routine that they follow and precede, and these routines are of central importance for transforming the career. There are five types of routine: confirmation contradictory, socialization, deployability and evolutionary. Routine periods and turning points are interrelated, so that can not be understood without the other one, and the separation between them is often arbitrary. The path to a turning point at another turning point may be predictable and smooth or irregular and idiosyncratic.

2. Longitudinal research with two waves

The purpose of this article is to test on the basis of two logistic regression models which are those factors (demographic and psychological) that predict the relative chance of successful employment among young people in Romania. Our data come from a longitudinal study with young people who were interviewed at an interval of two years. In the first wave of the survey, in 2012 the sample refers to 3509 young students in twelfth grade high school, and in 2014, 1509 of the same teenagers complete the questionnaire in the second wave of research. The research instrument used in both waves is an online questionnaire, using an internet

platform of a larger national research project, which deals with young people's transition from adolescence to adulthood in Romania[1]. For both waves the survey had common scales for social support, material deprivation and some psychosocial scales for depression, optimism, future orientation, family planning. The teenagers from our sample were asked to visit the online page of the project where there was the research instrument, to register for an account and to fill the online questionnaire. After 2 years we reconnected with young people in the first wave of research either through their telephone numbers, by email, or by means of the accounts on the social network Facebook to fill out a second questionnaire that captures aspects of life as well as continuing education training in two years after completion of compulsory education, the first experiences in the workplace and their intention of work, desire of educational training and perceptions over the future and the opportunities that young people have in Romania.

3. Results of the study and discussion

In the two waves of the survey the proportion of girls and boys is almost equal. Almost half (46,8%) of young urban high school graduates of the initial sample responded in wave two. In wave two only 7,6% of young people are graduates from high school areas and 16,6% come from deprived families. Table 1. shows the socio-demographic characteristics in the two study waves.

Table 1. Social demographic characteristics of the samples in the two waves

		Ist Wave 2012-2013 (no)	**Ist Wave %**	**IInd Wave 2014-2015 (no)**	**IInd Wave %**	**Percent IInd Wave/ Ist Wave (%)**
Gender	Girls	2043	58.2	891 (**-1152**)	59	**43.6**
	Boys	1466	41.8	618 (**-848**)	41	**42.1**
High school environment	Urban	2962	85.7	1389 (**-1573**)	92.4	**46.8**
	Rural	493	14.3	114 (**-379**)	7.6	**23.1**
Familiy's material deprivation		610	19.5	236 (**-374**)	16.6	**38.6**
Total		**3509**		**1509**		**43**

Analyzing data with an interval of two years after completion of high school on the vast majority of our sample, 82,4% we have found that they are following a form of education, while 17,6% did not continue their studies.

Table 2. Work experience in relation with various factors

[1] The present study is a part of a larger research project aiming to investigate transition into adulthood, which is called "Outcomes of adolescence. A longitudinal perspective on the effect of social context on successful life transitions", funded by The Romanian Research Fund: UEFISCDI. Project IDEI 2011-14.223 /5.10. 2011 (www.viitoradult.ro).

		Work experience	
		Yes (%)	No (%)
Continuing education after completing high school	No	82,8	17,2
	Yes	43,5	56,5
Bacalaureate result (finals exams from high school)	Successful	46,6	53,4
	Failure	75,8	24,2
Gender	Girl	46,1	53,9
	Boy	56,5	43,5
Severe material deprivation situation	No	48,1	51,9
	Yes	60,9	39,1
High school environment	Urban area	49,4	50,6
	Rural area	50,4	49,6
Self esteem	Good	50,8	49,2
	Low	49,7	50,3
Optimism	Low	47,8	52,2
	Increased	56,5	43,5

Half of those who study, 56,5% have no work experience, a possible explanation being that young people consider that at this age stage of formation and accumulation of knowledge better put on the forefront education, bearing in mind that the youth of 97,8% from the second wave of the survey say they „do not want a job right now" and 96,6% say they don't have a job now because „they are attending school or a training program/training". The vast majority (82,8%) of those who do not continue their studies after high school, have experience at work, the cause probably being a material one. According to the experience of labor, youth are divided into two almost equal halves. Just over half (50,4%) of those who do not continue their studies have experience in work, and the rest has never worked. From those with experience in the workplace, half (25,2%) currently work, and the other half (25,1%) had a job but now they don't have. Those who didn't continue their studies are more from rural high school graduates (43% to 15,5%) but their experience at work is higher (62,3% compared to 49,4% of urban high schools graduates). The boys know more the failure of 13,9% (6% for girls) have not been able to pass their final exam, while 26,1% (11,6% for girls) do not continue their studies. But of the total percentage of boys with experience of work is greater compared to the percentage of the total girls (56,5% from 46,1% girls). Moreover, of those who have never had a job of 64,2% are girls, they are those who don't have a job now (52,5% compared with 47,5% for boys). The youth from the second wave 17% have gone through the experience of unemployment and benefited the allowance. The fact is that the young people from deprived families and those who are graduates of high schools of rural, poverty and social exclusion is higher due to an educational failure and dropping out of school. From those who are deprived from material point of view (18,1% compared with 6,5% failed in their final exam; 29,9% compared with 13,7% don't continue their studies), but the

percentage of those among them who have never worked is lower (39,1% compared with 51,9% of young people from deprived families). And the situation of rural high schools' graduates is worse compared to urban high schools' graduates (26,9% versus 7,9% failed the final exam; 43% versus 15,5% don't continue their education, while 50,6% compared with 37,7% have no work experience). Our results seem to confirm the idea of Careership's theory, according to this the decisions which young people take regarding the choice of the workplace are pragmatic, they are based on information from familiar persons and acquitances or due to advice received from relatives, friends or neighbors because the second way of hiring in the first job which the young people from our sample have mentioned, after the interview/contest (45,9% saying this), 37,4% have undertaken with the help or a recommendation from a friend/ acquitance, and 11,5% declares that their parents have found jobs for them. In the case of young people it is possible that the decision concerning the choice of the workplace is opportunistic, being reactions to perceived and encountered opportunities since all young people in our sample, 79,2% of young people say that the industry in which they work/have worked there is/was related to the specialization that they followed, and 60,6% of them declare that the current job doesn't help/didn't help them in achieving career-related plans, but the explanation may be a material reason, those who work being forced to do it to survive.

Table 3. Predicting significant factors of the unexperienced at work, after adjusting for demographic factors

Studied (significant) factors	**Relative risk OR**	**Confidence interval 95% min-max**	**Sig. p**
Gender Girl	1,47	1,18-1,82	<0,0001
Presence of material deprivation situation Not in a material deprivation situation	1,67	1,25-2,24	<0,001
Environment of graduated high school Urban area	1,57	1,04-2,35	<0,05

Analyzing predicting factors of unexperienced in the workplace through a logistic regression model (Nagelkerke R^2=0,029; p<0.0001) in which we included demographic factors, we have concluded that compared with those who have experience in work, the risk of unemployment is statistically significantly increased for young girls (OR=1.47; 95% CI 1.18-1.82; p<0.0001), for young people who are not in a situation of material deprivation (OR= 1.67, 95% CI 1.25-2.24; p<0.001) but also for graduates of high schools in urban areas (OR= 1,57; 95% CI 1.04-2.35; p<0,05).

Table 4. Predicting significant factors of the unexperienced at work, after adjusting for demographic and psychological factors

Studied (significant) factors	Relative risk OR	Confidence interval 95% min-max	Sig. p
Gender Girl	1,50	1,19-1,87	<0,0001
Presence of material deprivation situation Not in a material deprivation situation	1,51	1,12-2,03	<0,001
Environment of graduated high school Urban area	1,46	0,97-2,20	<0,05
Low Optimism	1,40	1,08-1,82	<0,01
Good Self esteem	0,87	0,68-1,12	<0,29

In the second logistic regression model (Nagelkerke R^2=0.35; p<0.0001) in addition to the demographic factors we tested two psychological factors such as self-esteem and optimism, and it appeared that compared with those who have work experience, have relative employment opportunities, for girls (OR=1.50; 95% CI 1.19-1,87; p<0.0001), those who are not in situation of material deprivation (OR=1,51; 95% CI 1,12-2.03; p<0,01) young graduates of high schools in urban areas (OR=1; 95% CI 0,97-2.20; p<0.01) and those who have low optimism (OR=1.40; 95% CI 1.08-1.82; p<0,01). If self esteem has no effect on the degree of predictability of the employment of young people, those who have lower levels of optimism have relatively lower chances of employment, but lack of optimism or low levels of optimism is a factor that can be changed through counseling and psycho-social interventions. Social protection systems should be designed to provide incentives in order to promote the transition of young people and to avoid the risk of long-term exclusion and poverty. Young urban high graduates have 1,5 times greater chance to not have work experience. Girls have 1,4 times higher chance to not have work experience and young that are not in material deprivation situation have 1,6 times higher chance to not have work experience.

Conclusion

The vast majority of young people in our sample follows a form of education to two years after completing high school, and half of the students did not have experience in the workplace. Of those who do not study the vast majority have the experience in the workplace, the cause being probably a material one. Our data shows that for the young people from deprived families and for those who are graduates of high schools in rural areas, poverty and social exclusion is higher due to an educational failure and dropping out of school. The boys know more the failure of maturity exam (the final exam) and there they don't continue their studies, and from the young people who have never had a job the percentage is higher among the girls. Our results seem to confirm the idea of Careership's theory, according to which, the decisions what young people take regarding the choice of the workplace are pragmatic, they

take account of the information in the immediate vicinity, from the arrangements for employment that they have mentioned is being helped by a friend/acquitance or a recommendation from them, while others say their parents have found job for them. In the case of young people it is possible that the decision concerning the choice of the workplace to be opportunistic, at the moment and because of necessity in the conditions under which the vast majority say that their experience is not related to their specialization and that their job has not helped them in achieving career-related plans. Compared with those who have experience in work, the risk of unemployment in a job is increased for young girls, for young people who are not in a material deprivation situation, but also for graduates of high schools in urban areas. In addition to tested demographic factors to the psychological ones such as self-esteem and optimism, has appeared that self esteem has no effect on the degree of predictability of the employment of young people, but in comparison with those who have work experience, those who have a low optimism have relatively smaller chances of employment. Those who have lower levels of optimism need counseling, this feature can be enhanced through psycho-social intervention by specialists.

Acknowledgement

This work was possible due to the financial support of the Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 with the title „Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment".

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NATIONAL MINORITIES AND REGIONALIZATION. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA

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Abstract: What regionalization determines is the emergence of a multilevel governance in which, by applying the principle of subsidiarity, the decisions are taken at the nearest level of their direct beneficiaries. The debate on this policy of regionalization brings forward a series of political, economic, ethnic and cultural criteria that have been weighted and integrated differently by various Central and Eastern European countries in their regionalization projects.
The research aims at comparatively analyzing the manner in which ethnicity was managed in the context of regionalization in Romania and Slovakia, two countries which comprise a similar percentage of Hungarian minority. While in Romania regionalization is still at the stage of public and political debate – just the regional development policy being implemented, in Slovakia it has already been enacted. Thus we find it interesting to see which the reasons are for these divergent developments.
The research seeks to answer to the question whether the ethnicity criterion is a decisive factor in the articulation of regionalization projects and the subsequent political decision to implement the project. In order to analyze that, we will assess the influence exerted by the largest national minority (Hungarian) of the two countries in this matter.
Thus, we analyze the mechanisms used by the Slovak political elite to manage the ethnic criterion in implementing regionalization, as well as the debates that arose in this context. Regarding the Romanian case, given the previously exposed status quo, we will study the debates around the regionalization projects since 1989, focusing on the considerations linked to the Hungarian minority.

Keywords: ***regionalization, ethnicity, national minorities, Romania, Slovakia***

Introduction

The fall of communism opened up significant challenges and opportunities for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Structural reforms in economy required the adjustment of the administrative system, in conjunction with the process of democratic consolidation and European integration.

Yet, in spite of a similar type of centralist administrative system inherited from communism, the transition towards a decentralized state witnessed differentiated paths and paces in the countries in this region, due to several political, social, economic and cultural factors. Among these, a rather contentious topic considered throughout the regionalization process was the status and role of the dominant national minorities, a particularly sensitive issue in a region that was throughout history demographically and culturally heterogeneous.

Therefore, our comparative study focuses on the influence and weight of the ethnic dimension in the process of regionalization in Romania and Slovakia, two countries that have a similar proportion of the same dominant national minority, namely the Hungarian one. Our aim is to assess whether ethnicity was a decisive factor in the design and implementation of regionalization policies in the two countries, by taking into account the minority's claims on the one hand, and the response from the political elites on the other hand.

We find this research particularly interesting, because in spite of sharing similar features with regards to the Hungarian minority, the achievements in the design and implementation of regionalization vary greatly between the two countries.

I. The Hungarian Minority in Romania and Slovakia

1. Territorial and Administrative Developments in Romania and Slovakia (1918-1989)

Both the Romanian and the Slovak people have long lived in traditionally ethnically and culturally heterogeneous regions, for centuries in a row being under political and cultural dominance of other nations. This state of affairs sparked nationalism, which constituted the underlying base for subsequent nation- and state-building processes in the late 19th – early 20th centuries.

These processes were catalyzed by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, which allowed the creation of Czechoslovakia and Greater Romania, while depriving Hungary – which had been a dominant regional power – of a large portion of its territory.

In what concerns the Slovak nation- and state-building process, it must be noted that its territory had been integrated and developed its own identity as part of larger multinational states, first as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and afterwards as part of Czechoslovakia. It has been argued that the century-long subordination to the Hungarian sphere of influence has undermined the consolidation of the Slovak national identity, while giving birth to stronger regional and local identities. These territorial identities were further supported by the administrative divisions inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Empire ("*zupas*"), which were largely confined to the natural territorial borders[1].

In the case of Romania, the Old Kingdom (1859-1918) – composed of former principalities under Ottoman suzerainty Moldavia and Wallachia – served as a cradle of Romanian nationalism and a strong reference point for the Romanian elite in Transylvania, back then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Therefore, after the integration of the former Austro-Hungarian provinces of Transylvania and Bukovina and the former Russian province Bessarabia in the aftermath of World War 1, the Romanian Kingdom inherited not only a large percentage of ethnic minorities, but also different types of territorial units and administrative systems[2]. Hence, one of the first priorities in the following years was the

[1] Jennifer A., YODER, Crafting Democracy: Regional Politics in Post-Communist Europe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013, p. 112

[2] The Old Kingdom was functioning according to the administrative system introduced by the legislation from 1864 and 1866; Transylvania featured a more decentralized system; Bukovina had a rather archaic system; Bessarabia exhibited only an apparent local autonomy, being in fact subdued to the tsarist absolutism.

adoption of legislative and administrative measures aimed at consolidating the Romanian unitary state.

In the interwar period, two major tendencies can be traced in the political discourse on the territorial and administrative organization of the Romanian state: a centralist model, promoted by the liberals, and the regionalist model, promoted by the National Peasants' Party. In spite of their apparent antagonism, both models adhered to the primary objective of political and national consensus: the statehood consolidation. In fact, while there has been an oscillation between these models, fears of affecting the territorial integrity of the young state determined a very restricted application of decentralization principles, regional authorities being granted certain administrative powers, but not legislative ones.

The establishment of the communist regimes in Romania and Slovakia brought about the creation of a highly centralized state administration of Soviet inspiration. State-building policies in Czechoslovakia had been rather aggressive, especially after the brief period of Slovak statehood in the period of the World War 2, the communists de facto subordinating the Slovak institutions and political activity to the authorities in Prague. Attempts to grant Slovaks a diluted type of self-administration in the aftermath of 1968 revolution failed, and the feeling of alienation deepened among the Slovaks, which eventually led to the peaceful dissolution of the federation in 1992[3].

In Romania, two stages can be noticed. The Stalinization period under Dej (1948-1965) witnessed the implemented a new form of territorial and administrative organization in accordance with Soviet directions ("*regiuni*" and "*raioane*"), including the proclamation of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in the areas inhabited mainly by Hungarian ethnics, in an attempt to resolve the issue of the national minorities and in line with the Soviet deceptive ideology of "freedom of the peoples". Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989) reversed this policy under the banner of nationalist communism, being in favor of a unitary state, heavily centralized politically and administratively. The result was the replacement of the Soviet-type territorial units ("*regiuni*" and "*raioane*"), including the Hungarian Autonomous Region, with not-so-new organizational units called "*judeţe*". Arguments supporting this decision were: creating a direct link between the central and local levels, avoidance of powers overlaps, streamlining communication and coordination between administrative centers (horizontally and vertically)[4]. This latter form of territorial organization suffered only minor changes in 1981, being in place even nowadays.

2. The Hungarian Minority

As already mentioned, Hungarians have exerted a significant influence on the territories of nowadays Romania (especially Transylvania) and Slovakia, being for centuries endowed with more political and cultural rights than other populations from the Hungarian and then Austro-Hungarian multinational states. This privileged status meant eased access to the social, economic, cultural and political life in society, all of which were lost along with the dissolution of the Empire and subsequent rise in the majority groups' nationalism.

[3] John, COAKLEY, *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, Routledge, 2004

[4] "Principiile de bază adoptate de plenara C.C. al P.C.R. cu privire la îmbunătăţirea organizării administrativ-teritoriale a României şi sistematizarea localităţilor rurale – 5-6 octombrie 1967", Politica, Bucharest, 1967, pp. 9-10

This change of status from a dominant ethnic group to a minority group over such a short period of time must have had a significant impact on the collective consciousness of the Hungarian ethnics in these countries, one of the outcomes being the consolidation of their national identity giving birth to claims for autonomy, be it cultural or territorial. This process was facilitated by the fact that the Hungarian minorities remained concentrated in specific areas defined by the landscape: mountainous regions in central Romania and the south-western lowlands in Slovakia.

In fact, the demographic composition in the two countries changed substantially after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy in 1918. Present-day Slovakia witnessed a dramatic decrease in the Hungarian population both in absolute and relative numbers, namely from 884,309 (30.29%) in 1910 to 458,384 (8.48%) in 2011, mainly due to the intergovernmental agreements on the exchange of populations after World War 2, but also due to assimilation policies[5]. Romania[6] witnessed only a slight decrease of Hungarian population, from 1,425,507 (7.9%) in 1930 to 1,227,600 (6.5%) in 2011[7]. In Transylvania alone, while part of the Dual Monarchy, there were 1,662,180 Hungarian ethnics in 1910[8].

Ethnographic studies have analyzed the interactions between the majoritarian groups and minority ethnic groups, highlighting diverse perceptions, attitudes and behaviors towards each other, as well as numerous clichés, myths and stereotypes that still fuel interethnic tensions and distrust. In both countries analyzed, the national consciousness of the Romanians and Slovaks was sparked by the feelings of oppression caused by the former privileged status of the Hungarians under the monarchy and later during the Vienna Arbitration. "Forced Magyarization" in the past caused fears of instances of "forced Slovakiazation/Romanianization" in the unitary national states. In fact, studies[9] have revealed that traditionally heterogeneous communities tend to be more tolerant than ethnically homogeneous communities (be it minority or majoritarian), and that in general people tend to separate their interethnic relations from the politicization of ethnicity that fuels nationalistic policies.

3. Political Representation of the Hungarian Minority

After the fall of communism several political parties representing the Hungarian minority emerged within both Romanian and Slovak political arenas and a review of these structures is necessary in order to better understand the configuration of the political life in the two cases.

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[5] Yuko, KAMBARA, "Slovak Perspectives on the Hungarian Minority: The Possibility of an Ethnographic Approach to Nationalism and Multi-ethnic Experiences", in Osamu, IEDA (ed.), *Transboundary Symbiosis over the Danube: EU integration between Slovakia and Hungary from a local border perspective*, Slavic Eurasian Studies No.27, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004, p. 27

[6] The census data from 1930, refer to the first census conducted in Greater Romania was conducted, whereas the 2011 data refer to the census conducted in present-day Romania (excluding northern Bukovina, Bessarabia and Cadrilater region lost by Romania after World War 2).

[7] Institul National de Statistica al Romaniei, *Rezultate definitive ale Recensamantului Populatiei si al Locuintelor – 2011 (Caracteristici demografice ale populatiei)*, p. 5, available at www..recensamantromania.ro, last accessed on 05/10/2015

[8] Ioan, BOLOVAN, *Istoria României. Transilvania*, Vol. II, George Barițiu, Cluj-Napoca, 1997, pp. 1-174

[9] Yuko, KAMBARA, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30

In Slovakia[10], in the early 1990s three this kind of political parties had been established and they formed in 1998 a single party, due to the new electoral law (1998) which increased the threshold – the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK-MKP). The above mentioned party was included in the coalition governments in 1998-2002 and in 2002-2006 and entered into opposition from 2006. Due to some internal tensions that appeared after the loss of the representation within the governing coalition, some members of the SMK-MKP left the party and established a new political party, Most-Hid (2009). This new party entered the Parliament and also the governmental coalitions in 2010 and 2012.

The Hungarian minority in Romania[11] was first represented by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romanian (UDMR), which became the main actor representing the Hungarian minority within the Romanian political scene, even without a legal registration as political party. Part of the political opposition until 1996, UDMR became since then part of governmental coalitions. A similar phenomenon with the case of the Slovak SMK-MKP in 2006, namely several internal tensions, determined the emergence, at the beginning of 2000, of other political organizations and parties linked to the representation of the Hungarian minority: the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (which became a political party in 2011 under the name of the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania), the Szekler National Council (2003-2004) and the Hungarian Civic Party (2011). A unification of all these parties and organizations in a single structure was envisaged by some political leaders, as it is the case of the European Parliament deputy László Tőkés, who considers this step as a major one in achieving the main behests of the Hungarian minority in Romania[12].

II. Regionalization policies after 1989

1. Slovakia

In Slovakia, the process of regionalization begun when Vladimir Mečiar and his political party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia lost power. This was due to Mečiar's policies to hinder the Hungarian minority's claims for autonomy. More precisely, his government's reforms[13] from 1996 divided the territory in eight regions along the north-south axis and 79 districts, in such a way as to avoid the preponderance of Hungarian ethnics in any region or district. His policy was backed by Slovaks' fears concerning a potential massive political mobilization of the Hungarian minority, but also had perverted effects, as it sparked opposition to his centralized model of the state[14].

A genuine process of regionalization started in late 1998, under the new government headed by Mikuláš Dzurinda. The agenda for modernizing the state following the guideline principles of regionalization was summed up in the programmatic document entitled "Strategy

[10] Daniel, BOCHSLER, Edina, SZÖCSIK, "The Forbidden Fruit of Federalism: Evidence from Romania and Slovakia", *West European Politics*, volume 36, issue 2, 2013, pp. 426-446
[11] *Ibid*
[12] Adrian, EPURE, "Tőkés visează să unească partidele maghiare: "Putem obţine autonomia", *paginaeuropeană.ro*, 01/12/2015, last accessed on 05/10/2015
[13] Daniel, BOCHSLER, Edina, SZÖCSIK, *Art. Cit.*, p. 17
[14] Jennifer A., YODER, *Op. cit.*

of Public Administration Reform in the Slovak Republic"[15]. The document compared a "separated model" of state organization, characterized by an effective devolution of powers from central government to regional authorities, on the one hand, and an "integrated model", characterized by a limited transfer of power. Furthermore, Viktor Niznansky became the Government Commissioner for Public Administration Reform.

At the time, in the political discourse the tendency was to establish twelve regions, but the actual boundaries were subject to negotiation among the political elites. While all parties in the governmental coalition were favorable to regionalization, they had different views on its shape[16]: SDL (Party of the Democratic Left) and SOP (Party of Civic Understanding) opted for a centralized state, being in favor of eight regions and district offices. SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition) favored an in-depth regionalization with twelve regions; SMK-MKP (Hungarian Coalition Party) was altogether positive about regionalization, but imposed a condition of forming a 13th region (Komárno) in the south-west region of Slovakia where most Hungarian ethnics live.

The proposal put forward by SMK-MKP was not accepted by the coalition parties and it was considered to produce tensions in a region where the ethnic configuration is extremely delicate: 52% Hungarians and 42% Slovaks[17]. Without the coalition support, "the SMK position shifted to a compromise in favor of a higher proportion on its population in regions and, after territorial adjustments, declared its support for twelve regions in April 2001"[18]. However, it was too late because the SDL and SOP had already reached an agreement on eight regions. In 2001, the reform of the Slovak administrative system produced eight self-governed regions, none of them with Hungarian majority, because the ethnic criterion was not a central one, but merely one among fourteen criteria put forward by the experts.

After 2006 when SMK was voted out from power following the parliamentary elections, dissidents from the party formed a new political platform that managed to accede to power in 2010 and 2012. This new ethnically Hungarian party does not challenge the status quo of the administrative division implemented in 2001, deciding not to pursue territorial autonomy.

2. Romania

Like in the case of Slovakia, the perspective of EU integration determined the Romanian government in 1998 to introduce eight intermediary structures called Development Regions ("Regiuni de dezvoltare"). These cannot be labeled as genuine regional levels because they lacked juridical personality, serving only for the management of European funds and statistics. It was made clear from the very beginning that there was no consensus among political elites and even society to implement a profound regionalization.

In 2009, UDMR had a legislative proposal for the Law no. 315/2004 regarding Regional Development in Romania, aimed at replacing the eight development regions with sixteen micro-regions and five macro-regions, providing as arguments the necessity to ensure

[15] *pdc.ceu.hu*, last accessed on 05/10/2015
[16] Jan, BUČEK, "Regionalization in the Slovak Republic", in Gerard, MARCOU (ed.), *Regionalization for Development and Accession to the EU: A Comparative Perspective*, Open Society Institute, 2002, pp. 150-151
[17] *Ibid*
[18] *Ibid*

a balanced development, and thus the elimination of regional disparities, in line with the European convergence policies[19]. It made no reference to the ethnic criterion.

However in 2011 the leader of the Democrat-Liberal Party and incumbent prime minister announced the intention of his party to launch the reform of the Romanian administrative system through regionalization. Roughly speaking, the project consisted in replacing the existing counties ("judeţe") with eight mega-counties (still called "judeţe"). Preserving the name "judeţe" was an artifice to avoid reviewing the Constitution, which states that the Romanian territory is divided in counties ("judeţe"), towns and communes. The current powers of the County Councils and devolved institutions of the ministries were to be transferred to the local authorities, and the newly-formed County Councils were to retain attributions only in the field of regional development.

UDMR, as member of the governing coalition, objected to this proposal, claiming a separated region for the three counties currently inhabited by large Hungarian population (Harghita, Covasna and Mureş). Once again, they offered an economic justification: being tied up with other three counties (Braşov, Alba and Sibiu) that are already more developed and more prone to attract investments, the regional disparities would persist or even deepen. In addition to this, UDMR put forward the claim of a territorial autonomy regime on a region that overlapped with the Szekerland from the Middle Ages, offering the example of Northern Tirol in Italy[20].

In this political debate, the intervention of Romanian President Traian Băsescu bluntly rejected this administrative layout proposed by UDMR, stating that such an autonomous territorial unit was only established by Stalin. Still, he offered as an alternative to preserve the two counties with Hungarian majority as distinctive counties (Harghita and Covasna), and Mureş county to be annexed to other two neighboring counties.

The opposition coalition Social-Liberal Union (USL) put forward their own regional layout, which preserved the existing counties ("judeţe") and added an intermediary level (the regions). This form of administrative reorganization would presume a Constitutional review. In what concerns the institutional arrangements, it provided for the establishment of the Regional Courts and Regional Councils, and the transformation of the Senate in the Chamber of the Local Authorities.[21]

The feedback given by the Hungarian political elite to the USL version of regionalization ranged from criticism that it would increase the administrative bureaucracy and costs by implementing a new administrative layer, to the acceptance of the transformation of the Senate[22]. On the whole, UDMR rejected this form of regionalization.

Conclusions

Slovakia and Romania, like all former socialist countries, inherited a heavily centralized political and administrative system, which had to be adjusted in line with the economic and social transformations after the fall of communism. In addition to that, the issue

[19] *cdep.ro*, last accessed on 02/10/2015
[20] Sorin, NEGOIȚĂ, "PDL anunţă asumarea răspunderii pe regionalizare şi capitalele regiunilor…", 10 iunie 2011, *cursdeguvenare.ro* (last accessed on 02/10/2015)
[21] *USL project of regional development*, p. 19
[22] *Art. Cit*, cursdeguvernare.ro

of the dominant national minority constituted a central topic of debate, any tensions being sought to be eased democratically.

Claims for bringing closer the decision-making process to the citizens appeared as a legitimate goal, in particular in those regions where the population felt marginalized or discriminated against in the past, leaving them impoverished and backward. This was the case also of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia, which felt that under communism much of the industrialization and infrastructure efforts were channeled in the regions inhabited preponderantly by majoritarian citizens. Furthermore, these claims for regional cultural or territorial autonomy were raised on grounds of national identity.

In both countries, the Hungarian minority was actively involved in the political bargaining on the topic of administrative and territorial reform, their representative parties being often co-opted in government. Yet, their negotiation margin was narrowed by the nationalistic fears from the majoritarian population and populist discourse.

Unlike Slovakia, which managed to implement a regionalization policy, in Romania little progress has been made in establishing a genuine intermediary administrative units, primarily due to lack of political will to provide self-government to these regions.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT: *„This work was financially supported through the project "Routes of academic excellence in doctoral and post-doctoral research - READ" co-financed through the European Social Fund, by Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, contract no POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926."*

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COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MULTICULTURIST PROJECT

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Abstract: Two main approaches were used at the stage of European integration: the economic and the political-social one. In the latter, the political system is an apparatus which serves the purpose of selecting and implementing normative systems to the effect of attaining integration. The article attempts a parallel analysis of two paradigms concerning the social realities of the European Union and with the need that these paradigms focus on a `unity in diversity` which characterizes the European space. In order to integrate this goal, I will briefly outline the consequences of multiculturalism in relation to the social needs it must respond to. The mismatch between what multiculturalism proposes to achieve and what it succeeds in achieving can be understood as a deadlock of integration and not a failure. The last part of the article will seek to define the ethic fundaments of cosmopolitism in relation to the same social realities. The conclusion which will be built on these principles will show us the way in which the European integration might continue to take place around these fundaments which are of a certain normative character.

Keywords: ***cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, etics, european integration, social rights***

When the project of the European Union was seen as the sole solution to avoid the horrors of recently ended wars, the concept of *European integration* was thought out as a catalyst which would lead to the constitution of a large European society. This integration first happened by the building a common market. Establishing this integrated market was possible through the creation of superstate structures which, through a set of common norms and values, would make up a systemic unit so that afterwards this political and economic integration would be followed by a social one, as well. Thus, the citizens of Europe become the citizens of the European Union without giving up regional or national specificities.

Within the initial treaties dealing with the formation of the European Community, the purpose of transnational institutions was to build the common market. At this stage, social integration, seen as a long-term aspiration, remained in the background as the fore was being taken up by the practical priorities of the moment.

The theorization of the processes resulting in European integration meant the establishing, from the very beginning, of a paradigm of international relations that aimed at the realistic school's model (inter-national relations) through which the maximization of each of the Union's members' national interests was sought.[1]

Later on, the transition from the consolidation of the common economy to the making of a sole cultural and social space was achieved through the post-Maastricht model. Rightfully, social responsibility and economic growth must not rule each other out. 'Growth` is desirable, but not at the price of giving up the moral legitimacy provided by the conscience of a European identity. The economic integration achieved up to that point created a social European model. There were several versions of that model: Northern, Catholic, Southern – each with its variants. The common denominator did not consist of a series of economic or

[1] Dusan Sidjanski, (2010) *Viitorul federalist al Europei*, Polirom, , p 13

political practices. It was rather a perception – sometimes phrased at the level of public opinion, sometimes not - about what social rights, civic solidarity, collective responsibility – which is to be desired in a modern state and in an European democracy - mean.
Europe was, at the end of the millennium, of a thriving diversity. The dissolution of physical barriers, which do not always overlap cultural borders, the unprecedented speed of communications, as well as the contrasting perspectives of Islam and Christianity, the two great religions on the Continent – all these were an obstacle in easily discerning a form of collective experience.
It is in this context that the necessity of assessing a new paradigm that legitimates this super-statal political structure – the European Union – appears. It must refer to democratic values and principles: observing the autonomy of the person, [2] the minorities' rights and interests, women's rights, equal opportunities, social justice – unanimous values in the nation-states that make up the EU.

1. Unity and Diversity: Key Concepts in the European Integration Paradigm

Throughout history, there have always been flexible borders between the ethnic groups and peoples of Europe. The European continent has always been the space of migrations, interactions, disagreements and conflicts between nations. This diversity of origins was an essential element in the evolution of the European civilisation. The state of conflict that has tormented the history of Europe requires a different approach: applying the solution of *inclusion* to matters which have constantly been approached exclusively in the terms of *exclusion*. This explains the way in which, at different times in its evolution and expansion, the EU has continued to claim it is a project, not a territory. It has defined itself as political, not geographical, entity. This project had as main motivation the opposition towards any form of totalitarianism and authoritarianism that lead the entire European civilisation on the brink of disaster and annihilation. This opposition was characterized by the commitment to bring the Declaration of Human Rights at the fore of European policies and avoiding any form of totalitarianism. The most important results of the anti-totalitarian reaction are: the negotiation of differences, the suppression of unjustified inequalities, the reconciliation of contradictory values.
In order to support these statements, I will quote from *Opinion no. 64 of the Consultative Council of the European Judges* from 1935, which argues that the protection of national and cultural communities co-inhabiting Europe has, at its basis, `making sure that the different elements incorporated by the state, distinguished by race, language or religion, have the possibility to live in peace and in friendly cooperation with the majority and that, at the same time, they retain the features that distinguish them from the majority and the satisfaction of the ensuing specific necessities.`[3] These policies, phrased as officially adopted political ideologies, were constituted to support *inclusion*.

[2] I preferred the concept of 'autonomy' to that of freedon due to its ethical connotations.
[3] *Apud* Gabriel Andreescu, (2001)*Naţiuni şi minorităţi,* Iaşi, Polirom, , p. 134.

2. European Multiculturalism

European cultural diversity was dominated, up until the late 70s, by historical minorities. Until then, the main European states had integrated the national communities that separated themselves from the majority by means of specific legislation meant to ensure social inclusion, as well as means of fighting discrimination. Collective obligations were also adopted within the Council of Europe and European Communities. Most of the measures adopted by the EU concerning the cultural minorities were multiculturalist. However, multiculturalism became established as a political ideology especially after the 1980s as a means of managing the new minorities. This was also the moment when multiculturalism started to fail precisely because it exclusively focused on the attribute of `culture` while ignoring other human dimensions. Thus, in very many cases, the `tradition` invoked by these minorities seriously violated children's right to education or women's right to self-determination (`So-called honor murders are a significant problem in Britain`)[4]. Multiculturalists perceive communities as monoliths and do not provide individuals with status or fail in establishing an ethical framework concerning power relations between members. Courts belonging to minority cultures, for instance, such as the Stabor, which is a highly patriarchal parallel court of justice, or the Sharia, which imposes itself as the only Law authority adopted by the Muslim community, the Sharia observes that so-called `Cairo Declaration`, which emphasizes the fact that the position of the Muslim world regarding the fundamental human rights is one of rejection.[5] In many cases, the women's appearance before these courts is not voluntary; those convicted by these courts cannot appeal. Also, juridical procedures lack transparency – a central element to law practice which guarantees a fair trial. The judge's verdict is, of course, not justified.[6]

We can state that these communities' practice of seizing the claim to self-affirmation in order to promote, in their turn, a culture that rejects the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, a declaration which states, first and foremost, the rights by which entitles these communities' right to self-affirmation, is nonsensical. As a response to the failure of multiculturalism in the main EU countries, the political elite of most Western countries has distanced itself from multiculturalism in a series of statements.

Thus, Angela Merkel and Thilo Sarrazin declared at an Oct. 16(2010) meeting of young members of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, or Multikulti, as the Germans put it, `has failed totally`[7]. The statement should be taken with utmost seriousness and considered for its social and geopolitical implications. It should also be considered in the broader context of Europe's response to immigration, not to Germany's response alone. [8] David Cameron, in his first speech as Prime Minister, re-affirmed multiculturalism's failure: `Let's properly judge these organisations: Do they believe in universal human rights - including for women and people of other faiths? Do they believe in

[4]"Father denies killing daughter in UK 'honor murder' case" By Richard Allen Greene, CNN, July 11, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/uk-shafilea-honor-murder/

[5]Fatema Mernissi,(2002) *Islam and Democracy*, Cambridge, Perseus Books, p. 67.

[6]Ann Mayer, (1999)"An Assessment of Human Rights Schemes", in *Islam and Human Rights*, Westview, Westview Press p. 175.

[7] Geore Frideman, *Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism*, Stratfor, OCTOBER 19, 2010 | 08:55 GMT

[8] *Ibidem*.

equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separatism? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations.....the "doctrine of state multiculturalism", different cultures have been encouraged to live separate lives..... the key to achieving true cohesion by allowing people to say "I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am a Christian, but I am a Londoner... too"`[9]

3. Cosmopolitism, A New Perspective

Multiculturalism has failed in the way it should have addressed the double condition of the human being: of counting in itself and of counting for/along with the others. For to address this double condition means that we must own principles which are and must be universal, as well as there are a plethora of values which are, and should be, local.[10]

As we have seen so far, the ideological solution for European integration must take an essential aspect into account: individuals must be considered members of a European community. This implies bestowing a new meaning to the idea of `responsibility`. Individuals have a responsibility towards all the other members of the community, not only towards those within a particular group (nation, ethnic group, family, etc.) and, most importantly, all human beings must be considered *morally equal*. The normative commitments listed above only seem attainable under the terms of autonomy, which is the core of the EU political project, which thinks of the person as a `free and equal citizen`, at least in principle, in a manner *comprehensible* to all. The theories of democracy provide normative models of the way in which individual autonomy can be defended in particular historical, social and economical contexts. Unlike other political ideologies which have the role to understand and define the political regime, cosmopolitism has a rather normative role, in the sense that it relies on a set of ideals, ideas, ethical principles and doctrines that will define a social and political frame of action. Through people's autonomy, cosmopolitism understands the fact that human beings or persons are taken to be "self-originating sources of valid claims" and, as such, as the ultimate units of concern. In this way, moral cosmopolitanism differs from moral approaches that take ethnic or religious communities, the family, the state, traditions, etc. as moral concerns in and of themselves. For cosmopolitanism, such issues are not valuable intrinsically, but only instrumentally in the role they play in making people's lives better.[11]David Hield defines this type of principle as a `metaprinciple` as it shapes, in its turn, a new series of specific principles, such as the principle of equal opportunities, of active agency, of responsibility and transparency, of making collective decisions through vote in public matters (by abiding by the inclusiveness and subsidiarity criteria in the making of jurisdictions), the principle of avoiding serious damages that can be brought upon individuals (or the principle of social justice) etc.[12] Contemporary cosmopolitism is preoccupied with the conceptualization and generation of

[9] ´State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron´, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994.

[10] Kwane Antony Appiah,(1994) `Identity Autenticity Survival`, in *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton University Press, , p.163

[11]Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner, (2013)*Cosmopolitanism in Context, Perspectives from International Law and Political Theory*,Cambridge University Press, , p 15

[12]David Held,(2010) *Cosmopolitanism. Ideals, Realities and Deficits*, Polity Press, Bodmin, pp 20-25

conditions that can currently lead to the achievement of autonomy within the framework of ` a fundamental common structure of individual action and social activity`.[13]

Conclusion

The integration in a single political unit requires renouncing hegemony. The EU integration process must bring together the diverse elements of the European continent in a dynamic balance. Thus defined, integration must entail keeping the quality of each nation of ethnic group, of each region. It must represent the opposite of totalitarian simplification. The European Union will not be able to work as a social project if is not a space of freedom and pluralism of ideas, cultures, faiths evolving in complex and diversified social interconnection, an ideological system founded on acknowledging the free and responsible man, on tolerance.
Throughout this article I have attempted to emphasize those elements which can support the statement that cosmopolitism is fundamentally an ethical-political philosophy which responds to the same needs as multiculturalism but is different in its approach. This philosophy's specificity lies in the `normative individualism`, whose dimensions (individualism, impartiality, inclusion and generality) require the global application of derived principles such as the principles of autonomy, impartial argumentation, equal opportunity, representative participation, responsibility, social justice or public intervention. Cosmopolitism thus significantly influences the theory of democracy, as well as theory of justice, providing new meanings to their founding principles.[14]

AKNOWLEDGEMENT: This work was supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652, co-financed by the European Social Fund within the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2007 – 2013.

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[13]*Idem*, p. 16
[14]David A. Hollinger,(2006)*Cosmopolitanism and Solidarity,* University of Wisconsin Press, , p. 106.

TRANSPARENCY IN THE TTIP NEGOTIATIONS

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Abstract: The formal negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States (US) and European Union (EU) were launched in July 2013, when during a plenary session held in Washington DC, the representatives of the two trading partners discussed about the importance of signing a transatlantic trade and investment partnership. This was the first round of negotiations. It continued since 2013 and so far have been held eight rounds and the next one is scheduled for April 24, 2015. The transatlantic partnership is a great opportunity for both the US and the EU, the main objective being the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and also the harmonization of regulations on both sides of the Atlantic in order to facilitate trade. Even if this agreement would bring economic growth and would lead to an increased number of jobs in the US and the EU, it have been raised some concerns regarding the way the negotiations work. Most critical to the negotiations is related to the lack of transparency. For this reason, the present study aims to analyze how the negotiations for the transatlantic partnership are conducted and to verify if and how the principle of transparency is applied within them. Because these negotiations are being held in the full process of globalization, our attention will be directed also on how globalization affects the negotiations for the transatlantic partnership.

Keywords: ***free trade agreement, transparency, negotiations, US, EU, globalization.***

Introducere

Odată cu evoluția așa-numitelor state BRICS (Brazilia, Rusia, India, China și Africa de Sud), economia globală capătă o nouă formă și noi direcții. Este cunoscut faptul că de-a lungul timpului Statele Unite ale Americii (SUA) și Europa au dominat scena lumii internaționale, însă, în noul context international, acestea trebuie să se reorienteze în funcție de interesele comune dacă vor să-și mențină influența. Aflându-ne în plin proces de globalizare, putem presupune faptul că noile orientări ale statelor pot fi consecințe ale procesului de globalizare ce își propune crearea unui "tot global", a unei unități mondiale. Procesul de globalizare influențează guvernarea globală și totodată și comerțul mondial, negociindu-se astfel noi parteneriate și tratate. Negocierile Parteneriatului Trans-Pacific (Trans-Pacific Partnership - TPP) și cele ale Parteneriatului Transatlantic de Comerț și Investiții (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - TTIP) sunt considerate a fi efecte ale procesului de globalizare în contextul în care, prin intermediul lor, se încearcă remodelarea comerțului mondial.

În acest context, lucrarea de față prezintă cele mai importante aspecte ale negocierilor pentru parteneriatul transatlantic cu scopul de a observa măsura în care este sau nu aplicat și respectat principiul transparenței în cadrul acestor negocieri. Astfel, lucrarea este structurată în două secțiuni: prima se concentrează asupra relațiilor transatlantice, asupra negocierilor parteneriatului transatlantic, asupra modului în care acestea se desfășoară și care sunt cele mai importante aspecte de menționat, iar în a doua secțiune sunt problematizate concept precum transparența și echilibru care ar trebui să existe în negocierile pentru un parteneriat transatlantic ce este menit să remodeleze comerțul mondial.

Statele Unite ale Americii (SUA) și Uniunea Europeană (UE), doi poli de putere mondială economică și politică, negociază în prezent un acord de liber schimb ce este menit să instaureze o piață mondială de liber schimb în cadrul căreia piețele economice participante la acord să fie avantajate. Negociatorii celor două entități politice se confruntă cu diverse provocări în derularea negocierilor pentru asa-numitul "Parteneriatul Transatlantic de Comerț și Investiții" și de aceea procesul evoluează greu. În ciuda dificultăților întâmpinate, negociatorii sunt optimiști și depun eforturi foarte mari pentru a ajunge la măsuri comune.

1. Negocierile Parteneriatului Transatlantic

Relațiile transatlantice dintre SUA și UE au evoluat de-a lungul istoriei de la competiție la cooperare și invers, ajungându-se la situația în care cele două să constate faptul că economiile lor se află într-o oarecare interdependență, așa numita "interdependența competitivă". Conform acestui concept, relațiile transatlantice sunt cele în care UE și SUA se definesc în funcție de evoluția celeilalte (Sbragia, 2010:369). Evoluția economiilor transatlantice este interdependentă și totodată competitivă datorită intereselor comune globale (Wilkens, 2010).

Când a fost anunțată decizia începerii negocierilor pentru parteneriatul transatlantic dintre SUA și UE, liderii celor două entități politice au fost nevoiți să ofere explicații și să-și susțină punctul de vedere și poziția oficială față de negocieri (Akhtar și Jones, 2014). Atunci când se pune problema chestiunilor strategice de la nivel global, Statele Unite ale Americii acționează în zona de interes a Uniunii Europene, având astfel scopuri comune. Influența la nivel mondial a SUA și a UE poate fi foarte bine observată în politica comențului mondial (Overseas Development Institute, 2012). Cel mai potrivit partener comercial pentru SUA este Uniunea Europeană (EU Aid Explorer, 2012), datorită capacității sale de a exporta bunuri și de a-și promova valorile democratice.

Relația comercială și de investiții dintre SUA și UE, așa numita "economia transatlantică" este o relație cu beneficii mutuale și cu însemnătate la nivel global (Akhtar și Jones, 2014:5). Nu numai că această economie transatlantică este cea mai mare din lume, dar este și cea mai importantă datorită părților implicate. Totuși, această relație a avut și mai are de întâmpinat diverse provocări, iar unii specialiști susțin faptul că această relație nu a atins potențialul economic maxim de care este capabilă.

De-a lungul istoriei au existat diverse eforturi de a adânci relațiie transatlantice prin intermediul liberalizării comerțului și investițiilor. Acest lucru s-a realizat prin diferitele tentative de tratate și parteneriate, considerate a fi predecesoarele parteneriatului transatlantic negociat în prezent. Ca exemplu, în 1995 s-a negociat Tratatul Transatlantic de Liber Schimb (Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement - TAFTA) (Public Citizen Site, 2013) despre care susțin specialiștii că ar fi o anexă sau o completare la Acordul de Liber Schimb Nord American (North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA) (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2011a) și la Acordurile de la Uruguay care au dus la formarea Organizației Mondiale a Comerțului (World Trade Organization - WTO) (2014). Formarea acestei organizații a comerțului a dus și la întărirea relației transatlantice, la modificarea traiectoriei acesteia de la competiție la cooperare în scopul unei mai bune colaborări în zona economiei

mondiale. În acest context, criticii se arătau îngrijorați cu privire la modul în care erau rezolvate din punct de vedere politic problemele transatlantice referitoare la agricultură și reglementările standard.

După criza economică din 2008 și evoluția economică îngrijorătoare a unor țări precum China, le-a determinat pe SUA și pe UE să se reorienteze și să reducă barierele existente între ele cu scopul de a crea o piață mondială transatlantică prin intermediul căreia să poată instaura o serie de standarde transatlantice care vor deveni globale în timp. Parteneriatul transatlantic a devenit soluția comună pentru SUA și UE și soluția înlăturării de pe piața mondială economică e celorlalți competitori. Acordul de liber schimb va avea ca scop înlăturarea barierelor tarifare și nontarifare precum și determinarea unei creșteri economice mondiale și sporirea numărului de locuri de muncă. Negocierile pentru acordul de liber schimb sunt considerate de unii specialiști ca fiind un instrument cu "costuri reduse" sau unul "fără deficit" pentru îndeplinirea unor scopuri economice (Akhtar și Jones, 2014:8). Alții sunt preocupați de potențialul impact pe care îl va avea punerea în aplicarea a măsurilor parteneriatului transatlantic în anumite sectoare ale economiei SUA și UE care sunt sensibile la importuri sau asupra capacității puterii guvernamentale în zona protecției sănătății, mediului și muncii. În timp ce liberalizarea comerțului poate duce la câștiguri semnificative, costurile pot fi observate mai mult asupra anumitor grupuri specifice din sectoare economice (Morisson, 2015).

Conform susținătorilor, parteneriatul transatlantic ar trebui să determine o creștere economică semnificativă (Capaldo 2014, 1) și să fie soluția la criza economică actuală.

După cele nouă runde de negocieri în cadrul cărora s-au discutat diverse teme, de la investiții, servicii, energie și chestiuni de drept comunitar, până la siguranță alimentară, sănătate, protejarea mediului, protejarea drepturilor intelectuale, coerența reglementărilor, stabilirea de standarde comune, armonizarea standardelor specifice, regulile pieței unice și agricultură, Parteneriatul Transatlantic a început să prindă contur pe hârtie și să se transforme dintr-un document de câteva pagini în unul ce cuprinde capitole complexe cu teme de interes major. În toate cele nouă runde de negocieri s-au discutat chestiunile problematice asupra cărora SUA și UE nu puteau ajunge la un compromis. Dorința de a încheia un acord de liber schimb ce promite să aducă schimbări pozitive în economia mondială îi determină pe liderii celor două puteri mondiale să găsească soluții la temele ce prezintă probleme și la provocările pe care le întâmpină în cadrul negocierilor.

2. Transparență și echilibru în negocierile Parteneriatului Transatlantic

Uniunea Europeană și Statele Unite ale Americii îți doresc un echilibru în comerțul mondial (Moschella and Waver, 2014, 59), iar acest lucru nu poate realiza decât prin eliminarea barierelor tarifare și nontarifare între piețele lor și prin instaurarea unei piețe libere în cadrul căreia importurile și exporturile să nu mai fie taxate, sau să aibă taxe rezonabile și comune.

Noua Comisie Europeană (2014a), sub conducerea președintelui Junker susține liberul schimb, dar nu susține și sacrificarea normelor europene în sectoare de importanță majora precum siguranța alimentară, sănătatea, protecția socială și protecția datelor sau diversitate culturală. Totodată, o altă chestiune pe care nu o va admite Uniunea Europeană este cea legată

de jurisdicția instanțelor europene care să fie limitată de regimurile special ce restrâng accesul la instanțele naționale sau care permit unor anumite instanțe secrete să decidă asupra litigiilor dintre autoritățile de stat și investitori (Comisia Europeană, 2014a).

Comisia Junker susține că negocierile pentru parteneriatul transatlantic SUA-UE vor avea parte de transparența necesară, iar negociatorii celor două părți vor manifesta încredere reciprocă și echilibru în luarea deciziilor. Un alt element important legat de negocierile acordului de liber schimb este faptul că decizia finală, de încheire a tratatului nu va fi luată fără acordul Parlamentului European, în consecință se resimte și implicarea cetățenilor în cadrul acestui proces.

Printre cele mai importante obiective ale Comisiei Junker cu privire la parteneriatul transatlantic se numără "încheierea unui acord rezonabil și echilibrat între UE și SUA, pentru a elimina taxele vamale", în scopul promovării liberului schimb și menținerii unor standarde comune în comerțul transatlantic, dar și "înregistrarea de progrese în sensul recunoașterii reciproce a standardelor privind produsele între UE și SUA sau întreprinderea unor măsuri în vederea creării unor standarde transatlantice" (Comisia Europeană, 2014a).

Președintele noii Comisii Europene, Junker, susține faptul că își dorește ca acordul de liber schimb dintre SUA și UE să fie unul rezonabil și echilibrat. El explică acest lucru în proiectul candidaturii sale menționând că avantajele pe care le aduce acest tratat sunt reciproce, iar negocierile se vor desfășura în spiritual transparenței. El explică astfel necesitatea eliminării taxelor vamale dintre piețele UE și piețele SUA și recunoașterea reciprocă a standardelor privind produsele proprii și propunerea de măsuri în vederea creării unor standarde transatlantice. Acest lucru trebuie realizat însă fără afectarea standardelor specifice fiecărui partener ce participă la negocieri și fără afectarea diversității culturale a ambelor părți. Atât europenii, cât și americanii au standarde pe care nu le vor supune negocierilor, iar printre acestea ambele susțin că statul de drept și principiul egalității în fața legii nu sunt discutabile (Comisia Europeană, 2014b).

În comparație cu celelalte tratate negociate, predecesoarele parteneriatului transatlantic -CETA - Acordul Comercial și de Comerț Global (Comisia Europeană, 2014c) și ACTA – Acordul Comercial împotriva Contrafacerii (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2011b), acesta impune o transparență sporită față de cetățeni și de Parlamentul European care va avea ultimul cuvânt la momentul încheierii acordului.

După începerea oficială a negocierilor pentru acordul de liber schimb dintre SUA și UE, au existat diverse momente tensionate precum cel al presupusului spionaj practicat de serviciile americane asupra partenerilor europeni (Rodica Velciu, 2013). Acest moment a fost depășit de ambele părți datorită obiectivului ambițios al parteneriatului și datorită mizelor foarte mari.

Sub denumirea de Parteneriatul transatlantic pentru comerț și investiții (TTIP – Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), acest tratat ar putea reprezenta cel mai important acord de liber schimb ce va aduce creșteri semnificative în PIB-ul mondial (Ahrens, 2012), dar va avea și influențe pozitive asupra comerțului internațional și asupra investițiilor de la nivel global (Rodica Velciu, 2013). Printre elementele care au fost excluse de la negocieri prin așa-numita "excepție culturală" se numără și domeniul cultural și al audiovizualului (la insistențele Franței). Acest lucru s-a datorat necesității păstrării "a însăți

capacității noastre de a alege ți de a face să existe legislațiile și reglementările noastre în fața evoluțiilor tehnologice și economice" (Rodica Velciu, 2013).

Conform specialiștilor, Acordul de liber schimb SUA-UE, prin obiectivele propuse de eliminare a barierelor tarifare și netarifare și prin armonizarea reglementărilor, va duce la creșterea schimburilor comerciale și totodată la creștere economică. Poziția Comisiei Europene față de aceste rezultate mult așteptate ale parteneriatului transatlantic este una pozitivă și optimistă, chiar dacă efectele se vor resimți după o perioadă îndelungată de timp. Pe lângă beneficiile economice pe care le va avea atât SUA, cât și UE, întărirea relațiilor dintre americani și europeni va avea și un impact politic pozitiv. Pe cealaltă parte, poziția SUA față de acord este tot una pozitivă deoarece își va putea reduce deficitul comercial.

Până în prezent au fost derulate nouă runde de negocieri în cadrul cărora negociatorii au încercat să ajungă la un compromis în ceea ce privește măsurile de interes comun. Atât SUA, cât și UE își susțin propriile măsuri și au propria părere față de măsurile pe care vrea să le introducă partea cealaltă. Prima rundă de negocieri a fost condusă de reprezentantul American pentru comerț, Michael Froman și de negociatorul șef al UE, Ignacio Garcia Bercero. În cadrul negocierilor au participat 150 de experți americani și europeni care au fost împărțiți în 15 grupuri de lucru pentru a discuta și dezbate problemele legate de piețele publice, investiții, proprietate intelectuală, comerț electronic și concurență.

Chiar dacă cele două părți își doresc ca parteneriatul transatlantic să fie semnat foarte curând, acest lucru nu se va întâmpla tocmai datorită măsurilor dezbătute în cadrul negocierilor asupra cărora nu se pot lua decizii fără a fi de acord atât SUA, cât și UE (Atlantic Council, 2014). Negocierile au avut parte și de divergențe în cazul unor probleme sensibile cum ar fi faptul că statele member ale Uniunii Europene nu vor renunța foarte ușor la normele fitosanitare și la principiul "precauției", care au fost invocate tocmai pentru interzicerea importurilor de organisme modificate genetic din SUA (Rodica Velciu, 2013).

De cealaltă parte, Statele Unite ale Americii vor să își mențină legislația ce protejează producătorii americani prin programe de tip "Small Business Act" și "Buy American Act" (Rodica Velciu, 2013). Prin intermediul acestora, campaniile americane sunt protejate și au acces prioritar pe piețele americane, lucru care dezavantajează companiile străine.

Negocierile pentru parteneriatul transatlantic aduc în discuție o altă chestiune problematică, și anume cea a protecției datelor personale. Atât SUA, cât și UE consideră că este necesară protejarea datelor personale, dar modul în care se face acest lucru ar trebui să fie corect și echilibrat.

Principiul cel mai important care ar trebui aplicat în cadrul negocierilor pentru acordul de liber schimb dintre SUA și UE este cel al transparenței. Pe lângă cei doi parteneri implicați în negocieri, SUA și UE, și statele membre ca Franța și Germania susțin faptul că este necesară transparența în negocierea creării unei zone de liber schimb dintre Uniunea Europeană și Statele unite ale Americii.

Există situații în care negociatorii europeni și cei americani ajung repede la un compromis. Un exemplu elocvent ar fi dreptul de proprietate intelectuală. Eliminarea concurenților neloiali (firmele din țările emergente) este vizată, însă americanii consider că partenerii comunitari nu și-au stabilit un sistem de contracarare a acestora. Totodată, SUA reclamă și faptul că nu există un Acord Global pentru protecția drepturilor de proprietate

intelectuală şi că unele pieţe emergente care practică "furtul de proprietate intelectuală" afectează competitivitatea întreprinderilor transatlantice (Rodica Velciu, 2013).

Fiind cunoscut sub denumirea de Parteneriatul Transatlantic pentru Comerţ şi Investiţii, acordul de liber schimb SUA-UE se concentrează şi asupra investiţiilor şi serviciilor (Cordoso, 2013). În ceea ce priveşte mediul investiţional, există anumite reproşuri din partea firmelor americane către Uniunea Europeană. Acest lucru de datorează faptului că legislaţia din statele membre este impredictibilă ceea ce duce la incertitudine juridică şi apoi la descurajarea investiţiilor. Pe cealaltă parte, a serviciilor, Uniunii Europene i se reproşează faptul că piaţa unică este fragmentată între pieţele statelor membre, însă acest lucru se întâmplă şi în statele SUA, unde există diferenţe de reglementare de la un stat la altul.

Concluzii

Negocierile parteneriatului transatlantic reprezintă o temă de interes major în contextul actual al procesului de globalizare. Faptul că doi actori globali, SUA şi UE, încearcă să stabilească o piaţă de liber schimb globală în cadrul căreia să fie eliminate barierele tarifare şi nontarifare, poate însemna că într-adevăr acest acord reprezintă o oportunitate pentru cele două puteri, o opotunitate de care trebuie să profite.

În ceea ce priveşte influenţa asupra Uniunii Europene, trebuie să aduceam în discuţie provocările ce au apărut la adresa pieţei unice a acesteia. Comerţul internaţional este în continuă schimbare, iar eliminarea barierelor economice în schimburile comerciale cu SUA poate duce la piederea unor avantaje economice pe care le aveau anumite state membre ale Uniunii. Pe cealaltă parte, piaţa internă europeană are nevoie de o diversificare a relaţiilor comerciale, iar acest parteneriat poate fi ocazia potrivită. Prin fuzionarea celor două pieţe internaţionale, prin interconectarea pieţelor, a cererii şi totodată a ofertei, valoarea comerţului international ar avea mari şanse să crească (Gnesotto, 2003: 56-59). Totodată şi câştigurile pentru SUA au atât părţi pozitive, cât şi negative. Pentru a avea câştiguri, SUA trebuie să facă un compromis şi să fie de acord în unele privinţe cu Uniunea Europeană; la fel şi aceasta.

În legătură cu aplicarea principului transparenţei putem spune doar că prezenţa acestuia începe să se simtă, dar nu va fi niciodată pe deplin datorită mizelor globale pe care le implică un asemenea tratat. Aşteptăm cu nerăbdare noile runde de negocieri şi totodată modul în care Comisia Junker va reuşi să aplice transparenţa şi echilibrul în discuţii şi să ţină populaţia transatlantică informată cu privire la acordul de liber schimb.

Diversele reacţii negative în ceea ce priveşte negocierea acordului de liber schimb sunt concentrate asupra lipsei de transparenţă şi asupra slabei implicări a societăţii civile în cadrul negocierilor. Fiind un tratat cu mize globale în care sunt implicaţi doi actori internaţionali, transparenţa în cadrul negocierilor se impune tocmai datorită importanţei majore acordate acestui tratat. Lipsa transparenţei în negocieri şi furnizarea unui minim de informaţii oficiale sunt de ajuns pentru ca societatea civilă să nu aibă încredere în negocierea unui parteneriat transatlantic ale cărui efecte le va resimţi. Modul în care Comisia Junker şi-a început mandatul şi a preluat desfăşurarea negocierilor, susţinând că transparenţa va fi un principiu de bază, aplicat şi respectat, duce la creşterea încrederii că vom afla mai multe lucruri despre negocierile pentru acordul de liber schimb şi se vor organiza mai multe dezbateri în cadrul cărora se va cere şi părerea societăţii civile cu privire la o chestiune care o priveşte.

În măsura în care riscurile implicate de aplicarea măsurilor parteneriatului transatlantic vor fi diminuate, economia mondială ar putea fi recalibrată, iar relațiile economice dintre cei doi actori vor fi stabilizate. Până la urmă acest acord este o oportunitate ce trebuie fructificată cât mai eficient de către cele două piețe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: *This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), Lfinanced from the European Social Fund and the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675*

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"THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT FACTION" FROM IASI. SOME IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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Abstract: This paper aims to present the main aspects of the Free and Independent Faction from Iasi ideology, to analyze the impact of their anti-Semite ideas on the situation of the Jewish population in Romanian territory and relate them to the person of Charles I and the foreign policy promoted by him. The study will also analyze the impact that Simion Barnutiu's thinking had over them and illustrate some of the most important ideas that were promoted by the Nicolae Ionescu, the group leader, after his mentor's death. The factionists have supported the idea that Charles I was not a loyal ruler for its people and that for Romania a republic or an indigenous prince would be more suitable. We also debated their interest in keeping Moldavia and Wallachia united against any separatist attempts. In the end, an explanation as to why their anti-Semitic believes were so popular was given.

Keywords: ***Nicolae Ionescu, political group, anti-dynastic, unionism, anti-Semitism***

1. Introduction

The nineteenth century Romanian society was going through a vast modernization process. Political life was no exception. It was in this context that numerous political parties made their appearance on the public stage, although the majority had only a temporary existence. There are, of course, two parties that drew the general coordinates of Romanian politics in the era: the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. In addition, many other groups offered innovative solutions on the problems that the Romanians faced.

The political group named "The free and independent faction" is an interesting addition on the public stage. It had several interesting features. Its members were convinced anti-Semites and they played an important role in the existence of the "Jewish question" in Romania. Anti-dynastic, had it been in their powers, they would have banished Prince Carol I of Romania. Their dream was to see a "Romanian ruler on a Romanian throne". Liberals, but not less radicals, they proposed a series of reforms too advanced for the stage of development in which the Romanian society was at that time. Their importance lies in the overwhelming influence they had in Moldova, a Romanian province. They played a decisive role in Parliament, because their votes brought the power in the hands of the Liberals or the Conservatives.

Although the "factionist group" has not left a political program or an actual declaration of the political principles which governed their activities, we can still search for clues in the first issue of one of their "home" papers *Miscarea Nationala* which points to a self-definition of what they saw as important: "We see old and new political groups that manifest themselves every day. We however have not changed anything, not our beliefs, not our political attitude, because we are sure that we do the right thing in remaining constant in defending our ideas - we do not need new or redesigned programs"[1].

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Although apparently the quote does not offer much information about the factionalist ideology, two issues remain relevant for us: factionists were aware of their existence as a political group; although the word "ideology" is not even mentioned in the text. The "beliefs" and the "programs" remind us of the existence of specific ideas and values that the group tries translate from theory into practice.

2. Simion Barnutiu's influence

A very important moment in the completion of what later would become the factionist group was the arrival in Iasi in 1854 as professor of logic at Academia Mihăileană of Simion Bărnuţiu. He was considered at the time the "father" of the factionists and the mentor of Nicolae Ionescu, the group leader, and by default the source from which the latter took the ideas that guided his subsequent political activity.

It is difficult to approximate in percentages how much of the factionalist ideology has as a starting point Bărnuţiu's thinking, and how much was the contribution of each group member. The fact is that Bărnuţiu had a massive influence on his followers, in terms of the main directions, namely the anti-dynastic ideas, the anti-Semitism and the radicalism. Hence, an analysis of Simion Bărnuţiu's philosophy and thus one of his affect towards the factionist group is required.

George Panu, his student at the Academia Mihăileană, describes in his memoirs the influence that Bărnuţiu Simion was able to exert on those around him: "Simon Bărnuţiu had such an irresistible influence on students and pupils that he hypnotized them, had instilled his fanatic ideas in their heads; They spoke like him, dressed like him, walked like him, no doubt that they thought like him"[2].

Influenced by the writings of Wilhelm Traugott Krug, Bărnuţiu argued that freedom and equality are the first and oldest human conditions. Any differences between people, on the political or social scale, any privilege are subsequent creations, some imposed by violence others consented by mutual agreement between people. Bărnuţiu supported the theory of historical law in opposition to the theory of natural law. The theory of history law says that society's institutions were not created through the deliberate liberal consensus of the people, but were formed in a natural way, as a living organism develops. Therefore, it is not the man that creates and shapes in an aware state these institutions, but they are the ones that face the subject with their structures and traditions, forcing him to adapt. We do not create voluntarily our nationality and our language: we are born with them and we must conform to their patterns[3].

Although it plays an important role in his philosophy, the return to the Roman traditions is not the central axis of Bărnuţiu's thinking but the need to define the law. In its conception, the law can be divided into three categories: the natural law, the law of gens and

work was cofinanced from the European Social Fund through Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140863, Competitive Researchers in Europe in the Field of Humanities and Socio-Economic Sciences. A Multi-regional Research Network.

[1] *Mişcarea Naţională*, Iasi, year I, no. 1, March 1, 1880, p. 1.

[2] George Panu, *Amintiri de la „Junimea" din Iaşi,* edition by Z. Ornea, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2013, p. 45.

[3] Camil Mureşanu, „Simion Bărnuţiu-Gânditor politic" in *Viaţa românească*, Bucureşti, year XCVIII, January-February, no. 1-2, 2003, pp. 23-24.

the civil law[4]. The natural law has two meanings: a law that all animals have learned from nature this being nothing but the instinct that humans have in common with them and that determines their behavior in various ways and the law that is born from reason and natural necessity. The law of gens is something acquired by all nations through natural reason and it is one of the positive rights that all nations possess until the general union. The civil law is the particularly positive law of a state to its citizens[5].

As to the the laws of the country, Bărnuţiu is campaigning for preserving its existing legislative traditions. His motivation refers to the past: as long as the laws of the ancestors are in place, the people prove its vitality; any imitation of the codes belonging to foreign nations only illustrates its decay[6].

Regarding the foreign prince, the controversy on which the factionalist ideology was based, Bărnuţiu claimed that "the choice of a Romanian prince is governed by natural law and not by public law and therefore, it is enough for just one Romanian to be against the foreign prince so that he may not lay on the throne"[7]. Specifically, he claims in his paper *Dreptul public al românilor* the following: "The republican form is the best for the Romanians, because it is the most accommodated by their nature and their humanity"[8]; "The rulers of the Romanians were and it ought to be again what consuls or praetors were for the Romans, judges in peacetime and emperors in wartime"[9]; "The Romanians have always hated the idea of heredity"[10]. "All the Romanian communities are still free and republican because they are able to choose for themselves their magistrates"[11]; "The republican element rejects the hereditary domination; where it lies, it is there the duty of the politicians to lift it, it is the duty of every single Romanian"[12].

Simion Bărnuţiu's thinking remains an open field for research. The prior assertion of its key milestones is not an attempt to analyze the sources of Bărnuţiu's ideas or to problematize the existence of an own philosophical system, but rather an overview of ideas which influenced or could have influenced the factionist thinking[13].

3. The anti-dynastic ideas

An important component of the factionist ideology is the anti-dynastic ideas of its members. The main sources used in our analysis were the group's publications such *Tribuna Română*, *Dreptatea*, *Uniunea Liberală* şi *Mişcarea Naţională* in which the factionists presented their antimonarchic arguments. It will be noted on this occasion the lack of a uniform thinking among them regarding the benefits and disadvantages that a foreign prince could bring to the Romanians.

[4] Simion Bărnuţiu, *Dereptulu publicu aul românilorum,* Iassi, Tipariulu Tribunei Române, p. 4.
[5] Petre Pandrea, *Filosofia politico-juridică a lui Simion Bărnuţiu,* Bucureşti, Fundaţia pentru Literatură şi Arta „Regele Carol II", 1935, pp. 82-83.
[6] Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 1.
[7] George Panu, p. 45.
[8] Simion Bărnuţiu, p. 14.
[9] *Ibid,* p.141.
[10] *Ibid,* p. 171.
[11] *Ibid,* p. 183.
[12] *Ibid,* p. 83.
[13] See also Andreea Georgiana Dragomir, „Filosofia lui Simion Bărnuţiu", in *Revista de filosofie*, Bucureşti, volume LVIII, no. 3-4, 2011, pp. 339-357.

The factionist speech is not linear, it is frequently oscillating between the need to institute a republic to ensure the happiness of all Romanians, and the need of an indigenous prince to govern based on traditions. In addition, in what regards Nicolae Ionescu he will change his attitude later in life towards Charles I.

The factionists are not to be found in the rhetoric of the time when it comes to advocate for bringing a foreign prince on the throne of the country in order to preserve the union between Moldova and Wallachia. Nicolae Ionescu believed that strengthening the union under a foreign prince was not and could not be as valuable as the collective guarantee of the great powers or the good relations with the Turks that lasted for centuries, Turks who have always respected Romanians territorial integrity[14].

The Free and Independent Faction believed that the monarchy only by "a stable reign is far from achieving Romanian happiness". The very foundation of the monarchy, the Constitution was inefficient and corrupt, because it favored "the laughingstock of those at the helm of thieves which have multiplied after February 11"[15].

An even more trenchant article regarding the events on February 11, 1866 can be found in the factionalist publication *Mişcarea Naţională*: "Cuza's dethroning felt awkward in his country and a large dose of patriotism[16] full of selflessness from the sincere liberals was needed in order to succeed in not letting the pain translate into violence"[17].

A. D Holban, another member of the factionist group is explaining his country's downfall using as an argument the monarchical institution's very foundations. He did not see the opportunity to progress as long as "the countries first magistrate embodies the principle of hereditary feudal dynasty". But the in the same time, Holban was offering a "solution" to the prince who "should be very circumspect and very balanced in his habits, in order not to rouse the national feeling of the people, because this could be the only chance for his origins to be overlooked"[18].

Although he began his political career as a convinced anti-dynastic, Ionescu ended appreciating Charles I. In a work from 1888 that treated among others the recent events in Bulgaria[19], Ionescu was pitting our neighbors from south of the Danube, when comparing them to us: "Why should we care about anything when we have an independent state, a wise diplomatic body, a wise king and a gentle people who can be governed in the highest degree"[20].

[14] *Monitorul Oficial*, Bucureşti, no. 98, May, 5/171866, p. 434.
[15] February 11 was the date in which Alexandru Ioan Cuza was forced to abdicate; *Dreptatea,* Iaşi, year II, no.126, April 6, 1869.
[16] About the connotation of this word in the 19th century see Klaus Bochmann, „Conceptul de patriotism în cultura română" in *Istoria României prin concepte*, edited by Victor Neumann, Armin Heinen, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2010, pp. 103-127.
[17] *Mişcarea Naţională*, Iaşi, year I, no. 57, May 9, 1880, p. 2.
[18] *Dreptatea,* Iaşi, year III, no. 201, March 15, 1870.
[19] The Berlin treaty has ensured the autonomy of East Rumelia from the Ottoman Empire. But in 1885, Rumelia went under the ruling of the Bulgarians after a bloody rebellion. The annexation of East Rumelia did not last for long, the province was officially returned to the Ottomans on April 17, 1886. However, Rumelia remained under Bulgarian control and on March 24, 1886, the sultan admitted the status of "general governor" for the Bulgarian prince.
[20] Nicolae Ionescu, *Despre împărăţia româno-bulgară,* Bucureşti, I. G. Haimam, 1888, p. 11.

4. The unionism

Although they opposed the idea of a foreign dynasty, the factionist did not indulge at any time the separatist ideas that were widespread in Iasi[21]. Even if the union between Moldova and Wallachia did not necessarily lead to the desired outcome, specifically an indigenous prince or implicitly the establishment of the republic, the factionist decided that the territorial unity outweighed their personal beliefs concerning the person who was the head of state[22].

Even if he condemned the separatist movement, Nicolae Ionescu was updated throughout the month of March 1866, with the intention of those who were unwilling to preserve the union. In a letter he addressed to Petru Poni, close friend and relative, Ionescu notifies him that he took part in a meeting in his house of Vasile Pogor, where Nunuţă Roznovanu read a separatist manifesto. Ionescu exposed his intention of giving the latter an answer and even more at the next meeting he wanted "all our teachers to be present, especially those of us who are unionists, decentralization supporters and anti-absolutism"[23].

A. D. Holban agrees with Nicolae Ionescu regarding the need to preserve the union. In its paper *Poporulu* the separatist problem is a widely debated issue. For him the union was the only way to "form a strong and vivacious nation that is the most ardent aspiration of our hearts". Holban intention was to contribute to "the extirpation of that fierce spirit of provincialism, which still maintains unjust glory among brothers". This difficulty would be overcome by the measures the factionists wanted to support and which "will require a systematic and effective decentralization [...] by which the good life shall be able to spread equally in all corners of the country"[24].

Alecu M. Şendrea, also a factionist, attended a lecture organized by the other influential group from Iasi, Junimea, at the University, in order to debate the separatist ideas circulating in Iasi. Iacob Negruzzi, member of Junimea, remembers that Şendrea "although in favour of the union, is from another party than us"[25].

Tribuna Română, Nicolae Ionescu's paper gave an ample space to the unionist ideas promoted by Ion Ghica, ideas that Ionescu considered to be "serious and truthful [...] here we transcribe them so we may all remember them". Ghica was fighting for unity, because only a united nation could be a powerful nation. The union was the manner in which the Romanian people survived the secular struggles against invasion, fighting through which they were able to keep their nationality. Giving up the union between Moldova and Wallachia would be

[21] We are referring to the separatist ideas from the period February 1866-April 1866. Some Moldovans wanted a separation of the two provinces and therefore were supporting Nunuta Roznovanu in his attempt to become the new ruler of Moldova.

[22] We note, however, the position of the historian Zigu Ornea who in the preface of the book George Panu, *Amintiri de la Junimea din Iaşi....*, states the following related to the time of the abdication of Cuza: "The former anti-union circles took this opportunity in order to plan for a resurgence of separatist tendencies, public separatist meetings (former anti unionists and those who were by then organized in the so-called "free and independent faction") and anti-separatist (Junimea). His statement is totally wrong, as proven by direct testimony and the group actions from the period.

[23] Nicolae Ionescu to Petru Poni, March 1866, in Direcţia Judeţeană a Arhivelor Naţionale Iaşi, *Fond Familial „Poni",* Documente Petru Poni, doc. no. 462.

[24] *Poporulu*, Iasi, year I, no. 9, September, 18/30, 1866. See also the article „Centralisarea şi decentralisarea" in *Poporulu*, Iasi, year I, no. 2, August 16/28, 1866, p. 7.

[25] Iacob Negruzzi, *Amintiri din Junimea*, edition by Ioana Pârvulescu, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, 2011, p. 68.

synonymous with an abdication as a nation, but preserving it would be a fulfillment of the divine will[26].

Towards the end of 1880, the claims of the Free and Independent Faction to the "brothers from Wallachia" worsened: "we are all Romanian and we joined together, Moldavians and Wallachians, to no longer be divided into two families as we are the same people"; but we did not envision that this union would become an instrument of exploitation, and that one of the brothers was about to seize all the advantages of the united family, only for his personal profit [...], we have not thought that in order to be Romanian, for the Moldavians it will mean ever since the overthrow of Cuza only giving and never receiving anything in return"[27].

The solution proposed by the factionists in order to resolve the situation of Moldova was to create a unionist party with the porpoise to protect their interests: "For the Moldovans unionists, for true patriots beyond the Milcov it is a pressing duty to serve and to affirm [...] to be a regulator of Moldovan society and a protector for its harmed interests [...] this can only be achieved by the establishment of a national party"[28]. We may only assume that this party was about to be lead and controlled by the factionist group.

5. The anti-Semitism

One of the major problems of Romanian society in the second half of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly the Hebrew problem. We can identify three key moments in its development: the year of 1866 when the Constitution of principalities was discussed, discussion which included the possibility of giving rights to those of Jewish rite; the spring of 1868 when Moldova was confronted with the some local movements against the Jews; and the years 1878-1879 when the discussion of Article 7 of the Constitution was in motion. We will consider, in the following the exposure of certain anti-Semitic arguments of the Free and Independent Faction from Iasi, as well as the political and social motivation behind these arguments[29].

Also relevant are the actions of A. D. Holban who in 1863 initiated a media campaign through the newspaper he controlled, *Viitorul*, against those of Jewish rite; he is the most vehement factionist at a discursive level. He is ready to give up the very independence of the country, if its acquisition is conditional upon the recognition of rights for the Hebrew: "to be asked today to allow Jewish emancipation would be the greatest irony that the enlightened Europe were to throw at us after the blood and money sacrifices we did"[30].

He is not the only one to think this way. Alexandru Gheorghiu repeatedly stated its desire to see the "Hebrew element" permanently excluded from the economic life of Iasi. He was using all of his relations in order to make this goal achievable: "I talked to the Forests

[26] *Tribuna Română,* Iasi, year VIII, no. 259, August, 25, 1866.
[27] *Miscarea Nationala*, Bucuresti, no. 235, December, 17, 1880, p. 1.
[28] *Ibid*, no. 237, December 19, 1880, p.1.
[29] See also Carol Iancu, *Evreii din România (1866-1919) De la excludere la emancipare*, Bucureşti, Editura Hasefer, 2006, p. 133.
[30] According to Anastase Hâciu, *Evreii în Ţările Româneşti,* Bucureşti, Tiparul „Cartea Românească", 1943, p. 243.

Minister Dimitrie Ghica and he told me that the auction will be held in Iasi, but he gave orders not to accept any bid coming from a Jew"[31] .

It was said about Nicolae Ionescu that he had an extraordinary talent when it came to debate the Hebrew issue his passion for the topic was surprising everyone, even his most bitter opponents[32]. Ionescu's speech presented a number of constants that were repeated over the years: the foreign invasion of the city, the need to regain Romanism, the improvement of material life by purifying commercial activities, and not least, the existence of exclusive Romanian administration[33].

Through the factionists publications the image of a besieged city, a city without the means to get out of the morass in which it struggles, is created. The streets where someday in the past people were speaking Romanian, the Sunday, the food offered by a Romanian to a Romanian, the morals, the family worship, the religion[34], they are all are invoked to support the need for a new beginning. Jews are regarded by the factionist, as guests in Moldova who in order to become Romanian citizens must undergo a process of assimilation, "a patriotic internship to learn how to live like us" then, and only then discussions on the possibility of granting them political rights are to follow[35].

How can the factionist attitude towards the Jewish element be explained? A simplistic answer would focus singularly on the economic aspect. However, there are advisory opinions like that of anthropologist Vintila Mihailescu who considers that this sentiment can be translated through the Romanian's need to build their national identity. The lack of pre-modern identity construction among others is replaced by "the ideological weapon" of hating the "intruder", the foreign element in its attempt to preserve the cohesion of the native population. Things are even more acute in rural areas. If the city allows an uprooted individual, Romanian village retains the need for the "old man" and of the linear descent. In this landscape, there are the Jews who tend to play the role of the "ancient people" by intruding into the economic sphere[36].

The "foreign exploiter" element is even more acute on a micro level. With the political empowerment of the rural population, the human mass that political demagogy could have called increased. And in times of crisis, neither left nor right, make any exception in bringing to light xenophobic sentiments which are subsequently perverted in arguments for noble purposes[37].

6. Conclusions

The Free and independent faction from Iasi or the "group of teachers" as it was called at the time was a unique presence on the stage of Romanian politics. This was partly due to

[31] Alexandru Gheoghiu to Petru Poni, January 17, 1868; in DJANI, *Fond Familial „Poni*", Documente „Petru Poni", doc. no. 467.
[32] Alexandru Gheorghiu to Petru Poni, May 9, 1868, doc. no. 470.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Dreptatea*, Iaşi, year I, no. 19, July 6, 1867.
[35] *Tribuna Română,* Iaşi, year VIII, no. 255, August 11, 1866.
[36] Vintilă Mihăilescu, *Nationalite et nationalism en Roumanie,* in „Terrain 17-revue d'etudes ethnologique", Paris, October 1991, pp. 79-82. The quoted article does not refer specifically to the factionist group but to the Romania anti-Semitism of the era as a whole.
[37] *Ibid*, pp. 82-84.

the ideology promoted by them. Anti-dynastic and anti-Semites, but at the same time unionists, the factionists always affirmed their individuality.

In the absence of memoirs from our main actors, our analysis was based on a series of factionist papers that appeared over time. Tribuna Română", „Dreptatea", „Uniunea Liberală" or „Mişcarea Naţională" helps us enter their ideological universe.

Justifying or affirming it, the factionists did not hide behind some kind paper articles. They want to be accepted, noticed, they wanted to accede and to maintain power. Their own ideology is one of their strongest weapons, a weapon they did not hesitate to use.

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INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSABILITY: SOCIAL INTERVENTION OF THE STATE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: At the end of the fourth decade of the twentieth century, the United States and Western Europe, has developed a new concept - the welfare state - around which they created a rich and extensive literature outlining thus a way of state intervention in producing social welfare. The term welfare state is associated frequently with the modern state interventionism in market economy that focuses on healthcare, better education, labor market regulations and social security. Since the emergence of the welfare state came about a new concept, globalization has been evolved and deals with the intensification of cross border social transactions. Some empirical studies demonstrate a negative relationship between globalization and the welfare state, while others show adverse findings or a non-significant relationship. Some even accuse that the welfare state bankruptcy explanation lies in maintaining and alleviating the phenomenon of poverty. So in this article we intend to debate the usefulness of the welfare state and its ability to meet the needs of society in a globalized world.

Keywords: ***globalization, welfare state, social intervention, social policy, poverty.***

La sfârșitul deceniului al patrulea al secolului XX, în Statele Unite ale Americii și în Europa de Vest, s-a dezvoltat un concept nou – *statul bunăstării* - în jurul căruia s-a creat și extins o bogată literatură, conturându-se astfel o modalitate de intervenție a statului în producerea bunăstării sociale. Termenul de stat al bunăstării este asociat, în mod frecvent, cu statul modern intervenționist cu economie de piață care se focalizează pe îngrijirea sănătății, creșterea nivelului de educație, reglarea pieței muncii și securitatea socială.

De aceea, specialiștii din domeniul științelor socio-politice, vorbesc de o dualitate a conceptului, acesta referindu-se la multitudinea de componente ce îl definește; astfel că, discutam despre componenta politică (manifestarea unei comunități politice), componenta socială (expresia solidarității sociale) și nu în ultimul rând, componenta economică (încurajarea creșterii economice cu scopul de a favoriza bunăstarea economică și de a elimina sărăcia).

Termenul de *stat al bunăstării* a fost consacrat în literatura de specialitate odată cu publicarea *raportului Beveridge*, în anul 1942[1]. Într-un context internaţional în care rănile războiului mondial se resimţeau, raportul a supus atenţiei problema bunăstării preponderent din punct de vedere economic. A fost reafirmată credinţa în ocuparea forţei de muncă ca sursă a unui nivel decent de trai, fără a neglija implicarea individuală.

Statul bunăstării sociale se generalizează la scară mondială după anul 1945, schimbându-şi natura şi funcţia. În timp ce în perioada postbelică scopul lui era acela de asistenţă, de reechilibrare a disfuncţionalităţilor sociale şi de canalizare a luptelor de clasă, noua concepţie despre rolul statului marchează o ruptură cu epoca în care se considera că progresul economic se poate realiza numai cu sacrificarea progresului social. În sfârşit, are întâietate ideea potrivit căreia chestiunea socială este un tot care nu se divide iar statul este

[1] Stănescu, S., *Statul bunăstării între supravieţuire, reformă şi integrare europeană*, Editura Pro Universitaria, Bucureşti, 2013, p. 16.

obligat să protejeze cetăţenii prin organizarea transferurilor sociale. Bunăstarea devine deci un factor important al statelor în secolul XX, fapt care a determinat ca dintr-o activitate informală, nestructurată, dirijată de organizaţii ne-statale (biserică, de caritate), securitatea socială să devină un sistem statal. Această schimbare majoră a avut loc în direcţiile:[2]

1. Etatizarea suportului social.
2. Ajutor acordat nu prin bunăvoinţa unei persoane sau instituţii, ci ca un drept reprezentat de lege.
3. Ajutorul este lărgit prin includerea unui complex sistem de asigurări.
4. Asigurările sociale şi ajutorul social sunt acordate din fonduri de stat, care, în general, sunt colectate obligatoriu, pe diferite căi, de la populaţie.
5. Iniţiativele private şi comunitare nu sunt excluse, SUA fiind un exemplu elocvent în acest sens.

Câteva abordări teoretice principale sugerează un rol diferit al statului şi o situaţie în urma căreia acesta ar trebui să intervină în economie; aceste teze au un impact direct asupra modului în care problemele sărăciei, impozitarea, redistribuirea, reglementarea şi producţia publică sunt percepute. Astfel, statul bunăstării apare ca un produs al nevoilor survenite ca urmare a dezvoltării societăților industriale. Conform *tezei industrialiste,* statul bunăstării sociale este atât suma noilor nevoi, cât și al noilor resurse generate de procesul industrializării.

Statul bunăstării este rezultatul mobilizării politice eficiente în atingerea deplinei cetățenii sub procesul industrializării. Conform *abordării moderniste*, statul bunăstării este o parte a unui sistem complex specific societății moderne. Procesul modernizării a fost și unul al expansiunii drepturilor cetățenești.

Statul bunăstării este văzut și ca un produs al mobilizării politice și industriale, incluzând succesele repurtate de proiectele social-democrate în transformarea graduală a capitalismului. Dezvoltarea statului bunăstării a instituționalizat practic *succesul politicilor social-democrate.*

Și nu în ultimul rând, statul bunăstării este perceput o formă particulară de *stat capitalist* dezvoltat. Funcționarea și conducerea acestui tip de stat constituie o parte componentă a sistemului capitalist, care este în primul rând preocupat de menținerea și reproducerea relațiilor sociale capitaliste.

Referitor la cel de-al doilea concept cheie al lucrării noastre, *globalizarea*, este definită în primul rând ca *intensificarea relațiilor sociale la nivel mondial, intensificare care leagă localități îndepărtate în asemenea mod încât evenimentele locale sunt modelate de evenimentele care se petrec la mare distanță și invers*[3].

Procesul globalizării nu este unul de la care statele se pot eschiva, din moment ce orice țară are ca interes atragerea de capital potențial, în special sub forma investițiilor directe. Din punct de vedere teoretic, globalizarea oferă cheia spre progres, fiind echivalentă cu transparența, standarde înalte ale calității vieții, protecția mediului, ș.a.m.d. Însă tot în contextul acesta apar și o serie de probleme care nu pot fi evitate atunci când e vorba de

[2] Deme, C., "Rolul politicilor sociale în statul bunăstării" în *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences,* nr. 16, 2006, p. 40.
[3] Giddens, A., *Consecințele modernității,* Editura Univers, București, 2000, p. 64.

efectele produse de problemele globale. Sunt deja de neneglijat procesele de fragmentare şi slăbire a coeziunii sociale în multe zone ale globului.

Tot mai mulţi specialişti aduc în discuţie sindromul *statului slab* care suferă de fragilitate instituţională şi anomii sociale. De aici, cele mai multe dintre analizele dedicate procesului de globalizare gravitează, în esenţă *provocării mileniului* – nevoia de a diminua decalajele de dezvoltare socio-economică dintre state, prin suprimarea dezavantajelor suportate aproape sistematic de ţările mediu sau slab dezvoltate, în cadrul relaţiilor economice pe care acestea le întreprind cu ţările dezvoltate. Aceste dezavantaje contribuie efectiv nu numai la menţinerea, dar şi la adâncirea polarizării economice a naţiunilor şi a situaţiei economico-sociale a populaţiei în interiorul fiecărei naţiuni.[4]

În acelaşi timp, pe măsură ce procesul de globalizare avansează, accesul la informaţie devine mai larg, iar populaţia care trăieşte în sărăcie devine mai conştientă de inegalităţile existente, fapt ce poate duce la iniţierea unor mişcări sociale de avengură.

În această poziţie dificilă găsim *statul bunăstării* în zilele noastre, pe de o parte trebuie să răspundă nevoilor cetăţenilor, pe de altă parte trebuie să acţioneze în funcţie de volatilitatea sistemului economico-global în care se află.

Statele bunăstării occidentale îşi ghidează ideologia în funcţie de trei dimensiuni ale protecţiei sociale: reducerea sărăciei, protecţia în faţa riscurilor imposibil de asigurat pe piaţa muncii şi recompensarea pe termen lung a participării pe pieţele muncii. Însă, în ambele sale variante principale (modelul rezidual[5] şi modelul redistributiv[6]) statul bunăstării a consumat resurse uriaşe, fără a ajunge la rezultate notabile în ceea ce priveşte eradicarea sărăciei şi eliminarea decalajelor.

La nivel intern s-a încurajat dezvoltarea unei birocraţii tentaculare, interesată mai mult de propria menţinere şi dezvoltare decât de efectele asupra grupurilor-ţintă, decât de problemele reale ale săracilor şi de căile cele mai eficace de a-i sprijini.

Explicaţia menţinerii sărăciei în societăţile contemporane rezidă, în această optică, în *falimentul statului bunăstării*, faliment datorat, în principal, proastei administrări. Administrarea ineficientă se reflectă pe două planuri: *relaţiile cu grupurile-ţintă* şi e*ficienţa consumării* resurselor. În ceea ce priveşte relaţiile cu grupurile-ţintă proasta administrare se remarcă printr-o dezumanizare accentuată şi indiferenţă faţă de nevoile acestor grupuri. Cât despre cheltuirea resurselor, instituţiile statului bunăstării acţionează după *legea numărului magic*, diagnosticată ca maladie a organizaţiilor birocratice de către Amitai Etzioni.[7] Potrivit acestei legi, birocraţiile îşi ghidează activitatea în direcţia îndeplinirii unor obiective formale, operaţionalizate, cuantificate. De cele mai multe ori, adevăratele obiective (obiectivele oficiale) sunt uitate sau trecute pe planul doi, obiectivele operaţionale devenind scop în sine.

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[4] Stanciu, M., "Politici sociale şi globalizare în ţările europene" în *Revista Calitatea Vieţii*, XVIII, nr. 1-2, 2007, p. 138.

[5] *Modelul rezidualist* (Richard Titmuss, 1974) - în care ideea centrală este aceea că statul trebuie să intervină temporar pentru asigurarea protecţiei sociale a cetăţenilor doar în cazul în care veniturile primare ale populaţiei, obţinute prin mecanismele pieţei, ar fi afectate.

[6] *Modelul redistributiv* (Richard Titmuss, 1974) în care "instituţia" bunăstării sociale reprezintă o parte integrantă a societăţii, iar scopul acesteia este de a asigura servicii sociale pe principii universaliste şi în funcţie de necesităţi

[7] Livadă-Cadeschi, L. (coord.), *Sărăcie şi asistenţă socială în spaţiul românesc (sec. XVIII-XX)*, Editura Colegiul Noua Europă, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 100.

Astfel, birocrațiile își consumă resursele, timpul și energia pentru a respecta anumite proceduri formale, pentru a elabora regulamente, pentru a realiza indicatori exprimați numeric care, deși încearcă să exprime îndeplinirea obiectivelor oficiale, nu fac decât să îndepărteze organizația de ele. De exemplu, instituțiile de protecție socială își vor justifica cheltuielile prin numărul de beneficii acordate, prin numărul de dosare prelucrate – fără să se preocupe de rezultatul real, de efectele asupra grupului-țintă, de atingerea obiectivului oficial (reducerea sărăciei).

Pe de altă parte, aceste fonduri publice pot fi folosite discreționar de către actorii cu putere de decizie. Ele pot fi redistribuite către diverse categorii sociale pe criterii netransparente și inechitabile, de aceea aceste mecanisme pot fi folosite de către decidenții politici în scopul maximizării suportului electoral și nu în scopul creșterii bunăstării generale.

Posibilitatea apariției fraudei este facilitată și de nivelul ridicat al standardelor de eligibilitate. Cei aflați în situații care necesită realmente intervenția publică, prin programele de asistența socială, nu dețin suficiente informații și resurse pentru a-și demonstra nevoia și pentru a-și reclama drepturile, pe când cei care dețin mai multe informații pot să obțină, prin influență și corupție, drepturi care nu li se cuvin.

Împotriva acestei situații, în ultimul deceniu, mai ales, s-au afirmat curente de opinie favorabile reformei radicale a statului-bunăstării. Una din principalele direcții ale reformei ar fi *reforma administrării (managementului) programelor anti-sărăcie*. S-au încercat abordări mai noi, precum teoria relațiilor umane, managementul prin indicatorii de performanță, managementul calității totale și mai ales noul management public. Aplicarea acestor abordări în administrarea programelor anti-sărăcie se reflectă pe cele două planuri menționate mai sus: relațiile cu grupurile-țintă și eficiența consumării resurselor.

Se speră să se ajungă astfel la o umanizare a birocrației, paralel cu o mai eficientă cheltuire a banilor publici. Pentru creșterea eficienței în acest domeniu se preconizează aplicarea mecanismelor pieței libere în acest sector, situat în mod tradițional în afara economiei de piață: privatizare, dezetatizare, competiție între programe, contractare, organizarea activității după modelul serviciilor de piață, pe baza relației furnizor de servicii-client, etc.

La nivel internațional, impactul globalizării asupra celor săraci a constituit tema centrală de dezbatere în marile foruri internaționale, a căror statele bunăstării generale occidentale sunt membre (Organizația Națiunilor Unite – Programul Națiunilor Unite pentru Dezvoltare, Banca Mondială, Fondul Monetar Internațional, ș.a.m.d. Pentru a-i putea face față acestei situații este important de studiat nu atât efectul ca atare, cat mai ales cauzele acesteia, iar aceste cauze nu-și au originea în partea teoretică a globalizării, în conceptul în sine, ci în modul de aplicare, dat fiind că acest fenomen se produce la nivel macro și ca urmare, deciziile nu sunt luate de fiecare individ în parte, ci se iau la nivel statal și suprastatal.

Glasul societății civile reclamă că, globalizarea, așa cum se face ea acum, nu furnizează bunăstarea generală promisă. Se susține că procesul de globalizare a căpătat o forță proprie și că statele bunăstării au devenit mai slabe și mai puțin capabile să îndeplinească obligațiile sociale tradiționale. În plus, statale se găsesc și în dificultatea de a îndeplini îndatoriri necesare capitalului internațional, cum ar fi: asigurarea ordinii sociale, lupta contra criminalității, asigurarea păcii, din moment ce granițele au devenit mai permeabile. Printre

alte efecte negative atribuite globalizării amintim și dispariția politicii ca instanță de sine-stătătoare și absorbirea sa în economic, legea economică transformându-se *ipso facto* în legea politicii. Mishra R. susținea că *asigurând capital prin opțiune externă, globalizarea a făcut mai puternică forța capitalului decât cea a guvernului*[8]. Impactul instabilității economice datorat importurilor mai ieftine din țările industrializate în cele rămase în urmă, în condițiile liberalizării piețelor, dezordinile financiare ca urmare a activităților speculative, sau concedierile masive de personal, consecință a fuziunilor marilor corporații industriale, sunt alte consecințe ale fenomenului globalizării.

Concluzii

Globalizarea este un fenomen dinamic care produce deopotrivă oportunități și amenințări la adresa statelor bunăstării sociale. Globalizarea creează un surplus de bogăție la nivel mondial care ar putea fi utilizat atât în direcția reducerii inegalităților și a creșterii coeziunii sociale, cât și pentru corectarea propriilor deficiențe. În același timp, globalizarea produce însă și sărăcie, șomaj și excluziune socială. De asemenea, globalizarea împreună cu schimbările tehnologice frecvente, mutațiile demografice etc. ridică probleme de finanțare ale politicilor sociale ale statului bunăstării.

Sursa sărăciei în lumea contemporană este, în această viziune, distribuția inechitabilă a resurselor și a accesului la diferitele resurse. Din această cauză, unii sunt avantajați iar alții sunt dezavantajați. Problema sărăciei este localizată în aparatul politic, care nu poate sau nu vrea o distribuție echitabilă a resurselor. Conceptul-cheie este acela de *discriminare* iar soluția este realocarea resurselor, pe fundamente anti-discriminatorii. Principalul instrument, în această perspectivă, este reforma politicilor și a legislației, reformă bazată pe măsuri anti-discriminatorii, inclusiv pe discriminarea pozitivă.

Statele bunăstării sociale se află astfel în fața unei adevărate dileme privind modalitățile de elaborare și implementare a politicilor lor sociale. Modelele bunăstării sociale intră în contradicție cu logica fundamentalismului de piață. În timp ce dezvoltarea economică nu mai constituie apanajul politicilor economice naționale, problemele sociale ocupă încă un loc fruntaș pe lista de priorități a statelor naționale. În ciuda faptului că statul are mai puține funcții în era globalizării, acesta rămâne un actor socio-politic și economic de prim rang care trebuie să-și asume în continuare responsabilitatea creării și furnizării bunăstării sociale la nivel național.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: This paper is made and published under the aegis of the Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy as a part of programme co-funded by the European Union within the Operational Sectorial Programme for Human Resources Development through the project for Pluri and interdisciplinary in doctoral and post-doctoral programmes Project Code: POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086

[8] Mishra R. *apud.* Cace, S., *Statul bunăstării: evoluţii şi tendinţe*, Editura Expert, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 176.

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THE HYBRIDIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY WAR

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Abstract: At the beginning of the 21st century we are witnessing some dramatic shifts in the character of the war, in combat, organization, and forces deployment. While current doctrines try to separate conflicts within two distinct categories – conventional versus irregular, there are, however, a series of contemporary conflicts that challenge this western view on war showing that the disjunctive manner of classification in „big and conventional" versus „small and irregular" is limited and simplistic. The military strategist confirm that we are assisting to a hybridization of warfare. This article aims to identify the main shifts in war evolution in the new international context. The objective of such an approach is to contribute to an understanding of the wars that continue today to defy international peace, understanding the forces that determine the new combatants to prefer certain fighting strategies and to help shape a picture of the future war.

Keywords: ***hybrid warfare, conventional, irregular,combatant, non-state actors***

Introducere

Am devenit, în secolul XXI, martorii unor mutaţii în maniera de luptă, de organizare, de desfăşurare a forţelor. În timp ce doctrinele curente încearcă să separe conflictele în două categorii clare – convenţionale versus neregulate există, totuşi, conflicte contemporane care contestă această concepţie occidentală despre război demonstrând că maniera disjunctivă de clasificare în „mari şi convenţionale" versus „mici şi neregulate" este limitată, simplistă şi contraproductivă. Acest articol îşi propune să identifice mutaţiile suferite de război în noul context internaţional, obiectivul unui asemenea demers fiind acela de a contribui la înţelegerea caracterului războaielor ce continuă astăzi să sfideze pacea internaţională, înţelegerea forţelor ce îi determină pe noii combatanţi să prefere anumite strategii de luptă şi de a contribui la conturarea unui tablou al războiului viitor.

Atunci când un război ia sfârşit, strategii militari obişnuiesc să se întrebe cum va arăta următorul război, ce formă va lua şi cum va lupta următorul inamic. Acelaşi lucru s-a întâmplat la încheierea confruntării bipolare dintre SUA şi URSS. În absenţa unei confruntări militare directe, superputerile Războiului Rece s-au ciocnit în numerose rânduri într-o serie de războaie proxy, prin intermediul aliaţilor şi a sateliţilor proprii. Chiar dacă timp de aproape cinci decenii, lumea nu a fost martorul unui conflict militar direct, aceasta a fost o epocă a militarizării intense, a investiţiilor majore în sectorul militar, a înarmării masive, a dezvoltării arsenalului nuclear, a competiţiei pentru supremaţie globală. Odată cu sfârşitul Războiului Rece, a devenit de necontestat superioritatea militară a Statelor Unite, marele câştigător în competiţia pentru supremaţia globală. Nu mai exista inamic apt să facă faţă unui atac convenţional din partea armatei americane, cea mai puternică armată a lumii. Primul război din Irak nu a făcut decât să confirme acest lucru, respectând toate rigorile unei lupte convenţionale executate ca după manual. Cu toate acestea, manualul avea să-şi demonstreze foarte curând limitele, incapabil să prezică o serie de conflicte militare ce nu se încadrau în tiparele războiului convenţional. Războiul din Bosnia, intervenţia militară din Mogadishu,

războiul din Kosovo, atacurile teroriste ce au lovit SUA pe teritoriul propriu şi Războiul Global împotriva Terorii declanşat ca un răspuns – toate aceste evenimente au contestat gândirea tradiţională în domeniul militar şi au chestionat maniera de înţelegere a războiului în noul context post-Război Rece.

Trăim astăzi într-o „nouă normalitate" şi acest lucru a devenit evident mai ales după atacurile teroriste din 2001. Securitatea internaţională este ameninţată de grupări teroriste şi de criminalitate organizată, de statele slabe sau eşuate incapabile să le asigure propriilor cetăţeni nevoile de bază, de absenţa sau caracterul limitat al resurselor vitale. Conceptul de suveranitate naţională este ţinta unor atacuri fără precedent, discutându-se despre intrarea într-o epocă post-westphalică, avansul tehnologic în domeniul comunicaţiilor, transportului şi a reţelelor globale continuă să facă graniţele tot mai transparente, economiile – mai interconectate, iar accesul la informaţii – posibil într-o manieră fără precedent. Aceste efecte negative ale globalizării contribuie la creşterea instabilităţii regionale[1] şi la izbucnirea unor conflicte sângeroase. Toate aceste schimbări generează mutaţii semnificative în evoluţia războiului.

1.Războiul hibrid

„I think the nation-state and conventional war is in a state of hibernation. I don't think it's gone away, but the most likely threats probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state"

Marine Gen. James Mattis

În perioada Războiului Rece a predominat o manieră de înţelegere a războiului marcată de două categorii intelectuale generice – conflictul convenţional (de mare intensitate) şi conflictul neconvenţional (de joasă intensitate). Majoritatea reprezentanţilor studiilor strategice gândeau şi analizau activitatea militară în termeni total opuşi – convenţional şi interstatal versus neconvenţional şi intrastatal. Din păcate, spectrul conflictului emergent la începutul secolului XXI a demonstrat mai curând o contopire a acestor categorii, evidenţiind caracterul multidimensional şi interacţiunea fără precedent. Odată cu intrarea într-o nouă epocă, post-Război Rece, s-a putut observa o manifestare cameleonică a războiului, luând forme interstatale, transstatale, nonstatale sau, în cele mai frecvente cazuri, o combinaţie de forme.

O serie de strategi militari, foşti luptători sau comandanţi de trupe (în special din cadrul Marine Corps), participanţi activi în misiuni dificile ale armatei americane au identificat în istoria recentă, post-Război Rece, misiuni atipice, ce nu puteau fi înţelese prin utilizarea limbajului militar tradiţional. Intervenţiile din Mogadishu, Kosovo, Fallouja, Afganistan, războiul dintre Hezbollah şi Israel din 2006 prezintă caracteristici greu de explicat de manualele militare. Aceşti autori au încercat să surprindă mutaţiile suferite de război în epoca post-Război Rece optând pentru utilizarea unui concept ce a început să se bucure de succes şi să se regăsească atât în discursurile oficialilor, cât şi într-o serie de documente oficiale şi strategii militare (americane, britanice, australiene). Recunoscând estomparea semnificativă a

[1] Eric Olson, „A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare" în *Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective Observations, Insights and Lessons*, Newsletter 11-34, Center for Army Lessons Learned. Supporting the Warfighter, June: 3-7, 2011, p.3

diferenţelor dintre conflictele interstatale şi cele intrastatale, dintre combatanţi şi civili, dintre pace şi război, experţi militari precum Frank Hoffman sau James Mattis dezvoltă conceptul de „război hibrid" pentru a descrie evoluţia post-Război Rece. Plecând de la recunoaşterea caracterului complex al ameninţărilor la adresa securităţii internaţionale, ameninţări determinate sau favorizate de globalizare, proliferarea armamentului şi a tehnologiei, extremismul transnaţional violent dar şi resurecţia fostelor puteri rivale, Hoffman utilizează termenul de „convergenţă" pentru a descrie transformarea războiului – convergenţa fizicului cu psihologicul, combatantului cu noncombatantului, violenţei cu nation-building, abordărilor kinetice cu cele informaţionale[2]. În încercarea de a identifica reperele noului context internaţional şi impactul acestuia asupra armatei SUA, cei doi experţi consideră că neta superioritate convenţională a armatei americane determină alţi actori statali şi non-statali să părăsească acea logică militară tradiţională cu scopul identificării şi dezvoltării unor capabilităţi de nişă sau a unor combinaţii inovative de tactici şi tehnologii în vederea obţinerii avantajului[3]. Deşi războiul convenţional nu a dispărut din paleta de instrumente utilizate de actorii internaţionali, Mattis, cel care a condus forţele americane la Fallouja în 2004, declara „*I think the nation-state and conventional war is in a state of hibernation. I don't think it's gone away, but the most likely threats probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state*"[4]. Această afirmaţie pare să fie susţinută de ultimile evoluţii înregistrate de institutele de analiză a conflictelor. Spre exemplu, conform celui mai recent studiu HIIK – Conflict Barometer 2014, în ultimul an nu a fost înregistrat niciun război interstatal[5]. Şi dacă şansele antrenării într-un război convenţional, simetric sunt reduse, trebuie să ne aşteptăm să crească vizibilitatea provocărilor de natură neregulată – terorism, insurgenţă, război nerestricţionat, război de guerrilla sau acţiunile coercitive realizate de grupări narco-criminale[6]. Războaiele viitoare nu vor respecta acea distincţie clară între convenţional/neregulat, combatant/noncombatant. Viitorul adversar va alege din „meniul" existent, un mix de tactici şi instrumente care să-i permită să evite confruntarea directă în termenii noştri, după regulile noastre. Aşa cum susţine Hoffman, viitorul va fi marcat de războaie hibride în care statele şi actorii nonstatali vor utiliza în mod simultan mai multe tipuri de luptă – convenţionale, neregulate, teroriste, distrugatoare şi criminale cu scopul destabilizării ordinii existente. Evans, sintetizând noile tendinţe vedea cum „*symmetric and asymmetric wars merge and Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers*"[7]. Utilizate atât de state cât şi de actori non-statali, de unităţi separate sau chiar de acelaşi corp de luptă, războaiele hibride presupun apelul simultan la o combinaţie de capabilităţi convenţionale, tactici neregulate, atacuri teroriste şi elemente de criminalitate

[2] Frank G. Hoffman, „Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" în *JFQ* 52 (1st quarter), 2009, p. 34
[3] James Mattis, Frank Hoffman, „Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars" în *Proceedings Magazine*, U.S. Naval Institute, Issue November (132/11/1,233), 2005, p. 1
[4] Julian Barnes, Peter Spiegel, „A Pentagon Battle Over ‚The Next War'. Some resist Gates' focus on guerrilla, not large-scale fighting" în *Los Angeles Times*, July 21, 2008.
[5] Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. *Conflict Barometer 2014*. 23, p. 16, Disponibil pe http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/, accesat la 30.04.2015
[6] James Mattis, Frank Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 1
[7] Michael Evans, „From Kadesh to Kandahar: Theory and the Future of War", in *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003, p. 140

organizată cu scopul obţinerii unui efect sinergic[8]. Termenul hibrid se aplică atât la nivel organizaţional (unde putem regăsi, simultan, o structură politică ierarhică şi celule descentralizate sau reţele de unităţi tactice), cât şi la nivelul mijloacelor utilizate. Adversarii hibrizi vor exploata accesul la capabilităţile militare moderne şi sofisticate, combinând letalitatea conflictului statal cu fanatismul războaielor neregulate[9]. Astfel, viitorul nu implică neapărat creşterea numărului de ameninţări ci convergenţa celor existente într-o formă hibridă de război. Cea mai importantă mutaţie în caracterul războiului implică estomparea graniţelor dintre diverse metode de luptă şi combinarea lor simultană.

Printre victimile atacurilor teroriste din 2001 se numără şi sentimentul de invulnerabilitate al SUA în acelaşi timp cu preferinţa occidentalilor pentru războaiele convenţionale. Aceasta a fost o lecţie pentru toată lumea – aliaţi sau inamici, actori statali sau non-statali. Succesul teroriştilor a reprezentat o dovadă a mutaţiilor în maniera de luptă evidenţiind necesitatea adaptării în noul context, adaptare conceptuală, strategică, operaţională. Încăpăţânarea de a persista în interiorul aceloraşi graniţe intelectuale şi instituţionale nu poate fi decât o soluţie perdantă în faţa potenţialului inamic ce nu suferă de handicapul nostru - rigiditatea intelectuală. Termenul de război hibrid descrie complexitatea crescândă a viitoarelor conflicte şi necesitatea unor forţe militare flexibile şi capabile să se adapteze cu uşurinţă. Combatanţii de azi (statele mai ales) care vor să câştige războaiele hibride trebuie să înveţe să atingă un echilibru între capabilităţile convenţionale specifice Războiului Rece şi stilul de luptă specific războaielor de mici dimensiuni, neregulate. Trupele trebuie să fie pregătite să lupte şi, în acelaşi timp, să desfăşoare misiuni de peacekeeping, reconstrucţie, stabilitate, ajutor internaţional etc. Dacă inamicul acţionează multidimensional, asta trebuie să înveţe să facă şi armatele naţionale ale statelor ce urmăresc să-şi menţină poziţia în ierarhia militară şi să obţină victoria. Războaiele viitoare vor necesita unităţi flexibile, „*multi-purpose*" iar un rol esenţial îl vor avea liderii acestor unităţi care vor trebui să demonstreze o gândire inovativă şi o capacitate de adaptare sporită într-un mediu complex şi schimbător. Viitorii inamici nu vor adopta tactici demne de cei slabi şi nu se vor retrage în munţi. Dimpotrivă, ei vor alege "*tactics of the smart and agile, presenting greater reach and lethality. They may attempt to operate within heavily populated cities, and use the networks of an urban metropolis to maneuver within as well as to sustain themselves*"[10]. Aşa cum au demonstrat luptătorii Hezbollah în lupta împotriva mult mai puternicei armate israeliene în Liban, o serie de organizaţii jihadiste de mici dimensiuni sau trupele pro-ruse în estul Ukrainei mai recent, câteva celule extrem de disciplinate, bine pregătite şi bine distribuite pot contesta forţele convenţionale moderne prin utilizarea unui mix inovativ şi simultan de tactici de guerrilla cu tehnologii performante în interiorul centrelor urbane dens populate. Într-un studiu privind războaiele hibride, colonelul John McCuenn susţinea că pentru a câştiga această formă nouă de război, Occidentul trebuie să obţină victorii simultane pe trei terenuri de luptă – pe câmpul de luptă convenţional, prin intermediul operaţiunilor convenţionale gândite în vederea atingerii unor obiective pe termen lung, pe terenul reprezentat de populaţia

[8] Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, 2007, p.14
[9] Frank G. Hoffman (2009), *op.cit,* p. 38
[10] Frank G. Hoffman (2007), *op.cit.*, p. 43

indigenă din zona de conflict prin intermediul unor strategii de tipul „*clear, control and counter-organize*" şi pe câmpul de luptă reprezentat de populaţia proprie şi comunitatea internaţională prin intermediul unor acţiuni ce urmăresc să câştige şi menţină sprijinul şi legitimitatea războiului[11]. Concluziile expertului militar evidenţiază o trăsătură distinctivă a noilor războaie – luptele nu se dau doar fizic, pe un câmp de luptă clasic ci, poate chiar în aceeaşi măsură, în rândurile populaţiilor indigene, a populaţiei proprii şi a comunităţii internaţionale. Înţelegând acest lucru, vom reuşi să identificăm atât ameninţarea, cât şi soluţia. Prin acţiunile de „*clear, control and counter-organize*" implementate la nivelul populaţiei se pot preveni insurgenţele şi războaiele civile. În esenţă, aceste acţiuni urmăresc să asigure stabilitatea, să promoveze valorile locale, să identifice şi pregătească potenţiali lideri, să susţină dezvoltarea de tip bottom up, să protejeze populaţia autohtonă şi să contribuie la scăderea atractivităţii organizaţiilor insurgente oferind alternative[12].

Concluzii

Există o tendinţă ca la finalul unui război, experţii militari şi strategii să se întrebe - cum va fi următorul război. Va fi un război convenţional împotriva unei naţiuni modern industrializate sau va fi o campanie de contrainsurgenţă. Conform analiştilor, viitorul va fi undeva la mijloc. Apare un consens privind faptul că ar trebui să ne pregătim pentru războaie hibride în care să luptăm cu insurgenţi sau combatanţi neconvenţionali înarmaţi cu armament modern, sofisticat şi care dispun de tehnologii informaţionale moderne. Războiul hibrid, fără a fi o anomalie, va reprezenta o caracteristică esenţială a viitorului mediu de securitate. Deşi nu exclude posibilitatea izbucnirii unor războaie tradiţionale, convenţionale, simetrice, tendinţa de hibridizare a războiului va fi o provocare majoră pentru actorii internaţionali ai secolului XXI. Ignorarea acestei mutaţii şi concentrarea exclusivă pe dezvoltarea arsenalului convenţional nu poate fi decât o soluţie perdantă. Nicio armată statală nu a reuşit recent să obţină victoria împotriva unui inamic nonstatal, într-un război neconvenţional. Evoluţia războiului necesită creşterea gradului de flexibilitate şi adaptabilitate. Viitorii inamici nu vor lupta după regulile noastre, în războaiele alese de noi. Prima lecţie a istoriei militare – „*the enemy gets a vote*" – continuă să fie de actualitate şi trebuie să fie conştientizată astăzi de militarii ce speră să obţină victoria împotriva inamicului, aparent mai slab dar, în acelaşi timp, mai flexibil, inovativ, sofisticat şi determinat.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT: *Această lucrare a fost realizată în cadrul Proiectului POSDRU 159/1.5/S/133675 "Inovare şi dezvoltare în structura şi reprezentarea cunoaşterii prin burse doctorale şi postdoctorale (IDSRC – doc postdoc)", cofinanţat de Uniunea Europeană şi Guvernul României din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaţional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013*

[11] Col. John McCuen, „Hybrid Wars" în *Military Review*, March-April, 2008, p. 111
[12] Col. John McCuen, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112

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DISTORTING THE PAST AS A POLITICAL TOOL CASE STUDY: ALTERING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

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Abstract : In Romania's case as in the other soviet satellite states, in order for the new communist regime that took power in 1944 to hold it, history had to be rewritten and reinterpreted in such an order to make use for the current political goals the Government had. Large amounts of people were put to work for achieving the goal of altering the national identity to a more favorable one to the new power.
As in Orwell's 1984, remodeling the past was a basic method for creating an entire platform of criteria, standards and habits designed to motivate the actions in the immediate reality taken by the regime's leader. The consequences of staging mass forgetting by forging facts from the past were dire and are still noticeable today in the lack of adequate civic memory in the Romanian society.
This article is conducted on the relationship between the two main apparatuses used to stage mass forgetting (censorship and propaganda) and how their actions reflected in the collective mind. I am emphasizing here the distortion of historical facts such as the coming of Communists to power by force, imposed by the Soviets, were presented as a result of the will of the entire Romanian people; past events were reinterpreted in order to be useful to the communist doctrine. The "new man" should no longer have any connection with the adverse influences of the past. It is necessary for an imposed and artificial regime to stand the test of time it must blend into reality, to be justified by the past therefore to determine the future in an organic way. By doing this, any doubt about its might and its validity is removed.

Keywords: ***memory, communism, history, censorship, manipulation***

MOTTO : "Culture is the arena in which political struggle occurs in order to obtain identity and legitimacy"

- Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu

Introduction

In order to fulfill the Communization of the entire society, the new regime had to secure its long-term existence by justifying its legitimacy in a country such as Romania. Late '40 Romania wasn't the most fertile society, sociologically speaking, for the apparition of a strong communist movement. Given the strong religious nature of the country and a weak proletariat in conjunction with the majority of the nation being conservative small owner peasants, Romania was a better breeding ground for far right movements.[1]

In this paper I would like to demonstrate that controlling human communication is a fundamental mean of action for totalitarian regimes in remodeling human thought. The

[1] The most successful of the far-right political movements was the Iron Guard which promoted a nationalist anti-communist doctrine within a conservative Christian Orthodox faith. Its electoral scores and popular support surpasses the leftist movements of the time such as the Socialist Party of Romania or Romanian Social Democratic Party. The Romanian Communist Party, while outlawed for the greater part of the interwar era, had few members and promoted ideas that were deemed anti-romanian by the majority of the citizens.

analysis will focus on communist template of remodeling of the past in order to ensure its survival and authority, centering the Stalinist phase of Romanian communism spanning roughly between 1945 and 1958. The main methodology I will use will mix quantitative and qualitative research based upon archive materials from the former censorship institution[2], newspapers and textbooks from the aforementioned period.

Throughout my research I will rely upon history textbooks from the time, which especially became the expression of communist ideology and nationalism which promoted a mystic perception of history, being viewed as instruments of party ideology rather an independent social science. Also, in order to make a more complete research I will make use of scientific literature on the subject such as Robert Jay Lifton, Klaus Mehnert, Roger Markwick or Marc Ferro who have touched on the relationship between national identity and remodeling history. The historical revision of facts in order to make benefit to present day issues is a practice done by democratic and totalitarian societies alike, with different tools and expected results in mind however. In this short research I will focus on the totalitarian case with a strong accent on Romania's experience.

1. Changing History in Totalitarian Regimes

It is a well known fact that regardless of the nature of regime we are putting into question, democratic or totalitarian, some ideas and/or actions could be seen as dangerous for the status quo.[3] This is especially the case for oppressive regimes where censorship and propaganda are vital tools in maintaining political power and legitimacy.

In what is perhaps one of the best books ever written about manipulation Robert Lifton states that *whatever its setting, thought reform consists of two basic elements: confession, the exposure and renunciation or past and present "evil"; and re-education, the remaking of a man in the Communist image. These elements are closely related and overlapping, since they both bring into play a series of pressures and appeals- intellectual, emotional, and physical- aimed at social control and individual change.*[4]

Ideology involves both a philosophy of history and usually some sense of teleology, an assumption that history is working towards a certain goal or in a certain direction. This relation between history and ideology can be seen as an action program that provides guidelines about how people should act.[5]

Any truly revolutionary change will involve the substantial reworking of the cultural sphere. The new structures of power that these norms represent become embedded in the patterns of action and the webs of relationships that develop in the society, and they are reinforced by the daily interactions which are structured by these norms and which give

[2] General Direction of Press and Prints/Committee for Press and Prints (1949-1975/1975-1977)
[3] Marc Ferro, *The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught to Children*, Routledge, New York, 2003, p. 12
[4] Robert Jay Lifton Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1989, p. 5
[5] Klaus Mehnert, *Stalin Versus Marx: the Stalinist historical doctrine*, Port Washington Kennikat Press, New York, 1972, p. 81

concrete realization to their essence.[6] This principle applies best to totalitarian regimes regardless of which place they situate themselves on the political spectrum.

This so-called "Stalinist civilization" has been seen as emanating from the dramatic social changes imposed upon Soviet society from the end of the 1920s with the introduction of rapid industrialization, forces-paced agricultural collectivization and through discursive domination principally through the involvement of the population in a process of participatory totalitarianism.[7]

The totalitarian regime invents a new vocabulary, giving well-known words special new meanings, making them into trite clichés. The clichés become "ultimate terms", either "god terms", representative of ultimate good, or "devil terms", representative of ultimate evil. Totalitarian language, then, is repetitiously centered on all-encompassing jargon, prematurely abstract, highly categorical, relentlessly judging, and to anyone but its most devoted advocate, deadly dull: the language of non-thought.[8]

The soviet historiography that served as an example for all the satellite states after the Second World War ended has been influenced by Marxism. Marxism believes that the moving forces of history are determined by material production and the rise of different socioeconomic formations. Applying this perspective to socioeconomic formations such as slavery and feudalism is a major methodological principle of Marxist historiography.[9] Based on this principle, historiography predicts that history there will be an abolition of capitalism by a socialist revolution made by the working-class. Soviet historians believed that Marxist–Leninist theory allows for applying categories of dialectical and historical materialism for studying historical events.[10]

The materialist or dialectic basis of history does not normally have a place in the discussion of policy alternatives. The discussion of policy and the interaction between regime and society must be structured in terms consistent with the ideology. All the successes of the Soviet Union, from the 1917 revolution to the construction of socialism, were attributed to Stalin's leadership. *He was keeping the locomotive of history on the socialist rails* as a saying of the time stated.[11]

2. **Rewriting History in Communist Romania**

The early years of communism accounted for the postwar Romanian culture extensive and profound changes, bearing the generic term of "*cultural revolution*". Both the traditional structure of the scientific community of the historians, and the modern historiographical Romanian rhetoric, shaped in the last eighty years starting with Xenopol and Iorga was radically reconfigured in just a few years.[12] Given that even an ailing authentic prewar

[6] Gill Graeme, *Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 2
[7] Graeme, *Op. cit.*
[8] Lifton, *Op. cit.*, p. 429
[9] Roger Markwick, Donald Raleigh, *Rewriting History in Soviet Russia: The Politics of Revivionist Historiography*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 133
[10] Markwick, Raleigh, *Op. cit.*
[11] Mehnert, *Op. cit.*, p. 89
[12] Andrei Mihalache, „Ideologie şi politică în istoriografia română (1948-1965)" în Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A.D. Xenopol", XXXVI, 1999, p. 37

Marxist "tradition" was missing from the cultural sphere, the Bucharest political elite embraced the Soviet cultural model, in a first phase at least, without hesitation. Historical science, like other "*politically sensitive*" social sciences and humanities, was thus entirely subordinated to the political interests of the Party. [13]

As the communist power grew, aided by the Soviet Red Army and commissars, the Romanian culture entered a new phase in its history. The entire spiritual tradition of the country will be reconsidered radically by means of the communist ideology and the soviet proletcultist practice; the new "cultural production" will be tailored by Kremlin tenets. The soviet cultural model which broke through along with the Red Army has set up a destructive trend that had a great impact on the national identity in the first decade at least. Romanians never had a fidelity tradition towards the Soviet Union or Russia for that matter; this problem had to be dealt with for a long-term solution as the same thing was true for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary or the Baltic states. This was to be done by censoring press, stopping access to traditions, printing in large numbers of soviet books and Russian authors, reorganizing education, changing the teachers who had an anti-communist stance in the past, establishing various soviet cultural institutions (such as joint museums, magazines, theatres etc.), statues and monuments depicting soviet personalities, making Russian language a mandatory school discipline or controlling/banning some religious cults.

On the other hand, given the fact that the political system itself had an indisputable ideological nature, relying on a questionless philosophy and a certain vision of the past which had to justify its existence, further increased the ideological aspect of the historical discourse. Its most extreme form was established and took form in the sole and mandatory history textbook "The history of the People's Republic of Romania" in its various editions that have followed between 1947 and 1956.[14]

History was based on directives from Moscow, diverting it accordingly. Everything that had to do with Romania's pre-communist past had to be reconsidered and truncated. Topics such as the role of the masses and elites in Romania's past were reinterpreted on Marxist terms; events that took place in ancient and medieval times were linked to communist dogma. Issues like the Royalist period, the role of the communist party and the events of 23rd of August 1944 due to the fact that were much closer, chronologically speaking, to the communist establishment was altered the most both by censorship and propaganda. Using history books as propaganda tools through which facts and events were manipulated or falsified was a common sight until the fall of the regime.

Once the "*peoples democratic*" regime was officially institutionalized after the 30 December 1947, it did not take long until historical research suffered a radical change as a whole, in the image of the Soviet Union experience. This radical change was accomplished through two complementary mechanisms that functioned interrelated and were coordinated simultaneously by the political power: first of all reorganizing the universities, academic and research centers and by giving a more ideological tone of the historical research. This was

[13] Gabriel Catalan, "Istoriografia română sub impactul modelului sovietic 1947-1955" în *Intelectualii şi regimul comunist: istoriile unei relaţii. Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România*, vol. IV, Ed. Polirom, 2009, p. 60

[14] Florin Muller, *Politică şi istoriografie în România, 1948 – 1964*, Editura Nereamia Napocae, Cluj Napoca, 2003, p. 19

part of totalitarian political prerequisite of restructuring the human condition by subordinating and controlling people's conscience.

After the 175 decree of the 2nd of August 1948 issued by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the RPR, eliminated the vast majority of scholars, renowned university historians were substituted by secondary school teachers and intellectuals, activists, and the faculties of Letters and Philosophy were dismantled into other faculties.

Mihai Roller's mission mainly concerned with giving higher education a more ideological tone and controlling universities by political means.[15] Thus, at the 15th of May 1948 meeting of the Propaganda and Agitation Department Office, he stated: "*We must introduce the study of Marxism-Leninism in universities. This problem must be radically solved. The country's highest science and culture forum will not be as it was in bourgeois-landowning regime, a feudal caste, limited and isolated from the masses and the people's needs, but an alive and active factor in the development of our science and culture. The Academy of the Peoples Republic of Romania needs to unite theory with practice. [...] By creating six departments in different branches of science, one should not forget that there is a branch of science that all those working in the scientific realm need to know, regardless of their specialty. That is the Marxist-Leninist science on society, the science of laws that develop a society, the science of the development of the proletarian revolution, laws about developing socialist construction, the victory of communism."*[16]

In light of the positions Mihail Roller held and the commissions that's he received from Party, he practically held control of the entire historiography during 1948 and 1955. His speech became the norm of expression, setting limits on what would be the new Romanian historiography.

The aim was to eradicate traditional Romanian values and consciousness and to replace them with propaganda themes that expressed the new power's vision. Among them we can include:

- the exaltation of the U.S.S.R. and Stalin and an exaggerated and extended vision on Tsarist Russia and the Slavic migrations (Roller says study Marxism-Leninism leads to "*the appropriation of the most advanced culture in the world – the Soviet culture*[17]");
- condemning other external factors, especially if they are Western inspired, starting with ancient Rome, France, the United Kingdom;
- condemning old ruling class – the boyars were called "traitors" in favor of the Ottomans and the bourgeoisie (which was deemed as "*cosmopolitan*", "*submissive to imperialist capitalists*" etc.)
- minimizing the role of historical personalities Romanian, shifting the historical concept that focused on the role the elites had in making history in the favor to the masses

[15] Florin Constantiniu, *De la Răutu şi Roller la Muşat şi Ardeleanu*, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 102
[16] Mihalache, *Op. cit.* p. 39
[17] *Ibidem*

- the characterization of Romania's participation in World War I as an "*imperialist action*", thus condemning the occupation of Bessarabia and intervention in Béla Kun's ruled Hungary etc.

All these theses regarding Romania's past were developed by activists from the Propaganda and Agitation Department or the Party's History Institute, being approved at the Romanian's Worker Party congresses and penuries and thus became dogma.

Starting with 1948, the main focus was on combating old historiography[18], accused of being "bourgeois" and "reactionary", "excluding the masses", "subservient to the West", or just plain "anti-Romanian".

Infamous for the time was the new history textbook that was designed to change the approach on education, which gained a more ideological tone. Below are some of the political ideas that laid the basis for new manual, becoming historiographical theses overnight, and shaping the official historical writings that were to come for almost a decade:

- class struggle became the driving force of historical evolution, history being pegged to all kind of social conflict, often being out of context and amplified, sometimes even invented (such as those regarding the ancient history of Dacia) and the great historical personalities were considered as belonging to the exploiting classes. Thus they were trying to legitimizing the communist regime - the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in alliance with the "peasantry" was being presented as a natural conclusion after centuries of struggle of the masses against the "exploiting classes";[19]

- In the foreground of it all stood the hailing of the "*great brother from the east*". By any means necessary the beneficial influence of the Slavic factor was to be highlighted: starting with the migrations period, continuing with the middle Ages and the 1877 War of Independence and ending with the contemporary;

- As a counterweight, Western values were strongly contested (in subsequent editions the tone will become more and more virulent, as divergences between the Western countries and Eastern countries grew);

- Out of the leaders of the 1848 Revolution, only Nicolae Bălcescu was highlighted, as he was perceived to have fought against feudalism and supporting the same position as czarist Russia. Instead, Avram Iancu was accused of serving the counterrevolution by joining the Habsburgs, in opposition to Bălcescu;

- The 1859 union between Wallachia and Moldova was only beneficial to the bourgeoisie (which sustained the act only with the will to create a larger market for the products they produced), not the masses, therefore being a political class act, not a national one;

- The name "Transylvanian School" was replaced with "Latinist School" and its leaders were accused of hiding the influence of the Slavs and "great Russian people" upon the Romanians and by their theories they encouraged chauvinism;[20]

- In accordance with the tenets of Comintern PCdR Congress, creating Greater Romania in 1918 was not presented as a union per se, in the case of Bessarabia the act being

[18] Muller, *Op. cit.*, p. 65
[19] *Ibidem*
[20] *Ibidem*, p. 66

entitled "*Imperialist intervention against the socialist revolution in Russia*", and the union of Transylvania by "*intervention against the Hungarian Revolution*";

- Besides the alterations mentioned, there were significant changes introduced in periodizating history: Contemporary history was considered to begin with the Great October Socialist Revolution, not the 1918 Union as before; Using Marxist theory of history and stages of history the term "Paleolithic" was replaced with "wilderness" and the "Neolithic" with "barbarism" and claims society as fundamentally determined by the *material conditions* at any given time.

- The communist strikes and demonstrations that took place in the interwar period were highlighted and exaggerated in importance, aiming at shaping Romania's contemporary history (1917 1948) more than the Monarchy of the various Governments the country had in that time;

- The Church's role in national history was greatly reduced, secularizing official history;

- The immediate political struggle plan was compromising the political parties and the Monarchy ("*the most reactionary exponent of the political class and the largest landowner*"), the democratic regime and its institutions. The aim was to legitimize the class struggle and especially the repression against the representatives of these categories, because if they were perceived as being sociologically against the masses, the subsequent dispossession of their property (nationalization) and their imprisonment would be much easier;[21]

- Also some events that occurred after 1944 were shown in a biased manner: the 23rd of August Act was presented as "*Liberation Day by the Soviet Army*" which protected Romania from the intervention by the imperialist powers; Transylvania was returned to Romania only through the intervention of the U.S.S.R.; the sovroms helped the economic development of the country; during the Paris Peace Treaty all favorable terms towards Romania were due to the Soviet Union and the unfavorable clauses to the imperialists etc.

Special care was put into giving a more ideological aspect to archaeological research.[22] The new regime wanted to shift the focus from the Roman archeology, to the study of pre- and post Roman era. Ancient Rome was considered by Marx and Engels an essentially exploitative empire, neglecting its role in the development of European civilization.[23] Roller insisted that ancient history should be interpreted using Joseph Stalin's teachings[24], which pointed out the "*unscientific position of the old bourgeois historians*" that Russia had begun its history since the foundation of the Kievan Rus' State, thus denying the human society until that point. Similarly, in Romania the bourgeois historians only concentrated on the period near the Roman conquest, "denying the human development until the conquest of Dacia" or the formation of a Dacian state.

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 67
[22] Liviu Pleşa, „Mihail Roller şi stalinizarea istoriografiei romneşti" în Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Historica, nr. 10/1, 2006, p. 55
[23] Vlad Georgescu, *Politică şi istorie*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1991, p. 61
[24] Pleşa, *Op. cit.*, p. 56

Contributing to this idea, some of Gheorghiu-Dej's guidance were also used, who stated that Romania was plundered over thousand years by Romans, barbarians, then by French, English, German imperialists.[25]

After Stalin's death, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Since and the more relaxed climate allowed by Moscow, changes started to take shape in Romanian's internal politics including the way history was looked upon. Although it kept a strong ideological tone and it continued to be used as a tool for the regime's survival and legitimacy, history was put to use (along with the entire culture for that matter) into the aid of the national element of the communist party.

Conclusions

For the first time in Romania's history, the *historical* discipline became an "ideological weapon" in the arsenal of the party, fact clearly stated by Roller himself during the completion of the first review of historical research in the People's Republic of Romania in September of 1949: "*...historians have to study and explain that based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, that the people's fight on PRR's territory ever since the most remote times until today was to combat the influence of cosmopolitan bourgeois historical school, to transform the historical sciences in our country into a powerful ideological weapon in the service of the working people, in the service of educating the builders of socialism, using to the maximum great achievements of the Soviet science.*"[26]

The project communist cultural revolution, which was to happen "under the banner of the ever so victorious Marxism-Leninism" and taught by "the great teacher of the proletariat", Stalin, was inserted into the discourse and practice of power politics even before 1948. Since that time however, significant efforts were made more intensely both in terms of cutting all ties with the values of Western culture - proclaimed without appeal as being in a state of advanced decomposition - and the full adoption of the cultural model of the Soviet Union proclaimed as being "*the science of the most advanced country in the world*".

Over the second half of last century, the communists' reinvented biography of the Dacian king Burebista to create a fictitious connection with Ceauşescu's need for a charismatically-mythical legitimacy through the descent from a genuine ancient autochthonous "hero" which proved in time to be a decent propaganda tool. History has always been an instrument of power and legitimating of the present and future through the past is not a mythological logic invented by the communists. A reconfiguration of mythical history especially that of the beginnings, aims to strengthen a common consciousness through a founding myth provides an essential part of a civilization.

AKNOWLEDGEMENT **"This paper is a result of a research made possible by the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project**

[25] *Ibidem*

[26] Mihail Roller, „Realizări şi sarcini noi pe tărâmul ştiinţelor istorice" în *Studii. Revistă de istorie şi filosofie*, nr 4, anul 2, (octombrie-decembrie 1949), p. 24

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THE ACCESION OF THE TWO KOREAS TO UN IN 1991. AN ARCHIVE BASED STUDY

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Abstract: Whereas international system describes the sum of all existing national states, the concept of international society stands for a wishful intersubjective platform based on mutual recognition and mutual restraint. It tries to mitigate conflicts and submit cultural, political and economical divergences under a basic set of laws. Experience shows that even the most autarchic and so called <rogue states> are eager to be accepted within the fold of their peers. Such was the case with both Koreas during the 1980s. Pyonyang as well as Seoul indulged in a blame game in order to be recognised by the international community as the true embodiment of the Korean idea, casting the other one as an usurper or accident of history. After the end of the Cold War, Bush Sr.'s hailed New World Order became permeable to a an ecumenical sentiment which accepted the dual entrance of Koreas as members of UN, fact happened in September, 17 1991. The study details the story based on a research in Romanian diplomatic archives.

Keywords: ***South Korea, North Korea, UN, international society, social rationality***

With the fading away of Cold War, UN could finally emerge a truly global forum for solving problems between states and close the gap between reality and its founding Chart. No longer plagued by the veto game which had intoxicated the functioning of the Security Council for two generations, UN Charter had better chances to relegitimise its provisions as norm for interstate behaviour.

The first part of this article tells the common history of Korean Peninsula and postwar Organisation of United Nations. The second argues that 1991 double accession to UN should pe seen within the wider frenzy of the international community which aimed to celebrate the end of Cold War by establishing a new legalistic world order. Third part dwells upon the notion of social reason and concludes that North Korean accession to UN, in spite of knowledge about a nascent nuclear program, can be explained through a desire to bring Pyonyang back to the fold of international society and thus, hopefully, curtail its extremist tendencies.

Cutting through the study will be Romanian contribution to the cause of inter-Korean dialogue and especially of UN disarmament policy in late 1980s and early 1990s.

The research benefited the telegrams found at the Romanian Diplomatic Archive from December 2014 till February 2015.

I. Korean Peninsula and the UN

In international relations theory one of the most enduring debate tries to find whether states construct international system or, on the contrary, it is the systemic pressure which actually moulds unit behaviour and influences the dissappearance/birth of new borders.

In the case of modern Korean geopolitics, the post1945 faith of the Peninsula was annexed by the higher dynamics of early US-Soviet divide.

Korea had been a Japanese colony between 1910 and 1945. Late WWII, what should have been a boastful sphere of co-prosperity ended as a shrinking iron ring against the Empire of the Sun. As Tokyo was expected to fall in near timeframe, both Soviet and American forces divided Korean Peninsula as a precondition to grant independence in the aftermath of hostilities. What should have been only a temporary demarcation line was recycled to hail a new state of crisis. Similar to Eastern Europe, Korean division was quickly followed by the imposition of victor's domestic regime for each side. In North USSR imposed a Stalinist regime under Kim Ir Sen (Kim Il Sung) and created North Korean Peoples' Army. In South American backed the presidential administration of Syngman Rhee. After a period of border skirmeshes, NKPA attacked South Korean perimeter on 25 June 1950. US garnered UN back-up, invoked the breaching of the Charter and assembled a multinational force to repel the North Korean invaders.[1] General MacArthur's masterstroke landing at Inchon, behind enemy lines was to be swiftly overturn by Chinese intervention in November, the same year. Repeatedly back and forth pitch battles ended in a stalemate, in itself a future proof of what the looming Cold War should have looked like.[2]

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953 with the aim to „*insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved*." The signatory parts were US Army general William Harrison Jr representing United Nations Command (UNC) and general NAM II representing North Korean Peopple's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The document, indeed the closest thing reassembling a peace declaration cemented the establishment of a Demilitarized Zone and the repatriation of prisoners.

UN contribution came by several bodies:

- United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (**UNCMAC**)- designed to guard the persistence of KDZ;
- United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, was a body which oversaw elections in May, 1948. It was the country's first electoral exercise after Japanese conquer and was held in the presence of US forces.
- **UNCOK** – the UN Commission on Korea. Was created under General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of December 12, 1948. Its mission was to preside over the retreat of occupying forces from Korea, organise security forces and cut off any economic hurdle between North and South. USSR and North Korea did not accept UNCOK, therefore, since 1949 it was added another task: to report any military threats coming from the 38 parallel.[3]

[1] *Anthony Leviero, Truman Orders U.S. Air, Navy Units To Fight In Aid Of Korea; U.N. Council Supports Him; Our Fliers In Action; Fleet Guards Formosa,* The New York Times, *27 June 1950*

[2] Michael Hickey, The Korean War: An Overview, BBC, March 21, 2011

[3] Chi Young Pak, *Korea and the United Nations*, Kluwer Law International, Hague, The Netherlands, 2000, p.7

- **UNCURK** – the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. After UN became embroiled in the peninsular crisis, the General Assembly created another body under the resolution 376 (V), October 1950: United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (disolved in 1973). Another subsequent body, United Nation Korean Reconstruction Agency (**UNKRA**) was submit to UNCURK. It was to coordinate it action with Economic and Social Council and help reconstruct Korean economy. United States contributed over 100 million $ aid for South Korea. Disbanded in 1958.[4]
- **Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission** – has been created by article 36 of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Its functions consisted in carrying the provisions of articles 13 (c), 13 (d), and 28, namely forbidding the introduction of new military personnel or weaponry that might upset the balance between sides, and conducting inspections outside Demilitarized Zone where breach of Armistice has been signaled. The Commission's members were elected from countries which did not attend to Korean conflict in any manner: Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia.[5]

Judging the events as they laid on the canvas, it is fair to say that UN decision making was arrested by geopolitics and acted more like a part in the conflict than as a mediator.[6] From another point of view it was perhaps one of the last kicks coming from a dying British empire, if one takes into account that nations such as Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand supplied the majority of units.[7]

Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement provided that governments concerned were to organise a conference and settle the Korean matter peacefully. To implement the provision, representatives of United States, USSR, France and Great Britain met in Berlin (18 February 1953) and decided to convene a conference in Geneva from April 26 to June 15, 1954.

The fifteen Korean war participants wrote a final report and submitted it to the UN Secretary General on 11 November 1954. The General Assembly invited only South Korea to the public debate and rejected China's suggestion to receive North Korea also. UN General Assembly adopted Allied draft resolution and stated that: 1) approves the report on Korean Political Conference; 2) reaffirms the objectives of the United States to settle Korean conundrum by peaceful means, all colluding with the restoration of a unified democratic state.

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[4] For more information about UNCURK see the archives scanned and posted by the Wilson Center, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
See also Chi Young Pak, *op.cit.*, p.7-8

[5] Observe full text of Korean Armistice Agreement: Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, Find Law, July 27, 1953, http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html

[6] For an opinion about UN simulated multilateralism in Korean War see Ronda Hauben, The Role of the UN in the Unending Korean War. "United Nations Command" As Camouflage, *Global Research*, September 21, 2013
However, one must nuance the above statement, at least to some extent, as UN General Assembly has protested North Korean invasion and pointed fingers towards Security Council "*because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese communist intervention in Korea*." See United Nations resolution calling on the People's Republic of China to cease all hostilities on the Korean peninsula, 332 plenary meeting, 5 November 1951, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116196 (accesed 10 February 2015)

[7] The Armed Forces in the Korean War. United Nations Forces in the Korean War, http://korean-war.commemoration.gov.au/armed-forces-in-korea/united-nations-forces-in-the-korean-war.php (accesed 10 February 2015)

This Geneva 811 resolution will provide the legal basis for debating the aforementioned dossier within the boundaries of UN.[8]

In the following years, both countries have tried to use the UN rostrum to gain international acclaim and score points of prestige against each other. Nonetheless, their attitude towards the UN resources has been different: whereas Seoul aimed to keep the Korean dossier wide open and preserve it on the GA table, Pyongyang much preffered inter-Korean dialogue with as less outside interference as possible.[9]

II. Unity and disarmament

1970s acquired the reputation for strategic calm demeanour, at least at the ceiling of the system. Far from reassembling a long lasting peace, the relationship between superpowers hovered around apeacement, both of them styling a frere-enmity (Kenneth Waltz) or a minuet (I.Wallerstein) based on tamed security dilemma and mutual restrain. Underneath, at the lower floor, several issues: the growth of OPEC, especially in the postBretton Woods phase, the maturement of European institutions, the Iranian Khomenyist Revolution along with UN efforts to achieve disarmament sketched the megatrends beyond bipolar world.

Concerning the cause of disarmament, it is important to mention, for methodological clarity, that projects in this direction came from reductionist (national) level as well as from systemic (multilateral/multinational) level. Some of them happened through bilateral disccusion, other had regional substance while other appealed to UN in order to achieve the utmost global visibility. Bellow, the strive to disarmament will pe separated according to the two criteria listed above:

II A. Reductionist disarmament initiatives. Korean Peninsula

In this regard, the geopolitical climaterics in Korean Peninsula stood as an indicator for other moves both between Communist capitals and between two rival blocs. In 1971-1972 Nixon administration started courting China and exploited the gaps between Moscow and Beijing. Similarly, Pyongyang assumed a more flexible diplomacy with less concern for ideological colours. For those who read Romanian diplomatic archives worthy of not is

[8] Chi Young Pak, *op.cit.*, p.9

[9] For the importance many South Korean bestow on UN see the congratulatory speech of Han Seung-soo, former prime-minister: " *I believe that the relationship between Korea and the United Nations is a special one, perhaps more so than any other nations in the world. Korea has had a very unique relationship with the United Nations from its birth.*
Korea's first general election was supervised by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in 1948 and its government was recognized as the only legitimate government in the Korean peninsula at the 3rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1948.
When the Korean war broke out in June 1950, it was once again the United Nations which acted swiftly to repel the aggressor from the North through two important Security Council Resolutions 83(S-1511) and 164(S-1588), and succeeded in protecting Korea's freedom and independence.
Therefore, the freedom, independence, economic development, democracy, political liberties and human rights which we Koreans enjoy today all owe a great deal to the United Nations. I would not be exaggerating too much if I were to state that had there not been the United Nations, there would not have been the free and prosperous Korea today. In a sense, therefore, Korea can be said to be the child of the United Nations." Han Seung-soo, Congratulatory Speech at the International Seminar on "Korea in the UN – The Third Decade" organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Korea's Membership in the UN, Shilla Hotel, Seoul, 12 July 2011

Romanian - DPRK rapprochement and the former eagerness to play the middleman between Kim Il Sung and Washington. For the North Korean dictator, extending a shaking hand towards the Americans should have represented the precondition for an attempt to reunify the Peninsula and cast away nuclear weapons. Romanian part extended its aid when it submitted to UN general-secretary, Kurt Waldheim the North Korean letter of intent to open a permanent mission in New York (July 16, 1973).[10] Six month later, another letter send via Romania reached US authorities and Henry Kissinger. Its message repeated Pyongyang's desideratum towards opening and also the archplan for reunification qua demilitarisation of Peninsula.[11]

Following these seminal steps, Kim crystallized another proposition that would make career all across the followind decade: in October 1980, during the Sixth Workers Party Congress in he launched the Confederate Republic of Koryo initiative. The Koryo plan ran against South Korean counter intuitive towards dual recognitions followed by dual accession to UN membership.[12]

Romania as well as USSR supported peaceful reunification. The former to gain prestige and the latter due to military-strategic reasons, as a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula would levied the pressure exerted by the Americans.[13]

II B. Systemic/Multileral disarmament initiatives. UN activity

United Nations created institutional legal instruments to tackle the arms race since its very beginning.

In 1952, the General Assembly gave birth to the Disarmament Commission from two previous and separate commissions, with the synthetic goal to make proposals for a coordinated program of arms limitations and reductions of military forces, especially those equipments capable to inflict mass distruction. Initially covering the selective club of great nuclear powers, the membership was extended for all UN members.

In 1959, the major nations of Europe and the United States established the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament to bridge the difference between East and West with regard to security matters. In 1962 it was further expanded and transformed into Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), endorsed by the General Assembly. Eight of its

[10] Mihail E.Ionescu, Carmen Rîjnoveanu, *Between the two Communists Giants. Romania and North Korea Relationship during the Cold War*, Center for East European and Asian Studies Association, Bucharest, 2014, pp.21-22

[11] Ibidem, p.23

[12] See in this regard Dossier No.20/ 1982/RSR, „Darea de seamă privind activitatea DR I pe anul 1982", p.2
Also Dossier 220/1988, Problem RPD Coreeană. Vizita oficială a tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu în Asia, Telegrama 057814, 12. 10. 1988. Dossier 244, Problem 210, 1989, Referitor la relaţiile intercoreene, Telegram 05506, 10.01.1989
It must be stated also that Kim Il Sung's Koryo plan satisfied his taste for showmanship and served as chip in the blame game with Seul, because in reality North Koreans feared the reunification with their much stronger co-nationals. A 1987 report of activity by Romanian embassy from Pyongyang details North Korean gross mismanagement of economic affairs and proclivity for „*finalising ambitious yet unproductive objectives*." Report of activity and workplan of the Romanian Embassy from Phenian in 1987, Problem 20/1988, Chapter I, p.14. See also Rhee Sang-Woo, North Korea in 1991: Struggle to Save Chuch'e Amid Signs of Change, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1991: Part I (Jan., 1992), pp. 56-63, esp. p.57

[13] Soviet support for Koryo initiative in late '80s appears in Dossier 220/1988, Problema RPD Coreeană. Vizita oficială a tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu în Asia, Telegrama 057814, 12.10.1988

member were gathered amongst the Non-Aligned states. In 1969 this last initiative rebranded as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) including 26 members (in 1975: 31 members within the ranks).

In all that period a cascade of initiatives came to add substance to an ever dynamic international regime suited to achieve disarmament:

- the 1959 Antarctic Treaty;
- the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere;
- the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty);
- the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);
- the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty);
- the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, usually known as the Biological Weapons Treaty.[14]

General Assembly 35/46 resolution of 3 December 1980 declared the second disarmament decade.[15] The moment was bracketed by two sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament – first in 1978, second in 1982.[16]

The life of all those enterprise would not have been possible only by the whim of great powers, absent the implication of smaller actors.

It is also the case of Romania which conducted a diplomacy above its eco-demographic scale. Romanian diplomats attended and formulated positions to numerous multileteral fora: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna Mutual Balanced Force Reduction or UN disarmament committees (UNDCs). Between 11-25 May 1983 , UNDC's Working Group was chaired by Ion Diaconu.[17] The importance given to UN by smaller capitals such as our country stems from two telegrams: the first warns about Romanian presence fading away within the Organisation late 1980s, while the second, written by Petre Tănăsescu to ministry of foreign affairs, Ioan V.Totu, speaks about the praise coming from Yabushi Akashi (deputy General Secretary) for Romanian activity in the matter of disarmament.[18] Both texts are dated fall 1988, a period when Ceauşescu's regime approached its last breath and economic collapse, whereas internal illegitimacy and international isolation compounded a crisis not very different from other Socialist nations.

[14] Derek Boothby, The United Nations and Disarmament, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers 2002, No. 1, pp.3-5

[15] Full text of the Declaration at: http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1980/53.pdf

[16] Derek Boothby, *op.cit*., p.6

[17] Daniel N. Nelson, *Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era*, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1988, p.204

[18] Dossier 1989 (Secret), Problem 241, 1988, Referitor la prezenţa României în Organisemele ONU, Telegrama 076936, 29.12.1988

III. 1991: peace dividend over division

The collapse of Communism ended the divisive politics between East and West and stirred the dividends of peace in the service of global governance.

1991 may have been a pivotal moment for several motives, but it did not come out of the blue; instead it was a cumulative effort towards convergence- the wide shared political paradigm of the previous decade. Numerous agreements came to translate into action President Bush Sr's call for a legalistic new world order.

Thus, in 1991:

- NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries signed the Treaty for the Reduction of Conventional Weapons in Europe;
- Czechoslovakia became member in the Council of Europe;[19]
- NATO's twelfth summit drafted a new security strategy which extended the meaning of security beyond the realm of military issues according to tenets of Copenhagen School (Rome, 7-8 November, 1991)
- In December the same year the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments. The resolution requested the General Secretary to establish a register of conventional arms and asked member states to provide annual reports about the status of their imports and export of military equipment. (The register would be established in January next year).[20]
- Last but not least, both Korean states became UN members on September 17. Few month later, in December they signed A basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Agrresion, Exchanges, and Cooperation. Under that document, both parties pledge to end the mutual slender, enhance economic cooperation, work together to help reuniting split families and strive to end the 1953 Armistice.

Having presented all the above, one may asked oneself why did UN and the conclave of great powers accepted North Korean inclusion- a nascent nuclear actor[21]- at a time when general Noriega, Nicaraguan dictator was arrested by a US Navy commando or Saddam Hussein was severely punished for his regional expansionist ambition. Wouldn't have made more sense that Pyongyang was isolated and cut off from all economic, moral and military aid? Both realist balance of power theory and liberal collective security had plenty of reasons to council a concentric pressure against North Korea. By not mounting a concentric pressure against Kim Il-Sung aging rule, international community has only prolonged ad infinitum one of the most unsettling issues on the map.

[19] Paul Dănuţ Duţă, Ion Panait, Teodor Frunzetti, *Operaţiuni şi misiuni OSCE. Studiu de caz: Moldova*, Tehno Media, Sibiu, 2008, pp.20-21

[20] Derek Boothby, Disarmament: Succes and failures in Jean E. Krasno, *The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society*, Lynnne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2004, p.211

See the full text of the resolution at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r036.htm

[21] Kim Il Sung's craving for developing a nuclear program were known during late 1980 to the chagrin of USSR. See in this regard Dossier 244, Problem 210, 1989, Referitor la Relaţiile Intercoreene, Telegram 050720, 21.09.1989

The explanation put forth here lies around what we baptised: social rationality. Before providing a operational definition a short detour through international relations alphabet of notions is needed.

For decades, one of the boon of contention between competiting schools was the difference between anarchy and international society. The first is usually associated with the (neo)realist perspective and says that states remain the ultimate arbiters acknowledging no higher judge above their will. In such logic an international system cannot be more than the sum of its parts.

The second notion is usually associated with the English School as well as with liberalism. For its followers, a society may be described as a „*self-regulating system towards equilibrium or some strong normative structure to which members of society strongly adhere*."[22] For his part, Hedley Bull contends that : „*A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relationis with one another, and share in the working of common institutios*"[23]. Albeit it remains a anarchical environment, without the hierarchy imposed by a government or a sovereign over his subjects, an international society witnesses how member-units develop rules of engagement. Corespondly, an international society goes beyond the sum of its parts.

In continuation of Kenneth Waltz we hold that states are still considered rational entities, but they understand rationality in a much more intimate manner in close connection with the behaviour of other peers. Seldom they proceed unwisely or foolhardy accordingly to Waltzian perspective because they archaim is not short term gain but participation to group activities and esprit de corps on longer term. Sociology discovered long time ago that humans care to be recognised to share ranks with other/ keep up with the Jonses no matter financial costs.

Summing up individuals let themselves guided by a social rationality. Thorstein Veblen's theory about leisure class and conscious consumption bears the potential to explain many phenomenon unfolding in the international arena.[24]

If we employ all said above, then North Korea's acceptance within UN rank and file expressed a deep concern to bring a rogue member within the fold in order to mollify him, intensify the opportunities for dialogue and prevent eventual reckless play. We have seen from the pages of Romanian archives in the 1980s the reluctance of most Socialist fellow

[22] Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence*, Routledge, New York/London, 2004, p.52

[23] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, Foreword by Stanley Hoffmann, MacMillan Press Ltd., London, reprinted 1995, p.13

[24] "*In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence. And not only does the evidence of wealth serve to impress one's importance on others and to keep their sense of his importance alive and alert, but it is of scarcely less use in building up and preserving one's self-complacency*." Thorstein Veblen, *The Leisure Class*, The Echo Library, Middlesex, UK, 2007, p.4

In international relationships, Veblen seems to assert solidarity qua prestige even more clear than when he talks about individual of the same nation: „*Patriotism may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige*", *Ibidem*, p.20

For an employment of Veblen theory in studying international relations see Lilach Gilady, Big Science, Prestige and the Transits of Venus, Paper prepared for the 48 International Studies Association's Annual Convention (February-March, 2007). Silviu Petre, Shopping as deterrence? India's military acquistion policy, between improvisation and the pursuit of prestige, International Conference: Scientific Research and Education in Air Force, Braşov, 22-23 May 2013

countries to engage with South Korea out of ideological empathy and out of care not to offend Kim Il Sung.[25] Things turned in late '80 when the hole Warsaw Pact had passed its glory days and South Korean economic prowess became too irrezistable.[26] Largely at the same time, South Korean president, Roh Tae-Woo Nordpolitik manifested the goal to bring Pyonyang in another kind of solidarity, one based on shared national and cultural bonds.

Unfortunately all hopes that socialising N Korea entails promises of normalization did not outlive Kim Il Sung. With the advent of his son, Kim Jong Il, the regime at Pyonyang ressumed the same aggresive stance and continued to inflame regional stability to this very day.

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LE DISCOURS PARLEMENTAIRE DES FEMMES. LA COMMUNICATION VERBALE, NON-VERBALE ET PARAVERBALE DANS LE DISCOURS POLITIQUE ROUMAIN[1]

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(POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926)

RESUMÉ: The roots of women's participation at political level can be found in the early adoption of the female suffrage, followed by the right of being elected.
Our research is focused on women's participation in the political decision-making process in Romania in 2006. We opted for this reference year due to its importance derived from the necessity of adopting the EU accession legislation until 2007. This new legislation contained many provisions related to the status of Romanian women.
The main research questions of our analysis are the following: Are women in the Romanian Parliament involved in the political decision-making process? In case of an affirmative answer, which are the areas of interest for our target group, considerating that women represent 51% of Romanian people? Can they influence the destiny of a law? Do they have a specific language (verbal, nonverbal or paraverbal communication) which helps them be persuasive in proposing and supporting a legislative project?
In order to answer these questions, we will conduct a quantitative but also qualitative analysis, using as main sources the transcripts and videos of the parliamentary debates.

Keywords: ***political discourse, communication, European accession, women's representation, political actors.***

1. Le cadre théorique

Dans l'acte constitutif de l'Union européenne, le Traité de Maastricht, il y a un principe fondamental de l'Union Européenne : le principe de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, et il va apparaître dans tous les documents qui forment l'acquis communautaire. Il y a aussi une spécification concernant ce principe dans La Carte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne en stipulant que « L'égalité de chances entre les femmes et les hommes doit être assurée dans tous les domaines »[2].

Quand elles ont gagné le droit d'être élues dans la Chambre des Députés et dans le Sénat – en Roumanie, ça s'est passé en 1939[3] – les femmes ont pu participer au processus de la décision politique. À ce moment-là, comme maintenant, l'obtention du droit électoral signifiait pour la moitié de la population de notre pays l'autonomie politique. Et, si au commencement les Roumaines désiraient participer à la vie politique « pour améliorer le

[1] „Ce travail a bénéficié du soutien financier accordé par le biais du projet " Routes d'excellence académique dans la recherche doctorale et post-doctorale - READ" co-financé par le Fonds Social Européen par le Programme Opérationnel Sectoriel le Développement des Ressources Humaines 2007-2013, contrat n° POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926."
[2] *La Carte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne*, art. 23;
[3] PETRESCU, Alexandra – *Rolul femeilor în luarea deciziei politice în perioada interbelică. O introducere*, en VOINEA, Camelia Florela (editeur coordonateur) – *Decizia – o formulă interdisciplinară: elite, mentalitate, gen şi modelare în decizia politică*, L'Université de Bucarest, 2007, p. 48;

destin des mères et des enfants, pour créer des politiques sociales »[4], en bref, pour aider la société dont elles faisaient partie, il reste à vérifier par nos recherches si à présent elles veulent toujours représenter la population féminine du pays ou les intérêts du parti qui les a propulsées dans les positions éligibles.

Au commencement du XX^{ème} siècle, quand les femmes ont obtenu le droit de participer à la vie politique, on considérait qu'«Il y a un discours féminin qui a comme but d'obtenir les droits politiques et le discours masculin qui s'oppose aux droits politiques des femmes. Il y a donc un discours du genre féminin et un discours du genre masculin qui se trouvent en conflit. »[5] À nos jours il y a une multitude de discours politiques, différant en fonction de : l'appartenance de l'acteur politique à un parti ou à un group d'intérêts, l'illustration d'une idéologie politique ou d'une autre, le but du discours et le type de public auquel on s'adresse. Toutes ces différences de forme et de contenu sont soulignées dans l'analyse du discours. C'est ainsi que cette analyse peut révéler des nuances offensives, défensives, des accords ou des menaces. Dans ce contexte, l'affirmation de Christian Le Bart concernant le language qui « devient pouvoir dans les mains du pouvoir »[6] devient évidente.

Nous allons commencer notre recherche concernant le discours politique des femmes parlementaires roumaines avec la plus connue définition du discours. Entre les nombreuses définitions du discours se met en évidence celle d'Emile Benveniste (« toute énonciation suppose un locuteur et un auditeur et, au premier, l'intention d'influencer l'autre d'une manière quelconque »)[7], définition qui illustre le statut d'événement de la pratique discursive.

L'analyse du discours politique des femmes parlementaires roumaines est très importante si on veut identifier les éléments du langage qui déterminent l'impact de leur point de vue dans les débats parlementaires sur les différentes initiatives législatives.

Tout d'abord, nous devons tenir compte de la théorie de Hannah Arendt : « N'importe où est mise en jeu l'importance du discours, les questions deviennent par définition *politiques*, parce que *le discours est celui qui fait de l'homme une être politique »*[8] avec la spécification que le mot *homme* est utilisé généralement pour designer toute personne – homme ou femme - qui participe aux activités du gouvernement. C'est-à-dire que tout discours contient dans une certaine mesure l'intention du locuteur d'influencer les actions de l'écouteur. C'est à nous de démontrer si les éléments de communication politique qui constituent la force motrice d'un discours politique sont les mêmes pour les femmes que pour les hommes.

D'une autre partie, selon l'opinion de Daniela Rovența-Frumușani, le discours joue « un rôle essentiel dans la formulation idéologique des problèmes, dans leur production et reproduction médiatiques, dans les procédures de la décision politique et de médiatisation de ces décisions, dans le management institutionnel ».[9]

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[4] PETRESCU, Alexandra – *art. cit*, p. 49;
[5] PETRESCU, Alexandra – *Rolul femeilor în luarea deciziei politice în perioada interbelică. O introducere*, en VOINEA, Camelia Florela (editeur coordonateur) – *Decizia – o formulă interdisciplinară: elite, mentalitate, gen şi modelare în decizia politică*, Université de Bucarest, 2007, p. 67;
[6] Le BART, Christian – *Le discours politique*, PUF, Paris, 1998, p. 106;
[7] BENVENISTE, Emile, *Problèmes de linguistique générale I*, Gallimard, Paris, 1966, p.242;
[8] ARENDT, Hannah, *Condiția umană*, Maison d'édition Casa Cărții de Știință, Cluj, 2007, p. 9;
[9] ROVENȚA-FRUMUȘANI, Daniela, *Analiza discursului. Ipoteze și ipostaze*, Maison d'édition Tritonic, Bucarest, 2012, pp. 16-17;

L'importance du type de communication utilisée dans le cadre du discours politique est soulignée une fois de plus par la conclusion de Pierre Bourdieu après avoir bien étudie le langage, surtout le langage politique et ses caractéristiques spécifiques : les rapports de communication sont, en même temps, « des rapports de pouvoir symbolique par lesquels les rapports de force entre les locuteurs ou entre leurs groupes s'actualisent ».[10]

La question de recherche qui a guidé ma démarche est la suivante : Est-ce qu'il y a un langage spécifique des femmes parlementaires qui peut les aider à changer le destin d'une initiative législative ?

Les hypothéses de la recherche sont :

- Il y a, dans le discours politique des femmes parlementaires de Roumanie – tout comme d'ailleurs aussi – un langage spécifique déterminé par l'éducation différente de laquelle bénéficient les filles dans notre société et aussi par les besoins et les expériences spécifiques de ce segment de la population (la mise au monde des enfants, la maternité, l'allaitement sont seulement quelques exemples).
- La communication politique – avec tous ses niveaux d'expression (verbale, non-verbale et paraverbale) – pratiquée par les femmes parlementaires détermine l'impact de leurs discours politiques dans le processus de la décision politique.

2. La méthodologie de recherche

Notre recherche a comme point de départ la législature 2004-2008, parce que c'est alors que la Roumanie s'est intégrée dans l'Union européenne (au 1er Janvier 2007). Pendant cette législature, les femmes parlementaires étaient 62 d'un total de 541 parlementaires[11], 33 (+10) députées et 14 (+5) sénatrices[12], représentant un pourcentage de 10,2%[13].

De cette période, j'ai choisi l'année 2006, année pendant laquelle la Roumanie a finalisé ses préparations pour l'intégration européenne, en réalisant l'harmonisation législative sollicitée par la Communauté européenne. J'ai analysé les discours politiques des débats parlementaires en essayant d'identifier les éléments de la communication (aux différents niveaux : verbal ; non-verbal et paraverbal) qui sont déterminants pour une implication décisive dans le processus de la décision politique.

Mon analyse a été réalisée aux plusieurs niveaux : l'analyse quantitative et qualitative des sténogrammes des séances de la Chambre des Députés et du Sénat (nécessaire pour les statistiques et pour les éléments de la communication verbale) et l'analyse qualitative des vidéos (utile pour identifier les éléments de la communication non-verbale et para-verbale).

[10] BOURDIEU, Pierre, *Limbaj și putere simbolică*, Maison d'édition Art, Bucarest, 2012, p. 51;
[11] http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.home?leg=2004&idl=1, consulté le 08.05.2015;
[12] J'ai mis entre parenthèses les parlementaires qui ont fini leur mandat avant la fin de la législature 2004-2008;
[13] Direction d'études, documentation et suivi du processus électoral, Evoluția reprezentării femeilor în Parlamentul României, L'autorité électorale permanente, Bucarest, 2013, p. 1 ;

3. L'analyse des discours parlementaires

L'analyse de discours que j'ai fait relève plusieurs choses très intéressantes. Après avoir consulté les sténogrammes des 1025 séances de la Chambre des Députés et du Sénat et les vidéos de ces séances, développées en 2006, je peux conclure que les femmes parlementaires ont eu des initiatives législatives proportionnellement avec leur nombre dans le total des parlementaires (environ 10,2 %). Elles ont participé aussi à des initiatives mixtes : il y a plusieurs projets législatifs proposés par des parlementaires femmes et hommes. Dans les domaines tels l'assistance sociale des personnes vieilles, l'initiative est devenue loi.

Il y a eu, aussi, des initiatives législatives des femmes parlementaires qui ont été rejetées. Celles-ci ont été dans des domaines tels : les réglementations législatives concernant les partis politiques et les droits des vétérans, des invalides et des veuves de la guerre. Et il y a une troisième variante : les initiatives que les femmes parlementaires ont retirées avant qu'elles puissent être rejetées ou acceptées. Elles ont retiré des projets législatifs qui concernaient le payement des impôts pour des biens immobiles affectés par des désastres naturels ou les salaires des employés du Parlement roumain – soit pour les mieux préparer et revenir plus tard, soit pour d'autres raisons.

Une autre catégorie de propositions législatives, celle dans laquelle s'enscrivent les propositions mixtes (propositions préparées et faites par des parlementaires roumains, femmes et hommes aussi). La plupart d'eux ont été rejetées aussi. Elles visaient les domaines de l'allégement fiscal pour les familles jeunes du milieu rural ou bien celui des autorisations de construction.

Le spécifique de cette année – la dernière avant l'intégration européenne – a été constitué par le grand numero des initiatives législatives démarées par le gouvernement. La raison est celle que notre pays avait besoin de plusieurs réglementations législatives spéciales pour pouvoir s'aligner aux autres pays de la Communauté européenne. Toutes les initiatives proposées par le gouvernement ont été devenues lois.

Pour l'analyse proprement-dite des discours parlementaires j'ai accessé l'archive en ligne du Parlement de la Roumanie. J'ai découvert une grande différence entre les sténogrammes et les videos. *i dans les documents écrits les mots expriment seulement le sense connu*, dans les videos on peut voir, écouter et entendre ce que la personne qui parle transmet à ce moment-là par la voix, par les regards, par le rythme des mots: respect ou manque de respect à l'adresse de l'auditoire, désir de convaincre, amabilité ou arogance.

Je vais donner un seul exemple : pendant la séance de la Chambre des Députés du 23 février 2006 il y a eu lieu un petit débat concernant les modifications de l'Accord entre le Gouvernement de la Roumanie et celui de la République d'Albanie concernant la promotion et la protection mutuelle des investissements. Le vice-président de la Chambre des Députés, Mme Popa Daniela a invité les représentants des institutions concernées à exposer le point de vue de l'institution respective. De la part du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a parlé Madame Cristina Pocora. Au commencement, elle s'est présentée et elle a salué l'auditoire. Elle a lu ce qu'elle avait à transmettre, en regardant les parlementaires quand elle s'adressait directement à eux. Tout le temps, elle a prononcé les mots comme il faut, sans des abréviations, faisant preuve de professionnalisme (par exemple : « douăzeci și șase » entièrement prononcé). À la fin, elle a remercié et elle est partie. De la part de la Commission

pour la politique économique, reforme et privatisation a parlé Monsieur Octavian Mircea Purceld. Il ne s'est pas présenté. Par contre, il a tout le temps tousse sans couvrir sa bouche, directement dans le micro. Il n'a jamais regardé dans la salle. Il a lu son texte très vite, sans prononcer les mots comme il fallait (par exemple : « articolului nouăș'cinci », « douășase mai », « număru' PL X 9 », « un'șpe mai o mie nouă sute nouăș'patru »). Certainement, tous ces détails peuvent influencer, au moment du vote, le destin d'une loi.

Conclusions

La première conclusion de ma recherche est que les femmes parlementaires ont développé la plupart de leurs activités dans des domaines les plus proches des intérêts de la population féminine qu'elles représentent (l'assistance sociale, les droits des vétérans, des invalides et des veuves de la guerre, l'égalité de chances etc.).

La deuxième conclusion est celle qu'il y a un langage spécifique féminin au niveau de la communication politique (au niveau verbal, non-verbal ou para-verbal), capable de les aider à influencer la décision politique. Il s'agit d'un tableau complexe de la communication (elles peuvent transmettre leurs messages par des mots – verbal, par des gestes ou par la mimique – non-verbal et par la tonalité de la voix, par le rythme du discours ou bien par les pauses laissées entre les mots – para-verbal), y compris le comportement professionnel, qui manque d'agressivité, mais qui fait preuve d'empatie.

Au lieu de conclusion finale, nous pouvons être d'accord avec Clara Toma, en disant que : « La communication est pouvoir. La communication est influence. La communication est et elle doit être regardée comme art et science en même temps. »[14]

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NATIONAL IDENTITY UNDER SIEGE. THE IMAGINARY DEFENCE HEDGE AND THE RISE OF RADICAL DISCOURSE[1]

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Abstract: The present paper would like to analyze the global context of accelerated inter connections between several dimension of social life and the reaction of the society to this changes which are putting under siege (real or imaginary) the concepts of national identities and national values. In case of Europe and Eastern Europe the globalization, European integration, NATO joining and post communist cultural "imports" managed to create a sensation of insecurity at the level of national identity and cultural development of the societies. In this event frame the opposition toward this changes and influences managed to create a set of reactions and managed to build around the concept of national identities and values a hedge which real or imaginary base are playing a key role in the social development of the countries. These new defense constructions are many times based on negative attitude toward other societies or intolerance toward surrounding world or other communities. For this purpose the study would like to analyze this problem from the relevant point of view of globalization contextualized in the historical and social development of the eastern European countries. Analyzing the social, political and economic development in countries like Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia or Greece we intend to create an imaginary map of this identity issues based on real factors that are influencing the development of this societies in the contemporary globalized world.

Keywords: ***globalization, cultural globalization, national identity, extremism, integration.***

1. Introduction

The present paper intent is to create a frame of analysis for the national identity and its dynamics in the contemporary world, where imaginary or real threats are putting pressure on the foggy concept of national identity. Increased mobility, virtual reality, cultural exchanges are reshaping the structure of the societies in a way that creates disarray among its conservatory elements, creating a sense of insecurity at social and identity level. In the European Union the past years had known a substantial growth of populist rhetoric in public space or political arena, where the major debate topics were hijacked by fake or imaginary issues concentrated around the "anti everything" or "autarchy" discourse. This type of discourse and attitude change were shaped by real global issues, but the solutions offered by the political elites, public communicators or opinion makers can be characterized as false ones.

I will divide the present paper in two parts. The first part will concentrate on the problems related to globalization, integration and cultural transfers which are relevant to the topic of national identity in a globalised world. In the second part my attention will be on the dynamic of social and political changes in the eastern European regional and the rise of radical discourse in the past decade. In this context my purpose is to offer a frame of analysis

[1] This work was possible due to the financial support of the Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 with the title „Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment".

to recent events and to analyze the dynamics of the society and its defense mechanisms against issues created by the process of globalization.

2. Issue context

The contemporary world, the dynamic of foreign relations and the modifications of the social dimensions have known a radical change in the last two decades. The collapse of the bipolar system based on the ideological-political antagonism between West and East has created not only a power void at an international level, but it also opened the path towards new challenges for the states of the world. The accelerations of the global interconnectivity have led to a quicker globalization process with direct effect on human lives and on communities. The postwar technological revolution and the expansion of mass communication means had created a special context at the end of the past century, a context which modified the human perception on time and space and which put under siege consecrated values from different regions of the world.

Power, security and the threats on security have known a substantial change through their adaptation to the new directions of global development and to the new technological accomplishments. As a consequence, violence and use of violence in order to obtain political result or access to power adapted themselves to the modern instrument. In this context, the prevailing of some conservative mindsets, but especially radical ones, have created a solid base for new hot points of violence and offered a stronger legitimacy to those involved in the social conflicts of the new millennium. From this standpoint, the birth of contemporary fundamentalist discourse can be considered to be the sum of several historic, social and economic effects catalyzed by contemporary dilemmas and social issues.

These contemporary dilemmas with the difficult history of the 20th century, legacy of the two world war and the territorial changes after the First World War are not helping the fragile social structures of eastern European states, which are facing their own historical fears catalyzed by the contemporary threats. On the other hand the cultural, religious, ethnic diversity in the Eastern European region creates real cohabitation problems which are magnified in the light of the globalization phenomenon[2].

3. The “sins” of globalization and integration

The last quarter of century has known a major change at the level of interactions and social exchanges were the exchanged speed and time managed to change the human perspective over the surrounding environment. By bringing closer the distant geographical areas of the world, creating a real time virtual world the technology revolution from the second part of the 20th century managed to offer new opportunities for social development but created cultural flow corridors that in some cases produced negative effects to. In this contemporary frame of events the globalization is view many times in a pessimistic light, a destructive force which is attempting to the old ways of several communities and society.

[2] Stephen Iwan Griffiths, *National and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security*, SIPRI Research Report No. 5, 1993, pp. 4-14

The idea of center and periphery, or other views of neo-Marxist[3] school are representing the backbone negative of attitudes toward the globalization process, where the imperial expansion of some economical or cultural powers are criticized and blamed for almost every negative development in peripheral societies. The reality is that the societies are not prepared for the effects created by the technological revolution and the fastness of information flow/exchange through the virtual or physic pathways[4]. The new social issues, political problems or economic crisis cannot be handled in real time by societies or political leadership due to the complexity of the interaction web in which these issues are integrated.

On the other hand this complex web of interconnections, interdependencies or exchanges is creating the basis for the rise of populist and radical discourse, due to the simple fact that every negative event or direction of development cannot be separated from the others in this way all of discourse logic is targeted to the big picture represented by the process of globalization and the "cultural imperialism"[5]. In this way the globalization became the main element of radical discourse and its effects are expanded on every dimension of social life, even on ones that are not affected by the process itself. The globalization as external economic constraint[6] or the European integration[7] has became the favorite elements of radical discourse in Europe, especially Eastern Europe, and paired with the autarchic national identity centered ideas had become the leading argument of any radical discourse from the soft to the hard one.

For example the Greek or Hungarian social life and the changes related to the global economic context created a proper ground for this type of discourse, where the external interference over and the imagined threats over national identity managed to catalyze the society in the direction of a radical point of view over a short period of time. Of course this attitude changes have real issues in the background but it is hilarious to say that Hungary's main problem are related to the expansion of cultural imperialism of the west or to the Rroma community which is creating a nationwide climate of insecurity. Neither the Greek base of radical discourse[8] has more legitimacy and covers little part of the reality, not because their imaginary threats and source of problems are represented by the German republic and the European Union or euro-zone, but because their welfare is bound to the idea of an unexplored money source (represented by the world war II reparation and debt[9]) and to the idea of autarchic national future. Both cases and their radical discourse promoters have some merits but the globalized world and the complex interdependency is based on some rules of competition and regulated economic flows cannot be deconstructed by the will of one state or nor should be possible.

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[3] David Held, Anthony McGrew, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization. Beyond the Great Divide*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007

[4] James Lull, *Media. Communication. Culture: A global Approach*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, *passim*

[5] John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, cap. 1

[6] Colin Hay, Ben Rosamond, Globalization, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives in *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.9/2, 2002, pp. 147-167

[7] *The rise of anti-EU populism: why, and what to do about it?* in European Policy Center's Policy Brief from 12 September 2011

[8] Greek support for the EU in 2007 was +26 percent but by 2012 it changed to -63 percent. Support for the two biggest political parties, New Democracy and PASOK, has also collapsed in favor of Syriza party

[9] Alexis Tsipras lead government are demanding World War II reparations for German occupation of Greece in the amount of ~250 billion euro

In parallel with the globalization the European integration represents the second set of negative arguments for the rise of national discourse due to the union's purpose as a unifying political structure. From its beginning the European construction was based on the idea of integration and consolidation trough an economical and political union which could ride the tide of cold war military or economic conflict. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in the eastern countries, the European Union had the opportunity to expand and unify the European continent under one stander. The European integration became an opportunity for undeveloped eastern country to become members in a select club of states with political and economical power which could sustain and help their need to develop and consolidate their societies. After the accession of the first 10 states in 2004 and the last two in 2007 the European Union became aware of the burden of integration and consolidation of the newcomers, whom economy and social structures were far undeveloped and in some way incompatible with the early members. The first cracks in the European construction appeared at the moment of the ratification of the constitutional treaty, followed by the economic crisis which managed to affect in depth the economy of every member. With the deepening of the economic crisis, the national economies were put under enormous pressure for which the government was unable to answer in a pragmatic and clear way. This lack of decision and consensus over the actions that needs to be taking, the radical discourse of euro-skeptics and anti-globalists begin to rise and take roots in the affected societies.

The populist discourse and the general negative reactions toward external interference and international financial institutions started to take shape under the umbrella of new/old political formations which took profit of this political opportunity and acceded to the power trough elections. This was the case of the Hungarian Jobbik Party, Greek Syriza, British UKIP, etc. By the year 2013 the wave of radical discourse and radical movements started toward international institution, organization reach it's high point, when the xenophobic, racial, hate speech became integrated part of the public discourse vocabulary becoming the symbol of virtue in politics and society.

4. The "virtue" of national identity

"National identity, at the basic level, is an awareness of difference, that is, a feeling and recognition of 'we' and 'they' " [10] is probably the most simple but the most close to the reality definition of identity at national level. Of course this definition does not cover the complexity of identity issues of the nations as Anthony D. Smith is doing it in his studies[11], but from the perspective of contemporary problems this antagonistic view is the main base of the raise of radical discourse. The difference between academic definition and conceptualization is slightly distinct from the identity perception of radical discourse target groups. Ernest Gellner[12] point of view regarding the difference between the national identity and its perception at the top or bottom of the society creates two set of interpretation and understanding of the elements of identity.

[10] Yoonmi Lee, *Modern Education, Textbooks, and the Image of a Nation*, London, Routledge, 2012
[11] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin Books, 1991, passim
[12] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, passim.

In Smith's opinion the nation has multi-dimensional structure with five basic attributes which are defining their basic values and actions related to neighbors or other nations[13].

1. Nations need to have a territory or a geographical homeland
2. They have o common myth and historical memory
3. A common culture, which need to be a mass culture and it need to be a public one
4. They need to have a common judicial/legal system applicable for every individual of the nation (citizenship)
5. Common economy and territorial mobility for the individuals

This definition excludes the nations without states from the equation but from historical experience it can be said that creating myths or enemies of the group does not need the existence of the state, this process exist in almost all communities the statehood offers just the juridical and political legitimacy for actions. The effects of globalization or regional integration affects them in the same way that affects the nations with states, just the speed of cultural decay/integration differs due to the lack of some kind of institutional protection and preservation mechanism.

Smith's definition may be a clear one for the political or cultural leadership of a nation, but for the masses this type of definition sometimes is incomprehensible. In these cases they tend to create their own set of attributes which are more or less in concordance with the reality or with the need of the nation itself. Mostly the mass creates or modifies attributes related to the common myth system and territorial boundaries, to justify their contemporary social, economical or political actions or failures. The national history and the myths surrounding it are defining the national reactions to several external or internal issues that are jeopardizing the ideal image of the national identity[14].

In case of Eastern Europe the national identity and its virtual border were put under siege from external changes not only at cultural or financial level but on political level to. After the fall of the eastern block and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the sense of social security, military security or economical stability has stepped in the world of free market and free competition. Many of these countries were not fully prepared to make this step. In the case of Democratic Republic of Germany the thing were pretty clear, the Federal state took over the initiative and managed to know how transfer. Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland had some soft dictatorial regimes which created a proper context for some type of economical and social freedom. On the other hand the case of Romania or Bulgaria where the political regimes were more aligned to the hard line, and the political corruption and nepotism weakened the structures of the state, did not managed to adapt themselves in to the new form of economical interaction. This context and the emerging economical crisis (from 2008) created a socio-economic climate in which the disappointment sustained by the sentiment of social insecurity and economical weakness created a proper ground for the new radical discourse in the public space. This social weakness and the imagined threats represented by the globalization, European Union or other external factors managed to putt under siege the sentiment of national security and social welfare. Probably at academic or professional circles

[13] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 14-15
[14] Stefan Berger, On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe in European *History Quarterly* July 2009/39, pp.490-502

the relation of globalization with the contemporary social and economical issues are organized in somewhat logical and methodologically correct manner, in the public discourse this became impossible due to the structure of the promoters of the new discourse based on half truths or misguiding explications. In these times of crisis the radical discourse managed to use the weakness of the public and put the national identity under an imaginary siege. This imaginary siege created the need for defense mechanisms, based on the specificity of the national identity and many times regardless of historical truth or social reality.

This process of siege mentality on the other hand managed to create a set of fake imagined defense mechanisms which had no relation with the reality or with the needs of society to resolve the social or economical issues. For this the best example is the Rroma community from Hungary[15], Bulgaria[16] and Slovakia[17], where the economical degradation of the entire society and the nationalist/extremist discourse created the imaginary enemy or scapegoat. The search for scapegoats was extended by the rising radical groups, and the list of enemies of national identity was compiled from representatives from every dimension of social life. Regardless of the true or false nature of the issue the radical discourse grouped the enemies of national identity in three major groups:

Economic enemies: European Union, International Monetary Fund/World Bank, European Central Bank, World Trade Organization, international corporations, banking sector, import companies (for not promoting national products), George Soros, Jews, etc.

Cultural enemies: globalization, the United States of America as cultural imperialist state, corporations, Hollywood, foreign literature, foreign television stations, foreign state (usually neighbor states), pop music personalities, other ethnic groups (Gypsies, Hungarians. Romanians, Slovakians, Greeks), etc.

Political enemies: USA, European Union, Russian Federation, neighbor states, international military or political organizations as NATO or UN, Israel, Ukraine etc.

As we can see the above list contains an amalgam of organizations, international actors or private persons which at some point are on the black list of hate speech or scapegoat list for several extremist organization or political parties. In fact the national identity foggy concept is under siege by anything that is foreign or has somehow influence negatively the society in which the extremist discourse has a somewhat important presence. By a short analysis or glance at this type of pro national identity discourse any reader can see the relative disorder in ideas and concepts due to the fact that the language that needs to be aggressive not necessary true. In this context it is no surprise the huge success of Hungarian and Greek nationalist/pro-national identity parties' electoral success in the last years. Due to their propaganda concentrated on the siege mentality and on the need to save the national identity from real or imaginary enemies managed to gather for the a large public support regardless of the relation of their discourse with the reality. In a perverse way Hungarian Jobbik managed to convince the public that the foreign enemies are attempting on the welfare of the state, and the Greek Syriza managed to convince the public that the economic crisis is not based on

[15] *Accelerating Pattern of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*, A Report from the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard University, Boston February 2014
[16] *Factsheet: Roma Rights in Jeopardy*, European Roma Right Center, 16 February 2012
[17] *Roma people in Europe in the 21st century: violence, exclusion, insecurity*, European Association for the Defense of Human Rights, 2012

almost 20 years of fiscal policies based on lie and fake financial reports but on international created context.

Conclusion

The rise of radical discourse and the siege mentality created by the contemporary global context has managed to influence public perception over the attributes of national identity in a way that not every times produces the best results for the societies in discussion. Imaginary issues created by the process of globalization or regional integration have an impact over the public mentalities and offers opportunities for political or social groups to create a set of defense mechanisms and to accede to power on the basis of fear exploitation. This process of radicalization of discourse over the national identity issues is more and more present in the eastern European public sphere, although it has some roots in the reality the majority of arguments are based on fake solutions or ideas.

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PROPHECIES ABOUT MANAGERS: THE STEREOTYPES[1]

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Abstract: Research of image managers, relating to stereotypes, make necessary the use of theories and concepts of social psychology. Intuition helps us a lot in practice but it is still inaccurate. Often cannot be accompanied by arguments and devoid of system consistency. Constituting the interpersonal relations, interpersonal communication, common sense psychology is deeply marked by bias, of social stereotypes. We can change the real situations so as to correspond to our stereotypes, be remembering wrong information or conflicting information nereținând with our opinions.

Keywords: ***manager, social stereotypes, prejudice, social, image***.

Studiul asupra managerilor a impus o evaluare a percepțiilor stereotipice ale populației. Cercetarea imaginii managerilor, a stereotipurilor referitoare la aceştia, fac necesare folosirea unor teorii şi concepte din psihologia socială.

Dorindu-se o identificare a stereotipurilor aplicate asupra mangerilor managerilor la nivelul populaţiei, heteroimaginea managerilor şi autoimaginea managerilor, metoda aleasă a fost cea cantitativă. Eşantionul anchetat a fost selectat special din rândul celor ce frecventază cursurile Facultăţii FEAA, Univ. „Al. I. Cuza", specializarea management, Iaşi, plecând de la ideea că studenţii de la această specializare şi-au însuşit deja noţiunile teoretice despre management. Chestionarul a fost aplicat studenţilor de la *Facultatea* de Economie si Administrarea Afacerilor, datorită familiarizării acestora cu tema cercetării. Se doreşte evidenţierea stereotipurilor prin folosirea showcard-urilor în cadrul chestionarului.Alegând ca specializare acest domeniu, subiecţii care sunt cercetaţi, (managerii), se află în sfera lor de interes, în acelaşi timp, studenţii nepracticând încă managementul nu sunt detaşaţi de gândirea subiectivă, comună, încadrându-se în aspectele stereotipe.

Fiecare întrebare din chestionar va fi analizată în cele ce urmează în funcţie de răspunsurile existente, acestea fiind exprimate în procente şi concentrate în grafice specifice. Chestionarul cuprinde un număr de 9 întrebări, fiecare întrebare conţinând mai mulţi itemi cu referire strictă la modul în care sunt percepuţi managerii.

Din pespectiva investigată cantitativ s-a aplicat chestionarul prin care se urmăreşte, în opinia populaţiei, capitalul de valori caracteristice managerilor, şi identificarea stereotipurilor în opinia populaţiei.

Cu ajutorul showcard-ului se intenţionează evidenţierea gândirii stereotipe a populaţiei. Imaginile vor înfăţişa atât manageri femei cât şi manageri bărbaţi. În cadrul grupului de fotografii manageri bărbaţi sunt ataşate şi fotografii ale unor modele purtând

[1] ***Această lucrare a fost publicată cu sprijinul financiar al proiectului „Sistem integrat de îmbunătățire a calității cercetării doctorale și postdoctorale din România și de promovare a rolului științei în societate", POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652, finanțat prin Fondul Social European, Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013. This work was supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652, co-financed by the European Social Fund within the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2007 – 2013.***

costume tip business. În cadrul grupului de manageri femei nu vor exista poze cu modele, fiind alese doar femei cu aspect fizic placut. Intenţia este de manipulare a chestionaţilor pentru a evidenţia o eventuală gandire stereotipă.

Întrebării din chestionar „*Care dintre aceste persoane, în opinia dvs., ocupă funcţia de manageri?"* unde exista posibilitatea de a da mai multe răspunsuri, îi sunt ataşate un număr de 10 imagini. Mai exact: caracteristice după care pot fi recunoscuţi aceştia, valorile care îi caracterizează, inventarierea trăsăturilor caracteristice -*Ei, managerii sunt*- a trăsăturilor specifice profesiei, asocierea managerilor cu alte grupuri profesionale, clasificări de gen a managerilor şi folosirea unui *Showcard* pentru alegerea unor imagini ale unor personae care în opinia celor anchetaţi ocupă funcţia de manager. Răspunsurile la întrebările deschise au fost extrase, codificate şi introduse în baza de date în vederea depistării stereotipurilor. În urma procesului de codificare, se poate constata faptul că majoritatea codurilor se regăsesc în răspunsurile tuturor întrebărilor deschise după cum urmează:

Q- Enumeraţi maxim 5 răspunsuri după care recunoaşteţi un manager.

CODURI: 1 Comportament;
2 Comunicare;
3 Etică;
4 Expresia sinelui;
5 Atribuţii profesionale;
6 Caracteristici personale;
7 Imagine;
8 Autoritate;
98 Altele.

Q- Gândind în termini de "Ei, managerii sunt", oferiţi 5 răspunsuri(cuvinte, propoziţii), bazate pe ceea ce vă vine imediat în minte.

CODURI. 1 Formatori ;
2 comunicare;
3 Etică;
4 Expresia sinelui;
5 Competenţe profesionale;
6 Caracteristici personale;
7 Imagine;
8 Autoritate;
98 Altele.

Q- Când spuneţi „Ei, managerii", ce alte grupuri profesionale vă vin în minte?

CODURI- 1 Afaceri;
2 Politică;
3 Funcţii de conducere;
4 Subordonaţi;
5 Alte domenii cu studii superioare;
98 Altele.

Q- Când spuneţi „Ei, managerii", ce imagini , simboluri, prototipuri vă vin în minte?

CODURI- 1 Analogii;
2 Simboluri de prestigiu;
3 Simboluri monetare;
4 Imagine;
5 Autoritate;
6 Caracteristici personale;
98 Altele.

Q- Prin ce s-ar caracteriza clasa managerială actuală din România?

CODURI- 1 Contravalori generale;
2 Contravalori profesionale;
3 Expresia sinelui (forme ale individualismului);
4 Competenţă profesională;
5 Caracteristici personale, native, empirice;
98 Altele,

Opinia generală exprimată de subiecţi este faptul că recunoaşterea mangerilor este în funcţie de imagine. Caracteristicile dominante ale imaginei evocate de subiecţi sunt: *îmbracăminte; vestimentaţie; fizionomie; carismă; aspect; şarm; trăsături fizice; ţinută; prezenţă fizică; aspectul chipului-impune respect; poziţia corpului.*

Importanţa criteriului *imagine* reflectă gândirea stereotipică a populaţiei: „Managerii sunt îmbrăcaţi într-un anumit fel... managerii au carismă, şarm, un tip specific de trăsături fizice etc.”

Faptul că imaginea este primul răspuns majoritar din cei 5 itemi ai Q1 subliniază aspectele şi raţionamentele rezultate din partea teoretică a lucrării, de unde pot concluziona că baza reprezentării sociale a managerilor din România este imaginea fizică sau cea creată mental despre aceştia, locul şi rolul acestui criteriu fiind cel mai important în recunoaşterea managerilor.

Q- *Showcard-* reprezintă cu excepţia fig.6 şi a fig.8 numai imagini cu persoane ce deţin funcţii de conducere mai exact manageri. Aceste imagini au fost găsite, aleatoriu, pe internet.

Pentru a putea sublinia eventualitatea existenţei unor stereotipuri de imagine, fotografiile au fost alese astfel:

Fig.1-imaginea unei femei manager, frumoasă, îmbrăcată business, a cărei atitudine impune siguranţă.;

Fig.2- femeie manager îmbrăcată business care poate induce ideea că ar fi manger;

Fig.3- femeie manager în costum de ski, fotografiată în aer liber;

Fig.4- femeie manager a cărei atitudine impune autoritate, siguranţă, încredere. Poziţia corpului şi a mâinilor, a spaţiului despre care se poate presupune uşor că este un birou, poate determina ideea *că este manager, idee indusă şi de întrebarea în sine;*

Fig.5- femeie manager într-un ambient plăcut, cald, modern, frumoasă, într-o poziţie care induce părerea că este conştientă de faptul că va fi fotografiată, o poziţei a corpului gândită din punct de vedere artistic;

Fig.6- un bărbat îmbracat în costum de mire, angajat al unei case de modă;

Fig.7- b*ărbat manager îmbrăcat business, nu are figură autoritară, nu induce neapărat ideea că deţine o funcţie de conducere;*

Fig.8- un bărbat îmbracat în ţinută caussal, angajat al unei case de modă;

Fig.9- bărbat cu cămaşă şi cravată, manager. Acest fapt nu poate fi indus decât de ţinuta în sine;

Fig.10- bărbat, manager, fotografia nu arată decât chipul, spaţiul fiind în aer liber. Nimic nu induce ideea de manager.

Ierarhia răspunsurilor o regăsim astfel:

Fig. I

Poziţia	Figura	General	Figura	M	Figura	F
1.	*4*	*74,5%*	*4*	*88,9%*	*4*	*73,3%*
2.	*1*	*70,9%*	*7*	*77,8%*	*7*	*44,4%*
3.	*6*	*65,3%*	*6;1*	*66,7%*	*6*	*33,3%*
4.	*7*	*49,1%*	*2; 9*	*55,6%*	*2*	*20%*
5.	*2*	*25,5%*	*5*	*44,4%*	*5; 8*	*13,3%*
6.	*5*	*18,2%*	*8 ;10*	*22,2%*	*9*	*8,9%*
7.	*9*	*16,4%*	*3*	*11,1%*	*3 ;10*	*6,7%*
8.	*8*	*14,5%*	-	-	-	-
9.	*10*	*10,9%*	-	-	-	-
10.	*3*	*7,3%*	-	-	-	-

Analizând pe mărimea valorilor în alegeri, prima este figura nr. 4 care reprezintă imaginea unei femei ce are majoritatea caracteristicilor pe care subiecţii chestionaţi le-au dezvoltat pe tot parcursul seriilor de întrebări adresate, ca fiind cele mai importante valori ce caracterizează clasa managerială din România: *atitudine, autoritate, siguranţă, încredere, un chip plăcut, birou, vestimentaţia.*

Primele 5 alegeri cuprind ca şi caracteristică comună ţinuta. Confuzia creată de cele două figuri: 6 şi 8, a fost provocată tot de ţinută, care în nici una din imagini nu este business ci la fig.6 *costum de mire* iar la fig.8 ţinută *causal*. Fig.6 are în unanimitate poziţia 3 atât în ierarhia generală cât şi în cea pe sexe.

Pe ultimul loc este cu desavârşire imaginea femeii îmbrăcate în costum ski, părând că cei chestionaţi resping ideea conform căreia un manager poate fi şi în alt spaţiu sau vestimentaţie decât cele ce implică funcţia.

Distanţa dintre prima poziţie şi ultima pare să fie determinată de trăsăturile ce sunt stabilite la nivel mental de către cei chestionaţi*: caracteristici de impact al imaginei de manager* şi *atributele unei personalităţi carismatice*. În determinarea funcţiei de manager plecând de la *o singură sursă - imaginea din fotografii, se pare că nu există prejudecăţi de gen.*

Concluzii

Din rezultatele obţinute per ansamblu în acest studiu rezultă faptul că imaginea managerilor din România nu este neapărat una de top dacă ne referim la *atribuţiile*

profesionale. În opinia celor chestionaţi, managerii nu depăşesc limitele informaţiilor conceptuale personale dobândite în cadrul specializării pe care o urmează, cea de management. Populaţia nu este interesată de performaţele profesionale, de faptul că unui manager bun i se datorează succesul unei organizaţii, implicit crearea unor locuri de muncă, evoluţia angajaţilor.

Catalizator al celor două medii: organizaţional şi extraorganizaţional, stereotipurile de imagine vin în favoarea managerului, chiar şi atunci când anumite aspecte sunt negative la nivelul populaţiei.

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INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

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Abstract: If concerning the individual and his identity from the perspective of its own or of the others representations on the self we stand in a phenomenological or hermeneutical perspective, addressing this issue in terms of human and socio-political sends inevitably to the dialogue within wider thinking frames. Liberal and conservative visions that I have considered in this research make it possible to explore the relationship between individual rationality and collective reasoning on the one hand, and on the other between the national dimension and the global dimension of human existence. The individualism as a philosophical and moral doctrine on the one hand, the liberalism and the conservatism as political and philosophical doctrines on the other in connection with the issue of designing the individual identity on their background provides the premises of a comparative approach necessary for understanding how the seemingly disjoint concepts go hand in hand.

Keywords*: individual, identity, self construction, liberal philosophy, conservative vision*

1. Identitate și individualitate. Aspecte terminologice și metodologice

Din perspectiva individului și a identității sale politice și sociale, globalizarea este acel fenomen care permite - între altele - ignorarea voită a potențialului public al vieții private. Altfel spus, în condițiile în care posibilitățile de participare civică și afirmare publică sunt în principiu din ce în ce mai favorabile (afirmate și consacrate legal), cu atât mai mult individul este tentat să-și descopere propria identitate afectivă, proiectând-o în sfera culturii ale cărei tangențe cu politicul se realizează în numele unor valori transpolitice. Puterea individului în „situația" globalizării constă între altele în aceea că el își permite să fie indiferent față de politic, folosindu-și deprinderile și atuurile civice ca mijloc, nu ca scop, nu pentru a dobândi putere sau privilegii, ci pentru a se construi pe sine. Cum identitatea postmodernă în condițiile globalizării se construiește, dar se poate și pierde, ea trebuie în permanență redescoperită, recucerită, reinventată.

Dincolo de subiectivitatea care marchează individualitatea, identitatea se construiește în confruntare cu alteritatea, prin reflectări reciproce. În cartea *Contingență, ironie, solidaritate*, Richard Rorty concepe contingența individuală drept produs al timpului și întâmplării. Pe de altă parte, el vede în aceasta „amprenta ascunsă" pe care o poartă toate manifestările noastre, conștinetizarea diferențelor proprii, prin care ne distingem de alții: „Dacă ai putea găsi cuvinte sau forme distinctive pentru a marca propria individualitate – atunci ai demonstra că nu ai fost o copie sau o reproducere".1

Cu privire la imprecizia termenului, Ortega y Gasset observa, în capitolul „Individ și organizație" din Europa și ideea de națiune că „individ" este un cuvând care „nu ne spune în

[1] Richard Rorty, *Contingență, ironie și solidaritate*, traducere de Sorana Ștefanov, București, Editura All Educațional, 1998, p.65.

mod răspicat ce încearcă a defini" și „nu îndeplinește misiunea cuvintelor de-a ne înfățișa fără echivocuri excesive obiectul la care se referă". Potrivit filosofului spaniol, vocabula „individ" nu a fost la origine un cuvânt din limbă, ci dimpotrivă: „ea s-a născut de la bun început ca termen tehnic confecționat de către gramaticieni și filosofi".2

Ca dovadă, în dicționarul termenilor filosofiei greceşti, Francis E. Peters consemnează noțiunea *todé ti* ca „acest ceva, individ". Pentru Aristotel, arată Peters, „existentul individual concret" este „singularul ca opus universalului", ca substanță. Ceea ce conferă individualitate substanței sau existentului este *hýle*, materia, dar și cauza imanentă a lucrurilor, care îndeplinește funcția de principiu al individuației, precum *eidos* (forma). Eidos fiind indivizibil, poate servi numai la constituirea unei ființe în cadrul unui gen sau al unei specii date. Or, indivizii ce fac parte dintr-o specie infinită sunt numeric distincți datorită materiei lor. Pentru Aristotel, compunerea unui individ (Socrate sau Callias) este o procedură complexă, care poate fi concepută ca impunere a unei succesiuni de *eide* din ce în ce mai specifice. Fiecare dintre aceste forme este impusă unei materii din ce în ce mai informate, astfel că în hyle există distincții mergând de la o materie primă, trecând prin materii din ce în ce mai informate, până la material existentului individual3.

Cu alte cuvinte, de la începuturile filosofiei individul și identitatea se compun din distilarea alterităților, astfel încât, pentru a reveni la Ortega y Gasset, "Termenul individ, creat în Grecia, tradus de către eudiții latini, banalizat de scolasticieni, a sfârșit prin a intra în limba generală purtând în sine, confuz amestecate, toate semnificațiile pe care i le injectaseră cele mai diverse filosofii, filosofii complet necunoscute de cea mai mare parte dintre vorbitorii acelei limbi"4. În ziua de azi, continuă filosoful, cuvântul „individ" ar trebui să semnifice „acest om unic", dar pentru aceasta „ar fi nevoie ca vocabulele limbii să-și fi păstrat plasticitatea, să fie capabile de a primi marca inspirației noastre așa cum ceara primește pecetea."5

În această pecete, de fapt, ar trebui să distingem „sentimentul de identitate" care potrivit lui Erik Erikson (*Identity, Youth and crisis*, 1968) poate fi una personală, bazată pe sentimental unei continuități existențiale în timp (i.e., sentimental de a fi același și recunoașterea de către ceilalți a acestei continuități) și a unei identități a „eului" (sentimental de de a fi într-un anumit fel, de a fi o anume persoană, de a avea un anumit stil de individualitate).

Această abordare psihologică trimite la imaginea pe care o are individual despre sine, care presupune și cultivarea sinelui. De ce este importantă cultivarea sinelui pentru manifestarea omului „global" actual ne arată Michel Foucault. Etica elaborată cu ajutorul principiului „convertirii la sine însuși" arată cum „cultivarea sinelui îi oferă omului activ o regulă de limitarea cantitativă (a nu lăsa însărcinările politice, grija pentru bani, diferite obligații să-ți invadeze existența, împingându-te până la a uita de tine însuți"; „primatul raportării la sine mai permite de asemenea instituirea independenței subiectului în toate

[2] Ortega y Gasset, *Europa și ideea de națiune*, Traducere de Sorin Mărculescu, București, Humanitas, 1998, p.159.
[3] Francis E. Peters, *Termenii filosofiei grecești*, traducere de Dragan Stoianovici, București, Humanitas, 2007, pp.137-140; p.181.
[4] Ortega y Gasset, *op.cit.*, p.163.
[5] *Ibid.*, p.170.

celelalte relaţii la limitarea extinderii cărora a contribuit" – iar această observaţie aş lega-o de premise dela care am pornit; chiar dacă „cultul pe care trebuie să ni-l închinăm nouă înşine, austeritatea preocupărilor de sine" reprezintă „un instrument de luptă rezervat elitelor intelectuale" – acestă achiziţie subiectivă are impact general în societate. Fiindcă există trei forme de luptă : „împotriva dominaţiilor (politice); împotriva exploatărilor (economice); împotriva aservirilor (etice)".6

Secolul XX a fost marcat de ultimul tip de lupte. Pornind de la tehnicile sinelui putem concepe identitatea drept recunoaştere de sine în primul rând, drept afirmare a sinelui, a ceea ce avem caracteristic spre deosebire de alţii, a notelor personale prin care ne autoproiectăm la nivel social şi închidem astfel cercul identităţii individuale cu aceea socială.

În acest sens, individul, identitatea şi definirile care le asociază pot fi situate în perspectiva a două curente majore de gândire care au informat aceste două doctrine ce şi-au disputat întâietatea de-a lungul timpului în forme mai paşnice sau mai violente: liberalismul şi conservatorismul.

În continuare voi schiţa sensurile identităţii individuale în contextul filosofiei liberale, prin comparaţie cu filosofia conservatoare, integrând în planul general al confruntării celor două doctrine şi câteva consideraţii metodologice.

Dacă privind individul şi identitatea sa din perspectiva reprezentărilor proprii sau ale celorlalţi asupra sinelui ne situăm într-o perspectivă fenomenologică sau hermeneutică, la nivel socio-uman acest subiect este propriu atât ştiinţei, cât şi ştiinţelor politice, înscriindu-se totodată printre acelea care fac posibilă deschiderea metodologică, abandonarea rigidităţii şi a iluziilor unei ştiinţe în sensul „tare" al termenului. Între altele, tema identităţii individuale se înscrie în abordarea tradiţională a domeniului, aceea a teoriei politice normativiste. Norma presupune o formă de atins, forma nu poate apărea fără a respecta, a descoperi sau a-şi „inventa" anumite norme. Atunci când vorbim despre identitatea unui individ sau a lumii în care acesta trăieşte avem în minte un „scenariu" teoretic pe baza căruia se desfăşoară discuţia. Abordarea normativistă a faptelor istorice şi politice iniţiată de Kant în capitolele etice şi antropologice ale filosofiei sale este orientată spre identificarea regulilor ce transcend contextele. În ultimele decenii ale secolului al XX-lea aceasta a revenit în forţă în filosofia politică, principalii reprezentanţi ai normativismului fiind Habermas şi Rawls care îşi propun fiecare în limbajul propriu să descrie condiţiile unei societăţi juste, sub forma unei critici a politicii. Aspectele normative ţin de finalitatea unei construcţii teoretice, iar o astfel de perspectivă este necesară deoarece o concepţie teoretică este importantă în primul rând pentru idealul pe care îl propune, aici tipul de individ, de proiectarea acestui model şi de noţiunile valorice, evaluative în sfera relaţiilor şi practicii politice – fără a sucomba în ideologie[7].

De asemenea, viziunile liberală şi conservatoare pe care le am în vedere în conexiune cu problema proiecţiei identităţii pe fundalul acestora nu sunt străine nici de teoria alegerii raţionale preocupată de condiţiilor care definesc si constrâng alegerile sociale. Pornind de la

6 Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutica subiectului*, Traducere de Bogdan Ghiu.Iaşi, Polirom, 2004, pp.521; 524.

[7] În ideologie înţeleasă în funcţia sa legitimatoare a puterii, căci altfel ideologia poate fi asociată identităţii în sensul „necesităţii pentru un grup social de a-şi da o imagine de sine, de a se reprezenta, în sensul teatral al cuvântului, de a juca şi a se pune în scenă" – Paul Ricoeur, „Ideologie, utopie şi politică" în *Eseuri de hermeneutică*, Traducere de Vasile Tonoiu, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 1995, pp. 207-208.

alegerile făcute de persoanele individuale, înţelese ca actori raţionali, în cadrul acesteia sunt construite modele teoretice care încercă să ţină cont de o varietate de situaţii empirice. O operă cu valoare paradigmatică în acest sens este *Choice and Individual Values* (1951) a lui K.J. Arrow, unde autorul „s-a concentrat asupra modalităţilor prin care preferinţele individuale pot fi agregate pentru a construi o funcţie de bunăstare socială”[8] – aspect revelator pentru strategiile identitare individuale într-o lume globală. „Individualisml metodologic” propriu acestei teorii bazate pe „supoziţia că explicarea deciziei sociale trebuie să se realizeze, în ultimă instanţă, prin apelul la acţiunile actorilor individuali implicaţi”[9] poate fi pus în corespondenţă cu individualismul ontologic şi fenomenologic propriu unei abordări identitare. De asemenea, „teoria alegerii raţionale admite că actorii politici sunt raţionali, că ei îşi urmăresc interesele individuale şi caută să-şi maximizeze beneficiile”. Or, ipoteza acesteia este liberalismul, mai precis filosofia liberală. Pe de altă parte, cum „există o tensiune între raţionalitatea individuală şi cea colectivă”[10] considerăm că o confruntare a concepţiei liberale asupra individului cu concepţia conservatoare asupra acestuia este relevantă în această privinţă.

2. Individualismul liberal

Din perspectiva individualismului liberal atât ca filosofie centrată pe afirmarea propriei identităţi sociale, politice şi economice, cât şi în calitate de teorie şi practică a justiţiei într-un stat democratic aflate deopotrivă sub semnul libertăţii creatoare – individul reprezintă o valoare în sine şi în consecinţă acesta se află şi în centrul concepţiei despre organizarea socială.

Aventura individualismului liberal în accepţiunea de filosofie a libertăţii exprimată prin autocreaţie în cadrul comunităţii porneşte de la constatarea teoretică potrivit căreia apărarea libertăţilor individuale şi cultivarea capacităţilor şi competenţelor omului reprezintă sfera mai largă în care se înscriu toate speciile de liberalism, pentru a ajunge la contestarea universalismului abstract al acestei viziuni, în numele necesităţii unor proiecte referitoare la oameni, şi nu la natura umană.

Georges Burdeau spre sfârşitul secolului trecut pune în evidenţă datele originare ale concepţiei asupra libertăţii ce-au informat acest curent de gândire începând cu indivizii care au „făcut” lumea modernă adoptând o „filosofie a reuşitei”. Că această libertate se exteriorizează în plan economic prin promovarea învingătorilor, că socialmente, ea îi instalează într-o poziţie dominantă nu motivează indignarea pe tema inegalităţii, căci diferenţierile inerente pe care le provoacă nu-i infirmă universalitatea: „ele probează numai că dacă toţi oameni au vocaţia libertăţii, îi revine fiecăruia realizarea promisiunilor acesteia prin utilizarea pe care ştie să i-o dea”[11].

Proclamând valoarea absolută a fiinţei individuale, individualismul liberal se situează totodată la confluenţa unor curente de gândire precum acela al Reformei, al umanismului şi al raţionalismului. Astfel întemeiat epistemic şi asociat cu iluminismul „individualismul liberal

[8] Cf. Adrian Miroiu, *Fundamentele politicii. Volumul I, Preferinţe şi alegeri colective*, Iaşi, Polirom, 2006, p. 23.
[9] *Ibidem.*
[10] *Ibidem*, p. 24.
[11] Georges Burdeau, *Le libéralisme*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1979, p. 28.

îşi interzice considerarea prin intermediul contingenţelor. El fondează autonomia individuală pe esenţa omului şi nu pe existenţa sa, astfel încât acestei autonomii să-i fie indiferente condiţiilor concrete în care se află individul”[12].

Individualismul implică „valorizarea independenţei” (Alain Renaut, *L’ère de l’individu*), ceea ce nu exclude substituirea progresivă şi diferenţială a subiectivităţii („ipseităţii”, cum ar spune Ricoeur) cu individualitatea în definirea identităţii proprii.

Dintre „ideile-cheie” care ar configura după John Gray fie „matricea”, fie „sindromul” liberal (individualismul, universalismul, meliorismul, progresul) – „individualismul moral sau normativ” stipulează ca valoare fundamentală viaţa şi gândirea individului uman, fiind aşadar o variantă a umanismului (potrivit observaţiei lui Raz, specifică Gray), adică a „credinţei moderniste, având rădăcini adânci în Iudeo-Creştinism, potrivit căreia numai fiinţele umane şi formele lor de viaţă au în ultimă instanţă valoare”.[13]

După Joel Feinberg conceptul autonomiei presupune o concepţie adecvată a sinelui drept subiect al libertăţii: „un sine suficient de restrâns, încât să-l putem compara cu alte elemente interne ale sinelui total pe care îl coordonează, dar de asemenea suficient de larg încât să includă elementele constitutive ale convingerilor proprii, credinţelor, planurilor de viaţă, obiectivelor, principiilor morale”. Feinberg consideră că „sinele subiect al libertăţii” îl coordonează pe „acela mai larg (subiect al identităţii)”. Atributele interioare cele mai profunde ale celui dintâi care îl guvernează pe cel de-al doilea „includ nu numai Raţiunea, dar şi elementele cu care aceasta operează şi care vor deveni convingeri, idealuri şi scopuri aparţinând reţelei ierarhice a principiilor ce definesc persoana, greu falsificabile chiar şi în condiţiile transformărilor psiho-mentale”.[14]

Aşadar, dacă „sinele subiect al identităţii” este coordonat de „sinele subiect al libertăţii”, perspectiva liberală asupra identităţii individuale este prin excelenţă una constructivistă, asociind noţiunile de „persoană” şi „sine” cu acelea de „raţiune” şi „libertate”.

Tema autonomiei ca expresie individuală a libertăţii intersectează domeniul eticii, în măsura în care „libertatea este un fel de virtute”, iar aceasta din urmă înseamnă „cunoaşterea de sine în cadrul comunităţii care face posibil controlul raţional al acţiunii”.[15] Contrar concepţiilor asupra libertăţii negative pure, remarcă Richard E. Flathman, gânditorii libertăţii pozitive consideră că teoria libertăţii este parte integrantă a teoriei mai generale a moralităţii[16], care implică o cunoaştere de sine adecvată şi, în consecinţă, o veritabilă conştiinţă a propriei identităţi. Altfel spus, venind dinspre libertatea de gândire care întemeiază libertatea de acţiune raţională a individului, ideea de identitate individuală ca autocunoaştere intersectează sfera a ceea ce se numeşte „ideile nobile”, a formelor descoperite prin exersarea normelor.

O expresie fericită a individualităţii şi permanentei autoconstruiri a identităţii proprii se regăseşte în portretul „ironistului liberal” efectuat de Rorty. „Ironistul liberal” reprezintă un

[12] *Ibidem*.
[13] John Gray, *Post-liberalism. Studies in political thought*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 286.
[14] Joel Feinberg, *Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 20.
[15] Richard E. Flathman, *The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 96.
[16] *Ibidem*, p. 106.

tip uman (evident, ideal) dispus în permanenţă la autodistanţare critică faţă de propriu-i limbaj existenţial (aşadar aflat într-o continuă redefinire a propriei identităţi) şi în acelaşi timp capabil să ia atitudine împotriva cruzimii de orice fel (de unde putem deduce şi latura unei identificări de sine cu celălalt). El are drept caracteristici autocreaţia (ce se desfăşoară în spaţiul privat) şi solidaritatea (ce se manifestă în cadrul comunitar), acestea nefiind în mod necesar legate una de alta, dar nici incompatibile. De altfel, în *Contingenţă, ironie şi solidaritate* (1988), unde conturează acest portret, Rorty încearcă să arate, după propria-i mărturisire, „cum vor arăta lucrurile dacă renunţăm la cerinţa unei teorii care să unifice publicul şi privatul, şi ne mulţumim să tratăm cerinţele autocreaţiei şi solidarităţii umane ca fiind în mod egal valide, dar pururi incomensurabile”.[17] Autocreaţia şi solidaritatea sunt cu putinţă datorită libertăţii individuale şi toleranţei reciproce a indivizilor în cadrul unei comunităţi sau al unei societăţi, ceea ce invalidează acuza adusă individualismului că ar fi o viziune atomistă.

O concluzie pozitivă a individualismului liberal ar fi aceea că fiecare om are datoria morală de a se căuta şi a se construi în permanenţă pe sine însuşi, iar comunitatea politică pe aceea de a nu-l împiedica să şi-o găsească, oferind condiţiile performanţei şi demonstrând printr-o politică justă că are nevoie de aceşti indivizi.

„Extrema” individualismului liberal, şi anume libertarianismul în expresia unui libertarian radical precum Friedman nu ignoră concepţia despre libertatea creatoare pe care o presupune filosofia liberală încrezătoare în armonia intereselor indivizilor diferiţi, într-o reală civilizaţie a contractului şi într-o veritabilă „democraţie liberală” (Georges Burdeau). Pe de altă parte, contrar „aristotelismului” implicit ideii de viaţă social-politică, Friedman ne prezintă modelul unui individ a cărui natură ar putea fi apolitică. Pentru el, omul nu este fiinţă politică, ci individualistă, care nu vrea altceva decât să fie lăsată în pace să-şi trăiască viaţa după cum doreşte, fără a accepta vreun compromis, nici măcar acela de a fi protejat „cu forţa”, inclusiv de el însuşi. Individul nu este nici scop, nici mijloc, nici măcar o fiinţă care se „autoconstruieşte”, ci una care se mişcă din inerţie după profit, într-o lume secularizată, redusă în cea mai mare parte la plăceri trecătoare.

Între principiul raţiunii ca virtute cardinală în care se regăseşte profilul individului liberal clasic, ba chiar identitatea acestuia după un autor italian[18] şi raţionalitatea libertariană care nu acceptă să cedeze nici-o parte din libertate, nici măcar pentru binele propriu aşa cum îl văd alţii care l-ar „proteja cu forţa de el însuşi”[19], continuitatea este problematică. Individului

[17]Richard Rorty, *Contingenţă, ironie şi solidaritate*, traducere de Sorana Ştefanov, Bucureşti, Editura All Educaţional, 1998, p. 28.

[18] „Ideea identităţii cetăţeanului liberal-democratic permite, în opinia mea, să scoatem în evidenţă faptul că doctrina pe care se bazează ordinea politică liberal-democratică presupune ca element esenţial un subiect individual cu o conştiinţă de sine care îi arată raţionalitatea transferului unei părţi din drepturile proprii. Această perspectivă permite, altfel spus, relevarea modului în care gândirea liberală fundamentează ordinea politică pe guvernarea sinelui ca activitate proprie fiecărui individ înainte de a fi o activitate specifică guvernanţilor” – Emilio Santoro, „Appunti per una genealogia del citadino liberal-democratico”, în *Identità e politica*, a cura di Furio Cerutti, Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza, 1996, p. 150.

[19] După Friedman, ideea centrală a libertarianismului este aceea că indivizilor (i.e. persoanelor umane) ar trebui să li se permită să-şi ducă propria viaţă aşa cum doresc ei: „Respingem total ideea că oamenii trebuie să fie protejaţi cu forţa de ei înşişi”-David Friedman, *The Machinery of Freedom. Guide to a radical capitalism*, second edition, La

proiectat de Friedman îi lipseşte virtutea civică, adică exact marca unei societăţi raţionale, alcătuită din fiinţe raţionale care se bucură de drepturi, acceptând totodată disciplina raţiunii ca sursă ultimă a autorităţii, acea virtute raţională care se poate substitui ordinii politice, fundamentând ordinea bazată pe guvernarea sinelui. În plus, această revoluţionare a conceptului european clasic de individ arată că în accepţiunea cea mai curentă a identităţii, libertarianul friedmanian şi în genere anarhocapitalistul este un american, fie el la New York sau Paris.

3. Individul în viziunea conservatoare.

Dacă în antichitate şi în evul mediu, în gândirea politică europeană era predominantă concepţia conservatoare aristotelică potrivit căreia comunitatea precede individul şi prin urmare binele acesteia ca întreg trece înaintea binelui individual, epoca modernă prin reprezentanţii filosofiei dreptului şi apoi ai filosofiei liberale instaurează în ţările capitaliste dezvoltate paradigma omului ca fiinţă individuală raţională şi a condiţionării comunităţii de existenţa indivizilor care o compun, legaţi fiind printr-un contract ai cărui termeni ei înşişi îl stabilesc, chiar şi atunci când normele înscrise în el se revendică de la originea care le transcende.

Tensiunea între raţionalitatea individuală şi raţiunea colectivă se amplifică pe măsură ce individualismul ca doctrină filosofic-morală şi liberalismul ca doctrină filosofic-politică impun individul ca valoare în sine, furnizând argumente regimurilor democratice, iar acest fenomen este descris cu obiectivitate de John Gray: „Individualiştii conservatori recunosc că, înainte de orice altceva, chiar înainte de libertate, oamenii au nevoie de un cămin, de un grup de instituţii şi de un mod de viaţă pe care le simt ale lor”[20].

Dacă la nivelul concepţiei liberale şi cu atât mai mult la acela al liberalimului postmodern putem construi un concept al identităţii individuale ce transcende componenta politică naţională şi chiar pe aceea globală, acesta fiind chiar un ideal şi marcând de fapt o criză a democraţiei, din punct de vedere conservator nu există identitate individuală „pură”, autoconstruită de individul puternic şi întreprinzător datorită libertăţii şi drepturilor sale excesive, a spiritului său de iniţiativă. Cu toate că asemenea liberalilor, individualiştii conservatori recunosc necesitatea schimburilor de piaţă şi a argumentului raţional în toate planurile de judecată, ei nu le absolutizează: „Acestea nu reprezintă însă tot modul de viaţă pe care l-au moştenit şi ei nu se pot aştepta ca ele să prospere, sau în cele din urmă să supravieţuiască, în situaţia în care cultura comună a libertăţii şi responsabilităţii, care le susţine şi le animă, este erodată, prin urmărirea mirajului individului suveran al ideologiei liberale.”[21]

Consecinţele acestui mod de gândire se regăsesc nu numai în planul imediat al politicilor publice ale guvernelor conservatoare, dar şi pe termen lung, la nivelul antropologic-cultural şi identitar al societăţii: „Orice guvern conservator, în Marea Britanie sau în altă parte, trebuie să fie expresia nu numai a libertăţilor individuale cuprinse în capitalismul pieţei,

Salle,Illinois,1989.http://voluntarykaraism.com/wpcontent/uploads/Library/Friedman,%20David%20D/The%20Machinery%20of%20Freedom%20(1973).pdf

[20] John Gray, *Dincolo de liberalism şi conservatorism*, Ediţie îngrijită şi studiu introductiv de Adrian-Paul Iliescu, traducere de Raluca Prună, Bucureşti, Editura All, 1998, p. 142.

[21] John Gray, *Ibidem*.

ci şi a identităţilor culturale care renasc de-a lungul generaţiilor. Faptul că identităţile persoanelor nu pot fi o problemă de opţiune, fiind conferite acestora de istorii independente de orice alegere, astfel încât ceea ce este cel mai esenţial în legătură cu ei este, în cele din urmă, ceea ce este şi cel mai accidental, constituie cea mai adâncă intuiţie a conservatorismului. Viziunea conservatoare este aceea că oamenii vor ajunge să aprecieze pe de-a întregul avantajele alegerii atunci când îşi vor da seama cât de multe lucruri din vieţile lor trebuie să rămână pentru totdeauna, neschimbate".[22] Sunt recognoscibile aici ataşamentul tipic conservator pentru trecut şi pentru păstrarea şi perpetuarea valorilor durabile, cât şi importanţa continuităţii şi a memoriei în recunoaşterea identităţii atât din perspectiva „celuilalt", cât şi din punct de vedere subiectiv.

Dincolo de viziunile conservatoare sau liberală, subiectivitatea este componenta esenţială a individualităţii, iar centrarea asupra egoului este o condiţie a recunoaşterii identităţii, fie că e vorba de recunoaşterea-identificare a unui obiect (aici sinele individual), fie de recunoaşterea-atestare pe care le examina Paul Ricoeur luând ca reper reprezentanţi ai filosofiei moderne, începând cu Descartes, pentru a observa faptul că „reflecţia asupra identităţii colective este mai sofisticată decât aceea asupra identităţii-ipseitate a subiecţilor individuali ai acţiunii".[23]

Din moment ce există identităţi implicând capacităţi personale şi identităţi „aferente legăturii sociale", problema identităţii individuale conjugă perspective multiple cu ajutorul cărora subiectul teoretico-filosofic, antropolgic-cultural, psiho-social, politologic în sens larg, expunându-şi propria teorie a micilor sale percepţii se regăseşte pe sine, chiar şi atunci când descoperă superioritatea comunităţii asupra interesului egoist al individului liberal. Dacă „totuşi, individualismul este, pentru noi, un destin istoric pe care îl putem nuanţa, dar pe care nu putem spera să îl evităm", atunci, consideră John Gray, „sarcina politicii conservatoare este aceea de a menţine cultura şi instituţiile care constituie matricea individualismului, astfel încât să asigure faptul că forma individualistă de viaţă nu va ruina capitalul moral şi politic, într-o asemenea măsură încât aceasta să devină un episod care se autolimitează". Asumându-şi observaţia lui Disraeli, acelaşi autor afirmă că valorile conservatoare pot fi păstrate numai dacă avantajele acestora sunt resimţite de toţi indivizii („oamenii obişnuiţi") şi numai dacă ar fi cu adevărat activă, în rândul celor ce deţin bogăţia, grija pentru cei săraci: aceia care nu-şi pun problema identităţii individuale, ci o trăiesc zi de zi sub presiunea unor dureroase experienţe de piaţă a muncii şi a preţurilor; aceia care pleacă de „acasă" pentru un trai mai bun şi nu-şi permit luxul de a medita asupra „conştiinţei nefericite" a emigrantului ce-şi vinde forţa de muncă.

Pe fondul zdruncinării reperelor clasice ale umanismului, identitatea aplicată indivizilor este un concept relaţional care exprimă faptul unor caracteristici specifice şi unice bazate mai curând pe opţiuni decât pe moşteniri, un construct conceptual care dincolo de laturile psihologice, sociale, civile şi civice se referă la criteriile de recunoaştere la scara unei comunităţi locale, naţionale sau internaţionale.

[22] Gray, *Dincolo de liberalism*, op. cit., p. 161.
[23] Paul Ricoeur, *Parcours de la reconnaissance*, Paris, Éditions Stock, 2004, p. 247.

Desigur, această concepţie intră în coliziune cu neoconservatorismul potrivit căruia nu există identitate individuală „pură", autoconstruită de individul puternic şi întreprinzător datorită libertăţii şi drepturilor sale excesive, a spiritului său de iniţiativă, fapt sesizat atât de bine de C. Rădulescu-Motru între cele două războaie mondiale: „Când legitimarea francezilor ca francezi, a germanilor ca germani, a românilor ca români vine numai din consimţământul contractual al diferiţilor indivizi care se găsesc laolaltă pe pământul Franţei, Germaniei şi României, şi nicidecum din legături mai adânci de tradiţie locală, de sânge comun şi de aspiraţii comune, atunci rolul schimbului se înţelege de la sine: viaţa politică a unui popor are ca scop să dea prin schimb un echilibru de interese: fiecare cetăţean să schimbe cu profit bunurile sale contra bunurilor altui cetăţean. Cu un cuvânt, schimbul este agentul generator universal. Poporul, care a ajuns să producă, nu pentru consumul său propriu, ci pentru a câştiga prin schimb, a găsit bagheta magică a progresului."[24]

Este evidentă aici ideea că dincolo de valorile civico-politice şi economico-sociale care stau la baza statului de drept şi-i definesc identitatea politică (în cazul acesta congruente cu valorile definitorii ale identităţii europene), identitatea politică a unui stat este definită şi de simbolurile în jurul cărora sunt construite naraţiunile colective pentru care optează cetăţenii, proiectându-şi propria lor identitate.

Ceea ce se poate observa la nivelul unor eşantioane considerabile de cetăţeni ai ţărilor postcomuniste este că identitatea culturală, profesională sau politică a fiecărui individ dobândesc un sens aparte în contextul mondializării, oricare ar fi identitatea etnică sau naţională a acestuia. În plus, identitatea culturală europeană colectivă (de acum recognoscibilă în documentele UE sub aspectul cetăţeniei) a fost şi va rămâne în acelaşi timp o identitate individuală a celui mai „umil" cetăţean al unui stat european marginal, independent de construcţia politică actuală.

În orice caz, identitatea personală a „omului capabil" să-şi spună povestea fiindcă a conştientizat prezenţa lui în sine însuşi şi în lumea care îl înconjoară şi totodată părţile de „identitate naţională", „identitate culturală", „identitate etnică", „identitate istorică", „identitate socială", „identitate profesională", „identitate politică" care îl definesc, nu atentează la statutul lui ontologic ci dimpotrivă, îi subliniază unicitatea.

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[24] Constantin Rădulescu Motru, *Românismul, catehismul unei noi spiritualităţi*, Ediţie îngrijită de Gheorghe Cazan, (Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1992), 37

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ROMANIA'S ACCESSION TO THE UN. CASE-STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, GRIGORE PREOTEASA, IN THE PROCESS OF ACCESSION

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Abstract: The process of accession of Romania to the United Nations has been one of length; Romania expressing its desire to be an UN member since 1946, but the official accession happening in 1955. The entire process was rather difficult, given the geopolitical context that the country faced immediately after the end of the Second World War. Despite the fact that Romania seemed to act as an independent state that wanted to get out of Moscow's influence, the Romanian foreign policy follows the pattern of all the other countries that had a massive influence from the Soviets. We do however identify a shift in domestic politics, and also in foreign policy, immediately after Stalin's death, when the control of all administrative sectors weakened in intensity, and thus some changes occurred. One of these changes happened in the Foreign Ministry, where Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej appoints Grigore Preoteasa, one of the Party intellectuals. Preoteasa was no stranger to foreign policy, serving for some time as P.R.R. General Secretary of the Washington Legation and before being appointed to the role of Prime Minister's Deputy Minister. This text's aim, based on documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Archives of Romania and also scientific works to identify the role played by Grigore Preoteasa in Romania's accession process to the United Nations.

Keywords: ***United Nations, Romania, Grigore Preoteasa, accession.***

Grigore Preoteasa, pentru cei mai mulți, rămâne personajul comunist care și-a pierdut viața în accidentul aviatic din apropierea aeroportului Vnukovo, Moscova, din 4 noiembrie 1957. Acesta facea parte din delegația română, care urma să ia parte la manisfestațiile marcate de trecerea a 4 decenii de la *Revoluția din Octombrie*. La o privire mai atentă a personajului observăm cum Grigore Preoteasa este un reprezentant atipic al eşaloanelor superioare ale Comunismului Românesc. El face parte dintr-o familie muncitorească ce posedă intrinsec ataşamente politice țărăniste însă direcţia politică aleasă de acesta este una comunistă. De asemenea este evident faptul că personajul politic vizat nu a avut o traiectorie politică ascendentă liniară în interiorul ierarhiei de partid, viaţa sa partizană fiind marcată vizibil de multiple episoade în care Preoteasa a trebuit să utilizeze o cantitate impresionantă de abilitate politică pentru a se alia cu acele facţiuni avantajate ale Partidului sau pentru a se degaja de acele facţiuni a căror nivel de legitimitate internă scădea vizibil. Înainte de anul 1944 acesta era un personaj relativ activ al mișcării comuniste din țara noastră, lucru care i-a permis ca imediat după 23 august 1944 să ocupe o funcție importantă în cadrul ziarului România Liberă. Traseul profesional urmat de Preoteasa este descris de acesta în *Chestionarului pentru evidența cadrelor*: „aug 1944 – april 1945, Ziarul România Liberă, Redactor Șef; april 1945 – noemb 1947, Minist. Informaților, Dir. Presei – Secretar General; 1947 – 1948 M.A.E., Secretar General; iunie 1948 – decemb 1948 Washington, Legația R.P.R., Consilier; 1949 –

present, M.A.E., Prim Locţitor al Ministrului."[1] Funcţia de prim locţiitor a deţinut-o până în anul 1955 când a fost numit Ministru de Externe, ca apoi înainte de moartea sa prematură, să ocupe funcția de secretar al C.C. pentru propagandă.

În perioada 4 octombrie 1955 – 16 iulie 1957 Grigore Preoteasa a îndeplinit funcția de Ministru de Externe al Republicii Populare România. În perioada în care acesta a fost ministru, România a încercat să stabilească relații cu actorii scenei internaționale, însă atenția lui Preoteasa s-a îndreptat în special în crearea unor relații cu statele comuniste. Un eveniment care trebuie amintit, și care a avut loc în timpul mandatului său a fost acela reprezentat de faptul că România a devenit stat membru al Organizației Națiunilor Unite. Tratativele pentru ca România să devină stat membru au fost duse de predecesorul său aflat la conducerea Ministerului de Externe, Simion Bughici și nu numai. „Dorinţa României de a face parte din ONU a fost exprimată oficial încă din 1946, aderarea ţării noastre a fost blocată până în 1955."[2]

Funcția de Ministru de Externe i-a fost atribuită lui Grigore Preoteasa de către Gherghiu Dej având la bază mai multe motive. Unul dintre ele este amintit de Corneliu Mănescu (fost ministru de externe al României), care declara următoarele: „Grigore Preoteasa (decedat în catastrofa aviatică de pe aeroportul Vnukovo), Ion Gheorghe Maurer și Avram Banaciu, toți trei intelectuali, cu impresionantă morgă și ținută fizică, sunt niște posibile tatonări ale lui Gherghiu Dej de a găsi persoană capabilă să reprezinte interesele și ambițiile sale secrete de a scoate țara de sub hegemonia sovietică. Posibilitatea lor din acel moment era garantată, pe plan extern, de moartea lui Stalin, iar pe plan intern, de îndepărtarea ultimelor *cârtițe* ale Moscovei din Biroul Politic, Chișinevschi și Miron Constantinescu."[3] Toate aceste schimbări pe care Gheorghiu-Dej le operezează fac parte din ceea ce acesta caracteriza în cadrul „Congresului al II-lea PMR din decembrie 1955 ca început al unei noi faze, în care fuseseră reintroduse conducerea colectivă și democrația internă"[4], însă aceste schimbări nu sunt decât alte indicații venite din partea Moscovei, care a început campania de destalinizare, lansată de Nikita Hrușciov și oficializată în februarie 1956.

În ciuda faptului că România părea că acționează ca un stat independent care dorea să iasă de sub influiența Moscovei, politica externă românească urmează modelul tuturor țărilor în care era prezentă o influineță masivă din partea sovieticilor. Astfel despre statele care se regăsesc în *Europa de Est* autorul Tony Judt afirma următoarele: „deceniile sale postbelice au fost într-adevăr pașnice în comparație cu ceea ce se întâmplase înainte, dar numai datorită prezenței nedorite a Armatei Roșii: era liniștea din curtea închisorii, impusă cu tancul. Iar dacă țările-satelit din blocul sovietic s-au implicat într-o cooperare internațională aparent comparabilă cu evoluțiile din Vest, asta a fost numai pentru că Moscova le-a forțat să aibă instituții și schimburi *frățești*."[5] Faptul că România urma traiectoria stabilită de Moscova este

[1] Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (în continuare A.N.I.C.), Arhiva C.C. al P.C.R., Colecția 53, Dosare de partid ale membrilor de partid cu stagiu în ilegalitate care au încetat din viața, Dosar Nr. P/158, Grigore Preoteasa – Chestionar pentru evidența cadrelor, f. 6 – 7.
[2] „România în ONU", disponibil la http://www.mae.ro/node/1588, accesat la 15.04.2015.
[3] Lavinia BETEA, *Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea*, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2001, p. 17.
[4] Dennis DELETANT, „Studiu introductiv", în: Ștefan Bosomitu, Mihai Burcea, coordonatori, *Spectrele lui Dej. Incursiuni în biografia și regimul unui dictator*, Editura Polirom, 2012, p. 25.
[5] Tony JUDT, *Epoca postbelică. O istorie a Europei de după 1945*, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2008, p. 19.

prezentat pe scurt si de Vladimir Tismăneanu, care preciza faptul că țara noastră avea „o politică externă complet subordonată Moscovei în perioada 1948-1963.”[6] Nu doar politica externă a României este controlată de către regimul de la Moscova ci întreg sistemul este subordonat, după cum observă Francois Furet în lucrarea *Fascism și Comunism* „comunismul rămâne în Europa de Est (și cu deosebire în România) un regim impus cu forța,”[7] afirmație care inevitabil ne prezintă o sumbră concluzie, și anume „universalismul comunist nu mai seamănă prea tare cu universalismul democratic al iluminismului din care pretinde că se trage.”[8]

În cadrul unei conferințe O.N.U. din luna iulie 1955, în cadrul *Raportului privind deplasarea la San Francisco pentru a participa la ședința festivă de aniversare a O.N.U.-lui* este specificat următorul lucru: „privind situația primirii în O.N.U. a țărilor de Democrație Populară, aproape toți vorbitorii au ocolit-o dar mulți au spus însă că ar fi bine să fie reprezentate toate țările.”[9] La acel moment România a primit sprijin din partea unei țări care nu era apropiată, astfel „reprezentantul Indiei […] le-a spus că mulți delegați nu au enumerat și alte țări care au dreptul să fie în O.N.U., spunînd că există și o Românie, Bulgarie, Ungarie etc.”[10]

Aderarea României la O.N.U. a reprezentat un proces îndelungat la care au contribuit mai mulți factori, care în cele din urmă s-au dovedit decisivi pentru atingerea calității de membru. În anul 1955 se primeau primele semnale pozitive și astfel într-o notă primită de Ministerul de Externe în data de 1.XI.1955 din partea ambasadorului României, Cleja, în RPR Ungaria acesta specifica: „joi 13 octombrie am vizitat pe tovărașul Boldocki Jancs, ministrul Afacerilor Externe care printre altele m-a informat că, în ultimele zile, în emisiunile postului de radio *Europa Liberă* au intervenit unele elemente noi în sensul că respectivii n-ar fi exclus că Romînia, Ungaria și Bulgaria să fie primite în ONU, dar că acest fapt nu va avea o prea mare semnificație.”[11] Aceste informații se regăsesc și câteva zile mai târziu când același ambasador, Cleja, afirma următoarele: „la 19 octombrie crt. am fost chemat de tovarășul Jozsef Karpati, locțiitor al ministrului afacerilor externe. Cu această ocazie, discutînd unele aspecte ale vieții corpului diplomatic de la Budapesta tovarășul Karpati îmi spune că, nu de mult ar fi discutat cu ministrul Austrii și apoi cu cel al R.P.F. Jugoslave. și unul și altul erau siguri că țări ca Ungaria, Romînia, Austria, Italia, Finlanda vor fi admise în O.N.U. în actuala sesiune. Ministrul R.P.F. Jugoslave i-ar fi spus că, delegația R.P.F. Jugoslave și Canadei de la O.N.U. îndeplinesc rolul de intermediar între cele două blocuri.”[12]

În cadrul lucrărilor prilejuite de conferința din anul 1955, unde delegația României a fost condusă de Grigore Preoteasa, au fost și state care se opuneau aderării României la

[6] Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Dorin DOBRINCU, Cristian VASILE, (editori), *Comisia prezidențială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România. Raport Final*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 2007, p. 30
[7] Francois FURET, Ernst NOLTE, *Fascism și comunism*, Editura Art, București, 2007, p. 26
[8] *ibid.*
[9] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (în continuare A.M.A.E.), Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 - 1955, Raportului privind deplasarea la San Francisco pentru a participa la ședința festivă de aniversare a O.N.U.-lui, f. 4.
[10] *ibid.*
[11] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Extras din adresa Ambasei RPR Budapesta nr. 169 înreg. la MAE nr. 3608/1.XI.1955 trimise de tov. ambasador Cleja.
[12] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Extras din adresa Ambasei RPR Budapesta nr. 561 înreg. la MAE nr. 3606/1.XI.1955 trimise de tov. ambasador Cleja.

O.N.U. „În continuarea discuțiilor în comitetul politic adhoc astăzi 2 decembrie au luat cuvîntul delegați. China Komitangistă a atacat țările noastre și a făcut ape la toate democrațiile să nu cedeze în fața *Șantajului sovietic*. […] În încheiere a spus că delegația sa va face totul pentru admiterea celor 13 state dar că admiterea lor împreună cu celelalte 5 state care din punct de vedere al delegației lui nu îndeplinesc condițiile de a fi membru în O.N.U. *ar slăbi bazele omului*."[13] Putem observa cum România avea de suferit din cauza conducerii sale comuniste, dar și din cauza asocierii cu Uniunea Sovietică în contextul în care China manifesta un interes activ pentru desprinderea sa față de sfera de influență Sovietică.

Au fost și state care și-au afirmat deschis sprijinul pentru ca cele 18 state, din care făcea parte și România, să devină membre O.N.U. „Reprezentanții Noii Zeelande, Burmei, Filipinele, Irakului, Cehoslovaciei și Brazilia au susținut Principiul Universalității în O.N.U. și deci admiterea celor 18 țări."[14]

La scurt timp după această întâlnire, în data de 4 decembrie România a fost supusă unui nou atac din partea Cubei. „reprezentantul Cubei a vorbit timp de 2 ore atacînd țările de democrație populară și Uniunea Sovietică. Cubanezul a vorbit pe un ton al Războiului Rece, uzînd cuvinte necontrolate, reactionare. […] Vorbind despre țara noastră a spus că sunt 90 cîmpuri de concentrare, codul penal din 1949 aproba munca forțată, cetațenii de religie musulmană din Dobrogea sînr persecutați și a redat din declarația episcopului catolic de Sibiu care a fugit în Germania Ocidentală. A declarat că va vota împotriva admiterii țărilor de democrație în O.N.U."[15] În acel moment România a primit ajutor din partea Poloniei, „reprezentantul R.P. Polone a arătăt că reprezentantul Cubei a vorbit cu ură împotriva spiritului Genevei încercând să readucă războiul rece în comitetul adhoc. A enumerat diferite aspecte politice, economice și sociale ce au fost realizate de țările de democrație populară."[16]

În aceeași zi au avut loc noi evenimente, prin intermediul cărora observăm cum România nu se bucura de un sprijin politic declarat din partea unor state, însă acestea nu s-au opus aderării României la ONU. „În ședința de după masa zilei de 4 decembrie au luat cuvântul următorii. Reprezentantul Greciei susține rezoluțai canadiană în general. Face aceasta cu toate că țările noastre nu și-au respectat tratatele încheiate cu grecia după război."[17] Pe de altă parte observăm cum reprezentanții statelor care se aflau în sfera de influiență comunistă își exprimă sprijinul, astfel „reprezentantul R.S.S. Ucrainei sprijină intrarea celor 18 state fară a face discriminare. A răspuns atacurilor neîntemeiate ale reprezentantului Cubei. „[18]

În același context observăm cum și alte state oferă sprijin țărilor aspirante la statutul de membru O.N.U. printre care se află și România. „Reprezentantul Australiei sprijină primirea celor 18 state cu toate că *țările libere* platește aceasta. Face analiza statelor candidate și spune că *statele libere* are mai mult de câștigat deoarece de partea lor vor fi 13 state și în plus *țările satelite* se vor convinge de democrația vestică venind în contact cu O.N.U. Face

[13] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Direcțiunea Tratate București, Nota lui Dumitrăchescu de la New York.
[14] *ibid.*
[15] *ibid.*
[16] *ibid.*
[17] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Ministerul Poștelor și Telecomunicațiilor din R.P.R., Direcția Tratate București, Telegramă de stat, 6 decembrie 1955.
[18] *ibid.*

apel la China naţionalistă să nu depună veto în consiliul de securitate."[19] Grupul celor 18 state şi sprijinul Siriei, care prin reprezentantul său „cere să nu se mai uzeze cuvinte *ţări care merită şi ţări care nu merită*. Toate ţările au drept să fie membre ale O.N.U.-lui. În ţările nemembre nu sunt gansteri sau provocatori la război iar în ţările membre toată lumea este perfectă. Vorbind despre ţările nostre a arătat că *ţările din Europa Răsăriteană joacă un rol important în viaţa politicii internaţionale*, sprijină primirea tuturor 18 state."[20] Pe aceeaşi lungime de undă se află şi reprezentanţii Libanului şi Pakistanului. „Reprezentantul Pakistanului sprijină candidatura tuturor 18 ţări şi va vota ca atare. Reprezentantul Libanului susţine primirea tuturor 18 ţări spunînd că guvernul său consideră că toate îndeplinesc condiţii de a deveni membre."[21] Aceeaşi linie este respectată şi de Islanda care declara „că cei 60 de membri ai O.N.U.-lui se pretind care mai de care iubitori de pace însă a găsit că sunt cîteva ţări printre care nu sunt iubitoare de pace, […] toate ţările ce au depus candidatura de atâţia ani sunt calificate să devină membre."[22]

Data de 7 decembrie a reprezentat ziua în care aderarea celor 18 state a intrat în linie dreaptă. „În după amiaza zilei de 7 decembrie în comitetul adhoc a fost votat rezoluţia canadiană. Au votat pentru rezoluţie 52 delegatzi. Au votat împotriva resolutziei China naţionalită şi Cuba. Sau abţinut dela vot Statele Unite, Franţee, Belgia, Grecia şi Israelul. Africa de Sud fost absentă. Astăzi urmează să fie aprobată de Adunarea Generală şi după va merge la Consiliul de Securitate. Sa stabilit definitiv data de 26 decembrie când se va termina sesiunea celei de a zece Adunări Generale."[23]

Următoarea zi au avut loc noi discuţii contradictorii pe marginea intrării în O.N.U. a ţărilor menţionate în rezoluţia canadiană, „La 8 decembrie Adunarea Generală sa întrunit pentru a aproba rezoluţia adoptată de comitetul adhoc. Înainte de a se începe votul au luat cuvîntul următorii delegaţi. Grecia a spus ca s-a abţinut şi se va abţine dela vot deoarece nu vrea să voteze pentru democraţiile populare. A atacat în special R.P. Albania. China naţionalistă şi Cuba au repetat aceleaşi atacuri împotriva democraţiilor populare. Israel a motivat abţinerea şi că se va abţine şi pe viitor deoarece nu vrea să voteze pentru Iordania şi Liban. În cazul că se va pune separat la vot Israel va vota pentru toate celelalte 16 state. Paraguay şi Chile au spus că au votat şi vor vota pentru toate cele 18 ţări. Uniunea Sovietică a apărat din nou ce se ascundea în spatele acestei abţineri dela vot şi a răspuns Greciei în problema Albaniei. R.P. Polonă a răspuns la atacurile reprezentantului Cubei. Grecia a luat din nou cuvîntul şi a repetat aceleaşi atacuri împotriva R.P. Albaneze. Canada şi Peru şi-au exprimat convingerea că majoritatea Consiliului de Securitate va vota pentru rezoluţia pentru a rezolva o problemă atît de aşteptată de cele 18 ţări. După aceasta s-a trecut la vot. Au votat pentru rezoluţia canadiană 52 de ţări, s-au opus China naţionalistă şi Cuba, s-au abţinut de la

[19] *ibid.*
[20] *ibid.*
[21] *ibid.*
[22] *ibid.*
[23] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizaţia Naţiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Ministerul Poştelor şi Telecomunicaţiilor din R.P.R., Direcţia Tratate Bucureşti, Telegramă de stat, 8 decembrie 1955.

vot Statele Unite, Grecia, Israel, Franța, Belgia. Ședința Consiliului de Securitate nu s-a fixat încă."[24]

În data de 10 decembrie au demarat lucrările în urma cărora cele 18 state să devină membre cu drepturi depline ale O.N.U. „Astăzi 10 decembrie sa început discuția în Consiliul de Securitate. Reprezentantul Noii Zeelande care este președintele Consiliului șia exprimat convingerea că membrii Consiliului vor depune eforturi pentru soluționarea problemei primirii de noi membri. Același lucru a fost repetat de reprezentantul Peru. Reprezentantul Turciei a declarat ca este autorizat de Guvern să voteze pentru toate 18 țări. Reprezentatul Uniunii Sovietice a introdus o rezoluția care să reglementeze regula de proceduri (rezoluția cere Consiliului de Securitate să voteze pentru fiecare țară în ordinea datei cînd țara respectivă a cerut să fie membră după ce Consiliul de Securitate va vota pentru primul aplicant decizia să meargă la Adunarea Generală și în felul acesta să se voteze pentru fiecare în parte). Țara noastră este a 9 în ordinea respectivă."[25] După o serie de discuții care s-au derulat pe parcursul mai multor zile „la 14 decembrie 1955, Adunarea generală a ONU a decis, prin rezoluţia A/RES/995 (X), primirea României în ONU, alături de alte 15 state."[26]

După cum putem observa rolul pe care Grigore Preoteasa l-a jucat în procesul de aderare al țării noastre la Organizația Națiunilor Unite este unul important, dacă luam în calcul modul în care direcțiile politicii externe românești purtau amprenta sovietică. Spun acest lucru deoarece influența pe care Uniunea Sovietică o manisfesta asupra noastră era decisivă în luarea tuturor deciziilor, însă după moartea lui Stalin se observă o scădere în intensitate a presiunii venite din partea conducerii sovietice. Pe fondul acestor schimbări, aderarea a devenit un lucru din ce în ce mai prezent în agenda de politică externă a României, iar numirea lui Grigore Preoteasa în fruntea Ministerului de Externe nu trebuie să ne surprindă, având în vedere experiența de care acesta după perioada îndelungată pe care acesta a petrecut-o în cadrul minsterului, unde un interval însemnat de timp acesta a fost locțiitor al ministrului. Prin intermediul acestei funcții Preoteasa a asistat la schimbarea mai multor miniștri, el reușind să rămână personjul care a asigurat continuitatea politicii externe românești. Dacă luăm în calcul și perioada în care Preoteasa a activat la Washington, ca șef de legație, este evidentă aflarea sa în fruntea delegației care a reprezentat România în cadrul tratativelor pentru aderarea la O.N.U. Prin numirea lui Grigore Preoteasa la conducerea ministerului, Gheorghiu-Dej dă dovadă de maturitate politcă, fiind conștient de importanța unei persoane care să poată garanta o doză însemnată de mobilitatea, dar în același timp și de maturitate politică, calități principale într-un proces eficient de negociere. Nu în ultimul rând importanța pe care Preoteasa o are în procesul de aderare al României la Organizația Națiunilor Unite se regăsește și în momentul în care, imediat după aderare, discursul de mulțumire al țării noastre a fost rostit la radio, tot de Preoteasa, fapt ce ne demonstrează încrederea pe care Gheorghiu-Dej o investise în Grigore Preoteasa.

[24] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Ministerul Poștelor și Telecomunicațiilor din R.P.R., Direcția Tratate București, Telegramă de stat, 9 decembrie 1955.
[25] A.M.A.E., Dosar referitor la admiterea României în Organizația Națiunilor Unite 1947 – 1955, Ministerul Poștelor și Telecomunicațiilor din R.P.R., Direcția Tratate București, Telegramă de stat, 11 decembrie 1955
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CULTURAL PRACTICES AMONG HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS FROM IAȘI MUNICIPALITY

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to present the main cultural practices which are preferred by high-school students from Iași. The results have been generated following a research which was held in the first part of this year (2015) in a number of high schools in Iasi Municipality. This analysis has a descriptive character that is in addition to other field surveys (local, national or international) which are regularly organized on similar topics and on various population categories (pupils, teenagers, young people, elderly etc.). Based on this survey, it could be outlined a range of general trends regarding cultural behavior of high school students from Iași. Furthermore, of interest would be to set some preliminary profiles of consumers and non-consumers, according to a range of relevant socio-demographic characteristics (gender of respondents, school grades etc.). This work is supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652.

Keywords: ***cultural consumption, cultural practices, youth, high-school, cultural behavior***

1. Introducere

În cadrul acestui articol am optat pentru redarea într-o manieră descriptivă a rezultatelor unui demers empiric privind practicile culturale ale tinerilor liceeni din municipiul Iași, ancheta fiind parte integrantă din proiectul propus pentru stagiul doctoral pe care îl desfășor. Interesul de cercetare este major, cu atât mai mult cu cât cercetarea sociologică s-a derulat în municipiul Iași, recunoscut drept unul dintre marile centre universitare și culturale ale României și oraș candidat la obținerea statutului de Capitală Culturală Europeană în anul 2021. O asemenea inițiativă contribuie la *cunoașterea primară* a comportamentului cultural al unei sub-grupe de populație, cea alcătuită din tinerii liceeni (proveniți din clasele IX –XII), acest segment remarcându-se în cadrul unor studii similare, prin nivelul ridicat de „consum cultural"[1]. Astfel, analiza vine în completarea unor anchete de teren (locale, naționale sau internaționale) organizate în mod regulat pe teme similare și pe diverse categorii de indivizi (copii, adolescenți, bătrâni ș.a.). În prima parte, voi prezenta succint câteva aspecte generale legate de metodologia cercetării, iar în cea de-a doua parte, care este și cea mai consistentă, este realizată o analiză descriptivă a datelor privind practicile de consum cultural ale elevilor din patru unități de învățământ liceale din municipiul Iași.

2. Metodologia cercetării

Ancheta de teren, de tip cantitativ a avut loc în intervalul cuprins între a doua jumătate a lunii decembrie (2014) și luna februarie anului 2015, în patru unități de învățământ reprezentative din municipiul Iași, dintre care două cu specific teoretic (Colegiul „Costache Negruzzi" și Liceul Teoretic „Dimitrie Cantemir") și două cu specific tehnic/ tehnologic[2]

[1] A se consulta Barometrele Culturale din România, disponibile la adresa: http://www.culturadata.ro/categorie-cercetari-finalizate/1_barometrul-de-consum-cultural/ , site accesat la data de 5.05.2015.

[2] Chiar dacă aceste unități de învățământ au un specific tehnic/ tehnologic, există și clase cu profil teoretic (uman sau real).

(Colegiul Tehnic „Gheorghe Asachi” și Liceul Tehnologic „Petru Poni”). Populația studiată (N) a fost alcătuită din 645 de elevi din ciclul liceal, clasele IX – XII, chestionarul fiind auto-administrat, iar pasul statistic aplicat a fost de doi (dintr-o clasă de elevi, jumătate dintre cei prezenți au răspuns întrebărilor studiului). Prin prestabilirea criteriilor de completare anterior enunțate, au fost astfel limitate pe de o parte efectele reacției de prestigiu (care ar fi putut apărea în prezența unui operator de teren, care completa datele transmise de respondent), iar pe de altă parte cele ce țin de contagiunea răspunsurilor (prin influențarea reciprocă a opiniilor între colegi aflați în aceeași bancă).

Eșantionul de elevi a fost stratificat după o serie de variabile socio-demografice relevante, în concordanță cu specificul terenului de cercetare abordat, printre aceste criterii de structurare numărându-se genul respondenților, clasele de proveniență și filiera specifică instituțiilor de învățământ cuprinse în anchetă (Tabel 1). În acest mod, s-a avut în vedere cuprinderea unui grup eterogen de subiecți, proveniți din medii sociale diferite și care urmează specializări educaționale axate atât pe filiera teoretică (profil uman sau real), cât și pe cea tehnică/ tehnologică sau chiar profesională.

Genul respondenților			**Specificul principal al unității de învățământ**	
Masculin	46%		Specific teoretic	51%
Feminin	54%		Specific tehnic	49%
Media			**Clasele de proveniență**	
Sub 8	30%		Clasa a IX-a	26%
Între 8 și 9	31%		Clasa a X-a	27%
Între 9 și 9,5	22%		Clasa a XI-a	23%
Peste 9,5	17%		Clasa a XII-a	24%

Tabel 1 - Structura eșantionului

Obiectivele generale ale analizei pe care o voi dezvolta pe parcursului acestui articol sunt: (1) identificarea practicilor culturale agreate și frecventate de tinerii liceeni din municipiul Iași, (2) identificarea preliminară a unor profiluri privind preferințele pentru anumite practici culturale în rândul elevilor, pornind de la caracteristicile socio-demografice ale acestora. Totodată, voi testa o **ipoteză** conform căreia există diferențe și asocieri semnificative din punct de vedere statistic în funcție de genul respondenților, privind preferințele de consum cultural (fetele sunt mai predispuse, comparativ cu băieții, spre un consum al unor produse culturale „elitiste” – teatru, operă/ operetă, expoziții de artă sau fotografie, vizitarea unor situri culturale precum muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale).

3. Analiza datelor

În prima etapă, am realizat o ierarhie a activităților culturale la care elevii au partcipat cel puțin o dată, în ultimul an zile (Figura 1). În rândul acestor activități am inclus practici specifice unei culturi „înalte” (frecventarea teatrului, a spectacolelor de operă/ operetă sau balet, a unor expoziții sau a unor conferințe susținute de personalități culturale) și cele care caracterizează așa-numitul tip de cultură „populară” (cinema, concerte de muzică ușoară, evenimentele sportive de masă). O practică aparte o constituie „mersul la bibliotecă”, această categorie întrunind și cea mai mare pondere de răspunsuri pozitive (81%). De subliniat ar fi

faptul că proporția ridicată a tinerilor care au fost cel puțin o dată pe an la bibliotecă este firească, având în vedere faptul că aceasta constituie una din furnizoarele principale de materiale educaționale pentru elevii de liceu (cărți de beletristică și de specialitate, manuale sau alte materiale auxiliare utilizate în scop didactic). Jumătatea superioară a ierarhiei, este concentrată în jurul activităților culturale „populare", aproximativ câte două treimi dintre subiecți mărturisind că au fost în ultimele 12 luni, cel puțin o dată la cinematograf, la diverse acțiuni sportive, în calitate de spectatori și la concerte de muzică ușoară. Excepție face „vizitarea unor muzee, galerii de artă sau case memoriale" care se intercalează între categoriile anterior enumerate și care a fost amintită în 68% din cazurile analizate. Se distinge faptul că spectacolele de teatru au fost preferate de aproximativ jumătate dintre liceeni (48%), în timp ce spectacolele de operă, operetă, balet, conferințele unor personalități culturale sau expozițiile de artă vizuală au fost frecventate cel puțin o dată în ultimul an, de aproximativ o treime dintre adolescenții intervievați.

Comportamentul de consum cultural al elevilor din municipiul Iași deține însă o specificitate aparte conferită de organizarea în ultimii ani de ample evenimente culturale, precum Festivalul Internațional al Educației (F.I.E.), Festivalul Internațional de Literatură și Traducere (F.I.L.I.T.), Festivalul Internațional de Teatru pentru Publicul Tânăr (F.I.T.P.T.), „Noaptea muzeelor", târguri de carte, expoziții tematice ș.a., la manifestările cărora majoritatea acțiunilor sunt cu participare gratuită. Totodată, la acestea se adaugă apariția unor spații „neconvenționale" de manifestare culturală, sub forma teatrelor de cafenea sau studențești și a unor galerii ale tinerilor artiști, care beneficiază de cele mai multe ori de acces liber. De amintit ar fi și organizarea „Săptămânii altfel", în timpul căreia unitățile de învățământ renunță la activitățile didactice „clasice" și angrenează tinerii în diverse tipuri de activități culturale, multe dintre ele încadrabile în rândul tipului de consum cultural „înalt" (vizitarea unor muzee, organizarea de conferințe și workshopuri cu invitați prestigioși, participarea la diverse spectacole etc.).



Figura 1 - Ponderea elevilor care au participat în ultimul an la diverse activități culturale (N=645). *Exemplu de citire:* 81% din numărul total de elevi intervievați au mers în ultimul an cel puțin o dată la bibliotecă

Totuși, la o analiză mai amănunțită ce are în vedere frecvența cu care au luat parte elevii în ultimele 12 luni la diverse activități (Tabel 2), se constată că, în cazul activităților culturale „înalte", consumul este unul ocazional (1-2 ori în ultimul an) - excepție făcând așadar biblioteca și practicile specifice culturii „populare" (cinematograful, concertele de muzică ușoară și diversele evenimente sportive). În toate situațiile anterior enumerate, ponderea cumulată a elevilor care au participat cu o *frecvență ridicată* (peste 5 ori) și *medie* (3-5 ori) o depășește pe cea a tinerilor care au mărturisit că au participat în maxim două rânduri (*participare ocazională*). Astfel, numai 14% dintre elevi au mers *foarte des* (peste 5 ori) în ultimele 12 luni la muzee, galerii de artă și case memoriale, iar 7% au mărturisit același lucru legat de reprezentațiile teatrale. În ceea ce privește consumul de spectacole de operă, operetă sau balet, al expozițiilor de artă vizuală și al conferințelor susținute de personalități culturale, acesta este unul predominant ocazional.

Au mers în ultimele 12 luni la... (N=645)	Peste 5 ori *(frecvență ridicată)*	3-5 ori *(frecvență medie)*	1-2 ori *(participare ocazională)*	Niciodată
Bibliotecă	**34%**	17%	30%	19%
Diverse evenimente sportive (în calitate de	**20%**	16%	29%	35%

spectator)				
Cinema	**19%**	21%	28%	32%
Concerte de muzică ușoară	**16%**	16%	30%	38%
Muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale	**14%**	18%	36%	32%
Teatru	**7%**	8%	33%	52%
Un spectacol de operă, operetă, balet etc.	**4%**	7%	28%	61%
Expoziții de pictură/ grafică/ sculptură	**3%**	7%	26%	64%
Expoziții de fotografie	**3%**	7%	23%	67%
Conferințe ale unor personalități culturale	**3%**	9%	26%	62%

Tabel - 2 Frecvența cu care au participat elevii la diverse activități culturale

În a doua etapă a analizei am urmărit să evidențiez o serie de tendințe privind preferințele pentru anumite practici culturale, în funcție de o serie de caracteristici relevente pentru populația studiată (genul subiecților, specificul unității de învățământ și clasele de proveniență ale respondenților). Între subiecții de gen masculin și cei de gen feminin, există diferențe procentuale semnificative în ceea ce privește participarea în ultimul an la activitățile culturale analizate (Tabel 3). Astfel, dintr-o perspectivă descriptivă, elevele de liceu intervievate tind să prefere într-o măsură mai ridicată, comparativ cu băieții, să meargă la bibliotecă, la muzee/ case memoriale, galerii de artă, la conferințe ale unor personalități culturale și la expoziții de artă vizuală sau să participe la spectacole de teatru, operă, operetă sau balet. În schimb, în privința mersului la cinematograf există un echilibru procentual (diferența este de doar un singur procent). Singura categorie de acțiuni pe care băieții au preferat-o într-o măsură mai ridicată în ultimul an de zile a fost constituită din evenimentele sporive, la care au luat parte în calitate de spectatori (diferența procentuală între genuri este de 21%, în favoarea băieților).

De subliniat este faptul că majoritatea diferențelor între genuri sunt semnificative din punct de vedere statistic, pentru testarea asocierii dintre variabile, fiind utilizat testul Chi. Singurele categorii unde nu există o asociere sunt constituite de expozițiile de fotografie și conferințele unor personalități culturale. Așadar, ipoteza acestei analize conform căreia fetele sunt mai atrase, comparativ cu băieții, de consumul unor produse culturale „elitiste" – teatru, operă/ operetă, expoziții de artă sau fotografie, vizitarea unor situri culturale precum muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale a fost confirmată parțial[3].

Au mers cel puțin o dată în ultimul an la... (N=645)	**Masculin**	**Feminin**	**Diferență**
Bibliotecă	72%	89%	-17%
Teatru	41%	54%	-13%
Expoziții de pictură/ grafică/ sculptură	29%	42%	-13%
Muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale	61%	73%	-12%
Un spectacol de operă, operetă, balet etc.	33%	45%	-12%
Concerte de muzică ușoară	56%	67%	-11%
Conferințe ale unor personalități culturale	33%	42%	-9%

[3] *Teatrul* – p=0,002, χ^2 pt df 1 = 9,463; *Muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale* - p=0,002, χ^2 pt df 1 = 9,654; *Expoziții de pictură, grafică, sculptură* - p=0,001, χ^2 pt df 1 = 11,171; *Spectacole de operă, operetă, balet* - p=0,002, χ^2 pt df 1 = 9,382, *Expoziții de fotografie* - p=0,09, χ^2 pt df 1 = 2,870; *Conferințele unor personalități culturale* - p=0,17, χ^2 pt df 1 = 5,658.

Expoziții de fotografie	29%	36%	-7%
Cinema	68%	67%	1%
Diverse evenimente sportive (în calitate de spectator)	76%	55%	21%

Tabel 3 - Ponderea elevilor care au participat în ultimul an la diverse activități culturale, în funcție de genul respondenților. *Exemplu de citire*: 72% dintre respondenții de gen masculin au mers cel puțin o dată, în ultimul an, la bibliotecă.

Analiza după specificul *principal* al unităților de învățământ cuprinse în studiu (Tabel 4) indică faptul că tinerii din liceele teoretice manifestă o tendință mai ridicată, comparativ cu colegii lor din liceele tehnice și tehnologice în a frecventa conferințele unor personalități culturale (diferența procentuală de 30%), cinematograful (25%), reprezentațiile teatrale (20%), expozițiile de fotografie (15%), spectacolele de operă, operetă și balet (15%), respectiv expozițiile de pictură/ grafică/ sculptură (14%). În schimb, în ceea ce privește diferențele procentuale ce vizează frecventarea muzeelor, concertelor de muzică ușoară, a bibliotecilor și a manifestărilor sportive, acestea sunt nesemnificative.

Au mers cel puțin o dată în ultimul an la... (N=645)	**Unități de învățământ cu specific teoretic**	**Unități de învățământ cu specific tehnic**	**Diferență**
Conferințe ale unor personalități culturale	53%	23%	30%
Cinema	80%	55%	25%
Teatru	58%	38%	20%
Expoziții de fotografie	40%	25%	15%
Un spectacol de operă, operetă, balet etc.	47%	32%	15%
Expoziții de pictură/ grafică/ sculptură	43%	29%	14%
Muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale	69%	67%	2%
Concerte de muzică ușoară	63%	62%	1%
Bibliotecă	81%	81%	-
Diverse evenimente sportive (în calitate de spectator)	65%	65%	-

Tabel 4 - Ponderea elevilor care au participat în ultimul an la diverse activități culturale, în funcție de specificul unităților de învățământ eșantionate.

La analiza participării elevilor la diverse acțiuni culturale în funcție de clasa de proveniență a acestora (Tabel 5), nu au fost regăsite diferențe procentuale ridicate, existând un echilibru între cele două sub-categorii de populație vizate (elevii din clasele IX – X, respectiv elevii claselor XI – XII). Cu toate acestea, se poate observa o ușoară tendință a elevilor din clasele terminale din ciclul liceal (a XI-a și a XII-a) de a frecventa expozițiile de fotografie într-o proporție mai mare comparativ cu tinerii din clasele IX – X (diferența este de 6%). Aceeași diferență procentuală, de această dată în favoarea adolescenților aflați în primii doi ani de liceu, apare în cazul frecventării bibliotecilor.

Au mers cel puțin o dată în ultimul an la... (N=645)	**Clasele IX - X**	**Clasele XI - XII**	**Diferență**
Conferințe ale unor personalități culturale	38%	38%	-
Expoziții de fotografie	30%	36%	-6%
Expoziții de pictură/ grafică/ sculptură	34%	38%	-4%

Teatru	47%	50%	-3%
Cinema	66%	69%	-3%
Muzee, galerii de artă, case memoriale	66%	69%	-3%
Concerte de muzică ușoară	61%	64%	-3%
Diverse evenimente sportive (în calitate de spectator)	64%	66%	-2%
Un spectacol de operă, operetă, balet etc.	40%	38%	2%
Bibliotecă	84%	78%	6%

Tabel 4 - Ponderea elevilor care au participat în ultimul an la diverse activități culturale, în funcție de clasa de proveniență a acestora

Concluzii

Chiar dacă analiza propusă în cadrul acestui articol este una cu un caracter general, ea relevă o serie de aspecte extrem de interesante care ar putea fi aprofundate în viitoare demersuri empirice, fie de ordin cantitativ, fie chiar calitativ. Pentru a se ajunge la modele mai detaliate de „consum cultural" în rândul tinerilor, ar fi indicată o cunoaștere în profunzime (utilizând instrumente de cercetare specifice) atât a interesului elevilor față de diversele practici culturale la care sunt expuși în mod direct sau indirect, cât și a elementelor care îi stimulează să se implice în asemenea activități, alocându-și în acest sens diverse resurse pentru acumularea pe termen mediu sau lung al unui anumit capital cultural.

Mulțumiri/ Aknowledgements

Această lucrare a fost publicată cu sprijinul financiar al proiectului „Sistem integrat de îmbunătățire a calității cercetării doctorale și postdoctorale din România și de promovare a rolului științei în societate", POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652, finanțat prin Fondul Social European, Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013. This work was supported by the strategic grant POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133652, co-financed by the European Social Fund within the Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources Development 2007 – 2013.

EUROPEAN INFLUENCES IN REFORMING SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF MODERN ROMANIA

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Rezumat: Încă de la revolutia din 1821, s-a resimţit necesitatea reformării structurilor sociale. În eforturile de a se realiza modernizarea, un rol important l-a avut dialogul intercultural. Regulamentele Organice, Conventia de la Paris din 1858, reformele domnitorului Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Constitutia de la 1866 cu amendamentele ei ulterioare sunt dovezi ale influenţei culturii politice din Estul dar si din Vestul Europei. În acest articol, scopul esenţial este acela de a surprinde exact influenţele externe în gândirea structurilor sociale româneşti moderne, pornind de la specificul românesc.

Cuvinte cheie: ***structuri sociale, dialog intercultural, influenţe, modernizare***

Abstract: After the Revolution of 1821, the necessity of reforming the social structures was strongly resented. During the efforts of accomplishing the modern thinking, a main role belonged to the inter-cultural dialogue. The Constitutional Rules, Paris Convention of 1958, Statute of ruler Cuza, Constitution of 1866 with amendments are proves of the cultural influences for East and West of Europe. In this article, the main spurpose is that to highlight exactly the external influences in thinking of social structures of modern Romania, starting from their appropiate pattern.

Keywords: ***social structures, inter-cultural dialogue, influences, modernisation***

Prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea a reprezentat pentru Principatele Române o epocă de importante transformări politice, al căror impact asupra societăţii a fost considerabil. Revenirea la domniile pământene după 1821, complicatul stadiu al relaţiilor ruso-otomane, reglementat prin Convenţia de la Akkerman, dar mai ales prin Tratatul de la Adrianopol, au atras implicit ideile modernizatoare. Ocupaţia militară rusească din 1829, până în 1834 a fost gândită ca o etapă premergătoare anexiunii Principatelor. Curtea de la Petersburg a dorit să intervină asupra cadrului instituţional românesc, realizând sub directa sa supraveghere cele două Regulamente Organice, intrate în vigoare în 1831, respectiv 1832[1].

Aceste aşezăminte legislative trebuiau să pună o stavilă ideilor occidentale de reformă, de luptă pentru emancipare, însă aveau menirea de a face posibilă recuperarea unui decalaj pe care Principatele îl aveau în raport cu statele europene.

Imediat după 1821, plecat în mai multe călătorii europene, boierul luminat Dinicu Golescu a realizat o lucrare emblematică *Însemnare a călătoriei mele*, în care a dezvăluit decalajele imense dintre spaţiul românesc şi cel occidental. El a fost tatăl fraţilor Goleşti, cu un rol fundamental în revoluţia de la 1848. Moartea sa prematură l-a împiedicat să continue opera ştiinifică de teoretizare a cadrului instituţional intern[2].

[1]Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, *Enciclopedia de istorie a României*, vol. I, Bucureşti, Editura Meronia, 2001, p. 65.
[2]Dinicu Golescu *Însemnare a călătoriei mele Constantin Radovici din Goleşti făcută în anul 1824, 1825, 1826*, Editura Eminescu, Bucureşti, 1971, p.16 .

Perioada 1831-1848, numită ,,regulamentară" a cunoscut pe de o parte schimbări controlate, iar pe de altă parte intensificarea idelior reformatoare de factură revoluţionară occidentală.

Pe aceeaşi scară putem include contribuţia lui Ion Câmpineanu, cel care redactase *Act de unire şi independenţă* şi *Osăbitul act de numire a suveranului*. Erau acte care doreau să contracareze efectele negative ale ,,Actului adiţional" impus de puterea suzerană şi puterea protectoare prin care doreau să controleze orice iniţiativă internă de dezvoltare care nu întrunea acordul lor[3].

Totuşi, în epoca regulamentară, Principatele cunosc regenerarea unor instituţii precum armata, şcoala în limba naţională, existenţa unui sistem fiscal unitar, sistem de reglementare a muncii, chiar dacă dezavantajos pentru clăcaşi (ţăranii dependenţi), ţăranii liberi şi meşteşugari.

Revoluţia de la 1848 pregătită de pleiada de societăţi secrete revoluţionare create pe tot parcursul Europei a arătat că sistemul european reacţionar, întemeiat de Sfânta Alianţă trebuia înlăturat. Dacă în Moldova, vecinătatea cu Rusia făcea imposibilă declanşarea unei revoluţii, în adevăratul înţeles al cuvântului, în Ţara Românească, revoluţia a triumfat, astfel că Proclamaţia de la Islaz din 1848 a devenit un proiect constituţional. Revoluţionarii moldoveni ajunşi la Braşov şi la Cernăuţi, în Transilvania şi în Bucovina au continuat să realizeze programe în care structurile sociale erau pe aceeaşi treapăt cu libertatea naţională.

Convenţia de la Balta Liman, impusă după înfrângerea Revoluţiei cu ajutorul direct al Rusiei a adus cea mai puternică formă de subordonare instituţională a Principatelor. Domnitorii erau asimilaţi unor ,,înalţi funcţionari otomani", având o putere redusă de acţiune.

Izbucnirea ,,Războiului Crimeii" din 1853, pe fondul încercării Rusiei de a da o lovitură ,,omului bolnav" al Europei, Imperiul Otoman şi Congresul de Pace de la Paris din 1856 au adus ,,problema românească" în atenţia Europei. Practic, ideea unui stat românesc realizat printr-o unire formală a Ţării Româneşti şi a Moldovei era un prim pas pe calea unor viitoare reforme.

Emigraţia revoluţionară românească de la 1848, animată de ideea unei revoluţii europene, tendinţă generală pe bătrânul continent, s-a reorientat spre o bogată corespondenţă diplomatică, prin care factorii de decizie internaţionali ca Anglia şi Franţa, puteri victorioase în Războiul Crimeii să fie de acord cu realizarea statului român modern.

Clasa politică românească generată de revoluţia din 1848 a pus Europa în faţa faptului împlinit, impunând dubla alegere a colonelului Alexandru Ioan Cuza, atât în Moldova, cât şi în Ţara Românească.

Practic, se punea prima cărămidă la temelia statului modern românesc şi, implicit la cea a modernizării structurilor sociale. Paşoptiştii erau aproape în unanimitate fii de boieri. Ei studiaseră în Apus, intraseră în cercurile influente din jurul cancelariilor occidentale, publicaseră opere cu caracter social, politic, ştiinţific.

Nicolae Bălcescu, Gheorghe Magheru, fraţii Goleşti, fraţii Brătianu, Mihail Kogălniceanu,Vasile Alecsandri, Alexandru Ioan Cuza au realizat că problema structurilor sociale are o importanţă vitală pentru politica românească viitoare.

Alexandru Ioan Cuza a avut iniţiativa accelerării ritmului acţiunilor interne de

[3]Vladimir Osiac, *Istoria modernă a României*, Editura Universitaria, Craiova, 1999,p.147.

unificare legislativă şi instituţională, la 24 ianuarie 1862 România fiind unificată pe deplin. Un prim pas pe calea reformelor, ,,secularizarea averilor mănăstireşti", necesar pentru a realiza o reformă agrară, prin recăpătarea controlului naţional asupra unei însemnate părţi a pământului ţării, a fost inspirat de măsuri care fuseseră luate şi în alte state europene cu tradiţie cu mult timp înainte.

România totuşi era într-o situaţie deloc fericită, aceea a menţinerii unui sistem învechit de tip medieval de gestiune a raporturilor dintre proprietari şi ţăranii aserviţi, de îngreunare a vieţii ţăranuilor liberi. Accentuat sub fanarioţi acest sistem continua să-şi producă efectele chiar şi după 1859[4].

Totuşi, problemele sociale mai aveau un adversar şi în actul constituţional pentru Principatele Unite, Convenţia din 1858. Ea îl obliga pe domn, ca reprezentant al puterii executive să interacţioneze cu o Adunare, puterea legislativă care era compusă din mari proprietari, în marea ei majoritate, deoarece votul era unul cenzitar, ca în majoritatea statelor europene.

Reforma agrară, ca şi celelalte reforme modernizatoare nu ar fi trecut de Adunare, datorită dreptului acesteia de a vota împotriva actelor executive. Actul de la 2 mai 1864, în fapt o lovitură de stat dată de Alexandru Ioan Cuza, cu implicarea lui Mihail Kogălniceanu, ,,omul de la 2 mai", şeful guvernului în exerciţiu a însemnat un nou act constitutiv, *Statutul dezvoltător al Convenţiei de la Paris* şi o lege electorală, bazată pe vot cenzitar, dar cu o participare mai largă.

Legea rurală din vara anului 1864 aducea practic cea mai radicală modificare a structurilor sociale din întreaga epocă modernă românească. O replică a acesteia va mai fi reforma agrară din 1921. Practic, domnitorul Alexandru Ioan Cuza prin profeticele cuvinte din proclamaţia care a însoţit adoptarea legii ,,de azi înainte aveţi o patrie de iubit şi de apărat"[5] avea în vedere necesitatea absolută de a-i atrage pe ţărani, care furnizau baza oştirii române în apărarea ţării şi în câştigarea independenţei acesteia, nu doar în ai obliga să facă acest lucru.

Alexandru Ioan Cuza a înţeles că trebuie să introducă reforme legislative. Codul Civil Napoleonian era, în opinia sa şi a celor care i-au fost alături un document esenţial. De aceea, juriştii români au reuşit într-un termen relativ scurt să reformeze şi acest sector, de o importanţă deosebită. Astfel, introducerea căsătoriei civile, a legii însurăţeilor, a funcţionării superioare a instanţelor, aşeza aplicarea legii pe principii noi, mult mai solide.

Legea instrucţiunii publice, care introducea învăţământul obligatoriu, susţinut de stat aducea la îndeplinire un alt obiectiv paşoptist, luminarea celor de la sate, deoarece mediul rural era locul unde locuia marea majoritate a populaţiei[6].

Modernizarea unui sistem de gestiune a arhivelor statului, deja prevăzut de Regulamentele Organice, întemeierea de şcoli superioare pe diverse domenii, întemeierea celor două Universităţi din Iaşi şi Bucureşti erau măsuri de scoatere la lumină a energiilor creatoare ale neamului românesc.

Până la abdicarea sa din 1866, Alexandru Ioan Cuza a impus României cel mai accelerat ritm de dezvoltare cunoscut vreodată în epoca modernă. Valoarea reformelor sale a

[4]Academia Română, *Istoria Românilor*, vol.VII, tom I, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2003, p.21-27.
[5]Nichita Adăniloaie, Dan Berindei, *Reforma agrară din 1864*, Bucureşti, 1967, p. 35.
[6]*Istoria Românilor*, vol.VII, tom II, p.138.

fost înţeleasă de urmaşul său, Principele Carol de Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, care a dat României primul aşezământ fundamental din istoria românilor, cunoscut drept Constituţie, Constituţia din 1866[7].

Aceasta a fost realizată după modelul Constituţiei Belgiei, acest model fiind ales deoarece această ţară cunoscuse un ritm de dezvoltare deosebit pe plan mondial, ajungând ca în aproape două decenii de la independenţă să aibă statut de putere colonială.

Astfel, chestiunea structurilor sociale adusă în prim plan de reformele domnitorului Alexandru Ioan Cuza cunoştea o etapă superioară, fiind strâns legată de chestiunea electorală.

Cucerirea independenţei de stat a României şi recunoaşterea acesteia în 1880 de toate statele lumii a dus, la 14 martie 1881 la proclamarea Regatului României[8].

În perioada 1876-1888, România a cunoscut lunga guvernare liberală[9]. Liberalismul românesc, călit în focul revoluţiei paşoptiste este puternic influenţat de liberalismul european. Toţi istoricii, economiştii sau oamenii politici români recunosc influenţa occidentală a liberalismului. Desigur că acest curent nu a fost scutit de controverse, de dispute, este cunoscut faptul că au existat grupări moderate sau radicale. Totuşi, liberalismul românesc este legat pentru totdeauna de numele fraţilor Brătianu, de numele lui Mihail Kogălniceanu, de cele ale fraţilor Goleşti, C.A. Rosetti sau D.A. Sturdza. Liberalii români şi-au concentrat atenţia asupra adaptării ideologiei liberale la specificul românesc. Liberalismul românesc a dat numeroase guverne în epoca modernă, deşi legea electorală favoriza, datorită condiţiei cenzitare ascensiunea grupurilor conservatoare. Totuşi modelul european, occidental al sistemului politic românesc a făcut din Prinţ, apoi din Rege un factor de mediere pe scena politică. Suveranul era cel care în momente cheie, preum cel din 1871 sau din 1907 a ştiut să realizeze păstrarea normalităţii politice.

Chestiunile sociale au contiunat să reprezinte o provocare pentru clasa politică românească. Modernizarea instituţiilor, a infrastructurii, creşterea ponderii capitalului, a circulaţiei acestuia, modificarea relaţiilor de muncă între proprietari şi angajaţi[10] nu au ţinut întotdeauna pasul cu creşterea nivelului de trai, majoritatea populaţiei trăind aproape de limita sărăciei. La acestea se adăugau precaritatea din domeniul educaţional şi sanitar.

Necesitatea recuperării decalajului în domeniul infrastructurii făcea ca statul să contracteze împrumuturi financiare în condiţii grele, care, de multe ori împiedicau îndeplinirea obligaţiilor contractuale. Sunt binecunoscute în istorie chestiunea construirii căilor ferate şi a modernizării principalului port românesc de la Marea Neagră, portul Constanţa[11].

La fel ca în Occident, liberalismul a dominat scena politică românească în a doua jumătate a secolului XIX[12].

În preajma izbucnirii primului război mondial, necesitatea ducerii pe o treaptă

[7]Gheorghe Platon, *Istoria modernă a României*, Bucureşti, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, 1985, p. 210.
[8]Catherine Durandin, *Istoria Românilor*, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1998, p. 132.
[9]Ioan Scurtu, *Carol I. Istoria românilor în timpul celor patru regi*, vol. I, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 55.
[10]Gh. Matei, Damaschin Mioc, *Date cu privire la problema agrară în România la sfârşitul secolului al XIX-lea*, în „Studii. Revistă de Istorie", anul XI/1958, nr. 5, p. 8.
[11]Cornel Cârţână, *Structură şi stratificare socială în România interbelică. Contribuţii sociologice româneşti privind schimbarea şi dezvoltarea socială*, în „Sociologie românească", 2001, 1-4, p. 317-345.
[12]Mircea Iosa şi Traian Lungu, *Viaţa politică în România. 1899-1910*, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică, 1977, p. 243.

superioară a reformei agrare devenise un deziderat esenţial pentru clasa politică românească. Profilul social al României se schimbase esenţial de la momentul reformei din 1864, deşi nu trecuse decât o jumătate de secol.

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POEMS OF THE HUMAN CONDITION: SE QUESTO È UN UOMO (PRIMO LEVI)/ VORBIND PIETREI (NORMAN MANEA)

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Abstract: Norman Manea has repeatedly shown fascination with the figure of Primo Levi, renowned Italian writer and chemist who harnessed a painful experience, the years spent in the Auschwitz concentration camp, in his writings. Manea, himself a survivor of the Holocaust, expressed his interest for Levi's work. In my work, I will analyse two poems, Se questo e un uomo by Levi and Talking to the stone by Manea, both published in a correspondence volume by the latter, a volume dedicated to friendship.

În volumul epistolar, *Plicuri şi portrete*[1], Norman Manea alege însă să înfăţişeze, în oglindă, *Se questo è un uomo(Dacă acesta e un om*), poem aparţinând poetului evreu Primo Levi şi *Vorbind pietrei,* o creaţie lirică prin care scriitorul Norman Manea îşi exersează aptitudinile pentru discursul liric (poemul este citit, pentru prima oară în iunie 2003, la Târgul de Carte de la Ierusalim). Poeme-litanie: *Se questo è un uomo (Dacă acesta este un om)* şi *Vorbind pietrei,* acestea se prezintă ca o adresare directă, în formula iniţială, ele amintesc de *ecce homo-ul* lui Nietzsche. „Voi" este pronumele sub constelaţia căruia poeţii aşează întregul discurs liric, alegând vocativul (pentru a ilustra subiectul manipulat de o voinţă străină) în detrimentul nominativului, cazul definirii. Recurenţa pronumelui „care" imprimă discursului relativism, dar şi o distanţare voită a eului liric.Dacă primul poem are la bază aserţiunea: „gândiţi-vă, mai este acesta un om", ("considerate se queto è un uomo"), al doilea text se vrea, la o primă vedere, o re-explicare exhaustivă (cu nuanţă nominală) a fiinţei umane, „Nu ştiţi ce este un om". *Se questo è un uomo* înfăţişează omul în toată plenitudinea şi decăderea lui, în poemul manian se mizează pe un proces anamnezic, se încearcă o reactualizare a definiţiei iniţiale a fiinţei umane, neavând pretenţia vreuneia antropologice. Interlocutori fictivi, cititorii se erijează în judecători, ei trebuie să dea verdictul - „gândiţi-vă, mai este acesta un om", în cazulpoemului levist. În *Vorbind pietrei*, aceştia se aliniază în tagma eventualilor culpabili, alături de ceilalţi- marcată la nivel textual prin „voi", vina lor fiind aceea de a fi uitat ce este omul, şi, prin extrapolare, de a-şi fi acceptat tacit anularea propriei identităţi. În ambele discursuri, se remarcă izolarea programatică a senzaţiilor, exprimarea lor printr-un echivalent de imagine.

În cazul primului poem, la o prima lectură, limbajul despre lagăr, despre spaţii concentraţionare pare a fi doar un pretext- ca o „haină" care îmbracă un mesaj mai profund- şi avem, în acest sens, toate datele necesare: se conturează chiar o opoziţie între „Voi, ce trăiţi la adăpost" ("Voi che vivere sicuri", această securitate fiind dublată de confort, exprimat prin enunţarea „caselor tihnite" şi a „chipurilor prietenoase") şi potenţialul om, reprezentant al unei întregi clase sociale.

[1] Norman Manea, *Plicuri şi portrete*, Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 2004.

Levi îşi concepe imaginarul folosindu-se de o estetică a urâtului, formulată în accepţiunea lui Rosenkrantz: „obişnuitul, cotidianul devine, prin lipsa sa de diferenţiere, inexpresiv, plictisitor, ordinar şi se transformă astfel în urât”[2]

Omul e văzut tocmai din perspectiva oamenilor în siguranţă şi care pun etichete, putem vorbi, în acest caz, de un filtru procustian. „Consideraţi că” (o traducere mot-à-mot a verbului „considerate”, acesta fiind unul dintre punctele nevralgice ale textului) nu are, în acest context, sensul de „credeţi că ? ”, ci, mai degrabă de „luaţi-l în seamă/ în considerare că”. Se mizează pe un blanc textual simbolic puternic, un imaginar de esenţă tare. Dar acestui poem, credem noi, îi lipseşte motivul real pentru care „Voi, ce trăiţi la adăpost” (“Voi che vivere sicuri”) nu i-ar considera pe ceilalţi oameni mai oropsiţi; nu credibilitatea omenescului acestei fiinţe tipologice „(care) trudeşte în glod” (“che lavora nel fango”), pentru care pacea devine un ideal intangibil, pare a fi problema pe care textul ar vrea să o problematizeze, ci indiferenţa.
Mai mult, distanţa socială şi sufletească dintre cele două categorii sociale nu credem că reuşeşte foarte bine ca stategie de construire a lirismului, poetul făcând distincţia dintre om-neom în funcţie de condiţiile de trai ale unor clase diametral opuse.

Poemul poate antrena mai multe teme, în funcţie de unghiul de receptare. Eul liric, subiectiv, înţelege să traducă identitatea omului, însăşi condiţia umană, prin axa (unică şi esenţială) a socialului. Drept consecinţă, condiţia de a trăi devine sinonimă condiţiei umane (asistăm la o efasare a contururilor, supracategorialul integrează particularul, indiferent de marca specifică a acestuia). Putem afirma, pe baza expunerii textuale că, în opinia lui Levi, ceea ce-l defineşte pe om e socialul şi tocmai faptul acesta acuză el. Se poate porni de la premisa că pentru om e definitorie condiţia socială: în acest context, mizeria, sărăcia, exilul, înstrăinarea, condiţia de „evreu rătăcitor”, dar într-un sens negativ. Drept consecinţă, socialul devine instrumentul celor puternici pentru a traduce umanul, şi, astfel, pentru a face o selecţie naturală, în ideea că sărăcia şi boala devin stigmate ale ne-omenescului. Dacă interpretăm poemul dintr-o perspectivă strict biografică, putem schimba aproape în întregime unghiul de percepţie a realităţii reliefate. Avem drept reper premisa interogativă: cine e Primo Levi şi ce s-a întâmplat cu el? Răspunsul la aceste întrebări ne pot furniza o bună cheie de interpretare, fără a complica analiza printr-un balast referenţial. Primo Levi, chimist italian de origine evreiască, a fost trimis în lagăr la Auschwitz în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, acolo acesta a stat aproximativ trei-patru ani, până la eliberare.

În urma acestei experienţe, supravieţuitorul alege scrisul ca modalitate de chatarsis al sinelui, concepând un roman sau, mai degrabă o scriere diaristică: *Mai este oare acesta un om?* (1947, 1956, o carte despre lupta sa zilnică împotriva alienarii mentale, identitare şi fizice, a absurdităţii lagărului care a influenţat fundamental „literatura lagărului”).

Mai mult, poemul *Se questo è un uomo* este aşezat liminar, în deschiderea romanului.

[2]Karl Rosenkrantz, *O estetică a urâtului. Între frumos şi comic*, Trad. VictorErnest Maşek, Ed. Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1984, p. 188.

Considerăm că este important să precizăm şi soluţia pe care o găseşte Levi la propria criză existenţială, el alegând o modalitate tragică de „eliberare", sinuciderea, chiar dacă la o vârstă înaintată. Pentru a explicita termenul de „absurd", prin care am definit particularitatea operei acestui scriitor, menţionăm în acest sens o frază foarte citată în critica literară, pe care o şi contextualizăm. La un moment dat, cuprins de sete, prizonierul vrea sa bea în lagăr apă de la o pompă şi, văzut de un gardian german, este lovit cu un baston peste spinare. Nefiind contrariat chiar deloc, Levi îl întreabă: „de ce nu am voie?".

"Hier ist kein warum!"(„Aici nu există niciun de ce!", e răspunsul celui de-al doilea, radical şi nelămuritor, frază, aşa cum am menţionat anterior, devenită celebră în literatură, în istorie şi sociologie, care rezumă in nuce absurditatea Holocaustului).

Reluând interpretarea, reamintim că poemul lui Levi pune în opoziţie omul comod, cu familie, hrană şi „oropsitul", termen prin care suntem îndreptăţiţi acum să desemnăm prizonierul din lagăr, care trăieşte la limita supravieţuirii şi a suportabilităţii omeneşti şi a cărui viaţă depinde de şansă, de nimic altceva, de „un da sau un nu".

Dacă jurnalul lui Levi „de la prima pagină până la ultima, totul este o aglomerare de fapte, de amănunte care nu vor decât să restituie o imagine exactă a lagărului"[3], putem aplica această consideraţie critică şi în cazul poemului, care, redă explicit şi exhaustiv, printr-un raport antitetic, aceeaşi imagine terifiantă, dar potenţată artistic, a lagărului.

Având în vedere aceste considerente, putem crede că *Se questo è un uomo* poate fi receptat şi ca o invectivă, fiind un poem realizat oarecum sub forma unui blestem: nu trebuie să uităm vreodată ce a fost acolo, cel care va uita asta va păţi la fel, ar putea constitui morala acestei scrieri.

Manea se luptă şi el împotriva uitării, poemul său fiind o replică peste timp la poemul levist, acesta continuă „cruciada" lui Levi împotriva indiferenţei şi a uitării. Aşadar, în al doilea poem, *Vorbind pietrei*, construit cu intenţionalitataea *unei mise en abyme* a primului, se remarcă în economia discursului recurenţa motivului pietrei, care, prin valenţele pe care le importă, devine un pattern simbolic.De ce piatră, de ce om? Explicaţia ne este oferită de *Dicţionarul de simboluri*: „Piatra şi omul prezintă o dublă mişcare ascendentă şi descendentă"[4]. Şi în poemul manian, cele două entităţi sunt reliefate ca unităţi ale unei aceleiaşi structuri (în acest sens, Annick de Souzenelle remarcă faptul că ,,în toate tradiţiile, piatra se află în acelaşi fascicul cu Omul"[5], acest element fiind receptat într-o accepţiune christică, căci este aşezat în imediata proximitate a pâinii euharistice), raportul care se stabileşte între acestea două fiind indestructibil. Mai mult, „simbioza de organic şi amorf (...) la evrei, trecerea de la piatra brută necesară ridicării altarelor, la piatra cioplită, pentru clădirea Templului lui Solomon, este semnul sedentarizării

[3]Georgiana Sârbu, „Un roman-mărturie", în *Observator cultural*, nr. 75, 12 martie 2004, p. 10.

[4]Jean Chevalier, Alain Gheerbrant, *Dicţionar de simboluri*, Trad. Micaela Slăvescu, Laurenţiu Zoicaş, vol. III, Ed. Artemis, Bucureşti, pag.80.

[5]Annick de Souzenelle, *Simbolismul corpului uman*, Trad. Margareta Gyurcsik, Ed. Amarcord, Timişoara, 1999, p.25.

poporului ales, al unei stabilizări şi cristalizări ciclice, al unei involuţii, nu al unui progres”[6] Pe de altă parte, prin amorfismul şi lipsa oricărei elasticităţi pe care le sugerează, piatra devine element-metaforă al omului, caracterizat prin indiferenţă, în faţa semenului său.

Dacă Levi îşi aşeza întregul discurs liric sub semnul unei condiţionalităţi ipotetice (marcată la nivel textual prin conjuncţia „dacă”), Norman Manea alege ca stratagemă a creaţiei utilizarea verbului din titlu la modul gerunziu, ce exprimă o mişcare eternizată şi încremenită în acelaşi timp, echivalată poate doar de haiku-ul oriental. *Vorbind pietrei* înfăţisează şi o procesualitate (aceea a zicerii fără o finalitate intenţională, în succesiune neîntreruptă, ca o confesiune eliberatoare), dar şi o „poză” făcută la minut a momentului.

În acest poem, mizeria umană explicitată de Levi comportă un proces de interiorizare şi transcendere a spaţiului exterior spre interioritatea eului liric, care se confundă cu cel biografic (textul capătă, în consecinţă, tuşe memorialistice): „La Târgul de carte am venit/ La Ierusalim/ ca acum doi ani”. Instanţa eului liric suportă un proces de scindare interioară, de diseminare a sinelui: „soarele deşertului / mă taie, din nou, în două, în patru, în patruzeci şi patru” (în acest vers se remarcă şi marca ludică), proiectat în faţa instanţei paterne antropomorfizate („În faţa pietrei cu nume de om.../ în faţa tatălui meu/ devenit piatră”). Norman Manea apelează la un lirism epic, explicitator, care păstrează în conţinut combustia internă a eului confesor, dar care şi relatează. Infrarealismul (înţeles ca o construcţie a unei alte realităţi în faţa realităţii de facto) se configurează în discursul poetic, mai ales prin operarea cu substitute (al pietrei ca înlocuito al unui om, al incertitudinii ca replică a indiferenţei din subsidiarul simbolic al primului poem analizat).

Norman Manea resemantizează unele motive /imagini propuse de poemul levist („femeia fără cosiţe, fără nume”, dar a cărei descriere e „înnăsprită”, interlocutorii fictivi- „voi”, omul, proiectat de această dată nu în noroi, ci „în mâlul zilelor efemere,/ supebele zile şi nopţi ale incertitudinii”).

În continuare, propunem să ne centrăm atenţia asupra prezenţei feminine a poemului, a cărei descriere succintă am enunţat-o anterior. Pentru un demers analitic eficient, o vom corela cu „femeia fără cosiţe, fără nume” din poemul levist, având în vedere totodată şi posibilitatea ca cele două să fie reprezentări ale unei aceleiaşi femei. În primul caz, femeia este aşezată sub corolarul anonimatului, epitetul „fără nume” este un factor ce indică omogenizarea personalităţii, plonjarea în anonimat, acesta fiind potenţat de goliciunea care este plasată, în mod insolit, la nivelul ochilor, a privirii- femeia are „cu ochii goliţi”, organ prin excelenţă al senzorialului, al cunoaşterii, dar în acelaţi timp şi o oglindă reflectantă a interiorităţii. Drept urmare, fiinţa este vidată de orice suflu interior, acest vid având un corespondent şi la nivelul „pântecelui”, care, aflat sub stigmatul frigului, îşi pierde funcţia primară, denspaţiu maternal,regenerator. Prin antromorfizare, femeia îşi pierde chiar şi latura umană, fiind proiectată în sfera animalităţii. Broasca (simbol al grotescului, amfibie, prin definiţie, adică un organism adaptabil atât în spaţiul terestru, cât şi celui acvatic), asociată în poem iernii, temperaturilor scăzute, este anulată ca

[6] *Ibidem.*

vietate. Corespondenţa este preluată *ad litteram* şi de Levi care adaugă acesteia o nouă gamă de semnificaţii, sintetizată prin „masca neagră a urii". Această mască devine o componentă organică a fiinţei (ca o prelungire a propriului corp). Tirada al cărei început îl constituie o interogaţie „Întrebaţi-vă dacă" se construieşte pe baza unui imaginar dur, impregnat de o violenţă surprinsă in actio, în plină desfăşurare. Turmentarea prinde glas prin „vuietul de şrapnel al urii"care cuprinde totul, ca într-o magmă universală.

„Femeia lui Manea" nu apare în ipostaza infertilităţii, dar este plasată într-un topos al ne-orânduii, al războiului. „Ascunsă sub emblema de catran a dinamitei/ sub hipnoza belicoasă a asaltului", ea este îndelung supusă unor procese acut-traumatice, ce au drept repercusiuni până şi blocajul memoriei, imposibilitatea amintirii, a prezentificării unui trecut, însă a unuia deosebit de dureros (ea „nu-şi mai poate aminti/ numele copilului purtat în braţe/ în urmă cu o clipă", care, în iureşul masacrului este transformat, sub privirile mamei, într-o „minge de sânge"). „Mamă nebună" sau înnebunită, ea îşi pierde orice atribut, chiar şi pe cel definitoriu, de femeie. Ambii poeţii optează pentru o punere a lirismului la masculin, alegerea nefiind o extrapolare a unei tendinţe misogine, ci, mai degrabă, o conştientizare că, în perimetrul unor spaţii-limită, al lagărului sau al războiului, femeia, fiinţă delicată, care necesită protecţie şi afecţiune, îşi pierde orice tendinţă de opoziţie în faţa crizei şi se pierde şi pe sine. În ansamblul operei lui Manea, efectele spaţiului concentraţionar lasă urme adânci asupra mamei, care, asemeni „femeii fără nume", îşi pierde orice suflu de vitalitate feminină, fiind o victimă pentru care lupta pentru supravieţuire în lagăr e mult mai dură, deoarece ea trebuie să ofere iluzia unui trai decent copilului ei şi, iniţial, Marei, fetiţa pe care o are în grija sa (menţionăm că prin această analogie, nu încercăm o identificare a figurii poetice din text).

Mai mult, scriitorul, ipostaziat în poet, operează cu o topocronie pe care o investeşte cu valenţe simbolice: Statele Unite, ţara de împrumut devine astfel „efemerul Babilon al Lumii Noi", iar Israelul îşi recapătă statutul de „Cetate Eternă". Prezentul este intarsiat de incertitudine „ceaţa colorată a prezentului". Târgul de Carte îşi pierde investiturainiţială, aceea de manifestare culturală, devenind singurul pretext în cadrul căruia sunt puse faţă în faţă, omul şi piatra, organicul şi amorful, fiul şi tatăl, scriitorul şi condiţia umană.

Aici timpul împietreşte sub povara „urii"- „şi ascultaţi vuietul de şrapnel al urii (...) a secolelor devenite piatră", orice unitate de măsură este anulată. Revenind la raportul om-piatră, care include în aria sa mai mult decât celula semantică tată-fiu, putem emite mai multe ipoteze: tatăl în urma trecerii în nefiinţă, este înmormântat în conformiate cu tradiţia iudaică (evreilor li se aşază o piatră funerară, pe care se încrustează stela, de fiecare dată când mormântul este vizitat, se aprinde o lumânare timp de o zi şi se pune o pietricică pe mormânt, ca semn de recunoştinţă), această interpretare fiind una de suprafaţă, ce vizează primul nivel de receptare. Tatăl (prin acest substantiv putem înţelege atât o instanţă paternă, dar, pe de altă parte, şi una divină, „tata" fiind şi un apelativ de tip substitut al lui Dumnezeu-Tatăl) pare a fi fost „atins" şi el de criza timpului, de consecinţele abolirii acestuia.

În articolul „Periprava, 1958", Norman Manea îşi descrie tatăl ca pe o victimă a timpului său (fusese închis în „lagărul socialist", era „posedat" de clipă): „Tata avea cincizeci de ani. Nu

îmbătrânise, aşa mi se părea, dar clipa bătrână, puturoasă, îl poseda, îl făcea bătrân, bătrân”[7]. El îşi legitimează apartenenţa prin moarte la secolul de piatră, în care conflictele, raporturile dintre agresori şi cei agresaţi sunt susceptibile inversării. Revenind la poemul manian, credem că este interesant să urmărim modul în care omul, fiinţă caracterizată prin act, devine o simplă piatră de cimitir; Manea realizează aici o metonimie complexă.

Dacă în *Seducătorul din Sevilla* şi *Musafirul de piatră* (Tirso de Molina), don Fernando, întors din morţi, se transformă, în mod voluntar în piatră, în *Vorbind pietrei,* tatăl nu alege, ci este el cel ales de timpul crud, alimentat de o proliferare a violenţei. Se remarcă toate elementele-cheie din matricea semantică a războiului: „autobuz al morţii”, „isteria verii acesteia”, „spectacolul ultimei explozii”, „omul-proiectil”, „robotul care sfârtecă bătrâne şi prunci”, lupta pentru „colţul de pace”, „femeia (...) ascunsă sub emblema de catran a dinamitei (...) doar cu masca neagră a urii”, „minge de sânge”, „vuietul de şrapnel al urii”, „fiilor duşmanilor voştri”, „înşelătoarea linişte”„ora de pace şi linişte a amurgului” care reuşeşte să configureze un imaginar violent, puternic tehnicizat (nu se mai luptă doar omul contra semenului său, apar şi alte mijloace care transformă conflictul în unul injust)

Deşi în antiteză cu un Babilon modern, Ierusalimul, centrul Cetăţii Eterne- apare supus aceleiaşi cronografii aşezate sub constelaţia confruntării- fiind „asediat de urgia de azi”. În corespondenţă directă, Cetatea Eternă, spaţiu-matrice, este surprinsă într-un moment de decădere, ea îţi pierde valenţele iniţiale, de „pământ ales”, de topos al relevării sacrului, devenind un spaţiu al tensiunilor care apare mereu sub semnul unei convulsii ce nu se soluţionează nici la final, „ora de pace” fiind, în acelaşi timp, şi una de „sânge”. Mai mult, ea este racordată şi la paradigma „comercialului”- „s-au ieftinit călătoriile/ spre/ Ţara Sfântă credincioşilor. (...) Se obţine ieftin eternitatea / în aceste zile.”

Laitmotivul poemului, piatra, este dublat de un altul, pe care poetul nu insistă atât de mult, cartea. Cartea adună pribegii, devine un pretext al adunării oamenilor într-un singur spaţiu („La Târgul de carte am venit”), aflat şi el sub incidenţa terorii şi a fricii („Puţini au avut curajul să înfrunte/ isteria verii acesteia./ Festivităţile s-au chircit, speriate”), leagă prietenii, consolidează relaţia scriitor-cititor, dincolo de paginile ei (evidenţiat, la nivel subtextual de legătura pe care Primo Levi o întreţine cu cititorii cărţilor sale- „...sfaturile prietenilor,/ milioane de prieteni ai cărţilor sale”), reumple de sens un spaţiu vidat de evenimente externe (Norman Manea numeşte Ierusalimul şi „Cetatea Cărţii Eterne”, cu referire directă la Biblie/ Tora). Pentru a consolida afirmaţia emisă, putem interpreta rugăciunea lui Primo Levi, chatartică, ca fiind şi o evidenţiere a umanizării unei cărţi prin procesul rostirii. Mai mult, omul, făcând apel la o concepţie bahtiană, poate fi considerat o carte, pe care sunt înscrise însemnele timpului (şi putem merge şi mai departe, până într-acolo încât să certificăm existenţa unei Liber Mundi). În contextul acestui poem, omul, prin analogie metonimică, cartea, devine piatră.

Revenind la paralelismul care se instituie între cele două poeme, observăm că întrebarea lui Primo Levi e resemantizată. Norman Manea exclude din formulă pe „gândiţi-vă / consideraţi

[7]Norman Manea, „Periprava, 1958”, în *Apostrof*, nr. 4, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, p. 24.

că", deşi ambii recurg la aceeaşi metodă de punere sub interogaţie a unor probleme ce vizează direct omul, prin întrebarea retorică.

„Dacă acesta este un om" (întrebarea-cheie a textului alcătuieşte un singur vers şi se distinge la nivel prozodic, prin poziţia singulară, ce are drept efect, individualizarea acesteia). Interesant este faptul că Primo Levi, prin „consideraţi că", ezită în a conferi statutul de om unui oropsit „care luptă pentru o coajă de pâine,/ care moare pentru un da sau pentru un nu", pe când Norman Manea se arată mult mai tolerant chiar şi cu agresorul fiinţei plonjate în incertitudine (care este supusă, la rîndul ei, la o judecată de valoare) - „întrebaţi-vă dacă om este/ robotul care sfârtecă bătrâne şi prunci".

Concluzionând, ambii poeţi formulează întrebări care nu îşi găsesc un răspuns în cadrul perimetrului liric (ar putea, în acest sens, piatra să prindă glas?), ci, poate, doar o mise en abyme a problemelor lumii contemporane care nu pot fi trecute sub ceaţa uitării. Omul, cel care primeşte rolul principal în aceste două poeme, victimă a lagărului, a suferinţei sau a războiului, a urii sau, dimpotrivă, înconjurat de „chipuri prietenoase", proiectat fără voia lui în „vuietul de şrapnel al urii", este re-supus unei noi încercări, aceea de a-şi demonstra apartenenţa la specia umană. Această ultimă probă ne trimite, involuntar, la afirmaţia lui Ortega y Gasset, care încercă definirea omului dintr-un unghi sociologic: „Spre deosebire de celelalte fiinţe din univers, omul nu este niciodată cu siguranţă om, ci a fi om însemnează tocmai a fi mereu pe punctul de a fi, a fi problemă vie, aventură absolută şi hazardată sau, (...) a fi, prin esenţă, dramă!"[8].

Aşadar, fiinţa umană este aşezată între „a fi" şi „a nu fi", între „a fi" şi „a deveni", o procesualitate care înscrie în desfăşurarea ei tocmai existenţa umană.

Această lucrare a beneficiat de suport financiar prin proiectul 'Rute de excelență academică în cercetarea doctorală și post-doctorală – READ' cofinanțat din Fondul Social European, prin Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, contract nr. POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926

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[8]José Ortegay Gasset, *Omul şi mulţimea*, Trad.Sorin Mărculescu, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2000, p.27.

THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY DURING 2007-2013

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Abstract: The contribution of foreign capital is a significant part of the economic development of a State, especially when the economic relations are strongly influenced by political and social ones. The present paper focuses on the analysis of the economic relationship between France and Romania in the period 2007-2013, known as the post-accession period. Firstly, we have analyzed the contribution of the French capital during the aforementioned period, through a comparative analysis of its evolution. Secondly, it has become relevant to our research to illustrate the main economic areas that have benefited from the support of French capital, noting whether the French investors' preferences have changed from the beginning to the end of the post-accession interval subjected to our analysis.

Keywords: ***foreign capital, post-accession period, Romanian economy, French investments, contribution***

Argument

Foreign Direct Investments have an important contribution to the development of a country, their impact being visible not only in the economic sphere but also in the social, political or cultural one. The advantages of such an economic process are reported on both the investing country and upon the recipient. Some of the benefits of FDI to the host country include creating jobs, stimulating trade and technology transfers. FDI stimulates economic development through a dynamic and complex process of quantitative accumulation and structural-qualitative changes in the system of production forces and relations.[1]

The advantages are more significant if these investments are taking place in countries which are in the process of development, as it is the case of Romania. Foreign investors are attracted by the existence of a favorable economic environment, characterized by factors such as fair taxation, protection from unlawful expropriation or fair competition. Despite these advantages, foreign investors face difficulties in the process of outsourcing of the capital. This action requires skills such as coordinating a business away or signing cooperation agreements with governments that have different policies. However, the advantages prevail, which resulted in the expansion of FDI, as a characteristic of the modern economic world.[2]

Romania is trying to create a business environment favorable to the development of the market economy and to attract FDI. Since 2007, in the context of the EU integration, Romania has intensified its cooperation with European countries.

[1] Cătălin Postelnicu, Adina Rus, Coordonate ale economiei internațioanle, Editura Casa Cărții de Știință, Cluj-Napoca, 2007, p. 99.
[2] Charles Lipson, *Standing guard – Protecting foreign capital in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1985, p. 4.

This paper analyses the French Foreign Direct Investments in Romania in the period 2007-2013. Therefore, our research will start with the presenting the contribution of French capital during those 7 years of the post-accession period. The purpose of this analysis is to observe the French capital contribution from year to year, from the beginning to the end of the period. Moreover, this study mentions also the main economic areas that benefited from the support of French capital. Following the same framework, it can be observed if any changes have occurred between areas over the period.

In terms of methodology, the study is developed at a comparative level, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This is exposed by a qualitative interpretation of the quantitative data in order to provide clearer explanations. Regarding the use of qualitative methods, we chose the document analysis and the case study to achieve the objective of our research. So, we will focus on an analysis of the volume of French capital contribution during concerned period, in order to see if there were differences from one year to another, but also to identify the main causes of this situation. Moreover, research is detailed by exemplifying the main economic areas that had the support of the French capital. At the same time, the aim is to present the main economic areas to see if French investors' preferences have changed during the post-accession period.

On the other hand, the quantitative research uses numbers and statistical analysis methods to investigate. The main purpose of the quantitative analysis is to measure the research data, in order to test the hypotheses. For the present research, we used descriptive statistics because they allow links between variables, such as certain economic indicators.

The development of the study at a compared level is realized to confront the obtained results in order to provide a broader context and to identify general templates that can help to test the theories. In this research, we compared the level of foreign investment during the mentioned period to see if the French investors' interest was amplified or decreased, noting which were the causes of this fact and the main areas of investment.

Foreign capital investments during the period 2007 – 2013

A high level of FDI in the economy of a country is an important element of its development and for the efficient functioning of the market, because it supports the technological upgrading and raises the quality standards. The preference of developing countries for choosing direct foreign investments is motivated by the fact that, in comparison to foreign lending, it contributes not only with capital flows, but also with technological know-how and managerial experience.[3] It is of high importance for the national economy that the domestic and foreign investments are linked to the economic environment - if the investment rate is faster, the economic growth is stronger and more durable.[4]

[3] Bogdan Titus Corondan, *Impactul structurii investițiilor străine directe asupra cuantunului și dinamicii prelevărilor fiscal*, în RFPC nr. 1/2012, Ministerul Finanțelor Publice, 2012, p. 20.
[4] Elena Moise, *Investițiile străine directe,* Editura Victor, București, 2005, p. 88.

At the same time, the impact of FDI is influenced by their origin. Thus, there are cooperative relationships between states which are based on history or partnerships in organizations or international associations.

For example, in our research, the diplomatic relation between Romania and France is a relationship based on history, dating back more than 130 years[5], but also one of cooperation under treaties like the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The analyzed period in this study, 2007 - 2013, is the post-accession period to the European Union. Since then, economic relations between Romania and France are conducted under Community law. In addition, other important agreements for governing the bilateral economic relations are:

· Agreement about the avoidance of double taxation on income and property, entered into force in 27 September 1975;

· Agreement about the promotion and mutual protection of investments, entered into force in 2 June 1996.[6]

In the following lines, we will analyze the volume and the evolution of FDI during the post-accession period.

Thus, on a first glance to the presented chart, we see that the French FDI had constantly evolved, reaching a higher level of contribution to end of the period; in 2013 it had a value of 4568 million Euros, beside the value of 3759 million from 2007. The fact that these investments not only recorded an increase during the analyzed period is due to the international events, with global impact on the economy.

Figure 1. The volume of French foreign investment in the period of 2007-2013



Own processing after data provided by www.bnr.ro

[5] Romanian Embassy in France, *Relații bilaterale – Scurt istoric*, available at [http://paris.mae.ro/node/221], last access: 21 March 2015.

[6] Romanian Embassy in France, *Relații economice,* available at [http://paris.mae.ro/node/168], last access: 23 March 2015.

Before beginning the presentation of the investment level during the period 2007 – 2013 for each year separately, it is important to mention that France has been one of the most active partners of Romania in the pre-accession period, registering steady growth of FDI and occupying the first places in the ranking of investing countries. Given the fact that France has been a great supporter of Romania's integration in the European Union in 2007[7], at the beginning of the post-accession, French FDI in Romania reached the level of 3759 million. Against the backdrop of the global economic crisis, the year 2009[8] has determined a decrease of French FDI compared to 2008[9], rising from 4294 million euros to 4259 million euros. Even if there has been a decrease, it was reduced in comparison to the impact of the global economic crisis and it has not affected the evolution of French FDI in Romania. In this context, in 2010[10] we are facing a shy increase in the investments area, reaching the level of 4384 million. This indicates that the French FDI in Romania are stable investments in areas which were not heavily affected by the crisis. Some of the preferred areas by French investors are automotive industry or trade industry, but this aspect will be further exposed in the second part of our study. In 2011[11], the total French FDI registered was of 5042 million euros, which is noted to be the most significant increase from one year to another in the studied period. Thus, in 2012[12], we note the high level of FDI, the total registered was of 5273 million euros. Through a further analysis, we can see that this increase does not characterize the whole FDI area in the post-accession period; sometimes a significant decline can be noted.[13] The case of French investments is a particular one, determined by the nature of investments, due to the nature of investments and to the diplomatic relationships between these two countries. In 2013[14], French FDI recorded a slight decrease, totaling 4568 million euros but it did not affect the economic market in Romania, which began to experience a slight recovery after the Great Depression.

From the presented chart we note that the amounts invested have fluctuated over the studied period, being influenced by the global economic situation. The French FDI upward trend at the beginning of the studied period has followed the tradition of growth from the pre-accession period, being interrupted by the impact of the global economic crisis. The years 2009-2010 are characterized by a decrease of FDI, a recovery can be mentioned starting with 2011-2012. The decrease observed in 2013 took place in a context where foreign investors have adopted a more reserved position in increasing the investments, preferring to stabilize the existing businesses. This attitude was a precautionary measure, taking into account the economic events caused by the Great Depression. In this context, Romania has lost its appeal, especially due to underdeveloped infrastructure.

[7] National Bank of Romania, *Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2007,* București, 2008, p. 3.
[8] *Idem, Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2009,* București, 2010, p. 3.
[9] *Idem, Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2008,* București, 2009, p. 3.
[10] *Idem, Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2010,* București, 2011, p. 3.
[11] *Idem, Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2011,* București, 2012, p. 3.
[12] *Idem, Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2012,* București, 2013, p. 3.
[13] For further information, see also Elena Rusu, Delia Lung, *FDI flows in Romania before and after EU integration: a comparative approach*, in Modelling the New Europe, Online Journal, No. 14, 2014, p. 22.
[14] National Bank of Romania, *Investițiile străine în România la 31 decembrie 2013,* București, 2014, p. 5

It is important to note that France has constantly occupied the fourth position within the ranking of the investing states in Romania, after countries as the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. This shows that Romania has stable partners in the economic relations. It is important that the same countries are present throughout the period investigated, but also that they maintain their constant share of FDI. At the end ofthe post-accession period, during those seven years, France has invested 31,578 million, appearing during the whole period on the fourth position in the ranking of participating countries.[15]

The main economic sectors

Attracting foreign direct investment is an important means of developing an economy. In the lines below we will focus on presenting the main French investors in Romania in fields such as like industry, finance, trade and telecommunications.

Automobile-Dacia S.A. is the leading automotive manufacturer in Romania and was born in 1966; two years later it produced the first model Renault - Dacia 1100, under the license of Renault 8. In 1999, Renault purchased 51% of the capital after the privatization process, and currently holds 99.43% of the capital of Dacia.[16] Currently, Dacia is one of the most important companies in the Romanian economy and the second brand of the Renault group, with a turnover in 2013 of 18.402.497.788 lei and a net profit of 337.444.120 lei to a number of 14 002 employees.[17] In competition with other automobile companies, Dacia has the advantage that it offers a great rapport price/ quality /reliability.

Orange Romania S.A. is the brand under which France Telecom provides mobile communications services, Internet and television in our country.[18] The company provides telecommunication services to individuals and legal entities. Orange is the leader of telecommunications market in Romania from 2004, with 10.436 million customers, a revenue of 934 million euros[19] and a number of 2.855 employees[20], reported on 31 December 2013.

Carrefour Group is the largest European distributor and the second worldwide, developing its business in 34 countries. In Romania, Carrefour operates with 4 types of stores: hypermarkets, supermarkets, convenience stores (Express Angst and Contact) and a website for online commerce. Hypermarket concept was invented by Carrefour 40 years ago in France and was first

[15] La Direction Générale du Trésor, *Les services économique à l'étranger – Roumanie*, available at [http://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/pays/roumanie], last access: 5 April 2015.
[16] Dacia Company, *Dacia, cel mai bun ambasador al economiei românești*, available at [http://www.dacia.ro/despre-noi/marca-dacia/filosofia-dacia/], last access: 7 April 2015.
[17] Doing Business Website, *Automobile-Dacia S.A.*, available at [http://doingbusiness.ro/financiar/raport/93330/automobile-dacia-sa/], last access: 7 April 2015.
[18] Orange Romania, *Despre noi – Orange este ceea ce suntem și ceea ce facem, în fiecare zi,* available at [http://www.orange.ro/about-body-ro.html#m=100-4-6], last access: 8 April 2015.
[19] Orange Romania, *Despre noi – Orange este una dintre cele mai mari companii de telecomunicații,* available at [http://www.orange.ro/corporate/about-ro.html], last access: 8 April 2015.
[20] Doing Business Website, *Orange Romania S.A.*, available at [http://doingbusiness.ro/financiar/raport/1398769/orange-romania-sa/], last acces: 8 April 2015.

brought in Romania in 2001.[21] At the end of 2013, Carrefour Romania S.A. records a turnover of 4.289.031.026 lei and a net profit of 144.301.868 lei at a number of 6703 employees.[22]

BRD- Groupe Société Générale is one of the leading financial services groups in Romania. This is the former Romanian Bank for Development, using the name of BRD- Groupe Société Générale from 2003, after its listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. One year later, Société Générale bought the residual package of shares from the Romanian state and increased its stake from 51% to 58.32%.[23] On 30 September 2013, BRD declared a net income of 51 million lei, while BRD's loan stock was 34.4 billion lei, down with 5.1% compared to the level registered on 30 September 2012.[24]

The Michelin Group operates in Romania since August 2001 and at this time it has three factories and a commercial network. Most of the products from here are sold through a national distribution network, but also exported to Europe and North America. Currently, the Michelin team has 3,000 employees.[25] At the end of 2013, Michelin Romania S.A. records a turnover of 2.123.412.336 lei and a net profit of 78.028.208 lei.[26] In addition to the production activities, such as tire manufacturing (truck tires or industrial tires), Michelin has organized in Romania the coordination center of the commercial area of Central and South Europe.

As we can see after the presentation of some leading companies, the French capital is involved in various activity fields on the Romanian market, but it is important to note that most of the investments are materialized in the form of small and medium enterprises. Those operate throughout the country and activate in different sectors such as clothing, agriculture or industry.

Conclusions

Following our research, it can be noted that the French FDI tend to be constant and stable in the Romanian investment market. Romania has the advantage of the attractiveness for low cost labor, but the infrastructure is underdeveloped.

Economic cooperation between the two entities is the result of a traditional relationship, and a strategic partnership at the European level. Therefore, this research investigated the contribution of French capital in the post-accession period 2007-2013, in order to see the contribution level and the main economic areas that presented attractiveness for French investors. After analyzing the presented companies, we conclude that the interest of French investors is

[21] Carrefour Romania, *Despre Grup Carrefour,* available at [http://carrefour.ro/despre-grup-carrefour.html], last access: 8 April 2015.
[22] Doing Business Website, *Carrefour Romania S.A.,* available at [http://doingbusiness.ro/financiar/raport/581039/carrefour-romania-sa/], last access: 8 April 2015.
[23] Brd - Groupe Société Générale, *Istorie,* available at [https://www.brd.ro/despre-brd/profil/istorie/], last access: 14 April 2015.
[24] Brd - Groupe Société Générale (2013), *Rezultatele BRD la 30 septembrie 2013: profit net de 51 milioane RON,* available at [https://www.brd.ro/stiri/rezultatele-brd-la-30-septembrie-2013-profit-net-de-51-milioane-ron], last access 14 April 2015.
[25] Michelin Romania, *Despre Michelin in Romania,* available at [http://www.michelin.ro/despre/michelin-in-romania], last access: 14 April 2015.
[26] Doing Business Website, *Michelin Romania S.A.,* available at [http://doingbusiness.ro/financiar/raport/1368629/michelin-romania-sa/], last access 14 April 2015.

oriented towards sectors such as industrial equipment manufacturing, transportation, energy, banking and insurance, trade and services. However, the industry is proving to be the main attractive economic sector for foreign investment, and the best example is the development of companies such as Dacia. This brings a significant contribution to the GDP and to the development of the Romanian economy.

In conclusion, the Romanian business environment is still at an early stage of development and this can be overcome only by creating a favorable economic environment to attract foreign investors.

Given the fact that competition between countries to attract FDI has become increasingly intense, measures such as attractive fiscality, business transparency, protection from unlawful expropriation can be applied. Romania's integration in the EU determined a more intense collaboration with its stable partners, old members within EU and their contributions have significantly developed the economic environment of our country.

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THE GEOPOLITIC BEHAVIOUR OF CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS

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Abstract: The issue addressed in this study refers to the aspects less advertised and therefore less known on how the People Republic of China, aspiring to the title of world economic power, has become the protagonist of unprecedented economic growth, as a result not only of increased trade following diplomatic relations at international level, but also as a result of an intervention less peaceful, even threatening, coming from the military. Therefore, the author aims to provide explanations for their decisions in the areas of geopolitics and national security and their impact on the entire global economic and political circuit.

Keywords : ***global economy, political power, geopolitical behaviour, strategic decisions, economic growth.***

JEL Classification: F16, F54, F63, N15, N45

INTRODUCTION

China's geopolitical behavior today started by expanding its sphere of influence first in neighboring countries, and then by working with other world powers. In its relationship with other countries, China often resorted to intimidation, especially when profit was foreseen. When deemed necessary, the Chinese state has appealed to military movements. China become increasingly threatening with its current military development. Having a consistent declared military budget, China's actual spending for the military sector is growing annually, aspiring to the position of military supremacy.

The analysis of Chinese society regarding future is divided between the desire to see a peaceful China, dedicated to cultivating economic and diplomatic relations on an equal footing with other states of the world and fear of implacable dictatorship, being more dangerous as it simulates a fair behavior. China claims that it does not want to become an international political power, but an economic power.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The idea of Chinese economic growth and development is subject to conflicting debates in the specialized literature, reflecting different opinions and attitudes of the economic analysts regarding the changes and opportunities growth rate of China`s economic situation. So, while some are impressed by the energy and dynamism that characterize the Chinese economy, there are skeptics who see this jump as unsustainable and it may threaten the rest of the world which claims that China's integration into the world economy was done in an improper way, not peacefully.

However, it is widely recognized that this country had record development, subsequently involving the entire global economy, thus, earning the right to run for the position of the next economic power of the world.

Oded Shenkar, professor of management and human resources at Fisher College of Business within University of Ohio, speaks in his book entitled "Chinese century" on how China managed, after 500 years of obscurity, to lead the world economy, monetizing its bountiful resourced, important technological and financial resources, having qualities such as pragmatism, patience and a developed sense of entrepreneurship. The author argues that the rise of this country will result in a fundamental restructuring of the global business system that will determine a repositioning of its key elements.

Kenneth Pomeranz aims to point out through his book entitled "The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the birth of the modern world economy " an overview of modern history, by making parallel between economic expansion of Europe and East Asia and highlighting the most important issues regarding population growth, capital accumulation, investments, consumption and technology. In this respect, the most significant representative of Asia, China, seems to be coming increasingly more close to the European model, as will be seen further in the analysis carried out.

On the opposite side there are Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, the authors of the book "China kills: a global call to action". Peter Navarro, economist and professor of California University, is known as an outspoken critic and commentator on China. Together, the authors, reveal the aggressive methods used by China to become a world leader. Thus, we are presented with a capitalism that combines protectionist and mercantilist measures in order to penetrate all areas of American industry, a Chinese military power trained to face a possible confrontation with the U.S., an undervalued Chinese currency that may harm the United States and Europe, a country that promotes nuclear proliferation in order to obtain oil, cyber-attacks targeting defense system and American core sectors. In other words, China is shown as a threat to U.S. and, therefore, to the rest of the world.

In the book "China- wars to come" published by the same Peter Navarro in 2011, the issues behind the Chinese economic expansion are expressed as follows: " Chinese prices" are the result of modern slaves associated with a complex system of unfair trade practices that violate the principles and rules of international trade; Chinese economy is based on commercial piracy and counterfeit goods; China's commercial strategy for oil acquisition is based on monetizing nuclear weapons; China is characterized by a strong imperialism and the use of weapons of mass destruction; the coal used by the Chinese industry can be considered a determinant of global warming; China is involved not only in internal conflict but also external ones (the preparation of the Red Army to face any type of conflict, the possibility of a cosmic war following Chinese involvement) .

Taking over and developing of these ideas were aimed at explaining how unfair China started the battle for world supremacy, endangering not only the stability and national security of the less developed countries in its vicinity, but also those already involved the world economic circuit.

Flipping American hegemony and moving the geopolitical center of the North Atlantic to the Pacific area, raises some fears related to obtaining through violence and constraint of a new balance. According to Chinese doctrine raised throughout history, when a state has the ability to cause a change in its favor, will not hesitate to do it sooner or later. In this respect, the analysis of relations between China and key strategic actors of the world and the

possibility of extending their particular interest becomes particularly interesting.

THE GEOPOLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF CHINA

Given China's imperial past and its global present, some geopolitical actions with military implications were identified and ranked according to priorities and expected results on short and medium term. Thus, we can talk about the following objectives: recovery of existing delays in the areas of advanced technology, aviation development, the country's independence and ability to cope with the potential threat of nuclear deterrence and, not least, increased naval presence in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The way in which the Chinese want to reduce the advance earned by world powers in the fields of high technology is by stimulating the military investments in the People`s Liberation Army. This only confirms the less peaceful manner by which China would acquire know-how if faced with some difficulties from the owners. In this respect, the number of missiles located in the straits areas was increased in order to achieve a greater control and supremacy over command capacities.

Owner of the most important ballistics program in the world, China wants to prevent U.S. Navy military fleets to intervene in the area called the second island chain. In this respect, the country has five types of conventional and nuclear submarines prepared to face any situation at any time.

Aviation plays an important part in the development of military and draws massive investments. The main supplier of military technology was the Soviet Union and currently Russia, ranked on the second place (after the U.S.) in the world's military powers aviation. While military experts approximate the time that China would need in order to compete with the world leaders in the field would be 20-40 years, the sharp pace of Chinese aviation development suggests that it will only takes 10-15 years for the country to reach the potential of the first two fleets of the world.

Another top area where China invests to ensure independence of the country against a possible nuclear attack is a ballistic missile program (artillery program II). Currently it is estimated that Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of a number of 240 nuclear weapons. Regarding this issue, it is important to highlight China's concern about U.S. decision to build the missile shield and the awareness that this strategy is aimed at undermining the deterrence ability to deter China.

The decision to increase the number of Navy ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans is correlated with the desire to protect the interests of the national supply. Making an incursion into the past history of this state, we find out that since 1993, China occupies a leading position among oil-importing countries. Dependence on imports has increased (now the share of oil consumption coming from abroad exceeds 60%) to the extent of industrial development and increasing living standards for most of the population. And the Middle East remains the main supplier.

Geopolitical problem of the area of supply is doubled by the oil tankers routes, the most commonly used route being through the Malacca Strait. A threat of future imports of petroleum products can come from a hostile Taiwan that might restrict the trade route. But in this respect China has been cautious, developing the "String of pearls" strategy that provides

the location of civil and military bases along the naval way to act as protection and as rapid reaction forces. Another solution was found by China together with Thailand, a country that allows access to the Chinese fleet through Kra channel so as to avoid the Malacca Strait.

In turn, Cambodia signed in 2003 an agreement that allows China the construction of a railway that can take the oil before it reaches the Malacca Strait. Another strategic action taken by China was to modernize and increase the number of military units in Hainan, Spratly, Woody and Parcel islands.

Spratly Island represented the target of a geopolitical and military conflict between China and Vietnam, resulting in the triumph of the former. This island has so far remained a cause of dispute, holding important resources of oil and natural gas.

Parcel Island, initially in the custody Vietnam was conquered by China in 1994, after countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and Brunei expressed the desire to exploit it.

CHINA`S INFLUENCE SPHERE

Today China's geopolitical behavior started by expanding its sphere of influence in neighboring countries. In this respect, commercial agreements were negotiated and concluded, creating a certain dependence of the small states of Central Asia or Indochina Peninsula. Benefits arising from these agreements were embodied in acquiring additional resources to facilitate access to remote geographical regions but vital in obtaining diplomatic support from the UN or regional alliances. China wants to discourage assertion of Taiwan`s “de jure” independence by placing a large number of tactical missiles (800 in 2006) in the Taiwan Strait, to discourage any attempt of rebellion coming from the island in question.

Regarding the interest in the "second island chain", this still remains a desirable objective, lacking support from a military perspective. It still remains as an indicator of the future direction of political, economic and military action in the region.

Besides the great powers (Russian Federation, European Union, USA, Japan and India) and the relationships they have with China, it is important to explain the role that the African continent plays in China's geopolitical game. China is the major importer of oil from Africa, and this explains the caution in cooperating with countries such as Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria and Egypt. Besides purchasing the raw materials needed for the development of their economies, China wants to limit dependence on Western countries and to capture new markets.

China's has four development pillars: mining, energy, construction and telecommunications.

If until 2000 China was involved only in the oil industry in Sudan (China National Petroleum Corporation was owned by the state), currently, Chinese companies in the oil sector operate in 20 African countries. In addition to energy resources Chinese companies import timber, copper and diamonds, iron, manganese, gold and other base metals.

China aid to African states took the form of investment in infrastructure, particularly in energy and railway construction.

China's intervention in Africa should not be seen necessarily as a negative element. While the provision of financial resources experts and technology are factors of progress for the African

continent, supporting illegitimate regimes, offering arms and encouraging the use of violent means for the resettlement of people living in oil-rich areas is a factor of instability. China's attitude towards the African continent is often likened to that of the old colonial empires.

China is accused of undermining the international financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) to compel African states to respect human rights, providing loans under more favorable conditions and without imposing constraints on domestic affairs. The Chinese state does not impose restrictions on financial aid because, according to its policy, economic development is more important than human rights. In addition to financial support, China has provided African governments military training and weapons programs.

CONCLUSIONS

The current global context, characterized by permanent political, social and especially economic confrontations, become the scene emerging, consolidating and increasing of multilateral relations aimed not only to acquire a global reputation but also cooperation and coordination to ensure the welfare and prosperity of nations.

Of course, there were always gaps and difficulties, throughout history, in establishing mutually beneficial relationships, and this can be seen today, although attempting to limit and diminish their negative effects. We talk about countries that have achieved such a high level of development, the emerging countries and, not least, about the underdeveloped states, whose actions are aimed first of all to survival.

Following the course of history we see how the transition to a market economy occurs due to social and political movements and orientations that are aimed at restoring relations between the productive forces, placing them at the center of private property.

Today, thanks to the dynamics of integration processes to the highest level, countries that have similar development levels crave expansion and attraction of less developed economies to strengthen their positions globally. An example is the People's Republic of China, an actor becoming increasingly important on the world economic stage.

Important element of the global economic system, China has felt the effects of the current global crisis, although to a lesser extent. Therefore, the steps taken in recent years have sought to counter the slowdown mainly due to economic instability in the Eurozone and slow recovery of the U.S. economy. Another issue that the Chinese government has proposed to cover was to transform the pattern of economic development based on export, in a growth supported by domestic consumption, which can only be achieved through increased investment that will generate demand in the future.

So, starting from the premises already given predecessors who have treated such a subject, the effects of geopolitical decisions and military actions of China have on its external trade and economic and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, its assertion context on economic and global political scene could be identified.

Although China claims that it does not want to become an international political power but an economic power, the spectacular leap of the country in economic terms cannot hide the reality of a more peaceful regime than communism, but repressive enough .

In the relationship with other countries, China often resorted to intimidation, especially when foreseeing advantages. When deemed necessary, the Chinese state has

appealed to military movements (e.g. USSR border incidents, involvement in the conflict in Korea by attacking U.S. military, fights with India for certain territorial limits, invasion of Tibet, war with Vietnam). Today China has become increasingly threatening with its military development. Having a consistent declared military budget, China's actual spending for the military sector is growing annually, making it entitled to aspire to the position of military supremacy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was co financed from the European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134197 "Performance and excellence in doctoral and postdoctoral research in Romanian economics science domain

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THE LANGUAGE OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY: FOREIGN DONOR DISCOURSE ON AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY [1]

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Abstract:In recent decades, foreign (mostly Western) donor agencieshave designed their own discourse as a corollary of their view regarding development; the broad strokes of this discourse can be summarised as follows:Africa needs to be developed and this objective hinges upon the ability of foreign actors to plant the seeds of liberal democracy that is, in this simplified chain of events, undeniably bolstered by a vibrant associational life that forms the very backbone of civil society. Our article aims to illustrate exactly how the notions of liberal democracy and civil society have become almost implicitly entangled in the development issue, while at the same time aiming to deconstruct the above-mentioned discursive structure. For this purpose, the tools provided by discourse theory will be used to show how a social antagonism which insulates certain African civil society groups has taken root; moving one step further, we will also aim to demonstrate that the seeds for the dislocation of the hegemonic discourse of foreign donors are already present and gaining momentum in African societies.

Keywords*: discourse theory, foreign donors, development, liberal democracy, civil society*

Introduction and methodological considerations

In recent decades, ideas such as "development" and "liberal democracy" have come to dominate the language concerning Africa of a significant part of foreign/Western donors, understood here as a very loose category of international actors (bilateral/governments, multilateral International Organizations or Non-Governmental actors, to name just a few) who, irrespective of their institutional status or altruistic or opportunistic reasons, share at least a declared interest in the well-being of African states. Within this particular discourse, a certain type of civil society appears with increasing frequency as a corollary of the following logic: Africa needs to be developed and this objective hinges upon the ability of foreign actors to plant the seeds of liberal democracy that is, in this simplified chain of events, undeniably bolstered by a vibrant associational life that forms the very backbone of civil society.

It was precisely the dilemma created by the apparent cohesiveness of this discursive formation which triggered the following set of research questions: Is there an identifiable discursive link between development and liberal democracy in foreign donor discourse on Africa? If the answer is affirmative, how is this link constructed? What particularized view of civil society does this context promote? How does the resulting interpretation of civil society interact with the local context? Are there grounds for the de-structuring of the development-democracy-civil society unit stemming from the field of civil society itself?

[1]**Acknowledgments:**This paper is a result of a doctoral research made possible by the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 - "Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment".

In order to facilitate an informed answer to this set of inquiries, we started our research from a set of hypotheses: firstly, foreign donors perceive development as inextricably linked with the internalization of liberal democracy by African regimes; secondly, the predilection towards liberal democracy automatically implies that only those manifestations of civil society which are deemed compatible with this brand of democracy are recognized; thirdly, a social antagonism arises between "sanctioned" and other versions of civil society; lastly, the resulting overdetermination of civil society subjects may constitute itself as a solid starting point for the dislocation of the hegemonic discourse on development and democracy supported by foreign donors.

In order to test these hypotheses, this article makes use of the intriguing methodological tools provided by discourse theory, specifically the five main points that may be summarised through drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Concretely, we confront foreign donor approaches to the key concepts of development, democracy and civil society with relevant assertions made by Laclau and Mouffeso that we may determine whether the anticipated discursive construction plays out as we have hypothesised.

At this point, a few key observations need to be fleshed out: to begin with, as Laclau and Mouffe point out, we do not differentiate between "linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practice" (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, p. 107), namely we concern ourselves not only with concrete instances when donors have expressed their positions in a structured and visible manner, but with their broader policies and practices which necessarily represent acts of discursive articulation.

Apart from this, we consider civil society in the West-African states of Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leoneas a ripe field for the empirical illustration of practices understood in this vein, while providing sufficient nuances so as to challenge common notions of development, democracy and civil society.

Last but not least, it is especially important to offer at least a summarized account of the understanding of discourse promoted throughout this paper: as Laclau and Mouffe point out, a discourse is the result of an articulatory practice which modifies the identity of its constitutive parts. However, no discourse is ever truly an open and shut case, as totality within a completely sutured discursive field is impossible to achieve. The limits of a discourse constitute the very means of its potential subversion, so an identity, once constituted, is never immune to considerations outside of its internal logic. More elegantly stated, the differential positions within a discourse are called moments, whereas differences not captured in the articulatory practice upon which the discourse rests are called elements, with the caveat that it is impossible to reach a point when all elements have been transformed into moments. This is why there is no central transcendental discourse which is fully capable of explaining and containing the social, only multiple nodal points which attempt to achieve this status but are forever doomed to fail, as they are merely subjective instances of the political field posing as social objectivity. (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001).

This being said, the first step undertaken in the opening section of the paper is represented by establishing the presence of development as a discourse and outlining its traits as the background for the articulation of the "civil society as promoter of democracy" mantra;

secondly, we trace the formation of liberal democracy as a nodal point in foreign donor discourse. The next step is to analyse how civil society has developed as a floating signifier tied to this nodal point and to explain the logic of social antagonism created around it as a result. Last but not least, we attempt to sketch the limits and potential sources for subversion of the dominant discourse that are inherent in the characteristics of such an antagonism.

Articulation of the development discourse: the background for civil society debates

A trivialised, yet still accurate expression of the first main point of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is that social actors unwittingly adopt a dual role that turns them into products and artisans of a discursive plane which shapes the historical backdrop of their actions. More correctly stated, "…all forms of social practice take place against a background of historically specific *discourses*, which can be broadly defined as relational systems of signification. Whatever we say, think, or do is conditioned by a more or less sedimented discourse which is constantly modified and transformed by what we are saying, thinking, and doing." (Torfing, 2005, p. 14)

In our case, this inescapable historical backdrop is represented by the increasingly popular development discourse habitually promoted by foreign donors: in most cases, the common denominator shared by the ensuing debates taking place under the vast umbrella of development is that the starting point is generally top-down, looking inward; more specifically, the issue is posed by the aid community in terms such as "what can we do", a query which is "sometimes confused with answering the much broader question 'how can Africa develop?'" (Easterly, 2009, p. 376) Although apparently innocuous, this phrasing in itself creates a suggestion of an existing historical obligation: "we" are responsible for providing a solution; furthermore, it places international donors in a position thatenables them not only to become overconfident in their own brand of solutions, but also to impose their views on how development policies should be conducted.

At this point, it becomes opportune to offer a description of an apparently objective and unbiased practice which is actually a discursive construct: that of setting goals for African Nations at an international level and developing tools to assess the achievement of these pre-set standards. For instance, comprehensive reports are published which detail the progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals[2]of Africa as a whole, as well as ofeach individual country.Sometimes, the approach is more heavy-handed and intrusive, especially when it comes to well defined policy areas where its supporters feel that Africa cannot manage on its own; one such example is agriculture, a field where potentially useful local forces are constantly overlooked.(Okolie, 2003, p. 431) Perhaps even more tellingly, this discourse is further strengthened by seemingly innocent initiatives that have found an outlet in

[2]See, for instance, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union, African Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, *MDG Report 2014: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals,* 2014; ***, *Nigeria Millennium Development Goals 2013 Report,* 2013;***, *Liberia 2010 MDG Report: Liberia's Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals,*2010;National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), Government of Ghana, UNDP Ghana, *2008 Ghana Millennium Development Goals Report*,2010; Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, *Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2010,* 2010, all available online at [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdg-reports/africa-collection.html], accessed on 7 November 2014.

social spaces which are apparently neutral when it comes to politics; a good example of this point is represented by "pop" culture manifestations, such as 'Live 8' concerts. (Easterly, 2009, p. 374) These examples, while not necessarily comprehensive, reveal a very disquieting trend of providing external 'crutches' for African states, without properly assessing local capacities and the situation on the ground first.

However, this short exposition is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg which serves the purpose of setting the stage for a more in-depth analysis. So far, we have only managed to eliminate the artificial gap between development as a seemingly unbiased, universally desirable course of action and discourse, by proving that developmental goals, instruments and actors are actually discursively articulated through an infusion with the pre-defined models of Western foreign donors.

In order to ensure that the argument goes one step further, we need to see exactly how the broad strokes outlining this constant preoccupation of the development community tie in with a certain discourse on the inescapable interdependence between democracy and civil society. As a starting point for this discussion, we state our commitment towards the deconstruction of the following statement: "…a dense and vibrant civil society is essentially democratic and crucial to the achievement and consolidation of a democratic state." (Tar, 2009, p. 90)

The seemingly missing link in this statement becomes apparent if we move beyond the obvious economic dimension of development towards the more comprehensive understanding it has come to acquire in recent decades. More specifically, the optimism and outright enthusiasm concerning democracy in the 1990s have meant that an inescapable link between development and democracy could be forged and, indeed, these two elements are seldom discussed separately, since a democratic political culture, with corresponding social capital and civil society is in and of itself perceived as an inextricable positive part of development. (Hyden, 1997, p. 4)

Therefore, as we may note in the case of Nigeria, demands of political, institutional and social nature have become an inherent characteristic of the *modus operandi* of international aid providers, whose help in debt relief came with a list of structural adjustment conditions aimed at shaping a more liberal, more democratic, more 'Western' African landscape with "a dense and vibrant civil society as a precursor to democratisation." (Tar, 2009, p, 19) In fact, a 1998 report referring to the issue of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa as a whole formulates this exact type of conclusion in even harsher terms, highlighting the fact that liberal democracy and development did not enter the stage separately, but were intimately acquainted from the very beginning. More specifically, it is argued that there was no actual consideration of the opportunity and effectiveness of the SAP model, but simply an expectation that the political context would adapt through a supportive brand of liberal democracy which embraced free elections, multi-partyism, market competition, privatization, deregulation and liberalization. (Olukoshi, 1998)

This trend of influencing the social and political realms through financial incentives is once again identified as obvious in an article discussing the role of donors in the context of post-conflict situations (the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone come to mind); in addition to postulating that the very articulation of the post-conflict discourse is a means and excuse for

foreign agencies to encourage a neo-liberal track of development even before the conflict actually ends, it claims the following when discussing a World Bank Report: "It is as if the World Bank political scientists' revolutionary fervour sees the terrain of 'post-conflict' situations as ripe for the implementation of their kind of state, economy and society." (Moore, 2000, p. 14)

An apt summary of these observations is provided by Peiffer and Englebert, who make use of the concept of extraversion, understood as exploitation by African elites of their dependency to external elements so that they may appropriate resources and consolidate their power internally. They find empirical proof to validate their hypothesis that, the more dependent a regime is on foreign donors and the fewer options it has regarding its "extraversion portfolio" (those external actors it can establish relations with), the more likely it is to be strongly influenced by political conditionality imposed from the outside in the form of demands for democratization. (Peiffer, Englebert, 2012)

In order to translate these observations in the more structured and complex language of discourse theory, we need to identify a *nodal point* in the sense outlined by Laclau and Mouffe: "Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, *nodal points*." (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, p. 112) In our particular case, this role is arguably fulfilled by the notion of *liberal democracy*, whoserise to the status of an ultimate solution can be traced with the help of a small dosage of historical backtracking. Concretely, at certain points in the last two decades, democracy had emerged as an empty signifier when it came to represent everything that the Nigerian, Ghanaian, Sierra Leonean, Liberian and other African societies *were not*. In other words, democracy constituted for these societies what Ernesto Laclau terms an "absent communitarian fullness" or "absent totality" (Laclau, 2007, pp. 36-47), becoming a concept that can essentially "…have different meanings and can thereby serve to unite disparate social movements." (Crăciun, 2008, p. 40) In other words, democracy subsumed the chains of equivalence created by a staggeringly wide variety of social demands which more or less described the exact opposite of the oppressive and undemocratic societies which were the actual reality at the time. This explanation follows the logic proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, who argue that "…if *all* the differential features of an object have become equivalent, it is impossible to express anything *positive* concerning that object; this can only imply that through the equivalence something is expressed which the object *is not*." (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, p. 128)

In this context, we may note that Western donors demonstrated a commendable proficiency in seizing the opportunity of the wider global historical context and the emergence of this empty signifier in order to fill the void with their own interpretation construed as *liberal democracy*, which became the complete opposite of a previous "lack of development" encountered during Africa's authoritarian past; indeed, these actors appear to have been particularly eager to extol the virtues of the neoliberal model as a trigger of reforms and regime overhaul in Africa, while downplaying domestic contributions and capacities (Adetula, 2011, p. 10). As far as its actual substance is concerned,the conceptof liberal democracy arguably carries a significant discursive baggage that, through its particularized interpretation of keen African desires for democracy, suggests the belief there is little room

for nascent regimes to adjust to this notion outside of a pre-established checklist of characteristics, such as "free elections" or "freedom of speech".(Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002, p. 50)To summarize, we may state that liberal democracy has assumed a hegemonic position, understood in Laclau's words, as "a relationship by which a particular content assumes, in a certain context, the function of incarnating an absent fullness." (Laclau, 2014, p. 32)

In order to further strengthen our point of view, we may circle back to the issue of practices as building blocks of discourse, a step that would enable us to notice that, just like development, liberal democracy is the subject of assessment reports which implicitly assign it certain attributes, such as government effectiveness, anti-corruption, rule of law, elections, constitution, parliament, human rights or women's representation, as seen in a paper discussing UNDP options in Western Africa. (Cooper, 2009, p. 5) In the same vein, the issue of elections is often awarded special consideration as a pillar of democracy, with Ghana presented as an example of progress and innovation in electoral policies (Frempong, 2008); in contrast, Nigeria is generally treated as a resounding example of a lack of due process in this regard, with non-independent electoral bodies, corruption, stolen results and patrimonial tendencies. (Ogbonnaya et. al., 2012; Yagboyaju, 2011)

The next section of this article answers the dilemmas relating to the position carved for civil society within the liberal-democratic universe by discourses which construct this concept as an intrinsic condition of the dominant political trend, thereby forcibly assuming that its characteristics are subsumed by the essential role it plays on the stage of liberal democracy.

An antagonistic view of civil society

The previous section has already made important strides towards exposing the ideological totalization that manages to coagulate all required steps towards development into a platform shaped by liberal democratic principles. As a result, we may now safely turn to our more individualized analysis of the construction of meaning as it relates to the concept of civil society. Seeing as "…discourse is constructed in and through *hegemonic struggles* that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity" (Torfing, 2005, p. 15), it was to be expected that, considering its well-established role in the realm of democracy, civil society would be one of the crucial elements which needed to be transformed into a moment of the liberal democratic discourse and also a keypoint of contention in the anticipated "battle of meanings".

If we were to consider civil society as a *floating signifier*, which "…can assimilate different meanings depending on the nature or topic of the discourse" (Crăciun, 2008, p. 41), we would observe that "civil society" is generally filled with meaning in a biased manner, taking into account who and for what purposes defines it, an assumption which is easily confirmed when we turn to the generalized ambiguity and even confusion that is stirred by the mere mention of this concept. "To see civil society as 'associational life' continually requires one to ask what are its boundaries: which associations, when, and under what conditions act in the ways supposedly characteristic of civil society?" (Allen, 1997, p. 334) It is by no means a surprise that the African landscape, in keeping with this undefined view of civil society, is the bearer of an impressive diversity, from NGOs and advocacy groups to "labour unions, churches, women's and student organizations, professional and trade associations, business

groups, ethnic and community associations, clan affiliations, secret societies, cultural groups and various economic networks...". (Lewis, 1992, p. 33)

The purpose of this short exposition was to cast civil society more firmly into the role of a floating signifier in preparation for the next step, which traces the way in which, in true hegemonic fashion, the concept of civil society has been filled by international donors with a meaning that is completely in accordance with the characteristics and requirements of liberal democracy (the victor of the so-called "battle of meanings"). As a matter of fact, we maynote that the liberal definition of civil society as the independent sphere situated at the confluence of state, market and family dominates the discursive field, with the notion of 'development NGOs' sometimes seen as a valid placeholder for civil society (Obadare, 2011, p. 429). Proponents of such a construct have therefore transformed civil society into a familiar concept informed by liberal-democratic theory, which identifies civic organizations such as advocacy groups in Europe and the United States of America as the main elements of civil society (Orji, 2009, p. 77); thus, the meaning of civil society as a floating signifier is fixed by elevating particular moments (e. g. advocacy groups, civility, internal democracy, democratic socialization) to nodal points which claim to represent its objectivity.

The Civil Society Index Rapid Assessment Regional Report for West Africa (CIVICUS, 2014, pp. 3-6) sheds further light on the situation of civil society, by revealing a set of concerning trends regarding the way in which the apparently economic issue of financing reveals a discursive bias towards liberal principles. First of all, emphasis is placed on the fact that civil society organisations (CSOs) have weak fundraising capacities, are not aware of project assessment criteria put forth by donors and do not have the necessary skills to write sufficiently competitive proposals; posing the issue in these terms betrays the emphasis placed on values such as free market, competition, individuality and professionalization of civil society. Moreover, CSOs are reported to have barely tapped local funding alternatives, while remaining largely dependent on money from a limited number of donors, which comes and goes on a project-by-project basis and carries the burden of political conditionality.

To conclude, we may emphasise that the marriage between civil society and liberal democracy has managed to gain a very firm footing by permeating virtually all layers of socio-political activity related to the development of African countries; moreover, this link has become so stabilized that, as the Nigerian climate indicates, "reports of activities carried out by CSOs have become the barometer through which international organizations and governments assess the democratic temperature of the country." (Mercy, 2012, p. 61)

Before going any further, it is imperative to keep in mind the fact that "…the hegemonic articulation of meaning and identity is intrinsically linked to the construction of *social antagonism*, which involves the exclusion of a threatening Otherness that stabilizes the discursive system while, at the same time, preventing its ultimate closure." (Torfing, 2005, p. 15) In our case, the "threatening Otherness" which looms on the horizon, paradoxically giving substance to the discourse outlined above is represented by everything that fails to fit the bill of liberal democracy; in the particular instance of civil society, it is represented by forms of activism that are not necessarily civilized and democratic and fail to assume the professionalized character envisioned by the fervent international proponents of a vibrant civil

society sphere. However, it must be noted that these marginalized forms are not in contradiction with officially sanctioned organisations, as the existence of the liberal democratic brand of civil society does not automatically close this field for any other type of association. In other words, the articulation of "unorthodox" organisationsas instances of civic action is not impossible; it is merely the limit of the liberal democratic discourse on civil society, which prevents it from enshrining its own conceptualisation as a static objectivity. (Laclau, Mouffe, 2001, pp. 125-127)

More specifically, the types of association we are referring to here may be the "uncivilized" reflection of certain social tensions such as ethnic and religious ones, or may simply be more firmly rooted in the local realities, thus only reluctantly abiding by the 'rules of the game' set by 'outsiders'. Thus, we may be talking about "ascriptive" groups, organisations with state ties, ethnic tensions (Orji, 2009, p. 79), or traditional allegiances unchanged by state penetration such as "clan, age-set, or brotherhood." (Bratton, 1989, p. 411)In addition to this, the traditional advocacy role and pro-democracy agenda of voluntary civic associations characterized by a firm respect for the rule of law is undertaken by groups that sometimes have an ambiguous relation with the state and may be professional, labour, women's or students' associations, which may or may not act in the capacity of liberal democracy promoters.

The common denominator subsuming this staggering variety of organisations is that, when they fail to fit in the constricting straightjacket of what civil society *should be/should advocate*, they become "the other" which, through a totalizing procedure is eventually reduced to its failure to conform to a set of criteria underlying the elusive concepts of "civil", "democratic" or "voluntary". For instance, religious organisations are one branch of African civil society that is regarded with an arguably healthy dose of caution in connection with democratic ideals; however, when suspicion turns into outright rejection, these types of groups become part of the generic 'other' and their mobilizing potential is unfairly disregarded. A good example in support of this argument would be that of religious organisations such as the Interfaith Mediation Committee/Inter-Religious Council(Liberia) and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone), both organisations that cut across religious boundaries and strived for peace by assuming roles as mediators in their countries' respective civil conflicts. (Kode, 2012; Pham, 2004).

This being said, the last section of our paper focuses on the shortcomings that have caused an extremely tenuous position for the discourse outlined up to this point.

A revised concept of civil society: looking beyond the discourse of Africa's "saviours"

As anticipated, the argument constructed in this section derives from the firm conviction that "…a stable hegemonic discourse becomes *dislocated* when it is confronted by new events that it cannot explain, represent, or inother ways domesticate." (Torfing, 2005, p. 16) In the particular circumstances discussed throughout our short exposition, grounds for the dislocation of the dominant discourse can be identified within the heavily disputed, yet extremely significant, flank of civil society. Therefore, we are now tasked with detecting the elements which fail to yield to the pressure of becoming moments in the liberal democratic discourse on civil society proposed by foreign donors.

Our first observation is that the stubborn insistence of international donors on certain types of groups accounts for a wide range of untapped local capacities, a fact which serves to weaken the credibility of development efforts supported by ardent advocates of liberal-democracy. For instance, the Sierra Leonean exampleis set to demonstrate how foreign donors tend to emphasise needs and downplay local agency in a post-conflict society(Kanyako, 2011, p. 4) What may be inferred is that such top-down initiatives on the part of donors are actually self-defeating in terms of liberal democracy, seeing as participation by all relevant social forces should undisputedly constitute one of the key elements, if not the very foundation, of such an ambitious political project (as a case in point, we may revisit the role played by religious organisations in the resolution of the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts).Furthermore, this somewhat conceited attitude leads to a rather shallow understanding of local needs, which causes the exclusion of significant issues that touch the daily lives of local populations from an agenda that fails to acknowledge their actual weight. Consequently, transplanted "legitimate"CSOs may lack compatibility with local culture and may gloss over actual community interests. (Chaplowe,Engo-Tjéga, 2007, p. 259)

Another salient aspect that needs to be touched upon is that, in the rush to build a solid discursive fortress for liberal democracy as a corollary of development, many enthusiastic actors have failed to notice that the results have sometimes been undemocratic, even amongst favoured organisations who, other than paying lip service to certain norms and values, carry on in a manner that is decidedly "uncivilised" or ethically ambivalent(Obadare, 2005, p. 269) However, this trend also seems to be losing ground, as the wilful blindness of those who perceive civil society as a necessary pillar of democracy gives way to a more healthy cautious ambivalence that acknowledges the fact that the role of civil society organisations remains undecided. (Obadare, 2005, p. 270)

Up to this point, we have focused on highlighting the inconsistencies of the hegemonic discourse wherein civil society is a key democratic contributor, while, at the same time, strongly suggesting that the often excluded "other" is in fact comprised of groups that mainly draw their support from the grassroots found within local communities; as a result, the model deconstructed throughout this paper simply excludes too many elements of potential civic action and the imminent reconceptualization of civil society is a threat to the whole discursive articulation which presupposes a liberal version of this floating signifier as self-explanatory.

This is not to say that liberal democracy as a signifier is completely untenable with regards to the local landscape; our contention is simply that its recent hegemonic articulation has caused the emergence of a *split subject* who, as a result of his/her failure to achieve a completely sutured identity, "is always in a process of search for an identification that offers the illusion of the complete integration." (Mișcoiu, 2008, p. 27) When we analyse this statement in the context outlined throughout this paper, we are hard pressed not to notice that, in light of the alarming number of cracks in the armour of the development community's discourse, many civically engaged subjects find themselves in this unstable and insecure position, trapped between the hegemonic discourse and their more traditional allegiances. For example, a conflict might be generated between the identities of "member of a civil society organisation" and "clan member" if the latter allegiances form the basis of participation and

civil society is strictly defined in Western donor language, thus excluding membershipstemming from such loyalties.

A further source of cracks in the identity of more high-profile civic actors is represented by the numerous centrifugal forces that they need to contend with on a regular basis: the trappings of donor dependency which may threaten the survival and capacities of CSOs (Atuobi, 2010, p. 17) are counterbalanced by a dearth of alternative funding, thus creating a struggle which leaves may CSO representatives ripe for co-optation by more financially and politically secure environments such as state structures.

At this juncture, it is advisable to point out that, should the hegemonic discourse attempt to persist in its present form, its many sources of contestation bear the risk of coagulating into a radicalized discourse which becomes increasingly disenchanted with the modes of democratic expression it cannot access. The regular individual as a *split subject* may well decide to choose a militant ethnicity over a civic participation that fails to address his or her key concerns. One cannot help but wonder whether this was not, to at least some extent, the case in the violent oil clashes of the Niger Delta. (Ojakorotu, Okeke-Uzodike, 2006) A further example in the same vein may also be associated with the Nigerian realities: it can be argued that an authoritarian climate, coupled with economic struggles and social inequalities has led to the emergence of radicalized groups who sometimes use tactics that escalate into violence. (Adekson, 2004, pp. 13-23)Taking into consideration the conditions for the emergence of such groups, it is to be expected that they will have significant difficulties in speaking the language of democracy, but the outright exclusion of these population segments from the public sphere would also deviate from democratic norms and ideals which extol the virtues of participation.

Another pattern encompassing most of the points discussed in this last section is represented by the proliferation of Islamic civil society groups who have managed to seize the opportunities provided by a more open civic arena (Kelley, 2011) This particular situation demonstrates not only the strength of such forms of identification, but also their capacity to undermine the "civil society as bedrock of democracy" discourse, in light of the fact that the very process implemented in the hopes of more democracy paradoxically bolstered organisations that pushed forward decidedly undemocratic agendas. This particular phenomenon also poses an unsavoury and destabilizing dilemma: to stymie the growth and influence of such organisations would go against the very fibre of democratic values, yet not to do so would mean that this same set of values is under constant rigorous scrutiny.

In answer to such dilemmas, our last few examples demonstrate that, should the persistence to allow only certain actors access to the public sphere continue, the delayed dislocation of the hegemonic discourse would probably result in a radicalized identity of the split-subject, which is even more undesirable from a democratic point of view than allowing the voices of elements such as militantethnic or Islamic groups to be heard.

Conclusion

Our main findings resulting from the confrontation of discourse theory with the actions and language of foreign donors are not surprising, in the sense that they arguably confirm our hypotheses: the liberal democracy-development couple is discursively articulated so that liberal democracy as a nodal point incorporates donor views on development and

prescribes an exclusive way forward; in this context, civil society only has one acceptable version, presupposed by its adherence to and bolstering of the liberal democratic discourse. As a consequence, antagonism is created between sanctioned and alternative versions of civil society, thus preventing the creation an ultimate uncontested conceptualization of the latter.

On top of all this, civil society is a ripe ground for the emergence of numerous elements which the prevailing discourse fails to grasp and integrate as moments explained within its internal logic. Examples of such elements are the untapped local capacities, the unaddressed local issues and the partially undemocratic results of efforts to implement the development-liberal democracy articulation in the realm of civil society. Moreover, the unstable (and even potentially radical) identity of the split subject suggests that the flow of differences has not even temporarily been arrested in the field of civil society, a fact which is likely to reverberate within the wider discursive formation. In other words, the insistence on liberal democracy as a corollary of development fails to grasp the complexity of civil society, whose antagonistic construction exhibits a strong potential of subverting the coherence of the dominant donor discourse from within.

To conclude, the current article has followed a newly prevalent trend in the academic world, which focuses on the deconstruction of the development-liberal democracy-civil society discursive construct. The next logical step in this type of research would be to go one step beyond this exercise in order to properly trace the coordinates of the emerging discursive struggle surrounding African civil society.

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THE MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION AND RELEVANCE OF THEIR USE IN EU – NATIONAL STATE RELATIONSHIP

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Abstract:The impact of European integration at the level of nation states has become an important and active research, as witnessed by the large number of academic studies dealing with the europeanization of national institutions and the entend to which European policy implementation involves changes in institutions and in the policies and political processes taking place at national level.
This paper aims to analyze the mechanisms by which the europeanization process causes changes in the policy of national states. The first mechanism analyzed takes the form of „positive integration" and is used when the European Union prescribes an institutional model, and national structures must adapt to. The second mechanism, negative integration does not require a model proposed by the EU and its policies aplly to areas where the removal of national barriers to trade, investment, freedom of establishment and free movement of people, is sufficient to create a common policy. The third mechanism by which the process of europeanization takes place, is represented by facilitated coordination, and assumes that the EU is only an arena for the exchange of ideas, and supranational institutions have limited powers, drawing only the conduct of institutions, Member States and political actors.
The stated purpose of this analysis is, beyond the transmission of relevant information, to deepen the understanding and knowledge of the mecanisms that drive the europeanization process. They will be examined not only theoretically, practical exemples and problems specific to each type of mechanism will be detailed.

Keywords: ***europeanization, mechanisms of europeanization, positive integration, negative integration, facilitated coordination.***

Procesul de europenizare și implicațiile acestuia la nivelul statelor naționale, reprezintă un domeniu de cercetare foarte activ, dar și foarte contestat, datorită faptului că nu există o definiție universal acceptată a acestui concept, sau o strategie bine delimitată pentru utilizarea acestuia în studiul relațiilor dintre UE și statele naționale. Ambiguitatea acestui termen, precum și numeroasele semnificații atribuite lui, nu reprezintă obiectul lucrării de față, însă este necesară prezentarea celor mai importante perspective ale fenomenului de europenizare, înainte de a prezenta maniera și mecanismele prin care acesta generează schimbări politice și instituționale la nivelul statelor naționale. Europenizarea nu este o teorie ci mai degrabă reprezintă un fenomen, pe care o serie largă de abordări teoretice încearcă să îl explice.[1]

Olsen a încercat să nominalizeze cinci procese diferite, prin care să explice termenul de europenizare. Astfel, în primul rând, europenizarea este asociată cu frontierele exterioare ale UE, și prin urmare, este înțeleasă ca fiind expansiunea teritorială a Uniunii Europene. În al

[1]Simon BULMER, „Theorizing Europeanization", în: Paolo GRAZIANO ,Maarten P. VINK, (eds.), *Europeanization. New research agendas*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England], New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 47.

doilea rând, europenizarea se poate referi la dezvoltarea de practici și norme comune la nivel european, sugerând o nouă formă de guvernare. În al treilea rând, europenizarea are de a face cu impactul guvernanței UE în practicile interne, privite în special din perspectiva guvernanței multi-nivel. În al patrulea rând, europenizarea se poate referi la exportul normelor europene către sistemul internațional mai larg, atât în contextul negocierilor internaționale, cât și în stabilirea agendei. În ultimul rând, europenizarea poate fi vazută ca fiind un proiect de unificare politică ce presupune și crearea unei identități politice europene distincte.[2]

Pe de altă parte Claudio Radaelli, în definirea conceptului de europenizare, a încercat să ofere o analiză a ceea ce nu reprezintă europenizarea. Astfel, europenizarea nu trebuie confundată cu procesul de convergență, deoarece în viziunea sa, există o diferență între un proces și consecințele sale. Mai mult de atât, europenizarea poate produce și divergență. Totodată Radaelli consideră că europenizarea nu trebuie confundată nici cu procesul de armonizare și nici cu cel de integrare politică, admițând că europenizarea nu ar exista fără integrarea europeană.[3]

În ceea ce privește efectul procesului de europenizare la nivelul statelor naționale, acesta poate fi conceptualizat ca fiind un proces de schimbare internă, în care statele membre ale Uniunii Europene,suferă o adaptare a instituțiilor, politicilor, precum și a proceselor politice interne, la noile practici, norme, reguli și proceduri dezvoltate odată cu apariția unui sistem european de guvernanță.[4]Mecanismele prin care acest proces de schimbare are loc la nivelul statelor naționale, identificate de Christoph Knill și Dirk Lehmkuhl, și analizate pe parcursul acestei lucrări, sunt: integrarea pozitivă, prin compatibilitate politică și instituțională, integrarea negativă, prin schimbarea oportunităților de putere și „framing integration" sau coordonare facilitată, prin integrarea așteptărilor și convingerilor interne.[5]

Integrarea pozitivă este primul mecanism analizat prin care se realizează procesul de europenizare și implică cele mai directe cerințe instituționale în ceea ce privește ajustarea națională. În general, aceste politici prescriu un model concret instituțional pentru obținerea comformității la nivel intern, ceea ce presupune o flexibilitate redusă în ceea ce privește adaptarea într-un context instituțional intern, deja existent.[6]

Astfel, Integrarea pozitivă reprezintă un set de politici ale UE care își propun să corecteze deficiențele de piață sau problemele care apar odată cu dezvoltarea Pieței Unice și procesele piețelor naționale. Politicile UE de integrare pozitivă au valoarea legală egală cu cea a unei legi a UE, astfel că după adoptarea finală a unei directive sau a unui regulament la nivelul UE, în urma unor negocieri prelungite, nu se pune problema dacă statele membre

[2]Johan P. OLSEN, „The Many Faces of Europeanization", *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.40, nr. 40/5, 2002, pp. 921–952.
[3]Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Whiter Europeanization? Concept Streching and substantive change", http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-008.pdf accesat în data de: 13.09.2014, p. 6.
[4]Tanja A. BÖRZEL și Thomas RISSE, „When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", file:///C:/Users/Inspiron/Downloads/SSRN-id302768.pdf accesat în data de: 14.09.2014, p. 6.
[5]Sabina STILLER, „Framing European Integration in Germany and Italy. Is the Eu used to justify Pension Reforms?", în: Ronald HOLZHACKER ,M. HAVERLAND, (eds.), *European research reloaded. Cooperation and integration among Europeanized states*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, p. 48.
[6]Christoph KNILL și Dirk LEHMKUHL, „How Europe matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization", http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007.htm accesat în data de: 15.09.2014, p. 4.

trebuie sau nu să se conformeze.[7] „Comisia are dreptul să ia măsuri pentru implementarea adecvată a legislației și are dreptul de a raporta guvernele care întârzie la CEJ, dacă este cazul. Supremația legislației europene dovedește natura ierarhică a acordurilor. Se poate vorbi de o dimensiune coercitivă pronunțată a acestor acorduri și este de datoria guvernelor membre să ia măsuri pentru corectarea eficientă a pieței".[8]

Simon Bulmer și Claudio Radaelli, analizează mecanismul integrării pozitive prin intermediul compatibilității de integrare și afirmă ca acesta reprezintă „cea mai coercitivă formă de europenizare".[9] Măsurile luate prin acest mod de luare a deciziilor au caracterul unei legi a UE și trebuie puse în aplicare de către statele membre. „Caracterul supranațional al politicii creează presiunea din spatele procesului de adaptare. Potențialul de intruziune reglementară este mare".[10]

Acestui tip de mecanism se aplică politicile UE cu privire la: protecția mediului, protecția consumatorului, sănătatea și siguranța la locul de muncă, Uniunea Economică și Monetară, Politica Agricolă Comună, anumite aspecte ce țin de politica socială etc. și argumentele ce țin de gradul de compatibilitate dintre instituțiile, politicile și procesele politice de la nivel european și cele de la nivel național.[11]

Dezbaterea analitică din această lucrare cu privire la integrarea pozitivă și exemplificarea manierei în care procesul de europenizare are loc la nivelul politicii, a politicilor și a proceselor politice de la nivelul statelor naționalese va face prin intermediul politicii de mediu a UE.

Astfel, Directiva Habitatului, mai exact Directiva 92/43/EEC adoptată în anul 1992, având scopul de a proteja cele mai importante habitate și specii ce aparțin de UE, a fost aleasă pentru a exemplifica maniera în care are loc schimbarea politică și instituțională la nivel intern. Una dintre cerințele majore ale acestei legislații implică crearea rețelei „Natura 2000" de zone protejate, ce aparține atât de programul *Special Areas of Conservation* a Directivei Habitatului, cât și de *Special Protected Areas* a Directivei Europene cu privire la păsări.[12] În acest caz, Olanda, deși a participat activ prin intermediul guvernuluiîn elaborarea acestei directive, a avut un grad ridicat de incompatibilitate între cerințele acesteia și politica existentă la nivel național în acest domeniu. Presiunea pentru adaptare la legislația europeană, a început să fie tot mai ridicată odată cu acțiunea grupurilor de interese și a altor părți interesate. Rezultatul presiunii exercitate de aceste grupuri a fost trecerea Directivei pentru habitat în topul agendei politice și publice a guvernului olandez. Schimbările pe care implementarea legislației europene cu privire la protejarea habitatelor și a diverselor specii le-

[7]Robert LADRECH, *Europeanization and national politics*, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 173.
[8]Simon BULMER și Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Europenizarea politicii naționale", în: Simon BULMER ,Christian LEQUESNE, (eds.), *Statele membre ale Uniunii Europene*, Chișinău, Cartier, 2009, p. 430.
[9]*Ibidem*, p. 442.
[10]*Ibidem*, p. 442.
[11]Kevin FEATHERSTONE, „Introduction: In the name of "Europe"", în: Kevin FEATHERSTONE ,Claudio M. RADAELLI, (eds.), *The politics of Europeanization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 14.
[12]INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, „Study to analyze differences in costs of implementing EU Policy. A project under DG Environment`s Framework contract for economic analysis ENV.F.1/FRA/2010/0044",
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/memberstate_policy/pdf/Differences%20in%20costs.pdf accesat în data de: 03.05.2015, p. 9.

a generat la nivelul Olandei au avut în vedere atât conținutul politicilor naționale, cât și conținutul discursului intern cu privire la ecologie și relația dintre aceasta și economie. Astfel, în ceea ce privește conținutul politicii, au fost inițiate schimbări concrete cu privire la metoda de conservare a naturii la nivelul Olandei, iar discursul politic cu privire la ecologie a devenit mai important. Mai mult de atât, actorii politici și administrativi olandezi au devenit mai conștienți de implicările negative ale legislației și politicilor UE la nivel național, implementarea acestei directive generând o dezbatere internă cu privire la procesul de europenizare și la interconectarea dintre politicile și actorii naționali și internaționali. Această directivă,considerată a fi în primul rând de competențe naționale sau locale, a scos în evidență faptul că implicarea UE la nivelul politicilor naționale olandeze privind conservarea naturii este nedorită. [13]

Analiza implementării Directivei Habitatului la nivelul Olandei, directivă ce aparține politicii de mediu și care se numără printre politicile care generează procesul de europenizare prin intermediul integrării pozitive, folosindu-se argumentul compatibilității de integrare, reflectă maniera în care schimbarea politică și instituțională are loc la nivel intern. Această analiză a scos în evidență faptul că existența unui grad de incompatibilitate ridicat între politica olandeză cu privire la conservarea naturii și cea elaborată la nivel european, cu participarea activă a oficialităților olandeze, duce la dificultăți de implementare. Totodată presiunea exercitată la nivel intern, a fost puternic influențată de existența grupurilor de interese și a altor părți interesate, care au întreprins acțiuni legale și administrative pentru implementarea adecvată a politicilor UE la nivelul Olandei. Presiunea adaptațională ridicată a dus la schimbarea politicii naționale privind conservarea naturii și la conformarea acesteia cu legislația europeană.

Cel de-al doilea mecanism al procesului de europenizare analizat pe parcursul acestei lucrări este reprezentat de politicile integrării negative, care în contrast cele pozitive, implică îndepărtarea barierelor asupra comerțului, conform programului Pieței Unice, lansat de Actul Unic European. Scopul integrării negative nu este acela de a promova noi șabloane politice pentru statele membre, ci mai degrabă acela de a permite mecanismelor pieței să își desfășoare activitatea libere de practicile necompetitive și blocajele ce pot apărea, indiferent de faptul că aceste dinamici negative se află în sectorul privat sau public.[14]

Nu este necesară existența unei legislații naționale pentru a pune în aplicare aceste politici, și nici chiar existența unei legislații europene, deoarece acestea sunt incluse in tratatele UE. „Comisiei îi sunt delegate puteri ample, iar introducerea unui cadru legislativ poate fi lăsată în seama jurisprudenței CEJ, cum este cazul legilor formulate în tratatele supranaționale. Integrarea negativă urmărește, de regulă, „constituirea unei piețe"". [15]Astfel, legile de la nivelul UE vor avea rolul de a asigura dezvoltarea și funcționarea eficientă a pieței. Printre domeniile de politică vizate de integrarea negativă, precum politicile de corectare a pieței, se numără și politica privind competiția în cadrul UE, „care stabilește ce se

[13]SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY, „The Habitats Directive: A case of contested Europeanization", http://www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/nl/publicaties/PDF-webpublicaties/The_Habitats_Directive.pdf accesat în data de: 03.05.2015, p. 4.
[14]Robert LADRECH, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
[15]Simon BULMER și Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Europenizarea politicii naționale", în: Simon BULMER ,Christian LEQUESNE, (eds.), *Statele membre ale Uniunii Europene*, Chișinău, Cartier, 2009, p. 430.

acceptă în cazul fuziunilor sau în cazul acțiunilor de tip „joint venture" între firme, prețurile și acordurile de împărțire a pieței și altele".[16] Prin intermediul acestui mecanism, procesul de europenizare tinde să aibă o formă mai orizontală, pe măsură ce structurile politice de oportunitate de la nivelul național, suferă schimbări ca urmare a redistribuirii de resurse și de putere între actorii interni.[17]

Și în cazul integrării negative cerințele politicii au caracterul unor legi europene, dar intruziunea reglementară nu este la fel de mare ca și în cazul integrării pozitive, deoarece scopul principal al acestor politici este funcționarea pieței. Simon Bulmer și Claudio Radaelli, atrag atenția asupra faptului că, în faza de tranziție a legislației, statele naționale vor fi nevoite să-și ajusteze politicile în funcție de argumentul compatibilității de integrare, dar după terminarea acesteia, „concurența egalizatoare trebuie să devină dinamica principală"[18], deoarece statele membre se vor afla în competiție.

Impactul politicilor europene din domeniul integrării negative este în strânsă legătură cu impactul acestora asupra structurilor de oportunitate de la nivelul statelor membre, impact ce determină schimbări ale distribuției de putere și resurse între actorii politici ai arenelor naționale.[19] În ceea ce privește schimbarea oportunităților de putere de la nivel național, trebuie menționat faptul că, dezvoltarea unui nou set de instituții la nivelul UE cu puteri legislative, executive și judiciare, furnizează actorilor naționali o nouă cale de acces la elaborarea politicilor. UE creează astfel, noi oportunități de ieșire, veto, sau de informare pentru actorii interni, ceea ce duce la o nouă redistribuire a puterii și a resurselor la nivelul actorilor publici sau privați de la nivelul statelor membre.[20]

Așa cum s-a menționat de altfel și mai sus, spre deosebire de domeniul integrării pozitive, politicile europene din domeniul integrării negative, duc la o redistribuție a puterii și a resurselor între actorii interni, provocând o schimbare a echilibrului de putere de la nivel intern, dar nu oferă un model concret cu privire la felul în care noul echilibru de putere ar trebui să arate, această libertate rămânând la nivelul statelor membre. Analiza Politicii Europene a Transportului, efectuată de Knill și Lehmkuhl,va scoate în evidență maniera în care, la nivelul statelor a existat o redistribuire a puterii și a resurselor.Astfel, Marea Britanie a trecut prin procesul de liberalizare a pieței transporturilor în anul 1968, iar acest proces a avut o direcție foarte asemănătoare cu perspectiva europeană a transportului internațional. În consecință, la nivelul Marii Britanii, nu a existat o schimbare semnificantă a oportunităților de putere, iar la nivelul Olandei a existat o întărire a modelelor corporatiste de concertare și consultare, specifice sistemului instituțional olandez. În schimb, în Italia, structurile de oportunitate interne nu au suferit schimbări majore pentru a face față numeroaselor puncte

[16]*Ibidem*, p. 430.
[17]Ian BACHE și Andrew JORDAN, „Europeanization and Domestic Change", în: Ian BACHE ,Andrew JORDAN, (eds.), *The Europeanization of British politics*, Basingstoke [England], New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 24.
[18]Simon BULMER și Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Europenizarea politicii naționale", în: Simon BULMER ,Christian LEQUESNE, (eds.), *Statele membre ale Uniunii Europene*, Chișinău, Cartier, 2009, p. 443.
[19]Christoph KNILL și Dirk LEHMKUHL, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[20]Ronald HOLZHACKER și M. HAVERLAND, „Introduction: Cooperation and Integration among Europeanized States", în: Ronald HOLZHACKER ,M. HAVERLAND, (eds.), *European research reloaded. Cooperation and integration among Europeanized states*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, p. 4.

instituționale de veto ale transportatorilor interni, prin care aceștia au încercat să blocheze orice reformă.

În același timp, politicile ce țin de integrarea negativă, precum promovarea Pieței Unice și dezvoltarea unor piețe mai competitive, au fost susținute cu entuziasm de către actorii politici din Marea Britanie, care au avut întotdeauna probleme cu politicile intervenționiste comune de la nivelul UE, ce țin de integrarea pozitivă. „Astfel, în timp ce politica de concurență a fost considerată necesară în scopul menținerii libertăților pieței, încercările de dezvoltare a politicii sociale au fost considerate în Marea Britanie mult prea intervenționiste".[21] Mai mult de atât, Marea Britanie, a fost un proiector de idei politice în ambele componente ale Politicii în domeniul Concurenței, dacă nu forța generală a principiilor de bază ale acesteia. Politica sa de privatizare a industriilor naționalizate, începută odată cu guvernarea Thatcher în 1979 și anii 1980, a continuat cu liberalizarea anumitor utilități sub guvernările laburiste, și a constituit un model de urmat pentru statele membre continentale. Analiza Politicii Europene în domeniul Concurenței scoate în evidență faptul că aceasta reflectă interesele interne britanice.[22]

Cel de al treilea mecanism al procesului de europenizare este reprezentat de coordonarea facilitată, denumită astfel de Bulmer și Radaelli, și care se referă la domeniile politicii, unde guvernele naționale reprezintă actorii principali, politicile fiind adoptate prin intermediul negocierilor interguvernamentale. În acest caz, legislația UE nu este proeminentă, gradul de constrângere este foarte redus, UE devenind mai degrabă o arenă pentru schimbul bilateral al ideilor, prin intermediul Metodei Deschise de Coordonare, iar procesul de europenizare tinde să adopte o formă mai puțin ierarhică sau coercitivă. Acesta are loc mai degrabă, prin dezvoltarea, la nivelul actorilor politici, a unei înțelegeri cu privire la problemele politice unde competența UE este slabă, precum politica externă sau politica de imigrare. [23] În aceste domenii, acordurile au forma unor declarații politice sau a unor legislații de tip „soft". „Legislația ușoară vizează regulile de conduită care nu pot fi impuse legal, însă au o dimensiune legală prin faptul că ghidează conduita instituțiilor, a statelor membre și a altor participanți la politică".[24] Sub acțiunea coordonării facilitate, Uniunea Europeană organizează cooperarea la nivelul statelor membre, dar nu produce legislație europeană, ci doar oportunități de învățare. Acțiunea UE în aceste domenii facilitează procesul de învățare și cel al răspândirii bunei practici.[25]

Specifice acestei modalități de luare a deciziilor sunt politicile ce țin de domeniul PESC, de cel al politicii economice, al politicii de ocupare a forței de muncă, al cercetării și dezvoltării, politici ce țin de Metoda Deschisă de Coordonare, precum protecția socială și incluziunea socială, în care statele membre sunt cele care dețin competența.

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[21]David ALLEN, „Marea Britanie: Un Guvern Europenizat într-un stat non-europenizat", în: Christian LEQUESNE ,Simon BULMER, (eds.), *Statele Membre ale Uniunii Europene*, Chisinau, Cartier, 2009, p. 185.
[22]Robert LADRECH, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[23]Ian BACHE și Andrew JORDAN, „Europeanization and Domestic Change", în: Ian BACHE ,Andrew JORDAN, (eds.), *The Europeanization of British politics*, Basingstoke [England], New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 24.
[24]Simon BULMER și Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Europenizarea politicii naționale", în: Simon BULMER ,Christian LEQUESNE, (eds.), *Statele membre ale Uniunii Europene*, Chișinău, Cartier, 2009, p. 431.
[25]Claudio M. RADAELLI, „Europeanization: Solution or problem?", http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf accesat în data de: 14.09.2014, p. 13.

În ceea ce privește Metoda Deschisă de Coordonare, aceasta reprezintă răspândirea celor mai bune practici și dobândirea unei mari convergențe în realizarea obiectivelor principale ale UE. Această metodă, creată pentru a ajuta statele membre pentru a-și dezvolta progresiv propriile lor politici, implică: obiective clare, bine definite care trebuie îndeplinite și instrucțiuni fixe cu calendare specifice, adoptate de către Consiliu, indicatori calitativi și cantitativi și de referință, precum și fixarea unor ținte specifice, urmate de monitorizare periodică, evaluare și peer review, efectuate de către Comisie și care facilitează procesul de învățare reciprocă.[26] Totodată MDC reprezintă o strategie interguvernamentală de integrare europeană, sarcina de a intocmi un plan de acțiune revenind fiecărui stat în parte, urmând ca evaluarea să fie făcută ulterior de către celelalte state membre, iar rolul Comisiei Europene este acela de a supraveghea respectarea planului.

Claudio Radaelli afirmă că Metoda Deschisă de Coordonare a devenit un discurs legitim în perioada actuală, deoarece oferă o comunitate întreagă de factori de decizie, care au un limbaj comun și un proiect legitim și anume acela de a face din Europa cea mai competitivă societate bazată pe cunoaștere, din întreaga lume. Mai mult de atât academicienii și cercetătorii Relațiilor Internaționale au analizat MDC, ca un nou mod de guvernare, sporind astfel legitimitatea MDC ca discurs și generând mai multă eficiență și coerență în politicile de guvernare europene.[27]

Astfel, în domeniile protecției sociale și incluziunii sociale, Comisia Europeană sprijină și completează politicile statelor membre. Strategia Europa 2020 a stabilit 5 obiective majore la nivelul UE, pentru a măsura progresele realizate de fiecare stat membru. Cele 5 obiective majore, au în vedere: ocuparea forței de muncă, mai exact atingerea unei rate de ocupare a forței de muncă de 75% în rândul populației cu vârste cuprinse între 20 și 64 ani; cercetarea și dezvoltarea, prin alocarea a 3% din PIB-ul UE; schimbarea climatică și utilizarea durabilă a energiei, prin reducerea cu 20% a emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră față de nivelul existent în 1990, prin creșterea ponderii surselor de energie regenerabile până la 20% și creșterea cu 20% a eficienței energetice; educația, prin reducerea cu 10% a ratei de părăsire timpurie a școlii și creșterea la peste 40% a ponderii absolvenților de studii superioare în rândul populației în vârstă de 30-34 ani; lupta împotriva sărăciei și a excluziunii sociale. Mai mult de atât, aceste obiective sunt transpuse în obiective naționale, pentru ca evoluția fiecărui state membru să poată fi urmărită.[28]Comisia Europeană, pentru a garanta că fiecare stat membru va reuși să își adapteze strategia Europa 2020, la situația sa specifică, va propune transpunerea obiectivelor menționate mai sus, în obiective și traiectorii naționale. Mai mult de atât, așa cum se regăsește în Comunicarea Comisiei Europene, *O strategie europeană pentru o creștere inteligentă, ecologică și favorabilă incluziunii*,strategia Europa 2020 se va sprijini pe doi piloni: abordarea tematică prezentată cateva rânduri mai sus, care reprezintă o combinație a priorităților și principalelor obiective, și care presupune întocmirea unor rapoarte de țară, permițând statelor membre să își dezvolte propriile strategii de reîntoarcere la o

[26]Robert LADRECH, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
[27]Claudio M. RADAELLI, *The open method of coordination. A new governance architecture for the European Union,* Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2003, p. 51.
[28]Comisia EUROPEANĂ, „Comisia Europeană - Ocuparea Forţei de Muncă, Afaceri Sociale şi Incluziune: Protecţie socială şi incluziune socială", http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=750&langId=ro accesat în data de: 10.05.2015, p. 5.

creştere economică durabilă şi la sustenabilitatea finanţelor publice. Astfel, în cadrul UE se vor adopta orientări integrate care să cuprindă domeniul de aplicare al priorităţilor şi obiectivelor UE. Statele membre vor beneficia de recomandări specifice.

MDC în domeniul social reprezintă „un proces voluntar pentru cooperare politică, bazat pe stabilirea unor obiective comune şi evaluarea progreselor înregistrate prin utilizarea unor indicatori comuni. Acest proces implică şi colaborarea strânsă cu părţile interesate, inclusiv cu partenerii sociali şi societatea civilă”.[29]

În concluzie, lucrarea de faţă, şi-a propus să analizeze procesul de europenizare şi mecanismele prin care UE determină schimbarea la nivelul instituţiilor, politicilor, şi al proceselor politice de la nivelul statelor membre. Dovada existenţei unui proces de europenizare stă în maniera în care un stat membru îşi adaptează politicile sau instrumentele politice pentru a întâmpina provocările implementării. Europenizarea politicii naţionale este astfel, reflectată la nivelul consecinţelor care derivă din încercarea guvernelor naţionale de a implementa politicile UE, chiar dacă acestea au forma unor directive sau regulamente sau forma unor recomandări făcute de Comisie.[30]

În ceea ce privesc mecanismele prin care europenizarea determină schimbări politice sau instituţionale la nivel naţional, au fost analizate pe parcursul acestei lucrări: integrarea pozitivă, prin compatibilitate politică şi instituţională, integrarea negativă, prin schimbarea oportunităţilor de putere şi „framing integration”, prin integrarea aşteptărilor şi convingerilor interne. Astfel, integrarea pozitivă a fost analizată prin intermediul politicii de mediu, mai exact prin analiza Directivei Habitatului şi a manierei în care aceasta a produs schimbări la nivelul politicii privind conservarea naturii de la nivelul Olandei. S-a ales această ţară datorită faptului că a participat activ la luarea deciziilor cu privire la protejarea naturii, în ciuda faptului că a existat un grad mare de incompatibilitate între deciziile luate la nivel european şi modul în care această lege opera la nivel naţional. Rezultatul procesului de europenizare în acest caz a fost implementarea politicii europene, în ciuda costurilor ridicate şi a schimbărilor politice şi instituţionale necesare pentru conformitatea cu legislaţia UE.

Integrarea negativă a fost analizată prin intermediul politicii privind concurenţa, iar statul membru ales pentru a reda maniera în care procesul de europenizare operează la nivel naţional a fost Marea Britanie, datorită faptului că a fost un proiector de idei politice în ambele componente ale Politicii în domeniul Concurenţei, dacă nu forţa generală a principiilor de bază ale acesteia. Mai mult de atât, politicile europene din domeniul integrării negative, duc la o redistribuţie a puterii şi a resurselor între actorii interni, provocând o schimbare a echilibrului de putere de la nivel intern, dar nu oferă nici un model nou sau concret cu privire la felul în care noul echilibru de putere ar trebui să arate, această libertate rămânând la nivelul statelor membre. Marea Britanie a preferat întotdeauna mecanismul integrării negative ca manieră de luare a deciziilor la nivel european, faţă de cel al integrării pozitive.

În ceea ce priveşte coordonarea facilitată, procesul de europenizare tinde să adopte o formă mai puţin ierarhică sau coercitivă, diferenţiindu-se aici de integrarea pozitivă sau

[29]Comisia EUROPEANĂ, „Ocuparea forţei de muncă, afaceri sociale şi incluziune”, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=750&langId=ro accesat în data de: 09.05.2015.
[30]Robert LADRECH, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

negativă. Acesta are loc mai degrabă, prin dezvoltarea, la nivelul actorilor politici, a unei înțelegeri cu privire la problemele politice unde competența UE este slabă. Politica protecției sociale și a incluziunii sociale a fost analizată pentru a se scoate în evidență maniera în care statele membre utilizează UE ca o platformă pentru procesul de invățare și distribuire de bune practici.

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SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BULLYING BEHAVIOR

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Abstract: The phenomenon of school violence is a large internationally current problem, with serious mental and social health consequences of individuals involved. This implies a wider range of social activities with aggressive potential, such as physical violence, the use of nicknames, the exclusion, private property damage ,and psychological intimidation.
Bullying behavior is a deliberate action, that causes others injuries, repeatedly performed, and developing physically, physical or psychological aggression. This txpe of behavior usese some tools such as words, actions and social exclusion. The phenomenon of bullying can be initiated by a perpetrator or by group of people, involving the non unequal power relations, whereas the victim does not have the (physical, psychological, social) resources to defend (Hazler, 1996).
This study aims to discuss the pupil representation and a school bullying conceptualization type. The theoretical vision of this work sees bullying as a mainly social action borned and developed in social groups, after a certain pattern.

Keywords: ***school bullying, victimization school, bullying, harassment***

Bullying. Etimologie

Începând cu anii 1969 este întâia oară adus în dezbatere fenomenul de bullying prin prisma articoluli *Dangens Nyheter* dintr-un ziar suedez. Bullying-ul este descris ca fiind una din cea mai comună şi severă formă de comportament negativ manifestat în rândul şcolarilor, devenind o problemă de investigat, de interes internaţional (Gill, Petterson, 2010).

Situaţia actuală a cercetărilor care analizează fenomenul de bullying denotă investigaţii considerabile asupra acestuia, începând cu studiile ample ale lui Olweus (1993, 1994, 1997, 1999) şi continuate de alţi predecesori ai săi..

Teoreticianul descrie interacţiunea ca pe o formă de abuz care nu este neapărat provocată de către victimă/e. Acesta distinge *bullying*-ul - de interacţiuni în care actorii sunt egali din punct de vedere al puterii fizice sau psihologice şi pretinde că *bullying*-ul nu este condiţionat de prezenţa actelor de violenţa fizică pentru a putea fi clasificat astfel (bullying verbal, relaţional, psihologic, social etc).

Abuzul de putere este un element adesea asociat comportamentului de *bullying* de către diverşi teoreticieni şi cercetători (Haynie, Nansel, Eitel, Crump, Saylor, Yu, Simons-Morton apud. Macklem, 2003), fiind vorba de un abuz specific de putere socială (Smith şi Morita, 1999). Teoreticienii îl conceptualizează ca pe o subcategorie a agresivităţii, unde *bullying*-ul este *afirmarea puterii prin intermediul agresiunii sau a intimidării* (Pepler, Connolly, Craig, 2000).

Bullying-ul implică desfăşurarea intenţionată şi în mod repetat a unei acţiuni menite să provoace daune de natură fizică şi psihologică asupra unei persoane sau a unui grup de persoane, iniţiată de către o persoană sau un grup de persoane, şi se înscrie într-un patern complex al nevoii de dominanţă şi status (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999).

Perspective sociologice asupra bullying-ului

Anumiţi cercetători consideră că larga răspândire a fenomenului de bullying este explicată de *mecanisme sociale* ale interacţiunilor în grup precum *contagiunea socială*, *deficitul/inhibiţia de control a tendinţelor agresive*, *difuziunea responsabilităţilor* (Olweus, 1973,2001; Salmivalli şi Voeten, 2004) şi că acest tip de comportament este împrumutat sau simulat de la covârstnici sau copiii din proximitate (Salmivalli, Lappalainen, Lagerspetz, 1998). Aceste considerente etiologice asupra comportamentului de bullying, mizează pe existenţa unui patern comportamental de manifestare, unui ritual tip "moştenit" sau "împrumutat" din generaţie în generaţie şi menţinut de către adolescenţi în cadrul culturii sociale a grupului acestora. Rolul covârstnicilor ca influenţa asupra grupului - este semnificativ în dezvoltarea şi menţinerea comportamentului de bullying ca şi fenomen social în rândul adolescenţilor, şi este confirmat de studii observaţionale mutliple (e.g. Atlas,1998; Craig şi Pepler, 1997, Salmivalli, 1997).

Gini şi colab., (2006) aduc în scena cercetării asupra răspândirii fenomenului de bullying conceptul stereotipului de *macho,* mecansim social observabil la 15%- 20% dintre copiii care resping "victimele" pe seama "slăbiciunii" acestora şi admiră "agresorii (*en. bully*) pe seama puterii şi popularităţii acestora, justificându-le acţiunile(Boulton şi colab, 1999; Menesini şi colab, 1997; Rigby şi colab., Gini, 2006). Teoreticienii sesizează importanţa fenomenului de bullying ca *fenomen soc*ial, ca dinamică a grupului care poate prezenta o formă specifică de *conflict intergrup* (Gini, 2006; Ojala şi Nesdale, 2004).

Cercetările iniţiate de italianul Gini şi colaboratorii, au în prim plan bullying-ul ca fenomen social care are la bază mecansime sociale de interacţiune a grupurilor precum *presiunea socială a grupului*, *contagiunea socială* ca mijloc de preluare/învăţare a unor comportamente, *complianţa la norme* de grup şa. Autorii recomandă ca bullying-ul să fie abordat ca un *fenomen de grup* şi nu ca o interacţiune de tip diadă conflictuală restrânsă doar la membrii acesteia. Ca şi consecinţe ale acestei abordări, bulying-ul şcolar poate fi menţinut de aspecte ale identităţii sociale precum urmărirea unui status social ridicat.

Bullying şi identitate socială

Teoria identităţii sociale a lui Tajfel, (Tajfel,Turner, 1979) presupune că percepţiile, atitudinile şi comportamentele indivizilor din cadrul grupului sociale, precum şi în afara acestuia, provin din dorinţa acestora de a se identifica şi de a adera la un grup perceput ca fiind "superior" de către alte grupuri, cu scopul dezvoltării stimei de sine. Astfle indivizii, membri a unui grup, dezvoltă *identitate socială*, şi atitudini de favorizare a membrilor din cadrul grupului, care sunt percepuţi ca fiind mai "speciali". În contrast, membrii din afara grupului sunt percepuţi ca fiind "diferiţi" şi ca posedând mai puţine calităţi decât cei din interiorul grupului, riscând astfel, să fie discriminaţi sau marginalizaţi. Mecansimul identităţii sociale însuşite este cel care prescrie atitudinile şi comportamentelor membrilor în cadrul grupului si în afara acestuia (Ojala şi Nesdale, 2004).

Tendinţa membrilor grupului de a deţine atitudini discriminatorii faţă de alţi membri dinafara grupului este direct proporţională cu nivelul de identificare cu membri propriului grup. Această tendinţă discriminatorie este de asemenea influenţată de cultura vehiculată în acel grup – de măsura în care se încurajează de către membrii grupului –fenomenul de

stigmatizarea a altora. (Nesdale şi Scarlett, 2004). Membrii unui grup îşi apară cultura grupului, considerând că orice influenţă externă este dăunătoare şi trebuie marginalizată, sau că, poate fi potenţată prin marginalizarea şi denigrarea altora (asemeni trusimului "suntem mai buni, pentru că alţii sunt mai răi"). De exemplu, un copil membru al unui grup care promovează bullying-ul, consideră că bullying-ul este un comportament "normal" dacă este îndreptat spre un membru-intrus (din exterior) care ameninţă stabilitatea grupului (Ojala şi Nesdale, 2004).

Nevoie de adeziune la un grup şi de identificare cu acesta constituie un mecanism mediator al interacţiunilor sociale la adolescenţilor. Teoreticieni consideră că această viziune poate explica anumite conflicte de grup de tipul bullying-ului şcolar (Giani şi colab., 2006).

Teoria status-ului social în dezvoltarea comportamentului de bullying

Dobândirea **statut-ului social** este un fenomen răspândit în toate grupurile sociale. Acesta reprezintă o continuă provocare şi pentru adolescenţi (Ljungström, 1998). Unii adolescenţi caută afirmare şi popularitate în cadrul grupului de covârstnici, în timp ce alţii cedează în ierarhia popularităţii, ocupând locuri inferioare. Însă distincţia dintre cei cu status inferior şi cei care devin victime ale bullying-ului este realizată de incapacitatea (psihologică sau fizică) a victimei de a se apăra (Elliot, 2002), confruntată în mod repetat cu marginalizarea, hărţuirea, intimidarea, tachinarea şa (forme ale bullying-ului).

*Competenţa soci*ală la adolescenţi este exersată prin testarea şi tatonarea poziţiei pe care fiecare o ocupă în rândul covârstnicilor (Ljungström, 1998). Aceasta se dezvolta prin intermediul interacţiunilor sociale, în contextul şcolii, în proximitatea spaţiului de joacă, a colegilor, a clasei. Teoreticianul suedez subliniază că prin intermediul interacţiunilor sociale tinerii dobândesc înţelegerea normelor sociale nonscrise şi a culturii sociale comune. Copilul care deţine un statut social provoacă mai uşor normele şi regulile de comportare fără teama de a fi sancţionat de către colegii săi.

Perspective sociale asupra comportamentului de tip bullying şcolar

Perspectiva spectatorilor (en. by-standers)

Adolescenţii din postura de spectatori, care nu au adoptat roluri de victimă sau de agresor, susţin că victimele bullying-ului îşi merită soarta (Rigby, 1996), autorul susţine *modelul puterii* ca fiind model predominant al băieţilor. Conform acestuia, băieţii trebuie să manifeste putere şi să exercite control pentru afirmarea status-ului. Pretind că băieţii deţin interpretări mai largi în ceea ce priveşte acceptarea unui comportament de tip bullying în care comportamentul agresiv este o modalitate acceptată de interacţiune şi de rezolvare a conflictelor intergrup (Simpson, Cohen, 2004).

În similaritatea cu această interpretare, participanţii unui studiu realizat de Oliver şi colab., (1994) cred că victimele comportamentului de bullying în şcoli sunt pe de-o parte răspunzători de ceea ce li se întâmplă. Explicaţia posibilă se regăseşte în remarca anterioară în care spectatorii manifestărilor de bullying consideră că victima este capabilă să riposteze sau să se apare, neluând atitudine, devine răspunzătoare pentru victimizare.

Perspectiva adulţilor: profesorii şi părinţii

Profesorii au rolul unor „agenţi morali”, în peisajul bullying-ului şcolar, cu rol în modelarea dezvoltării morale şi civice a şcolarilor. Cadrele didactice reprezintă figura „autorităţii” în şcoală şi contribuie la inhibarea sau la exacerbarea a diferitor comportamente iniţiate de elevi, iar prin trăsăturile atitudinale şi persoanel generează influenţe sociale asupra interpretărilor pe care le construiesc elevii, precum şi asupra climatului şcolar (Gini şi colab., 2006; Chang, 2003).

Variaţiile comportamentale şi atitudinale ale profesorilor contribuie la imprimarea anumitor reguli nonformale ale clasei şi la trasarea anumitor referinţe de evaluare a atributelor sociale ale elevilor (Hughes şi colab., 2001). În continuare acestei accepţiuni, atitudinile de control şi autoritate ridicate ale profesorilor contribuie la scăderea interacţiunilor pozitive cu elevii răspinditori de acte agresive, şi prin urmare influenţează dezaprobarea comportamentului acestor elevi la clasă (Coie şi Koeppl,1990). Pe de cealată parte, atitudinile profesorilor care manifestă toleranţă faţă de comportamente agresive ale elevilor comunică îngăduinţa lor, caz în care elevii acţionează mai aprobativ faţă de colegii lor agresivi (Chang, 2003).

Deşi profesorii sunt conştienţi de exista acestui fenomen în şcoli, rareori pot sesiza un astfel de comportament, deoarece incidenţa acestuia are loc înafara orelelor, sau în spaţii nesupravegheate (toalete, curte, spaţii de joc), (Gill, Petterson, 2010). Aceste rezultate semnalează o conştientizare deficitară din partea adulţilor asupra complexităţii acestui comportament negativ din şcoli, care impune mai ales dificultăţi de identificare a situaţiilor amenintătoare, pentru prevenirea şi combaterea acestora. Este, aşadar, importantă semnificaţia sau interpretarea pe care adultul o atestă unor astfel de comportamente. Este necesară conştientizarea adulţilor că acţiuni precum excluderea, poreclirea, tachinarea şa. (forme ale bullyingului) pot avea un impact negativ asupra persoanelor implicate şi asupra climatului şcolar, fiind nevoie de monitorizare şi nu doar de acţiuni de prevenţie/combatere a acestuia, ci şi de atitudini de conştientizare şi combatere.

Percepţiile şi reprezentările adulţilor asupra acestui fenomen pot fi incomplete, biasate deci mai puţin acurate - luând în considerare că *adulţii*: personalul şcolii, părinţii, nu participă direct în desfăşurarea comportamentului.

În concluzie, eşantioanele de adulţi studiate pentru identificarea nivelului şi calităţilor de interpretare asupra fenomenului de bullying şcolar, restrâng definirea acestuia la comportamente de abuz fizic sau verbal. Anumite studii identifică un deficit în interpretarea adultilor asupra semnificaţiei fenomenului de bullying si asupra consecintelor negative ale acestuia (Siann şi colab, 1993)

Perspectiva adolescenţilor

S-a constat că elevii deţin definiţii mai incluzive asupra fenomenului de bullying şcolar, decât profesorii (Frisen, 2009; Smith, 2002), deţin reprezentări consistente, existând studii care reflectă şi o anumită similaritate între percepţia copiilor şi cea a cercetătorilor (Naylor,2006); Aceştia dintâi consideră consecinţele negative asupra victimei ca fiind o caracteristică importantă în definirea bullying-ului, iar Smith (2004) sugerează că această capacitate de a înţelege, se dezvoltă o dată cu vârsta.

O altă diferenţă sesizată între percepţiile adolescenţilor/elevilor faţă de cele ale adulţilor, remarcă faptul că adolescenţii tind să subclaseze actele de agresivitate indirectă (împrăştiere de zvonuri răutăcioase, excludere socială ş.a), în asociere cu bullying-ul (Naylor, 2006).

Oliver şi Candappa, (2003), subliniază în urma sondajelor realizate că o mare parte din adolescenţi consideră că e nevoie de repetarea unui act de agresivitate, pentru a fi considerat bullying.

Hoover, Oliver şi Hazler (1992) identifică o asociere pozitivă între experienţele adolescenţilor (12-18 ani) şi percepţia lor asupra bullying-ului, ceea ce semnalează faptul că experienţele subiective şi caracteristicile demografice şi biologice (gen, vârstă) influenţează modalitatea de atribuire a semnificaţiilor pentru o interacţiune – clasificarea acesteia ca bullying, empatizarea cu rolurile implicate ş.a.

Se observă că pe măsura înaintării în vârstă (fenomen dominant la preadolescenţi) atitudinile copiilor tind să se plieze într-o tendinţă de "pro-bullying", în aşa fel încât aceştia ajung să însuseaşcă şi să dezvolte astfel de comportamente (Gini, 2006), prin contagiune socială.Rezultatele studiilor cu privire la percepţia indivizilor sociali asupra bullying-ului sunt adesea contradictorii, şi variază în funcţie de variabilele luate în considerare – vârstă, gen, existenţa/absenţa unor programe de combatere şi educare cu privire la acest fenomen în şcoli (Gill şi Petterson, 2010).

Programul Operaţional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013
Titlul Proiectului: Pluri și interdisciplinaritate în programe doctorale și postdoctorale
Editorul materialului: TOCAI (SÎRBU) IOANA
Data publicării: 10.05.2015
Conținutul acestui material nu reprezintă în mod obligatoriu poziția oficială a Uniunii Europene sau a Guvernului României.
Această lucrare este elaborată şi publicată sub auspiciile Institutului de Cercetare a Calităţii Vieţii, Academia Română ca parte din proiectul co-finanţat de Uniunea Europeană prin Programului Operaţional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013 în cadrul proiectului Pluri şi interdisciplinaritate în programe doctorale şi postdoctorale Cod Proiect POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086
This paper is made and published under the aegis of the Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy as a part of programme co-funded by the European Union within the Operational Sectorial Programme for Human Resources Development through the project for Pluri and interdisciplinary in doctoral and post-doctoral programmes Project Code: POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086

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PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL CAPITAL: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

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Abstract:One of the major research topics in sociology of education is the relationship between family and school and the effects on children's attainment. The manner that families invest in their pupil's educational capital is essential for their school performance and professional development. At the same time, the strategies used by parents to increase their children's educational capital are influenced by certain characteristics of the family social background. Education represents – in many cases, a way to achieve intergenerational mobility and to succeed in life. Considering these facts, the aim of the paper is to identify some general trends about the investments in educational capital and on the relationship between school and family,using data from a sociological quantitative study conducted on a representative sample of pupils in upper secondary schools from Iasi city.The research will approach aspects related to: the role of the family in choosing pupils' schools (parents, grandparents, and brothers/sisters), types of investment in cultural and educational capital, perspectives on the way that family involves in school and extracurricular activities (helping with homework, parent-teacher relationship), families'educational styles.

Keywords: ***educational capital, family, education, parental/family involvement, school***

Introducere. Considerații generale

Preocupările privind relația dintre investițiile în educație și mediul familial au deja o bogată tradiție atât pe plan teoretic, cât și empiric, interesul cercetătorilor fiind centrat pe analiza influenței background-ului familial asupra șanselor de acces la educație, precum și asupra realizărilor educaționale, în legătură directă cu problematica mobilității sociale. Dintre autorii care au adus contribuții importante în acest domeniu fac parte: Blau & Duncan (1967), Bourdieu (1977), Bourdieu & Passeron (1979), DiMaggio (1982), Desimone (1999), Sullivan (2001), Barnard (2004), Van de Werfhorst & Luijx (2010), Jaeger (2011) ș.a.[1]

În anul 1987, Annette Lareau atrage atenția asupra faptului că -deși temele mai sus menționate au fost supuse mai multor investigații, relativ puține cercetări s-au concentrat în special pe implicarea părinților în relația cu școala. În susținerea importanței includerii acestei tematici în atenția specialiștilor, autoarea invocă studiile cantitative derulate de Epstein (1984) și

[1] Barnard, W. M. 2004. „Parent involvement in elementary school and educational attainment". *Children and Youth Services Review, 26,* 39–62. Blau, P. M., & Duncan, O. T. 1967. *The American occupational structure*. New York: John Wiley. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Reproduction in Education, Society, Culture*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. 1979. *The inheritors. French students and their relation to culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Desimone, L. 1999. „Linking parent involvement with student achievement: Do race and income matter?". *Journal of Educational Research, 93,* 11–30. DiMaggio, Paul. 1982. „Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Culture Participation on the Grade of U.S. High School Students''. *American Sociological Review* 47:189-201. Jæger, Mads Meier. 2011. „Does Cultural Capital Really Affect Academic Achievement? New Evidence from Combined Sibling and Panel Data". *Sociology of Education*, 84(4): 281-298. Sullivan, Alice. 2001. „Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment". *Sociology* 35:893-912. Van de Werfhorst, Herman G., Ruud Luijkx. 2010. „Educational Field of Study and Social Mobility: Disaggregating Social Origin and Education". *Sociology*, vol 44(4): 695-715.

Marjoribanks (1979), care au evidențiat faptul că un determinat crucial pentru performanța educațională este comportamentul parental (Lareau 1987, 73).

Relația dintre familie și școală este esențială pentru viitorul copilului, între cele două instanțe existând o relație de interdependență. A aborda în mod distinct cele două elemente presupune o segmentare a procesului per ansamblu, însă identitatea copilului se construiește plecând de la un cumul de procese și agenți ai socializării: „Educația nu se reduce la școlarizare, și nici la procesele de socializare. Este rezultatul unei munci de construcție colectivă, în care reflexivitatea actorilor este unul dintre elementele-cheie" (Gheorghiu, de Saint Martin 2011, 18).

Educaţia familială – în calitate de primă experienţă pedagogică, are un rol esenţial în dezvoltarea individului, producând *habitus*-ul primar şi reproducând structura sau raporturile de clasă. Rolul familiei în dobândirea capitalului educaţional al individului este definitoriu pentru evoluţia sa în societate: „mediul familial se află în miezul experienței educative, căci în cadrul său se experimentează raportul cu sine și cu ceilalți, precum și elasticitatea sau rigiditatea frontierelor sociale" (Gheorghiu, de Saint Martin 2011, 18). Prin intermediul procesului de socializare primară, individul îşi însuşeşte involuntar normele şi valorile după care operează cei din jur, trăind astfel primele experienţe educative. Apoi, agenții de socializare se diversifică: „Procesul de socializare presupune prezența unui număr de *relee*: celulă familială, sistem educativ, grup de camarazi etc. În contact cu aceste medii se dezvoltă învățarea, apoi interiorizarea unui întreg ansamblu de norme și atitudini" (Ferreol 1998, 42-43). Mizele investițiilor în educație diferă în funcție de specificul statusului socio-economic familial, de tipurile de capital avute la dispoziție. Acestea determină fie fenomene de reproducție culturală, fie reorganizări ale frontierelor sociale în vederea (speranța) atingerii unei mobilități verticale. Dinamica structurilor sociale și a relațiilor intergenerației ne oferă o perspectivă asupra mizei investițiilor în educație. Potrivit sociologului Elisabeta Stănciulescu, „Ceea ce părinții *doresc* și *urmăresc* în strategiile lor educative nu este (sau este prea puțin) o simplă transmitere/ reproducție de „capitaluri", ci posibilitatea de a le plasa/investi cu maximum de profit (material, simbolic, psihologic) posibil într-o situație dată (întotdeauna alta)" (Stănciulescu 2002, 24).

Rolul familiei în traseul educațional al copiilor este subliniat și de Croll (2004), care aduce în prim plan faptul că aceasta nu asigură doar identitate și securitate tinerilor, ci totodată influențează și rezultatele educaționale. Pe lângă statusul socio-economic ridicat al familiei, activitățile parentale – cum ar fi comunicarea, consilierea și monitorizarea temelor, duc la rezultate educaționale favorabile pentru tineri (Basit 2012, 134).

Cum se manifestă investițiile în capitalul educațional? Există o varietate de moduri prin care familia poate acționa în relația cu mediul școlar și cu educația copiilor. Întrucât prezentarea lor ar implica un cadru mai larg de analiză, sunt propuse în atenție câteva dimensiuni care urmează să fie analizate și prin intermediul cercetării sociologice: influența familiei asupra alegerii unităților de învățământ, relația directă dezvoltată între părinți și școală, gradul de implicare în pregătirea copiilor (teme/ proiecte/ verificare activitate școlară), investiții în *shadow education*.

Interesul pentru aceste aspecte derivă din faptul că cercetările realizate până în acest moment au subliniat efectele pozitive ale unei relații deschise între familie și școală asupra realizărilor

educaționale ale copiilor, o implicare susținută din partea părinților putând diminua/ media eventualele disparități generate de mediul de proveniență. În întărirea acestor idei, Lee și Bowen (2006) invocă mai multe studii derulate în ultimii ani, concluzionând că formele prin care părinții se pot implica sunt – în cazul relației cu școala: participarea la consultări părinte-profesor, programe ale elevilor și activități de voluntariat, iar în ceea ce privește participarea în cadrul familiei: oferirea de sprijin în realizarea temelor, discutarea activității școlare (Lee, Bowen 2006, 194).

Potrivit lui Lareau, întrucât implicarea părinților în activități legate de școală este esențială pentru fluxul de informații educaționale relevante, familiile care se angajează în activități formale legate de școală – cea mai mare parte aparținând clasei mijlocii, tind să acumuleze informații care îi conduc pe copiii lor către oportunități educaționale mai bune (Lareau, apud Andres, Adamuti-Trache 2007, 138).

Implicarea familiei în educația copilului se transpune și în alegerea instituțiilor școlare. Plecând de la intensitatea angajamentului luat în acest sens, Anthony Giddens identifică trei categorii de părinți: *alegători privilegiaţi/ abilitaţi*, *alegători semicompetenţi*, *alegători detaşaţi* (Giddens 2010, 655-656). Pe baza influenței exercitate de părinți în selectarea școlilor, putem stabili în ce măsură familia reprezintă un participant activ în trasarea unui parcurs educațional pentru copil.

De asemenea, un aspect important în analiza temei investițiilor în capitalul educațional este modul în care sunt distribuite rolurile între părinți. Cercetările derulate pe această temă au evidențiat faptul că, în general, mamele sunt cele mai implicate în acțiunile de acest tip. Potrivit studiului realizat de Diane Reay (2002), există diferențe de gen în asumarea responsabilității investițiilor în educația copiilor: rezultatele indică faptul că în majoritatea familiilor analizate sarcina de a oferi sprijin în activitățile școlare revine în primul rând mamei. Astfel, munca zilnică intensă dedicată copiilor intră în special în sfera competențelor mamelor. Bărbații oferă ajutor ocazional la teme și, în special în familiile din clasa de mijloc, își găsesc timp să participe la serile părinților organizate de școală (Reay 2002, 26). Un element care reiese clar din analiza lui Reay este faptul că mamele și tații acordă semnificații diferite noțiunii de implicare în pregătirea școlară a copiilor, aspect care poate fi completat și cu date privind modul în care sunt luate deciziile -aducând în atenție un studiu realizat în țara noastră: „Dacă în acest domeniu (n.r.: al copilului) puterea decizională a mamei scade comparativ cu cea a acțiunii ei, ponderea decizională a tatălui crește semnificativ. Aceasta înseamnă că, deși mamei îi revin cele mai multe sarcini legate de îngrijirea și socializarea copilului, tatăl deține o putere relativ mare, el putând avea ultimul cuvânt atunci când este dispus sau când dorește să se implice” (Turliuc, Răpan 2003, 64).

Plecând de la dinamica structurilor sociale care diversifică tipurile de investiții în educație, capitalul cultural poate lua forme diferite în funcție de specificul fiecărei unități familiale. În acest context, putem discuta despre o extindere a conceptului către *shadow education – meditații private, suplimentare:* „Metafora este folosită deoarece acest tip de pregătire imită sistemul de învățământ de masă. Dacă un nou plan de studiu sau model de evaluare este introdus în învățământul de masă, în timp util acesta va apărea și *în umbră*. Pe măsură ce sistemul de extinde, la fel se întâmplă și cu umbra (NESSE 2011, 13). În prezent, asistăm la o

creştere a investiţiilor în acest tip de activităţi, cu scopul de a spori şansele de reuşită în mediul şcolar - iar mai apoi profesional, ale copiilor.

Nu în ultimul rând, un rol important legat de investiţiile în educaţie este dat de motivaţia transmisă la nivel intergenerațional: „Tinerii cetăţeni care achiziţionează capitalul aspirațional de la părinţii lor au mai multe şanse de a reuşi în educaţie. Prin urmare, şcolile şi autorităţile din domeniul educaţiei ar trebui să creeze parteneriate mai strânse cu părinţii pentru a înţelege mecanismele care îi motivează pe tineri, pentru ca astfel de tineri cetăţeni să poată fi susţinuţi în mod corespunzător (Basit 2012, 140). Totodată, aspiraţia de creştere a realizărilor poate fi mai uşor concretizată dacă părinţii dau dovadă de implicare atât în relaţia cu şcoala, cât şi în procesul de învăţare, instruire a copiilor.

Cercetarea sociologică

Cercetarea de ordin cantitativ s-a derulat în patru unităţi de învăţământ liceal din municipiul Iaşi, două din filiera teoretică (Liceul Teoretic „Dimitrie Cantemir" şi Colegiul „Costache Negruzzi") şi două din cea tehnologică (Colegiul Tehnic „Gheorghe Asachi" şi Liceul Tehnologic „Petru Poni"). În fiecare clasă s-a aplicat un pas statistic de 2, fiind astfel intervievaţi doar jumătate dintre elevii prezenţi. Culegerea datelor a avut loc în perioada decembrie 2014 –februarie 2015. Dimensiunea eşantionului este de 659 subiecţi din clasele IX-XII. *Criterii de construcţie a eşantionului*: tipul de liceu, forma de învăţământ, specializarea, anul de studiu. *Metoda de culegere a datelor*: chestionar auto-administrat.

Filiera:	Procentaje
Teoretică	53%
Tehnologică	47%
Gen:	**Procentaje**
Masculin	46%
Feminin	54%

Clasa:	Procentaje
Clasa a IX-a	26%
Clasa a X-a	27%
Clasa a XI-a	24%
Clasa a XII-a	23%

Figura 1: *Structura eşantionului*

Obiective urmărite: (1) stabilirea gradului de implicare/influenţă al familiei în alegerea instituţiilor şcolare, (2) trasarea unor perspective privind relaţia familie - şcoală în funcţie de anumite particularităţi ale mediului de proveniență; (3) analiza modului în care familia se implică în traiectoria şcolară a copiilor (la nivelul generaţiilor studiate).

Analiza datelor

Opţiunea pentru o anumită unitate de învăţământ nu presupune întotdeauna o alegere individuală, ci implică de multe ori o decizie familială, fiind influenţată de diferite mecanisme sau caracteristici ale mediului de proveniență. Având în vedere aceste constatări, primul item din cadrul acestei analize se referă la gradul de implicare al membrilor familiei în alegerea unui traseu şcolar pentru elev. În acest sens, subiecţii au fost întrebaţi în ce măsură a contat opinia rudelor atunci când s-au înscris la liceul unde învaţă în prezent. După cum indică şi graficul de mai jos, părinţii au jucat rolul cel mai important în această decizie, aproximativ trei sferturi dintre elevi (71%) declarând că au fost influenţaţi *mult* şi *foarte mult* de părerea lor, în timp ce 28% au precizat că în hotărârea luată a contat *puţin* şi *foarte puţin* opinia părinţilor. Referitor la influenţa părinţilor, nu se constată diferenţe semnificative statistic în funcţie de genul respondenţilor sau de filiera liceului pentru care au optat elevii.

Pe cea de a doua poziţie în ordinea actorilor care au contribuit la conturarea deciziei de înscriere la liceu se clasează fraţii/ surorile, aspect valabil pentru 44% dintre elevii chestionaţi,

în timp ce 9% au menționat că nu au fost interesați de acest aspect. În analiză au fost selectați doar elevii care au declarat că nu sunt singuri la părinți. Diminuarea raporturilor dintre generații (copii vs. bunici) este confirmată de măsura în care opinia bunicilor a contat în conturarea unei hotărâri, doar un sfert dintre cei chestionați subliniind că au luat în considerare poziția acestora, în timp ce 58% au optat pentru variantele de răspuns *puțin* și *foarte puțin.*



Figura 2:*Cât de mult a contat părerea...atunci când v-ați înscris la acest liceu?*[2]

Gradul de implicare al părinților în parcursul educațional al copiilor se observă și din frecvența cu care aceștia mențin contactul cu unitatea de învățământ. În general, pe parcursul unui semestru, părinții vin la școală în special pentru *ședințele cu părinții* (69% - da) și aproape un sfert (22%) vin *cel puțin o dată din proprie inițiativă. Foarte rar/deloc* ajung 17% dintre părinții celor chestionați.



Figura 3:*Pe parcursul unui semestru, cât de des vin părinții dvs. la școală pentru a se interesa de situația dvs.?*
(N=659) – item cu alegere multiplă

[2]Au fost eliminate situațiile în care s-a răspuns *Nu este cazul.* Astfel, dintr-un total N=659 au fost validate pentru părinți 647, pentru bunici – N=538 și pentru frați/surori – N=408. Diferența până la 100% pentru fiecare categorie în parte este dată de non-răspunsuri

Cât privește analiza datelor în funcție de anumite caracteristici ale mediului familial, respectiv școlar, elevii care beneficiază de o prezență activă din partea familiei în cadrul ședințelor cu părinții întrunesc două elemente principale: aparțin de filiera teoretică (există o diferență de 15 p.p. între cele două filiere) și locuiesc cu părinții. Legat de mediul de rezidență, nu sunt semnalate diferențe foarte mari între cele două categorii, existând o ușoară creștere în rândul celor din mediul urban (o explicație în acest sens poate fi și distanța față de școală). Totodată, nu există decalaje mari de participare în funcție de nivelul de educație al tatălui (70% vs. 65%).

Analiza datelor în funcție de...		**Vin la ședințele cu părinții**	**Vin foarte rar/deloc**
Mediul de rezidență	**Urban**	**72%**	**16%**
	Rural	**66%**	**18%**
Filiera	**Teoretică**	**76%**	**13%**
	Tehnologică	**61%**	**21%**
Cu cine locuiți?	**Cu ambii părinți**	**73%**	**14%**
	Nu locuiesc cu ambii părinți	**60%**	**22%**
Studii TATĂ	**Învățământ superior**	**70%**	**14%**
	Învățământ postliceal și secundar superior	**70%**	**16%**
	Învățământ secundar inferior și primar	**65%**	**28%**

Figura 4:*Pe parcursul unui semestru, cât de des vin părinții dvs. la școală pentru a se interesa de situația dvs.?*

Elevii din filiera tehnologică, care nu locuiesc cu ambii părinți și ai căror tați sunt absolvenți de învățământ secundar inferior sau primar, beneficiază de o mai slabă participare activă din partea părinților în mediul școlar.

Dintre elevii care au avut media pe anul anterior cuprinsă între 5 și 6.99, 14% au declarat că părinții lor *vin cel puțin o dată din proprie inițiativă* la școală. Procentajul aferent acestei variante de răspuns crește pentru celelalte categorii de rezultate școlare, 22% dintre părinții copiilor care au avut mediile cuprinse în intervalul 7-8.99, respectiv 9-10, au fost la școală să se intereseze de situația acestora în afara întâlnirilor standard organizate de către diriginți.

Părinții dvs. țin legătura cu dirigintele clasei?[3]		**Genul respondenților**		
	Rezultate generale	**Masculin N = 299**	**Feminin N = 358**	***Diferența masculin-feminin***
Da, și în afara ședințelor cu părinții	44%	47%	41%	6%
Da, doar la ședințele cu părinții	43%	39%	47%	-8%
Nu	12%	13%	11%	2%

Figura 5: *Părinții dvs. țin legătura cu dirigintele clasei?*

Tot referitor la relația dintre școală și familie este itemul cu privire la legătura stabilită de către părinți cu dirigintele clasei. Dacă la nivelul populației generale de elevi nu se poate trasa o opinie dominantă, existând un raport echilibrat între elevii care au declarat că părinții lor mențin legătura doar în cadrul ședințelor cu părinții (43%) și cei care fac acest lucru și în afara

[3] Restul procentelor până la 100% este dat de non-răspunsuri

ședințelor (44%), analiza în funcție de genul respondenților arată că băieții beneficiază de un control mai mare din partea părinților în afara reuniunilor special organizate (47% - *da, și în afara ședințelor cu părinții),* comparativ cu situația populației feminine, unde dominantă este participarea la ședințele planificate de diriginți.

Părinții dvs. țin legătura cu dirigintele clasei?	***În funcție de media din ultimul an***		
	5 – 6.99	**7 – 8.99**	**9-10**
Da, și în afara ședințelor cu părinții	41%	44%	44%
Da, doar la ședințele cu părinții	23%	42%	47%
Nu	36%	14%	8%

Figura 6: ***Părinții dvs. țin legătura cu dirigintele clasei?***

Raportat la media obținută pe ultimul an, se constată faptul că elevii ai căror părinți sunt mai absenți fizic din viața școlară a copiilor au performanțe educaționale mai reduse: 36% dintre părinții elevilor care au media cuprinsă între 5 și 6.99 *nu țin legătura cu dirigintele clasei,* în timp ce această variantă de răspuns este valabilă pentru doar 8% dintre elevii cu rezultate peste media 9.

În pregătirea pentru școală, primiți ajutor din partea...	**Da**	**Uneori**	**Nu**	**Ns/ Nr**
Mamei	14%	31%	52%	3%
Tatălui	7%	26%	63%	4%
Bunicilor	3%	6%	86%	5%
Fraților/ surorilor[4]	13%	31%	54%	2%

Figura 7: ***În pregătirea pentru școală (teme/ proiecte/ concursuri), primiți ajutor din partea...***

Potrivit rezulatelor obținute, **mama** este persoana din familie care acordă cel mai mult ajutor în pregătirea pentru școală. Astfel, 14% dintre elevi au declarat că beneficiază constant de sprijin din partea acesteia, 31% - uneori și 52% - niciodată. La o diferență de un singur punct procentual se clasează sprijinul primit din partea fraților/surorilor (în acest caz au fost selectați doar elevii care au declarat că nu sunt singuri la părinți). În ceea ce privește ajutorul acordat de tată, se constată o diferență de 12 p.p. față de celălalt părinte pentru variantele cumulate *da* și *uneori*. Rolul bunicilor în acest proces este foarte scăzut, mai puțin de 10% dintre tinerii chestionați declarând că beneficiază de sprijin din partea acestora. De semnalat este faptul că peste jumătate dintre tineri *nu* au parte de ajutor din partea niciunui membru al familiei.

Cât de des este controlată activitatea de pregătire școlară de către membrii familiei?	**Zilnic**	**Câteodată**	**Rareori**	**Niciodată**	***Ns/ Nr***
Mama	14%	26%	24%	33%	*3%*
Tata	7%	20%	22%	47%	*4%*
Bunici	1%	4%	9%	80%	*6%*
Frați/surori[5]	3%	11%	12%	69%	*5%*

[4]Au fost luați în considerare doar subiecții care au declarat că au frați/surori (N=464)
[5]Au fost luați în considerare doar subiecții care au declarat că au frați/surori (N=464)

Figura 8: ***Cât de des este controlată activitatea de pregătire școlară de către membrii familiei? (verificare teme)***

Cât privește verificarea activității de pregătire școlară, și în acest caz se observă o mai mare implicare din partea mamei: 14% dintre elevi sunt controlați zilnic, 26% câteodată și 24% rareori. Comparativ cu itemul anterior, pe cea de a doua poziție se clasează *tatăl,* a cărui implicare este vizibilă mai degrabă la anumite intervale de timp (20% - câteodată, 7% - zilnic). Astfel, rezultatele studiului confirmă și constatările făcute în capitolul dedicat considerațiilor generale: mama reprezintă principalul responsabil cu sarcinile ce țin de traseul educațional al copiilor, prezența acesteia fiind mult mai vizibilă în sprijinirea și verificarea activităților pentru școală, comparativ cu cea a altor membri ai familiei. Totuși, procentajele mari alocate variantelor de răspuns *rareori* și *niciodată*, aduc în atenție faptul că influența familiei în acest demers este relativ redusă în ciclul de învățământ liceal.

		În ultimii 2 ani, ați făcut meditații/ mers la pregătire în afara școlii pentru anumite materii studiate la școală?		
Analiza datelor în funcție de...		**Da**	**Uneori**	**Niciodată**
Mediul de rezidență	**Urban**	**52%**	**15%**	**33%**
	Rural	**32%**	**12%**	**56%**
Filiera	**Teoretică**	**56%**	**12%**	**32%**
	Tehnologică	**30%**	**16%**	**54%**
Venituri	**Nu ne ajung nici pentru strictul necesar**	**17%**	**7%**	**76%**
	Reușim să avem tot ce ne trebuie, fără efort	**58%**	**13%**	**29%**
Studii TATĂ	**Învățământ superior**	**63%**	**13%**	**24%**
	Învățământ postliceal și secundar superior	**39%**	**13%**	**48%**
	Învățământ secundar inferior și primar	**22%**	**17%**	**61%**
Media din ultimul an	**5 – 6.99**	**18%**	**18%**	**64%**
	7 – 8.99	**38%**	**13%**	**49%**
	9 -10	**54%**	**13%**	**33%**

Figura 9: În ultimii 2 ani, ați făcut meditații/ mers la pregătire în afara școlii pentru anumite materii studiate la școală?

44% dintre elevii chestionați au declarat că în ultimii 2 ani au făcut meditații pentru anumite materii studiate la școală, 14% au menționat că acest lucru nu a fost constant (uneori), iar 42% nu au fost implicați în activități de acest tip în intervalul menționat.

Care este profilul elevului care a beneficiat de investiții în *shadow education*? Acesta face parte mai degrabă din mediul urban (52% - da, 15% - uneori), urmează un liceu din filiera teoretică (56% - da, 12% - uneori), provine dintr-o familie în care veniturile asigură tot ceea ce este nevoie, fără efort (58% - da, 13% - uneori) și în care tatăl are studii superioare (63% - da, 13% - uneori), iar în ultimul an a obținut rezultate școlare foarte bune – peste media 9 (54% - da, 13% - nu).

Pe de altă parte, lipsa de resurse financiare și mediul de proveniență constituie elemente care generează o mai slabă investiție în acest tip de completare a pregătirii școlare, fapt ce produce anumite dezechilibre cauzate de background-ul familial. În condițiile în care procentajele

confirmă faptul că o astfel de investiție duce la câștiguri în realizările educaționale, intervine problema inegalității de șanse de acces în competiția școlară.

Concluzii

Rezultatele studiului derulat în cele patru licee din municipiul Iași indică modele distincte de implicare și participare ale părinților în educația copiilor, în funcție de diferite caracteristici ale mediului familial. După cum indică și teoriile dezvoltate pe această temă, precum și concluziile cercetărilor relevante din acest domeniu, modul în care familia investește în capitalul educațional al copiilor are efecte vizibile asupra parcursului și rezultatelor școlare. Consecințele însă nu se limitează doar pe plan individual (traseu educațional, respectiv profesional), ci se reflectă și în plan intergenerațional, prin transmiterea unor modele care pot fi reproduse de noua generație. Aceste aspecte ne pun în fața unei realități din care reiese faptul că școala – ca instanță relevantă în procesul formării individului, nu elimină (în totalitate) disparitățile generate de mediul familial. În contextul în care între familie și școală – ca principali investitori în capitalul educațional al copilului, există o relație de interdependență, este evident faptul că acordarea unui interes ridicat legăturii dintre cele două entități (indiferent de statusul socio-economic al părinților) poate contribui la obținerea unor rezultate mai bune pentru viitorul copilului. Utilitatea acestui demers derivă și din faptul că în prezent – atât pe plan național, cât și local, nu există foarte multe studii pe această temă, derulate pe grupuri restrânse/ specifice de populație (în acest caz - cea de elevi din mediul liceal). Cunoașterea acestor realități – prin demersuri empirice, poate contribui la conturarea unor propuneri de consolidare a relației familie - școală, tocmai prin prisma conștientizării efectelor pe care o implicare susținută le poate avea asupra traseului educațional al noilor generații.

Mențiune: *Această lucrare a fost realizată în cadrul proiectului POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675 "Inovare și dezvoltare în structurarea și reprezentarea cunoașterii prin burse doctorale și postdoctorale (IDSRC - doc postdoc)", cofinanțat de Uniunea Europeană și Guvernul României din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: *This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract number* POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675

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DISABILITY AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION ISSUES

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Abstract: The quality of life of people with disabilities is a current concern of social policies promoted at international and national level. Removing discrimination and creating equal opportunities for all, involves a process of maturation of the whole society. Because every child can become an active part of society in which he lives, he must be accepted and integrated into its structures. An effective integration requires a comprehensive restructuring process conducted both at individual and social level, a transformation of society so that it can meet the needs of all its members. How to integrate children with special educational needs in mainstream schools? What are the issues of integration? What is and how to conduct an effective integration? - Are just some aspects of the comprehensive school integration process – foundation of social integration.
Keywords: disability, school, integration, quality of life, normalization

Integrare / incluziune

Normalizarea vieţii persoanelor cu dizabilităţi este un proces amplu ce presupune procese de asimilare şi acomodare atât a individului la societate cât şi a societăţii la individul dizabil. Pentru o imagine corectă şi completă asupra fenomenului este nevoie de o abordare interdisciplinară cu referire la domeniul psihologiei, pedagogiei, sociologiei, asistenţei sociale, medicinei, juridic. Reuşita normalizării depinde de numeroşi factori, interni şi externi subiectului în cauză, procesele de integrare şi incluziune având un rol important în desăvârşirea acestui deziderat.

Integrarea definită de UNESCO (apud Băndilă şi Rusu, 1999, p.111) ca ,,ansamblu de măsuri care se aplică diferitelor categorii de populaţie pentru a înlătura segregarea de toate formele", reprezintă unul dintre principalele obiective ale actualelor politici educaţionale promovate la nivel internaţional şi naţional. Ea presupune în sens larg ,,plasarea / transferul unei persoane dintr-un mediu mai mult sau mai puţin separat într-unul obişnuit, vizând ansamblu de măsuri care se aplică diverselor categorii de populaţie, şi urmăreşte înlăturarea segregării sub toate formele ei" (Gherguţ, 2006, p. 17). Definită de Wolfensberger (1983, apud Chelemen, 2010, pp. 80-81) drept ,,unul dintre mijloacele de a obţine acceptarea socială şi de a ajunge la schimbarea adaptivă a comportamentului", integrarea reprezintă una dintre principalele probleme cu care se confruntă atât copilul cu dizabilitate cât şi familia acestuia. Văzută ca ,,un proces de transfer al copiilor şi tinerilor dintr-o şcoală specială în una de masă" (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 10) integrarea este adeseori redusă la introducerea copilului cu dizabilitate întru-un mediu şcolar obişnuit, pierzându-se din vedere elementele esenţiale/ necesare unei integrări eficiente şi anume: angajamentul, resursele, timpul, energia, numărul de cadre didactice, mediul şcolar, cu alte cuvinte ceea ce oferă şcoala unui copil pentru ca acesta să fie parte integrantă a mediului căruia aparţine (Forest, 1987).

Alois Gherguţ (2013, p. 321) punctează câteva elemente a ceea ce este / ceea ce nu este integrarea. Astfel, integrare înseamnă:

- ,,educarea copiilor cu cerinţe educative speciale alături de ceilalţi copii normali;
- asigurarea serviciilor de specialitate recuperare, terapie educaţională, consiliere şcolară, asistenţă medicală şi socială etc, în şcoala respectivă;

- sprijinirea personalului didactic şi managerilor şcolii în procesul de proiectare şi aplicare a programelor de integrare;
- a permite accesul efectiv al copiilor cu cerinţe speciale la programul şi resursele şcolii obişnuite (săli de clasă, cabinet, laboratoare, bibliotecă, terenuri de sport etc.);
- încurajarea relaţiilor de prietenie şi comunicare între toţi copiii din clasă/şcoală;
- a educa şi ajuta toţi copiii pentru înţelegerea şi acceptarea diferenţelor dintre ei;
- luarea în considerare a problemelor cu care se confruntă părinţii şi valorizarea opiniilor acestora, încurajându-i să se implice în viaţa şcolii;
- a asigura programe de sprijin individualizate pentru copiii cu cerinţe speciale;
- a accepta schimbări radicale în organizarea şi dezvoltarea activităţilor instructiv-educative din şcoală."

Conform aceluiaşi autor nu este integrare:

- ,,- a cuprinde copiii cu cerinţe educative speciale în programul şcolilor obişnuite fără pregătirea şi suportul necesar;
- a izola copiii cu cerinţe educative speciale în şcolile obişnuite sau a plasa clasele speciale în extremitatea clădirii şcolii ori în spaţii separate de clădirea principală a şcolii;
- a grupa copiii cu cerinţe speciale foarte diferit în acelaşi program;
- a ignora cerinţele strict individuale ale copilului;
- a expune copilul unor riscuri nejustificate;
- a solicita sarcini nerealizabile în aplicarea programului de integrare a personalului didactic şi managerilor şcolii ;
- a ignora problemele şi opiniile părinţilor;
- a plasa copiii cu cerinţe speciale în instituţii şcolare obişnuite alături de copiii mai mici ca vârsta;
- a structura un orar separat pentru copiii cu cerinţe speciale aflaţi în şcolile obişnuite;"

In ultima perioadă termenul de ,,integrare" a început să fie înlocuit prin cel de ,,incluziune", care face referire, în principal, la numeroase aspecte privind scopul şi rolul şcolii în acest context (Kliewer, 1998). Considerată ,,esenţa unui sistem educaţional comprehensiv, specific unei societăţi care are ca obiectiv valorizarea şi promovarea diversităţii şi egalităţii în drepturi" (Ghergut, 2006, p. 20), incluziunea implică o restructurare a şcolilor de masă de aşa manieră încât fiecare şcoală să fie capabilă a ,,se acomoda" mai mult decât ,,a asimila" fiecare copil, indiferent de dizabilitatea pe care o are (Avramidis et all., 2000, p.192). Termenul de incluziune a început să fie utilizat începînd cu sfârşitul anilor 1980 şi vizează aspectul social-etic cu putenice accente puse asupra ,,valorilor" şi are la bază documentele de politică socială care susţin egalitatea drepturilor tuturor copiilor, oportunităţi egale în ceea ce priveşte şcolarizarea. Deşi termenii de integrare şi incluziune sunt diferiţi, ei se întrepătrund, mai ales în context şcolar, deoarece o integrare fără incluziune nu este o integrare eficientă iar incluziunea nu poate fi realizată în absenţa integrării. Un moment crucial care marchează schimbarea viziunii internaţionale asupra şcolarizării copiilor cu dizabilităţi l-a reprezentat Conferinţa de la Jomtiem 1990 (Thailanda) precum şi Conferinţa din 1994 de la Salamanca (Spania), când noile tendinţe privesc trecerea de la un învăţământ

integrat înspre unul incluziv, considerat mai eficient şi cu beneficii majore asupra calităţii vieţii copiilor dizabili.

Factori facilitatori şi frenatori ai integrăii/ incluziunii şcoalare a copiilor cu dizabilităţi

Deşi politicile sociale promovate la nivel international sunt pro integrare şi incluziune a copiilor cu dizabilităţi în învăţământul de masă, multe cadre didactice manifestă rezerve serioase în ceea ce priveşte sprijinirea acestui proces (Florian, 1998). Altele, deşi se arată deschise faţă de conceptul general de integrare, nu sunt de acord a implementa în propria clasă practicile specifice integrării (Scruggs şi Mastropieri, 1996), condiţiile dizabilităţii fiind unul dintre factorii care au dus la discrepanţe între atitudine şi comportamentul manifestat efectiv.

Cercetările sugerează că implementarea cu succes a politicilor de integrare şi incluziune depind în mare măsură de atitudinea pozitivă a educatorilor. Studiul realizat în Anglia de Avramidis et al. (2000) a investigat atitudinile profesorilor faţă de includerea copiilor cu dizabilităţi în şcoala obişnuită. Rezultatele au evidenţiat atitudini pozitive vizavi de conceptul de integrare, care însă au scăzut în funcţie de gradul de severitate al simptomelor manifestate de copii. Conform studiului, copiii cu dificultăţi emoţionale şi comportamentale sunt consideraţi a fi cei care provoacă mai mult stres şi îngrijorare decât copiii cu alte tipuri de deficienţe. Studiul a semnalat o serie de probleme legate de amploarea şi calitatea formării iniţiale a cadrelor didactice din Marea Britanie.

Gregor & Campbell (2001) au realizat, în Scoţia, un studiu vizavi de avantajele şi dezavantajele integrării copiilor cu tulburare din spectrul autist în şcoala de masă şi predictorii de succes. Rezultatele au evidenţiat că o mică parte a profesorilor din şcoala de masă cred că aceşti copii ar trebui integraţi în unităţi şcolare obişnuite, constatându-se faptul că cei cu exprienţă în domeniul autismului s-au arătat mai încrezători în a putea gestiona situaţia decât cei fără experienţă în munca cu astfel de subiecţi. Mulţi dintre respondenţi şi-au exprimat îngrijorarea cu privire la efectele pe care această integrare le-ar putea avea asupra copiilor fără dizabilităţi. Cei cu o atitudine mai pozitivă s-au arătat a fi profesorii de specialitate, specialiştii, care au recunoscut posibile dezavantaje faţă de ambele categorii de subiecţi, subliniind că succesul integrării depinde de fiecare copil.

Atitudinile specialiştilor privitor la educaţia integrată a fost un aspect amplu studiat şi investigat. Studiile privind atitudinile profesorilor (Center & Ward, 1987), ale psihologilor (Center & Ward 1989), ale directorilor (Center et al., 1985), ale educatorilor (Bochner & Pieterse, 1989) au evidenţiat că natura dizabilitaţii şi problemele educaţionale prezente sunt factori cu o puternică influenţă asupra atitudinilor manifestate vizavi de integrare. Un alt aspect important reliefat de studiul lui Center & Ward (1987) a fost acela că atitudinile profesorilor din şcoala publică reflectă o lipsă de încredere atât în propriile competenţe profesionale cât şi în cele ale personalului de sprijin, fapt dovedit prin manifestarea unor atitudini pozitive faţă de integrarea acelor copii a căror caracteristici nu necesită competenţe suplimentare, de management sau de instruire, din partea profesorului.

Studiul realizat de Vaughn et al. (1996) a urmărit modul în care este percepută incluziunea de către profesorii din învăţamântul de masă şi de către cei din învăţământul special. Atitudini negative au fost înregistrate din partea profesorilor care nu au participat la

programe incluzive, adică nu aveau experienţă în acest domeniu. Totodată au fost identificaţi o serie de factori care influenţează incluziunea, respectiv: dimensiunea clasei, resurse inadecvate, măsura în care toţi copiii ar beneficia în urma incluziunii, lipsa de pregătire adecvată a cadrelor didactice.

Politicile promovate la nivel internaţional şi adoptate inclusiv de către ţara noastră au făcut ca şi învăţământul românesc să devină din ce în ce mai deschis ideei de integrare şi incluziune. Proiectele pilot efectuate au evidenţiat faptul că integrarea copiilor cu dizabilităţi în şcolile obişnuite este posibilă şi poate fi extinsă la nivel naţional (Vrăşmaş, 2001). Un număr semnificativ dintre copiii cu dizabilităţi înscrişi în învăţământul de masă şi părinţii acestora, se declară satisfăcuţi de experienţa de învăţare din şcoala obişnuită şi de serviciile educaţionale de care au beneficiat (Horga & Jigău, 2006).

Organizarea şcolarizării copiilor cu cerinţe educative speciale în România

Organizarea şcolarizării copiilor cu ceinţe educative speciale este reglementată în România printr-o serie de documente specifice. Dintre acestea putem aminti:

- Articolul 46 din Constituţia României;
- Legea învăţământului nr. 1/ 2011;
- Ordinul nr. 5573/7.10.2011 privind aprobarea Regulamentului de organizare şi funcţionare a învăţământului special şi special integrat;
- Ordinul nr. 5574/7.10.2011 pentru aprobarea Metodologiei privind organizarea serviciilor de sprijin educaţional pentru copiii, elevii şi tinerii cu cerinţe educaţionale speciale integraţi în învăţământul de masă;
- OMECTS nr. 5575/7.10.2011 pentru aprobarea Metodologiei-cadru privind şcolarizarea la domiciliu, respectiv înfiinţarea de grupe/clase în spitale, publicat in Monitorul Oficial al Romaniei, partea I, Nr. 797, din 10 noiembrie 2011;
- Ordinul nr. 6552/13.12.2011 pentru aprobarea Metodologiei privind evaluarea, asistenţa psihoeducaţională, orientarea şcolară şi orientarea profesională a copiilor, a elevilor şi a tinerilor cu cerinţe educaţionale speciale;
- Ordinul nr. 4927/08.09.2005 privind aprobarea Planului-cadru de învăţământ pentru clasele/grupele din învăţământul special sau de masă care şcolarizează elevi cu deficienţe moderate sau uşoare;
- Ordinul nr. 4928/08.09.2005 privind aprobarea Planului-cadru de învăţământ pentru clasele/grupele/unităţile de învăţământ special care şcolarizează copii/elevi/tineri cu deficienţe grave, severe, profunde sau asociate;
- Ordinul nr. 5239/01.09.2008 privind aprobarea Planului-cadru de învăţământ pentru clasele/grupele din învăţământul special sau de masă care şcolarizează elevi cu dizabilităţi moderate sau uşoare;
- Ordinul nr. 5755/17.09.2012 privind aprobarea Planului-cadru pentru învăţământul primar, ciclul achiziţiilor fundamentale - clasa pregătitoare, învăţământ special;

Pentru facilitarea integrării şi incluziuneii copiilor cu CES în şcolile de masă, în România au fost derulate numeroase strategii şi programe menite a contribui la realizarea acestui deziderat (Horga şi Jigau, 2009, pp. 19-20):

- ,,*Strategia Naţională Acţiunea Comunitară* – desfăşurată la început în câteva şcoli

pilot şi implementată începând cu anul şcolar 2004-2005 în toate judeţele;

- *Programul împreună în aceeaşi şcoală* – ce a avut drept scop înscrierea tuturor copiilor în şcoală corespunzator domiciliului acestora şi dezvoltarea unor servicii educaţionale variate şi eficiente, capabile să facă faţă nevoilor fiecărui copil;
- Programul *Phare RO Acces la educaţie pentru grupurile dezavantajate* – a cărui activităţi au vizat elaborarea de materiale curriculare pentru educaţia incluzivă, desfăşurarea programelor de tip ,,a doua şansă" pentru învăţământul primar şi cel gimnazial, pregătirea personalului din învăţământ, stimularea participării comunităţii la educaţie prin dezvoltarea Centrelor de resurse pentru educaţia incluzivă, sprijinirea procesului de integrare a copiilor cu CES în şcolile de masă;
- Proiectul pentru *Reforma Educaţiei Timpurii* (2007-2011) – grupul ţintă al proiectului au fost copiii cu vârste între 0 şi 3 ani. Proiectul a urmărit prin activităţi specifice facilitarea integrării acestui grup în învătământul preşcolar de masă, precum şi formarea profesională a cadrelor didactice pentru munca cu copiii ce prezintă dizabilităţi;
- *Programul pentru educaţia incluzivă* (2007-2011) – ce a avut drept scop accesul egal pentru copiii care aparţin unor grupuri dezavantajate şi vulnerabile la o educaţie de calitate;
- Programul *Şi noi avem drepturi* (2006) – implementat de Organizaţia ,,Salvaţi copiii", a urmărit pregătirea elevilor şi cadrelor didactice din învăţământul preuniversitar pentru cunoaşterea, susţinerea şi promovarea drepturilor copilului;
- Proiectul *Puterea reţelei-sprijin pentru includerea şcolară şi socială a tuturor copiilor* (2005), realizat de RENINCO, UNICEF şi MECT şi a urmarit realizarea unor suporturi şi programe de formare pentru profesori pe tema incluziunii sociale, în general, şi cu acente deosebite pe incluziunea socială a copiilor cu cerinţe educative speciale;
- Proiectul *Impreună pentru o educaţie incluzivă* (2007-2008). Proiectul a avut drept scop promovarea educaţiei incluzive în România prin extinderea şi dezvoltarea REI (reţeaua de educaţie incluzivă) ca forţă de acţiune pentru schimbarea mentalităţii şi atitudinii fată de integrarea copiilor cu dizabilităţi în şcolile obişnuite"

Integrare şcolară reprezintă ,,procesul de adaptare a persoanei cu CES la normele şi cerinţele şcolii pe care o urmează, de stabilire a unor relaţii afective pozitive cu membrii grupului şcolar (grupă/clasă) şi de desfăşurare cu succes a activităţilor şcolare" (Ordinul 5574/ 2011). Integrarea şcolară a copiilor cu CES în România se realizează după cum urmează (Ordinul 5573/ 07.10.2011, art. 7):

a) prin intermediul claselor şi grupelor speciale - pentru copii şi elevi cu dizabilităţi - din unităţile şcolare speciale sau din şcolile de masă;
b) prin şcoli de masă, individual, cu sau fără servicii educaţionale de sprijin;
c) prin intermediul grupelor sau claselor din unităţile sanitare în care sunt internaţi copiii, elevii şi tinerii cu boli cronice sau cu boli care necesită perioade de spitalizare mai mari de 4 săptămâni;
d) la domiciliu (şcolarizare itinerantă), pe o perioadă determinată;
e) prin alte structuri şcolare.

Organizarea şcolarizării copiilor cu CES presupune o serie de cerinţe de bază şi anume (Vrăşmaş, 2001):

- o instruire individualizată bazată pe o evaluare complexă a subiectului în cauză;
- accesibilitatea locală (distanţa şcolii faţă de domiciliul elevului);
- comprehensivitatea – toate persoanele cu handicap trebuie să beneficieze de educaţie, indiferent de vârstă sau gradul de handicap;
- programe educaţionale multiple şi variate;

Şcolarizarea copiilor cu dizabilităţi nu se realizează identic scolarizării unui copil tipic. Există diverse forme şi modele de realizarea a educaţiei integrate (Gherguţ, 2013):

- *Modelul cooperării şcolii obinuite cu şcoala specială*

In cadrul acestui model şcoala obişnuită coordonează integrarea, primind sprijin din partea şcolii speciale în ceea ce priveşte adaptarea materialelor şi mijloacelor didactice. Modelul prezintă atât avantaje cât şi dezavantaje (Popovici, 1998, p. 30):

- profesorii din ambele şcoli au beneficii majore în cadru acestui model, cei din şcolile de masă dobândesc cunoştinţe şi experienţe legate de nevoile specifice ale copiilor cu dizabilităţi, iar profesorii din şcoala specială au posibilităţi de predare mult mai largi;
- şcoala specială devine o resură pentru şcoala obişnuită;
- fiind un mediu socializator propice, copiii cu dizabilităţi işi dezvoltă sociabilitatea, ceea ce sporeşte şansele unei integrări totale;
- copiii normali dobândesc o serie de cunoştinte legate de dizabilitate, fapt cu o influenţă pozitivă în direcţia acceptării şi valorizării diversităţii umane.

Dezavantajul major al acestui model constă în faptul că este dificil de administrat, iar copiii implicaţi în acest program pierd timp preţios prin deplasările de la un loc la altul.

- *Modelul bazat pe organizarea unei clase speciale în şcoala obişnuită*

Acest model urmăreşte stabilirea unor raporturi de socializare între copiii cu deficienţe şi copiii tipici, prin introducerea unei clase speciale în structura şcolii obişnuite. Modelul a atras numeroase critici fiind considerat tot o formă de segregare, interacţiunea dintre cele doua categorii de copii (cu dizabilităţi şi tipci) nefiind una autentică, poate duce foarte uşor la discriminare.

- *Modelul bazat pe amenajarea în şcoala obişnuită a unui spaţiu sau a unei săli de instruire şi resurse pentru copiii cu dizabilităţi, integraţi individual în clase obişnuite*

Acest model presupune desfăşurarea de către profesorul de sprijin a unor activităţi cu copilul dizabil, atât în acest spaţiu special amenajat cât şi la orele de clasă, prin colaborarea cu educatorii de la clasa unde este integrat copilul.

- *Modelul itinerant*

Conform modelului itinerant, copilul dizabil este integrat în şcoala obişnuită unde îşi desfăşoară întregul program , fiind sprijinit de profesorul itinerant.

- *Modelul comun*

Este asemănator cu modelul itinerant, diferenţa constând în faptul că în cazul modelului comun profesorul itinerant este responsabil de toţi copiii cu dizabilităţi dintr-o anumită zonă şi oferă ,,servicii de sprijinire a copilului şi familiei, ajută parinţii la alcătuirea programelor de învăţare, urmăreşte evoluţia şcolară a copilului, colaborează cu profesorii şcolii obişnuite în care este integrat copilul şi intervine atunci când apar probleme de învăţare sau adaptare a

copiilor la anumite cerinţe şcolare" (Gherguţ, 2013, p. 333).

Implicarea copilului cu CES într-un model sau altul nu este suficientă. Pentru o integrare eficientă în învăţământul de masă trebuie să fie îndeplinite şi o serie de condiţii legate de: atitudinile şi motivaţia cadrelor didactice, cunoştinţe şi competenţe profesionale, resurse materiale, resurse umane, sprijin specializat acordat atât elevilor cât şi cadrelor didactice, eficienţa partenerialtului şcoală-familie, politici relevante (Horga & Jigău, 2009).

Suportul în învăţare joacă un rol important şi presupune pe lângă sprijin acordat atât copilului în cauză cât şi cadrelor didactice, prin prezenţa profesorului specializat/ de sprijin, şi informare, elaborarea planurilor educaţionale individualizate, selecţia materialelor didactice, adaptarea acestora la particularităţile fiecărui educabil (Vrăşmaş, 2010).

La nivelul clasei de elevi şi al practicilor , în învăţământul de masă, pentru realizarea optimă a integrării, trebuie sa fie îndeplinite următoarele condiţii (Horga & Jigău, 2009):

- sprijin pentru cadrul didactic care are integraţi în clasă elevi cu dizabilitaţi, atât din partea celorlaţi colegi de breaslă, cât şi sprijin specializat venit din afara şcolii;
- organizarea diversificată a activităţilor prin modalităţi de învătare în grup, învăţare prin cooperare, care dau posibilitatea copiilor cu CES de a participa alături şi împreună cu ceilalţi colegi;
- obiective raportate la posibilităţile de învăţare a fiecărui copil, adaptarea conţinuturilor, sarcinilor de învăţare şi strategiilor de evaluare;
- conceperea unor planuri de intervenţie personalizate, care să stimuleze la maxim potenţialul fiecărui educabil, monitorizarea progresului şi rezultatelor elevilor cu CES pentru a putea fi luate măsurile optime de intervenţie.

Profesorul itinerant şi de sprijin este ,,cadrul didactic cu studii superioare în domeniul psihopedagogic care desfăşoară activităţi de învătare, stimulare, compensare şi recuperare cu persoanele cu CES integrate în unităţile de învăţamânt de masă, în colaborare cu toaţi factorii implicaţi" (Ordinul nr. 5574/7.10.2011). El are numeroase atribuţii şi sarcini privind realizarea evaluării periodice a acestor copii, elaborarea planului de interventie personalizat în funcţie de disponibilităţile elevului integrat, asigurarea sprijinului pentru cadrele didactice de la clasa în care sunt elevi cu CES integraţi, asigurarea suportului în ceea ce priveşte consilierea părinţilor şi a familiei respectivilor educabili (Vrăşmaş, 2010). Totodată, realizează adaptarea curriculară în funcţie de nivelul de dezvoltare şi competenţele fiecărui copil, sprijină cadrele didactice de la clasă în vederea selectării modalităţilor optime de lucru pentru fiecare unitate de învăţare, participă activ la activităţile de predare realizate în clasă, desfăşoară activităţi de intervenţie recuperatorie şi în alt context decât clasa, participă şi realizează activităţi extracurriculare, monitorizează permanent copilul cu CES în vederea readaptării planului de intervenţie personalizat în raport cu progresele realizate de copil (Horga & Jigău, 2009). Neajunsurile legate de cadrul didactic de sprijin/ itinerant ar fi cele legate de nivelul de pregatire profesională sau incapacitatea de a crea o colaborare fructuoasă cu cadrul didactic de la clasă.

Organizarea activităţilor de învăţare a copiilor cu CES se face aşadar raportat şi în accord cu diagnosticul şi disponibilităţile fiecărui copil. In acest context nu de puţine ori vorbim de curriculum diferenţiat care se referă la ,, modalităţile de selectare şi organizare a conţinuturilor, metodelor de predare-învăţare, metodelor şi tehnicilor de evaluare,

standardelor de performanţă, mediului psihologic de învăţare, în scopul diferenţierii experientelor de învăţare şi de adaptare a procesului instructiv-educativ la posibilităţile aptitudinale şi de întelegere, la nivelul intereselor şi cerinţelor educaţionale, la ritmul şi la stilul de învătare al elevului" (Gherguţ, 2013, pp. 325-326).

Adaptarea curriculară reprezintă ,, corelarea conţinuturilor componentelor curriculumului naţional cu posibilităţile elevului cu CES, din perspectiva finalităţilor procesului de adaptare şi de integrare şcolară şi socială a acestuia" (Ordinul nr. 5573/7.10.2011). Astfel, curriculum adaptat presupune faţa de curriculum-ul diferenţiat şi ,,o adaptare a conţinuturilor, metodelor, mijloacelor şi tehnicilor de lucru în activităţile instructiv-educative. (Gherguţ, 2013, p.325).

Pe lângă numeroasele aspecte legate de organizarea procesului de învăţământ, un rol important în realizarea unei integrări de succes în şcoala de masă îl are şi familia. Realizarea unui parteneriat eficient, productiv între şcoală şi familie reliefat prin: schimb permanent de informaţii, sprijin reciproc în eleborarea planului de intervenţie personalizat, activităţi de consiliere a părinţilor, organizarea împreună a unor activităţi extracurriculare etc, reprezintă ,, factori esenţiali pentru o participare şcolară reuşită, pentru succesul intervenţiilor educative şi progresul şcolar al copiilor" (Horga & Jigău, 2009, p. 71).

Principalele probleme care pot să apară în calea unei integrări eficiente sunt legate de:

- atitudilile discriminatorii ale cadrelor didactice, colegilor de clasă;
- lipsa resurselor umane şi materiale necesare;
- lipsa competenţelor profesionale în munca cu copiii cu CES;
- neadaptarea curriculară;
- neadaptarea strategieie didactice la particularităţile tuturor educabililor;
- lipsa unei colaborări eficiente între cadrele didactice şi profesorul itinerant/ de sprijin;
- absenţa unui parteneriat eficient şi productiv şcoală-familie;

Concluzii

Deşi politicile sociale promovate la invel internaţional sunt de integrare şi incluziune, de înlăturare a discriminărilor de orice fel şi de egalizare a şanselor, realizarea acestui deziderat întâmpină adesea probleme. Integrarea şcolară a copiilor cu dizabilităţi este un proces în plină desfăşurare ce cunoaşte restructurări şi reorientări în vederea optimizării beneficiilor pentru această categorie de copii. Abordarea diverselor modele de integrare, restructurări curriculare, adaptări ale conţinuturilor şi strategiilor didactice, perfecţionarea continuă a cadrelor didactice, reglementări legislative în domeniu, atitudini diverse ale cadrelor didactice şi ale celorlalti actori sociali vizavi de integrarea unui copil cu CES într-o şcoala obişnuită, sunt doar câteva aspecte care trebuie luate în considerare atunci când vorbim de integrarea şcolară a unui copil cu dizabilităţi.

Acknowledgement

Această lucrare este elaborată şi publicată sub auspiciile Institutului de Cercetare a Calităţii Vieţii, Academia Română ca parte din proiectul co-finanţat de Uniunea Europeană prin Programul Operaţional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013 în cadrul

proiectului Pluri şi interdisciplinaritate în programe doctorale şi postdoctorale Cod Proiect POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086.

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învăţământului special şi special integrat.
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LEGISLATION SYSTEMS REGARDING THE AIRING OF TV ADDS ADDRESSED TO CHILDREN. COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS

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Abstract: Currently called a "business philosophy that prioritizes the customer", marketing is a social and economic science. The most common means of communication used in marketing is advertising and the preferred means of transmitting information is the audiovisual channel.
Advertising is the most used part of publicity, because it proves to be effective beginning with the launch of a product or service and continuing with the customer loyalty and product repositioning. But now advertising has come to use means that negatively affect viewers, especially children, violating their rights. Children's rights most often violated by advertisements are stipulated in Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights Protection and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Therefore, in this paper, using the comparative content analysis, I will make an evaluation of the legislation in force regarding the TV advertising aimed at children, comparing the legislation in force inSweden, Canada, New Zealand andAustralia.
Keywords: ***children's rights, sociology, advertisement, audiovisual, legislation.***

Introducere

Marketingul a devenit în zilele noastre o influență în "viața fiecăruia, fiind mijlocul prin care se oferă oamenilor nivelul de trai" (Ph. Kotler, 1998).Numit până în prezent o „filozofie de afaceri care pune pe primul plan clientul" (Purcărea, 1999), marketingul este o știință prin care se observă modalitatea de a ajunge mai aproape de dorințele unei mase de oameni și mai ales modalitatea prin care o companie să prospere în viitor. Marketingul a cunoscut o evoluție veloce odată cu dinamica economiei și a societății, astfel că și tehnicile folosite s-au perfecționat,fiind adaptate la nevoile din prezent. O componentă importantă în marketing, des utilizată, este publicitatea realizată prin intermediul canalului audiovizual, dovadă fiind rezultatele studiilor. Potrivit unui raport realizat de agenția media Caratpentru anul 2015, se prevedeo creștere de 4,6% față de 2014a cheltuielilor cu publicitatea la nivel mondial,ajungându-se la suma de 540 miliarde de dolari, iar televiziunea va atrage 42% din cheltuielile de publicitate.Studiul „Television International KeyFacts", ediția 2013, realizat de firma internațională IP Netork, susține că timpul petrecut la televizor crește în Statele Unite cu 2 minute la fiecare an, iar la nivel european cu 8 minute. Conform aceluiași studiu, cetățenii Statelor Unite în medie petrec în fața micului 292 e minute pe zi, România fiind însa prima națiune ca timp petrecut în fața micului ecran, în medie, cu 326 minute pe zi, urmată de alte țări europene. Compania de cercetare de piață Deloitte vine în completarea studiului enunțat mai sus și afirmă că cel mai eficient canal media pentru promovare este televiziunea. Publicitatea audiovizuală se adresează tuturor categoriilor de vârstă, astfel că publicitatea pentru copii nu mai este un lucru necunoscut. Tehnicile de marketing în abordarea copiilor au evoluat, iar efectele publicității la copii sunt devastatoare pentru sănătatea micilor consumatori,atâtla nivel fizic, cât și la nivel psihic. Unul dintre efectele negative ale publicității este reprezentat de promovarea produselor cu conținut crescut în zaharuri și

carbohidrați, factorii principali care predispun și favorizează obezitatea.Pentru a combate efectele pe care le are publicitatea în declanșarea și susținerea obezității, Organizația Mondială a Sănătății a elaborat proiectul European Childhood Obesity Surveillance Initiative (COSI) (OMS / Europa, 2005). Rezultatele din anul 2010 indică faptul ca 24% dintre tinerii între 6-9 ani sunt supraponderali sau obezi. Așa cum afirma Livingstone (Livingstone, 2001), obezitatea este acum o problemă majoră de sănătate publicăîn Europa. Însă aspectele negative nu se opresc doar la acest nivel, astfel că micii consumatorii au nevoie de protecție specială, care să garanteze și să ocrotească în primul rând principiul, interesul superior al copilului, urmat de toate celelalte principii ce stau la baza Convenției cu privire la drepturile copilului. Din acest motiv, la nivelul Uniunii Europene, precum și în alte state care nu aparțin de continentul european, îngrijorarea cu privire la efectele publicității promovate prin canalul audiovizuala dus la realizarea unor regulamente restrictive privind publicitatea care se adresează copiilor. Însă reglementările în țările Uniunii Europenesunt aplicate diferit,cu toate că s-au realizat implementări naționale ale Directivei serviciilor audiovizuale (Audiovisual Media Services Directive – AVMSD) începând cu anul 2007.

Sisteme legislative restrictive

În privința reglementărilor prevăzute de Uniunea Europeană se regăsesc câteva prevederi de drept care se preocupă cu problema publicității destinate copiilor, în general, însă există puține dispoziții de reglementare care se ocupă de problema publicității la produsele alimentare destinate copiilor, în special (Garde, 2006). Instrumentul principal elaborat de Uniunea Europeană este Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Comisia Europeană, 2010), o evoluție a primului proiect în această problemă, Directiva „Televiziune fără frontiere”,din anul 1989 (revizuit în 1997 și înlocuit cu AVMSD în 2007). Alte politici aplicate în reglementarea publicității sunt orientate spre protecția consumatorilor. Mai multe acte legislative au fost adoptate în cadrul acestui domeniu de politică a Uniunii Europene, acte care vin și cu reglementări privind publicitatea, produsele alimentare, precum și etichetarea acestora. În privința reglementărilor cu interes strict asupra protejării minorilor, Uniunea Europeană dovedește o preocupare deosebită în privința siguranței jucăriilor, însă în privința publicității destinate copiilor, totul se tratează la un nivel general. Reglementări clare și foarte stricte sunt prevăzute în cadrul produselor de tutun și alcool. În privința altor produse sau servicii de interes pentru copii, cum ar fi dulciurile, produsele de cofetărie și jucăriile, reglementările în cadrul țărilor membrenu sunt consecvente, ci dimpotrivă, cu aspecte foarte diferite. Diferențele privind reglementarea publicității la nivel european nu acoperă în mod corespunzător dimensiunea transfrontalieră de publicitate pentru copii; prin urmare, este dificil pentru statele membre să pună în aplicare reglementări naționale în cazul agențiilor de publicitate străine care se supun reglementărilor din țara de proveniență. Potrivit Comisiei Europene (2012), rapoartele privind punerea în aplicare la nivel național a AVMSD (2010) oferă o serie de prevederi importante. Una dintre acestea este Directiva Audiovisual Media Services nr 13/2010 a Uniunii Europene. Prezenta directivă reprezintă o poziție centrală a legislației în reglementarea publicității oferite prin televiziune și direcționate către copii. Cu toate acestea, directiva nu implică o reglementare uniformă în toate statele membre. Cinci state membre interzic publicitatea în programele pentru copii (articolul 9 alineatul (2) din

directivă). Unele state membre impun o interdicție parțială sau alte restricții privind publicitatea în programele pentru copii, fie în timpul unor anumite intervale, fie pentru anumite produse. Alte state membre interzic prezentarea siglelor sponsorilor în programele pentru copii.

Una dintre cele mai restrictive legislații se practică în Suedia, unde publicitatea prin transmisie TV destinată copiilor sub 12 ani este interzisă, la fel ca și e-mailurile cu scopul de a promova diferite servicii și produse adresate copiilor sub vârsta de 16. Există, de asemenea o serie de acorduri comerciale, inclusiv norme privind jucăriile care inspiră și instigă la violență. Convenția cu privire la Drepturile Copilului subliniază, în general, necesitatea ca drepturile copilului să fie recunoscute, precum și nevoia de protecție, și mai precis faptul că nevoile copiilor diferă în diversele stadii ale copilăriei. Legislația suedeză a adaptat această idee și reglementările diferă în funcție de vârstă, iar acest lucru reprezintă o deficiență atunci când vine vorba de normele Comisiei Europene (CE).

Cu toate acestea, vârsta până la care se impun restricții în RTVA (Radio and TV Act-Suedia) este destul de mare, ceea ce înseamnă că tuturor copiilor de vârstă medie (între 8-12 ani) le este refuzată publicitatea cu privire la obiecte de interes specifice pentru ei (Lena Olsen, 2010). Acest lucru ar putea fi privit ca o lipsă de respect pentru drepturile acestor copii, având în vedere normele CE, care recunosc dreptul de a fi informat. Însă motivul care a primat la luarea acestei decizii, anume interdicția până la vârsta de 12 ani ca limită pentru aplicarea restricțiilor, a fost acela că, aceștia nu au capacitatea de a evalua informațiile și, din acest motiv au nevoie în special de protecție, care în astfel de cazuri este văzută ca o prioritate,fiindcă cei de vârstă medie sunt influențați de publicitate în aceeași măsură ca cei mai mici, deși recunosc diferența dintre publicitate și programele vizualizate (John, 1999)

Un alt tip de regulament restrictiv se poate observa în Australia și Noua Zeelandă, realizat prin diferite organizații, care în timp si-au adaptat legislația la nevoile populației, menționând că Australia își adaptează legislația de 40 de ani. În legislația celor două state se regăsesc cadrecreate special pentru protejarea copiilor de efectele negative ale reclamelor. În aceste țări, inițiativele organizațiilor au avut un real succes în rezolvarea problemelor de nutriție întâmpinate de tineri. Cele mai noi aspecte modificate în regulamentele ce impun limite atât difuzorilor de publicitate, cât și celor care creează publicitatea în Noua Zeelandă presupune: difuzarea acesteia în cadrul unui program strict, realizat în funcție de vârstă și de postul TV; difuzarea să se facă într-un interval orar bine definit; limitarea timpului de difuzare a reclamelor la 10 minute pe oră, cu o abatere de 2 minute, în funcție de postul TV și locul pe care copiii îl ocupă în ceea ce privește publicul țintă al emisiunii în cadrul căreia este difuzată; publicitatea trebuie să fie clară, recunoscută și bine delimitată de emisiunile destinate copiilor, chiar și în cadrul posturilor internaționale care difuzează prin satelit pe teritoriul Noii Zeelande; nici o reclamă nu se va repeta de mai mult de două ori pe oră, pe un anumit canal, pentru copiii școlari; numărul de reclame nu va fi mai mult de trei, în aceleași condiții de mai sus; în cazul posturilor internaționale care difuzează prin satelit, nu vor fi promovate produse licențiate în cadrul emisiunilor asociate și nu vor fi induse sentimente precum cele de umilință sau frustrare;toate televiziunile sunt obligate să adopte regulamentul privind Codul Practicilor publicitare, care conține Codul Practicilor Publicitare pentru copii, Codul de Etică, Codul Practicilor publicitare Alimentare și Codul pentru persoanele din cadrul mesajelor publicitare

(New Zealand Television Broadcaster's Council). Australia a realizat de asemenea o nouă revizuire a regulamentului, venind cu îmbunătățiri la nivelul aspectului de etică în publicitatea pentru copii și mediul înconjurător, dar și la nivelul discriminărilor și al utilizării termenilor cu conotații sexuale. (Advertising StandardsBureau, 2015).

Însă, în ciuda acestor eforturi constante, există voci care denunță ineficiența acestor măsuri legislative. Într-un studiu din anul 2014 realizat de Louise Thornley*et al.*, se face o analiză a activității organizației New Zealand Advertising StandardsAuthority (ASA) în raport cu prevederile din Convenția Organizației Națiunilor Unite cu privire la Drepturile Copilului (UNCROC). În urma analizeia opt decizii privind plângerile publice cu privire la publicitate, au fost observate următoarele aspecte: implementarea codurilor cuprinde decizii parțiale, nejustificate sau inconsecvente de către consiliul pentru reclamații, incapacitatea de a pune în aplicare modificările aduse codurilor și incapacitatea de a preveni publicitatea la produsele alimentare nesănătoase în continuă dezvoltare și difuzare. Astfel, consideră autorii, sistemul ASA se dovedește că este reactiv, că are limitări în privința sancțiunilor, oferind puține stimulente pentru restricționarea acestui tip de publicitate, lipsindu-i o monitorizare independentă. Această analiză sugerează faptul că sistemul de standarde de publicitate din Noua Zeelandă nu protejează drepturile copiilor în totalitate, prin incapacitatea de a acționa înspiritul UNCROC și în mod special prin faptul că nu abordează în mod adecvat articolele 3, 6 și 13 din UNCROC. Constatând gradul de nocivitate pe care îl are asupra copiilor, la nivel mondial, un mod alimentar nesănătos și contribuția marketingului în adoptarea unei nutriții nesănătoase, se concluzionează că reglementările legislative în ceea ce privește marketingul produselor alimentare destinate copiilor ar trebui să fie puse în aplicare la nivel global. Acest lucru ar ajuta guvernele să reducă efectele unuia dintre factorii cheie în adoptarea unui mod alimentar nesănătos și să le permită să îndeplinească obligațiile care le revin în cadrul dreptului internațional pentru a proteja drepturile copiilor. De asemenea, s-a dovedit prin această cercetare că nu li se oferă o protecție adecvată copiilor cu vârsta cuprinsă între 14 și 17 ani. (Louise Thornley, Louise Signal, George Thomson, 2014)

Un alt stat recunoscut pentru sistemul creat în protejarea micilor consumatori de televiziune este Canada, care are o lungă istorie în privința sistemelor de auto-reglementare în industria de publicitate, dovedindu-se a fi eficient. Publicitatea pentru copii în Canada este un domeniu de marketing și comunicare tratat cu mare responsabilitate de către instituțiile ce protejează drepturile copiilor. Vestit în întreaga lume ca unul dintre sistemele cele mai cuprinzătoare și complete de coduri și standarde în privința publicității pentru copii, sistemul canadian este citat frecvent de diferite țări și grupuri internaționale precum Organizația Mondială a Sănătății. De peste 40 de ani, Advertising Standards Canada (ASC) a promovat publicitatea responsabilă și aoferit sprijin în industrie, prin Codul Canadian de Standarde în Publicitate (Canadian Code of Advertising Standards - CCA). Organizația s-a adaptat la schimbarea valorilor sociale, lucru reflectat în ultimele revizuiri precum cele referitoare la publicitatea produselor alimentare și publicitatea pentru copii. Asociația Canadiana a Radiodifuzorilor, încă dinanul 1971, a creat un cod suplimentar, Codul audiovizualului pentru publicitatea destinată copiilor, administrat de ASC. Din 1974, radiodifuzorii au fost de acord să adopte Codul pentru Copii ca o condiție pentru obținerea licenței de emisie. De asemenea, o altă condiție a fost perioada de emisie a materialelor publicitare, care, deși la nivel

internațional este stabilită la 12 minute maximum într-o oră, radiodifuzorii au stabilit în mod voluntar o limită de 8 minute în programele pentru copii. În 1990, agențiile de publicitate aufondat un grup pentru companiile care promovează în mod responsabil publicitatea pentru produsele și serviciile destinate copiilorși familiilor acestora. Organizația lucrează activ în parteneriat cu guvernul, educatorii, părinții și experții pentru a identifica problemele de interes în viața copiilor și pentru a oferi soluții înprotejarea lor. Cea mai recentă inițiativă, cu suport cheie al părților interesate și implicate, esteChildren's Healthy Active Living Program, desfășurat alături de binecunoscutul programul realizat în cadrul programului din școală, TV & ME, care abordează domeniul mass-media și rolul activităților acestora. Când vine vorba de publicitate pentru copii, publicitatea, agenții de publicitate și mass-media din Canada au tratat acest lucru cu o mare grijă și respect de-a lungul anilor, creând o serie de garanții pentru a se asigura că se realizează responsabil comunicarea cu copiii. După impunerea noilor regulamente de desfășurare a programului publicitar, s-au realizat o serie de cercetări printre care și „The influence of theChildren's Food and Beverage Advertising initiative: change in children's exposure to food advertising on television in Canada between 2006-2009", în care au fost analizate reclamele difuzate pe 27 de posturi TV din Toronto și Vancouver, în anii 2006, 2009 și 2011.

În urma analizei s-a constatat o scădere cu 4,5% a spoturilor difuzate pe posturile pentru copii și o creștere cu 45% pe posturile generaliste. Per total, nivelul de reclame la care sunt expuși copiii a crescut cu 16,8% în Toronto și 6,4% în Vancouver. Creșteri semnificative au fost semnalate pentru reclamele la iaurt și snacks-uri în ambele orașe, și la fast food în Toronto. Având în vedere creșterea alarmantă a numărului de reclame, în ciuda inițiativei legislative, iese în evidență practicarea marketingului tot mai agresiv al producătorilor, mai ales cel care are în vedere produsele bogate în zahăr, grăsimi și sare, situație care necesită o reevaluare constantă a măsurilor legislative.

Concluzii

Sistemele restrictive, deși foarte criticate, au reușit să protejeze copiii de efectele nocive ale unei publicități tot mai agresive. Cu toate acestea, nici aceste sisteme nu se dovedesc a fi suficiente, deoarece unele agenții de publicitate adoptă un comportament agresiv prin dezvoltarea unor noi tehnici de a ajunge la copii, situație care presupune o adaptare continuă a legislației având în vedere evoluția industriei publicitare. Am ales sistemele legislative din Suedia, Canada, Australia și Noua Zeelandă în analiza realizată deoarece acestea sunt sistemele legislative cele mai apropiate de Convenția cu privire la Drepturile Copilului, sisteme care ar trebui, după părerea noastră, să fie luate ca modele de bune practici, cu rezultate în sens pozitiv.

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CONSEQUENCE OF MIGRATION ON CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS LIFE

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Abstract: Mobility, migration of people, has been and is always in the attention of the liable factors, but also of researchers. One of the multiple perspective considered when addressing and analysing this penomenon is that relating to the cultural and religious consequences of migration. This article aims at analizing both the preservation of the cultural and religious identity of migrants at the place of destination and the tendency to enrich such identity until reaching assimilation of the cultural and religous traditions of the majority population. The wide area of migration also includes the case of the Romanian migrants in Lazio area, Italy, who, according to analysts, attest the manner in which they express their cultural and religious identity and adjust such identity, to a smaller or greater extent, in the area where they live and work.

Keywords: ***culture, religion, identity, assimilation, migration.***

1.Introduction

Migration is a consequence, a product, or even a cause of the economic and social phenomena charactetistic to the countries receiving migrants or to their countries of origin. The presence and the number of migrating persons vary to a significant degree. If an extended crisis can deflate migration, an economic boom cand support such pehonemom. We can see migrants in the most varied scenarios. They leave footprints everywhere: an the bus terminals, on the ships crossing from the South to the North of the Mediterranean Sea – by means of improvised networks – in the hallways of the police departments, in hospitals, schools, tribunals and, lastly, at work.

Making the most of the sensational and in search of audience, mass media does not miss the opportunity to analyse migration whenever they get the chance. But what it is that makes this phenomenon to be so stricking? What makes these persons different from the rest of the people? Is there a certain acceptable behaviour in the case of migrants?

Some migrants have a skin color which is a little different and speak a language completely unknown to locals. Others wear clothes and eat food never seen before, and listen to music somewhat strange to the ears of the locals. Most of the time, migrants have a different religion, and, should they belong to the same denomination, they have strikingly different liturgical traditions and they express themselves differently. Poeple say about them that they speak a lot and loud, and even that they have a specific body odor.

Finally, summarizing the experiences in the name of civilization and progress of the 20th century, I. Sarbu, Romanian philosopher and writer, states in his work, *Adio Europa*: "Not every change means transformation, not every transformation means development, not every development means progress; not every progress leads to civilization, not every

civilization means kindness. And not even all kindness is always right, nor any justice is always democratic or of value: values, too, may not lead to kindness, light, salvation."[1]

Next, we will analyze the manner in which waiving the *identity* of the common heritage in the name of principles specific to postmodernism influenced the relations between the people in destination countries and the migrant flows. Considering that, in the specialty literature, the influence of cultural and religious phenomena on migration interferes in some areas; we will not address this issue now, but in the relevant subsections. Furthermore, we will also present the manner in which the above phenomena prevent or promote the assimilation of migrants, as well as their role in the public policies on integration.

1. Culture, Religion, Identity

2.1 Culture

The identity of a group or a nation is connected to its own culture. Culture includes a number of models, of behavioral norms transmitted within society, expressions of art and mythology, beliefs and other forms of thought and human activity. Culture can bring people together and it can separate them, as we will see in the following two examples.

The first example is provided by A. Bloom, taken from the American culture, preceding the Cultural Revolution of the second half of the 20th century.

"Practically speaking, in the U.S., the Bible was the only common culture that brought together the simple and the educated, the poor and the rich, the young and the old, and – as a real model for a vision of all things, and as a the key to the whole art of the Western world, along with other great works that, in one way or another, are a replica of the Bible – provided access to serious reading. Gradually, its disappearance leads to the disappearance of the very idea of such a comprehensive book, and the possibility and need for explanations about how to understand the world. Fathers and mothers lost sight of the fact that the highest aspiration that could have for their children was for them to be wise, similarly to priests, prophets and philosophers. Competence and success is everything they can imagine. Contrary to popular belief, lack of education implies the loss of the idea of an order of things as a whole. Nowadays, parents no longer enjoy the moral and legal authority that they had in the Old World. They lack self-confidence, as educators of their children, the belief that children will be better than their parents not only with respect to wealth, but also to their intellectual, moral and physical abilities. There is always a belief more or less open to progress, thus leading to considering the past more modest and looked at in a patronizing manner. Future cannot be predicted by parents; it overshadows the past that they perceive as inferior."[2]

The second example, specific to European culture, is presented by Andrei Pleşu and it represents the status of the Romanian society at the end of the communist regime. Andrei Pleşu presents the intellectual as manager of the cultural phenomenon. In communist Romania, as well as in the rest of Europe, intellectuals have an ingrate position as they serve the state. Their assessment and appreciation do not constitute a transparent process on the cultural product market; they are compensated and appreciated by a surplus of ministers of culture.

[1] Sârbu, I. D., *Adio Europa*, Ed. Corint, Bucharest, 2005.
[2] Bloom, A., *The closing of the American mind*, Ed. *Simon 6 Schuster Inc.*, New York, p. 55.

"How can one be a man of culture today? Obviously, the question is the result of a latent dissatisfaction, of the feeling that it is hard, and sometimes impossible, to be a man of culture; specifically, once cannot extract sufficient power, enough doctrine from cultural values, so as to face in a respectable manner the current life situations, not to mention extreme situations. Probably just like you, I have noticed two things over time: first, it happens that, in extreme situations, culture does not help: you are having a hard time and you find that nothing that you read can provide you some support, that your readings are pure literature, a shelf full of books without any existential efficency: you can not rely on any author. You feel the need of another resort to support you; you feel the need to take from another field even the energy to keep doing culture. There is, therefore, a precariousness of culture when it comes to extreme situations."[3]

To a certain extent, the phenomenon can be accounted for by the fact that cultural information is only shared by a minority, a minority that has nothing to do with the actual life. Intellectuals' life is characterized by the frustration of the French education system, which, according to Gustave Le Bon's *Psihologia multimilor*, focuses on general knowledge. Compared to the situation described by Alan Bloom on the role of the Bible as a cultural vehicle and liant, European civilization encouraged a segregationist and elitist system which separates the intellectuals from the half-intellectuals, thereby causing frustration for some and resentment for others. The situation was fully used during the communist regime, in order to control and isolate the two categories.

2.2 Religion

Religion is considered from the perspective of an always closer relationship to the cultural phenomenon. Similar to philosophy, religion provides an answer to human's quests, to the questions about the order of things in the world, the phenomena which are difficult to explain, the origin of the universe. However, while philosophy resorts to the human intellect, religion has a revelatory character. According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church,[4] God, in his love, revealed himself and offered himself to man. Thus, he provided a comprehensive and final answer to man's questions on its existence and on the meaning and purpose of life. The Catechism states that all religions present man's essential search for God.

Church, an institution introduced with Pentecost, reserves the universal mission of spreading the Gospel (the good news). Thus, we witness the so-called "multicultural phenomenon", as the Apostles, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, address the crowds in their languages. As an institution with a dual nature, *i.e.*, divine and human at the same time, the Church has been and is constantly subject to cultural pressures and, at the same time, it has had and still has a strong influence on culture. Taking possession of and passing on the legacy of the Greek and Roman culture in the early second millennium, the Church founded the higher education system. Since the Middle Ages, its contribution was significant also when it comes to primary education, by the organization of parish schools. Following the Second Vatican Council, the pressure caused by the evolution of society determined the Church to thoroughly look into this phenomenon and to adopt significant new measures with respect to liturgy. One of these measures concerns the celebration of the liturgy in vernacular.

[3] Pleşu, A., *Minima moralia*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucharest, 1994.
[4] *See Catehismul Bisericii Catolice*, Ed. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993.

Generally speaking, religious world is subject to remarkable cultural pressures coming from the secular world. The latter enjoys financial resources and the resources of the media, as well as the contribution of the academic world and of the political class. We also need to mention the pressure coming from religious organizations close to proselytism, especially in Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico). Other pressures also come and State. For example, in U.S., the public health insurance law adopted in 2010 (ACA - *Affordable Care Act* or *Obama Care*) requires employers with a confessional nature (universities, hospitals, NGOs, etc.) to support the expenses of their female employees for "reproductive health" (abortion pills, birth control pills).

Furthermore, cultural pressures also come from the so-called sexual minorities, feminist movements, families formed of remarried persons and of persons living in free parnership (common-law marriage). All these suggest new forms, such as acceptance by the church of abortion, ordination of women, granting Holy Communion to divorced persons, couples living together outside of marriage. These trends of acceptance or rejection of the "new" – which are the result of the cultural trends that dominate and influence the society – are carefully monitored and are speculated in the media; they divide the church leaders in "conservatives" or "liberal", according to their orientation.

Migrating persons are more exposed to cultural pressures caused by the phenomenon of secularization, and consequently, to a more reduced practice of religion in the destination countries. This is why the church leaders pay much attention to migration, establishing a pastoral function for this phenomenon.

2. Culture in the Process of Migration

Cultural phenomena have a decisive role in shaping public life. Events with high emotional impact, induced by facts and intensified by media, can influence economic and political decisions. Therefore, decisionmakers in pluralist countries take into account these phenomena. Migration process is influenced by the public, the latter acting in a volatile manner and not always according to reality. Conflicts in relation to migration are often at cultural level and are the result of the opposition of different identities. This leads to the tendency of preserving national identity which, as Herder said, lies in traditional culture.[5]

National identity is, as Francis Fukuyama, political scientist, stated, a social concept;[6] it revolves around its own symbols, national history, collective myths, national heroes, and the theme on history accepted by the public. This type of religion, a secular religion in which God plays a more or less important role depending on the country we are referring to, provided support in preserving the national identity, and even won battles in wars. Romanian states also managed throughout history to preserve what is most valuable and to assimilate migration flows, using this identity as cultural shield.

These national values need to become fully familiar to new citizens. To this end, Francis Fukuyama states: "In some countries, especially in Germany, the history of the 20th century made it difficult to talk about national history, and this dialogue has to be readdressed

[5] Herder, G. Johann, *Idei cu privire la istoria omenirii*. Retrieved from https://ro.scribd.com/doc/32022748/Johann-Gottfried-von-Herder-Idei-cu-privire-la-istoria-omenirii#force_seo, 30.11.2014, ora 5.30 PM.

[6] Fukuyama, F., *Identity and migration*. Retrieved from *http://tria.fcampalans.cat/images/onidentity.pdf*, 19.11.2014, ora 11.52 AM.

in light of the new diversity in Europe. If local people do not value their country enough, then European countries will have difficulties in asking newcomers to value them."[7]

When they reached decline, the great empires erected earth walls over distances of thousands of kilometers to protect themselves from invasion. Nowadays, because of the migration phenomenon, many believe that identity is the last resort against new invasions.

The same political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, said that the countries of Europe and North America tend to have a weak identity. Many boast their own pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity. Yet, national identity managed to survive these processes. It is worth noticing that national identity is very different in the two continents, being stronger in North America than in Europe. According to this political scientist, this accounts for the difficulties that Muslims face in adjusting in countries such as the Netherlands, France, Germany or England.

3.1 Identity and Relativity

Immigration is closely linked to identity. This relationship needs to be addressed in the context of postmodernism and the growth of relativism. The influence of these two contexts – starting from the academic world towards the public – makes it almost impossible to support a speech based on positive values and own traditions. Thus, for example, is quite difficult to impose these values to migrants as a condition for the granting of citizenship. Those promoting multiculturalism argue that they have already gone beyond identities based on religion and nation, being already at a higher level.

Denial of identities based on religion or other values, identities so far recognized, inevitably leads to the Samuel Huntington's question: "Who are we?"[8] In the absence of common values, we must find and apply other values in order to work and ensure order in another system of reference. If this is not done, the authors of the new doctrine promoted by multiculturalism will be overwhelmed by people who will wander in search of an identity.

3.2 Assimilation vs. Non-assimilation, Cultural Separation

The interaction between migrants and the indigenous population may lead to assimilation or non-assimilation (separation). The concept of "assimilation" does not refer to "integration", which means creating a state of social equality for a group different from the majority population, reflecting the size of the group in the total population of the country or area.[9] Assimilation occurs when a dominant group imposes its culture to the subordinate groups in such an efficient manner that the latter no longer differs from the dominant culture.[10] The conflict between assimilation and non-assimilation depends on a large number of factors, such as the choice of the place of migration, the reaction of the local people, the relationships created at work, the size of the group of migrants, migrants' political culture, the relationships with the persons who remained at home, and, not least, the status of the economy in the destination country.

[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Huntington, S., *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, Ed. Antet, Bucharest, 2007.
[9] Johnson, A. G., *Dicționarul Blackwell de sociologie*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucharest, 2007, p. 304- 305.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 88- 89.

With respect to migrants' salaries, studies on minorities conducted by Francine Blau and Lawrence Blau[11] show that their salaries are lower than those of the majority of the locals. This may be partially explained by the failed efforts of these minorities (migrants) to be assimilated by the indigenous majority. This failure can be motivated by a desire to maintain a separate cultural background or identity, which would thus be reduced if the migrant group were assimilated. Lack of desire for assimilation can lead to adjustment costs, such as risk of not speaking the language, gaps in the labor market regulations and difficulties in communicating at work.

Another important element is the degree of acceptance by the majority. One of the factors that lead to tension is of economic nature; it is well known that the presence of migrants causes negative effects on the labor market, by reduction of salaries or increase of unemployment.

The studies conducted by Gil Epstein and Ira Gang[12] found that networks play an important role in overcoming obstacles to adjustment and assimilation (costs related to information, risks), by strenghtening confidence and regulating international mediation contracts. In particular, the necessity for these networks is felt when specific assimination is not pursued. It is often acknowledged that the trend of assimilation is counterbalanced by a certain resistance from the indigenous population, in order to prevent this process of assimilation.

Another cultural phenomenon connected to migration is – according to the same studies mentioned above – the dangers to the family structure in the destination country, following interaction with local economic factors and the new culture. This has strong consequenceson the identity and assimilation of migrants. This phenomenon can be observed, for example, in the Muslim families coming from Asia, the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan families) who changed the family structure and the way of life along a generation. It was noticed that there is a break between generations in terms of housing (according to the Western model), by the phenomenon of separation of parents from adult children. Other characteristic changes were added to this process, such as the cessation of religious practices and the declining birth rates. The phenomenon can also be noticed in the Latin Amercian minority of the U.S., who adopted both the break with the family structure and the adoption of a system based on cohabitation outside the family (common-law marriage), as well as the single parent families, the local religious practice and the adoption of other denomination.[13]

Regarding the assimilation vs. non-assimiation binomial, it was noticed that there is a phenomenon leading to cultural separation and cultural enclaves. We have the example of Turkish migrants in Germany, who use only information obtained through their own media channels, in their native language. This was facilitated by the emergence of satellite channels and cable television.[14] Cultural policies having a precedent in other European bilingual or multilingual areas (Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain) led to the funding of bilingual

[11] Blau, D. F. & Lawrence M., Gender Differences in Pay. Retrieved from http://econ2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/blau_wages.pdf, 26.11.2014, 11.58 AM.
[12] Epstein, S. G., Gang, N. Ira, *Migration and Culture*. Retrieved from http://ftp.iza.org/dp5123.pdf, 19.11.2014, 10.06 AM.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*

television channels in Turkish and German, and to the promotion of television and film companies in both languages. The same situation was reported in the U.S., where a strong Hispanic minority is present.

3. Religion in the Process of Migration

Migration also has another important component relating to human identity: the religious feeling. The global nature of migration brings together people from the most varied nations and languages and who are also members of different religions. We will address here the Christian religion. Regardless of religion, religious feeling can act one way or the other, depending on the willingness to migrate and on the context. Migration from one place to another implies, in fact, the relocation of a spiritual microcosmos, together with the person or group it belongs to. From this perspective, one can speak of a church and a community that are both in movement and transnational.

Transnational Religion and the Diaspora

The transnational nature of religion refers to the presence the same religions beyond national borders. It can be said that the first transnational organization from chronological perspective is the Catholic Church. The centralized management and unique doctrine of this Church allowed dissemination of a single message and a uniform religious service. At various times in history, messengers of this dissemination were especially the members of religious orders such as the Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Franciscans and the Jesuits. On the other hand, as noted by Susanne Rudolph,[15] Islam was disseminated through networks of mystic people, Sufi Orders and Sufi individuals who spread their faith according to their inner vision.

Modern migration and globalization generate new cultural connections. At the beginning of the 20th century, the local churches in Europe, many believers of which migrated, were heavily involved in supporting such phenomena. Being concerned of the danger of proselytism, such churches contributed with financial resources and missionary priests in view of establishing new ethnic churches. For example, the Italian bishops cooperated to support and help migrants.[16] Another example is the example of the Irish migrants settled in New England, Boston and other cities where, unlike their predecessors, they did not have to create a new national environment in a foreign territory, but they rather adjusted to the new environment. Irish priests were sent there, supported by the Archdiocese of Boston, the Irish Church and the Irish Government. Their mission was to help migrants to settle in the U.S. and to preserve their connections with Ireland. It is known that within the church, they provided catechism lessons in view of marriage, as well as lessons for the management of mortgages in Boston and Ireland, and other activities for the support of migrants.[17]

As mentioned above, the Catholic Church acts as a transnational religious structure. Starting with the mid-19th century and up to the present day, the Church got involved "by sending religious people, by missionary campaigns, by management of own schools, by

[15] Rudolph, H. S., *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Ed. Westview Press, 1996.

[16] Text adapted after Levitt, P., *Between God, ethnicity and country. An approach to the study of transnational religion.* Retrieved from http:/ /www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/Levitt.pdf, 21.11.2014, ora 13.15.

[17] *Ibid.*

erection of sanctuaries for pilgrimage, by organization of international meetings, thus creating a wide international network."[18]

The transnational character is ensured by networks. From economic perspective, it relies of the exchange of goods and services, whereas from religious perspective it contributes to the transformation of identity through language and ritual service.

Religion manifested at transnational level also includes popular religious practices in a more or less institutionalized manner. These practices have a national dimension; they carry a specific national atmosphere and relate to traditions specific to certain liturgical periods of time (Christmas, Easter, celebrations influenced by traditional practices). Starting with the Second Vatican Council which introduced the use of the national languages in the liturgy, the Catholic Church promoted expression of preferences for local music and religious elements, thus encouraging the active participation of the believers in the liturgy and in the religious service. It was noted that the practice of own religious traditions has cultural influences on the country of destination, whereas the religious and cultural elements in the host country have a rather significant influence on migrants.

4. Conclusions

The migration process includes in its structure an economic dimension, a social dimension, and cultural and religious dimension. It points out several processes that are found in different geographical areas, at smaller or greater distances. The study of migration involves the separation of economic, social, cultural and religious phenomena, and the analysis of the same in a dynamic context, specific to the forces that activate it, as well as from the perspective of the causes and of the effects it is influenced by. The complex reality presented above shows that migration is a process with a strong social character, involving great masses of migrants. In this context, generally, the reality presented by the statistics show that, form professional perspective, migrants have an average level of training. The situation differs significantly for different ethnic groups. Migrants from the developed North generally have a lower level of education; the jobs they provide are usually rejected by the indigenous labor force. This type of work has created a migration model based on networks. This provides a real social capital, which we addressed above. They are also a cultural and religious microcosmos ensuring psychological comfort to migrants. This is true for migrant groups and certain stages of migration. The importance of cultural and religious element is paramount in the migration process. The religious element may stimulate integration or can hold back until cancellation. This is why the compatibility between the two cultures, that of the departure area and that of the adoption/arrival area, is important. Compatibility between complementary cultures or geographically close cultures can be easier to achieve, being more difficult, or almost impossible, in case of divergent cultures and antagonistic religions.

The cultural and religious element pertains to the individual identity and to the group identity. The cultural phenomenon that has dominated the debate in the recent decades is related to multiculturalism, diversity, positive discrimination, characteristics also expressed in public policies, on the basis of a massive secularization of society. This complex phenomenon

[18] Casanova, J., *Public religions in the modern world*, Ed. University of Chicago Press, 1994.

led to a weakening of the identity at individual level in the destination countries. Thus, the relevant societies become unable or do not wish to impose a model for the assimilation of the external element.

As stated, religious practices may become an impediment for migration or for the adjustment in the host society. In the country of origin, abandonment of connections and of the relationships created means giving up the investment of capital that can not be transferred. On the other hand, contact with a strongly-secularised society, as is the case of those in the Western part of Europe, becomes a burden for those used to practice their religion. This is manifested in public cultural space (media, entertainment), but also at work, in the relationships with colleagues.

At the same time, the cultural factor specific to the home community may or may not encourage integration. Knowledge of the language spoken in the host community is a gateway granting access to information on the labor market, facilitates relationships and communication with colleagues, employers, authorities and service providers.

On the other hand, enclavisation as a cultural phenomenon, developed on the migrant network infrastructure, replaces some of these inconveniences, but renders migrants vulnerable and dependent in front of the decisions taken without their consent.

In conclusion, it can be stated that, in the management of individual and group migration, as well as within the public policies, the cultural and religious element is just as important as the economic element. The redefinition of identity is a dynamic process, sometimes following a tortuous or traumatic path, but it is one of the risks accepted by those who embark on this journey.

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MONITORING OF AIR QUALITY IN GALATI COUNTY

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Abstarct: Although air pollution sources can be both natural and artificial, our focus is especially on the artificial sources, due to the fact that we can intervene more easily by identifing, monitoring and taking legislative, administrative and social measures, to reduce any negative impact on the health of the population. The main sources of air pollution are generally combustion processes in fixed installations, transport and various industrial processes.
Keywords: ***air, pollution, monitotring.***

1.Introducere

Atmosfera constituie mediul de viaţă pe Terra, calitatea vieţii fiind direct dependentă de calitatea aerului. În atmosferă aerul ocupă circa 96% din volum, restul de 4% fiind ocupat de vaporii de apă. Aerul atmosferic, alături de alte componente ale mediului ambiant, are o însemnătate vitală pentru natură. Aerul este un amestec de azot (78%) şi oxigen (21%) necesar activităţii organismelor aerobe, inclusiv oamenilor. Acest amestec conţine şi o cantitate neînsemnată de alte gaze: neon, argon, heliu, cripton, xenon, radon, bioxid de carbon, hidrogen, vapori de apă şi alte particule, care practic nu au nici o influenţă asupra organismelor vii.

Învelişului gazos alcătuit din aer, care înconjoară pământul, nu i se poate stabili o limită superioară precisă, stratul de aer din jurul planetei noastre trecând treptat în spaţiul interplanetar (extraatmosferic). Acționând ca o pătură protectoare (care ecranează razele dăunătoare ale soarelui), atmosfera menține o temperatură propice vieții pe pământ. Totodată, ea acționează ca un depozit pentru diverse gaze și particule care – localizându-se în diferitele ei straturi – influențează clima (și regimul precipitațiilor). [1]

Chiar dacă sursele de poluare a aerului pot fi atât naturale cât şi artificiale, ne putem focaliza în special asupra celor artificiale, unde putem interveni mai uşor, prin identificarea lor, monitorizare şi luarea unor măsuri legislative, administrative şi sociale, astfel încât să putem diminua un eventual impact negativ asupra sănătăţii populaţiei care poate deveni receptor. Principalele surse de poluare a aerului sunt în general procesele de combustie ininstalaţii fixe, transporturile şi procesele industriale diverse.

În funcţie de acţiunea lor asupra organismului poluanţii atmosferici pot fi clasificaţi în: iritanţi, fibrozanţi, toxicisistemici, asfixianţi, alergizanţi şi cancerigeni. Acţiunea acestora asupra organismului se traduce în efecte acute şi cronice care pot fi cuantificate prin modificarea unor indicatori specifici (mortalitate, morbiditate etc.).

În cazul poluanţilor atmosferici primul afectat este sistemul respirator, iar populaţia cea mai vulnerabilă face parte din categoria populaţiei infantile, apoi a grupei de vârstă >65 ani. [37]

Sursele de poluare reprezintă locul de producere şi de evacuare în mediul înconjurător a unor emisii poluante.

Principalii compuşi poluanți ai atmosferei:

- Compuşii organici volatili: benzina, eterii de petrol, benzen, acetonă, cloroform, esteri, fenoli, sulfura de carbon etc.) rezultă din prelucrarea țițeiului şi a produselor petroliere, din composturile menajere, agricole sau industriale şi din emisiile vehiculelor care folosesc motoare cu explozie.

- Oxizii de carbon:

- monoxidul de carbon: provine din surse naturale: erupții vulcanice, incendii, descărcări electrice şi fermentațiile anaerobe sau artificiale: arderea combustibililor fosili şi arderile incomplete ale carburanților în motoarele cu explozie. Efecte: afecțiuni cerebrale, dereglări de sarcină, malformații sau chiar decesul. Cele mai mari valori medii zilnice admise sunt de 2 mg/m^3.

- dioxidul de carbon: este principalul gaz care determină „efectul de seră". Rezultă din procese de combustie 79%, respirația plantelor 17,8 %, surse industriale 3%, alte procese naturale 0,2 %. Cantitatea totală de CO_2 din atmosferă a crescut de la 1,29 ppm în perioada 1965-1985, la 1,5 ppm între 1985 şi1995. Efecte: devine toxic pentru om în concentrații de peste 2–3 % şi nociv la concentrații de peste 25-30 %.

- Compuşii sulfului:

- dioxidul de sulf provine din arderea combustibililor fosili şi unele procese metalurgice. Efecte: >1,0 ppm, moartea tuturor plantelor, iar la om provoacă iritații ale aparatului respirator; în concentrații de 4-5 mg/m^3, intoxicații şi decese la mamifere şi om. În prezența vaporilor de apă formează acidul sulfuric determinând ploile acide.

-acidul sulfhidric (hidrogen sulfurat) provine din surse naturale şi artificiale (în special din industria petrolieră, petrochimică, etc). Efecte: acțiune toxică asupra omului şi animalelor.

- Compuşii azotului :

- oxizii de azot, cel mai cunoscut este NO_2, care provine din arderea combustibililor fosili şi emisiile motoarelor cu explozie. Contribuie la formarea smogului. Smogul este un amestec de ceață solidă sau lichidă şi particule solide rezultate din poluarea industrială, în special oxizi de azot şi compuşii organici volatili. Acest amestec se formează când umiditatea este crescută, iar condițiile atmosferice nu împrăştie emanațiile poluante, ci din contră, permit acumularea lor lângă surse. Smogul reduce vizibilitatea naturală şi adesea irită ochii şi căile respiratorii.

- peroxi-aceti-nitrații (PAN) - se formează sub influența radiației solare şi accelerează procesul de formare a ozonului în troposferă.

- Derivații halogenilor rezultă din activitățile industriale.

- clorul: rezultă din electroliza clorurilor alcaline, lichefierea clorului, producția de celuloză, hârtie şi solvenți organici şi a pesticidelor organoclorurate. Efecte: > 15-20 ppm, disfuncții ale aparatului respirator şi iritații severe ale mucoasei globului ocular, etc.

- fluorul este folosit în industria aluminiului. Efecte: produce necrozefoliare, defoliere, iar în concentrații de 60-100 ppb, moartea plantelor. [2]

Substanțele poluante nu rămân la locurile unde sunt produse, ci, prin intermediul unor factori, sunt deplasate pe distanțe mai scurte sau mai lungi. Aflate în concentrație mare la sursa emitentă, pe măsură ce se depărtează se împrăştie şi datorită unor fenomene fizice sau chimice, în anumite zone sau regiuni ele cad pe pământ sau se descompun. Principalii factori

meteorologici care contribuie la mişcarea poluanţilor în atmosferă sunt: temperatura, umiditatea, vântul, turbulenţa şi fenomenele meteorologice.

Emiterea în atmosferă a poluanţilor artificiali se poate face prin două moduri:
organizat, prin canale şi guri de evacuare cu debite şi concentraţii de impurităţi cunoscute şi calculate;
neorganizat, prin emiterea poluanţilor direct în atmosferă discontinuu şi în cantităţi puţin sau chiar deloc cunoscute.

Viteza de dispersie depinde de:

1) caracteristicile fizice ale sursei (viteza şi temperatura gazelor, înălţimea coşului de emisie şi diametrul acestuia, caracterul stabil sau mobil al sursei, durata de emisie);

2) caracteristicile chimice ale emisiei (concentraţia poluantului şi nivelul de toxicitate);

3) factori naturali: parametrii meteorologici (viteza şi durata vântului, umezeala aerului, precipitaţiile atmosferice, presiunea aerului), relief (culoare de vale, zone depresionare, barierele orografice) şi de prezenţa unor suprafeţe împădurite capabile să reţină particule şi să neutralizeze unele gaze. [5]

2. Aparatura folosita

Figura 1: Laborator mobil pentru determinarea poluanților din aer

Laboratorul mobil pentru determinarea poluanţilor atmosferici cuprinde [3]:

1) Analizor de dioxid de sulf (SO_2) şi hidrogen sulfurat (H_2S)

Principiul metodei – fluorescenţă UV;
Îndeplinirea normei ISO 10498;
Limita de detecţie: 1 ppb.

2) Analizor de oxizi de azot (NO, NO_2, NO_x) şi amoniac (NH_3)

Principiul metodei – chemoluminiscenţa;
Îndeplinirea normei ISO 7996;
Limita de detecţie: 0,4 ppb NO_2.

3) Analizor de monoxid de carbon (CO)

Principiul metodei – IR GFC;
Îndeplinirea normei ISO 4224;
Limita de detecţie: 50 ppb.

4) Analizor de ozon (O_3)

Principiul metodei – fotometrie UV;
Îndeplinirea normei ISO 13964;
Limita de detecţie: 0,4 ppb.

5) Analizor de VOC(benzen; toluen; etil-benzen; o,m,p-xilen; stiren)

Principiul metodei – PID(cromatografie de gaze);
Îndeplinirea normei ISO;
Limita de detecţie : 0,25 µg/ m^3 ciclu de 30 min.

6) Captator de particule PM10, PM2,5 şi TSP

Principiul metodei – filtrare;
Îndeplinirea normei ISO;
Limita de detecţie : 0,0001g.

7) Staţia meteorologică care determina:

-Viteza vântului - tip generator de impulsuri;
-Direcţia vântului - tip potenţiometru;
-Temperatura - pentru domeniul -40/+85°C;
-Umiditate relativă - tip element capacitiv;
-Radiaţie solară - tip celulă de siliciu;
-Presiune atmosferică - tip diafragmă capacitivă;
Precipitaţii – colectare automată.

8) Sistem de achiziţionare şi prelucrare digitală a datelor, grup electrogen, echipament de prelevare probe.

9) CFD-FLUENT pentru dinamica fluidelor, transfer de masă şi căldură. [4]

3. Monitorizarea calitatii aerului in Galaţi

Autolaboratorul a fost amplasat pe strada George Coşbuc din Municipiul Galati .

Temperatura medie anuală, calculată pe o perioadă de 70 de ani, este de 10 ^{0}C. Temperatura medie în timpul verii este de 21,3 ^{0}C. În timpul iernii, deasupra judeţului Galaţi vin din nord şi nord-est mase de aer rece care produc scăderi de temperatură care oscilează între 0,2 ^{0}C -3 ^{0}C. Temperatura medie lunară este mai scăzută în ianuarie când are valori de -3 ^{0}C -4 ^{0}C. Temperatura medie a lunii iulie este de 21,7 ^{0}C. În timpul anului sunt cca. 210 zile cu temperaturi de peste 10 ^{0}C. Repartiţia anuală a precipitaţiilor este neuniformă, cele mai mari cantităţi de apă cad în anotimpul de vară, sub formă de averse. Vântul predominant este Crivăţul, care reprezintă 29% din frecvenţa anuală a vânturilor. Al doilea vânt predominant este cel din sud, cu o frecvenţă de 16%. Valorile afisate in tabelul 1 sunt valori instantanee masurate la interval de 5 minute. Medierile la fiecare 5 minute şi medierile orare sunt in concordanta cu legislaţia in vigoare menţionata anterior. (luna noiembrie 2014)

Tabelul 1

SO_2 ppb	HS_2 ppb	NO ppb	NO_X ppb	NO_2 ppb	NY ppb	NH_3 ppb	CO ppm	O_3 ppb
0	0	0	66.82554	75.05507	0	0	3.881248	69.87213
0	0	0	71.65968	79.32235	0	0	3.244749	0
0	0	0	78.7079	85.3107	0	0	2.52247	0

				5			8	
0	0	0	84.9649 7	89.6868 1	0	0	1.30635 1	0
0	0	0	84.9649 7	89.6868 1	0	0	1.30635 1	12.8061
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.00587 5	67.6066 4
0	0	0	66.8255 4	75.0550 7	0	0	3.88124 8	69.8721 3
0	0	0	71.6596 8	79.3223 5	0	0	3.24474 9	0
0	0	0	80.8981 8	82.5004	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	80.8981 8	82.5004	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	75.7239 4	77.5852 7	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	70.0777 8	71.7498	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	65.7813 1	67.5372 8	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	65.7813 1	67.5372 8	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	45.5614	49.4593 7	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	52.1706 9	55.6888 3	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	62.0183 1	65.1061 6	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	68.2775 3	70.9341 2	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	68.2775 3	70.9341 2	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	45.5614	49.4593 7	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	37.6934 4	39.7044 9	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	33.8102 3	36.2414 2	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	31.7408 2	34.2531 5	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	31.7408 2	34.2531 5	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	29.6889 5	32.3944 5	0	314.195 2	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	29.8127 3	32.8223 2	6.62991 5	0	0	25.0305 3
0	0	0	28.6198 7	31.6620 1	6.96362 2	0	0	25.1778 9
0	0	0	27.0138 6	30.1700 3	7.35314 8	181.032 4	0	25.2630 1
0	0	0	26.4762 6	29.8504 6	7.60765 9	187.298 4	0	25.2630 1
0	0	0	26.4762 6	29.8504 6	7.60765 9	187.298 4	0	25.4201 5
0	0	0	25.8174 8	29.2692 5	7.83280 9	221.072 8	0	25.5563 1
0	0	0	25.0681 9	28.6083 7	8.05870 1	227.448 3	0	25.4753 3
0	0	0	24.5617 9	28.2554 6	8.27284 4	233.492 3	0	25.4753 3
0	0	0	24.5617 9	28.2554 6	8.27284 4	233.492 3	0	25.3128 6
0	0	0	23.8792 7	27.7406 1	8.46660 3	238.960 9	0	24.6110 5
0	0	0	23.0824 6	27.0063 4	8.80252 6	0.01239 79	0	23.2662
157.294 3	8.54918 8	0	22.8309	26.2144 6	7.76095 4	191.072 5	0	18.0673
159.578 8	8.54918 8	0	23.5048 9	26.4529 5	7.61699 2	187.528 2	0	18.0673
160.484 6	8.54918 8	0	23.5048 9	26.4529 5	7.61699 2	187.528 2	0	18.0892 3
160.484 6	8.54918 8	0	24.6304 8	27.0945 6	7.19800 4	177.212 8	0	18.0898 5
157.772 8	8.54918 8	0	28.9185 1	31.2022 5	5.89869 4	0	0	18.1295 1
162.452 9	8.54918 8	0	29.9839 8	32.1909 8	5.82654 4	0	0	18.1295 1
164.938 1	8.54918 8	0	29.9839 8	32.1909 8	5.82654 4	0	0	18.2322 2
164.938 1	8.54918 8	0	29.9556 2	32.2432 7	5.97709 6	0	0	18.2751 7
166.265	8.54918 8	0	28.7558 6	31.1321 7	6.36216 6	0	0	18.2707
166.265	8.54918 8	0	27.6743 1	30.2185 9	6.64346 9	0	0	18.2707
166.265	8.54918 8	0	27.6743 1	30.2185 9	6.64346 9	0	0	18.3194 7
166.265	8.54918 8	0	27.6760 4	30.5199	6.60190 9	0	0	18.4427 2
166.265	9.59103	0	26.7245	29.8009	6.91582	0	0	18.5198

	6			6	8			1
166.265	11.0292	0	26.73306	30.01917	6.814764	0	0	18.51981
157.2943	8.549188	0	22.8309	26.21446	7.760954	191.0725	0	18.0673
249.0558	27.45938	0	22.3173	26.33198	3.970125	157.8712	0	25.89431
248.6219	27.45938	0	22.49841	26.53223	3.913173	155.6065	0	25.89431
248.6219	27.45938	0	22.49841	26.53223	3.913173	155.6065	0	25.81328
248.6219	27.45938	0	22.04842	26.04347	3.998634	159.0048	0	25.76498
248.6219	27.45938	0	21.5779	25.72088	4.048025	160.9689	0	25.8056
248.6219	28.21732	0	21.97116	26.10841	3.84668	152.9624	0	25.8056
248.6219	29.04672	0	21.97116	26.10841	3.84668	152.9624	0	25.71166
248.6219	29.04672	0	22.54546	26.41894	3.786551	150.5714	0	25.56502
249.0558	27.45938	0	22.3173	26.33198	3.970125	157.8712	0	25.89431
248.6219	27.45938	0	22.49841	26.53223	3.913173	155.6065	0	25.89431
320.9869	46.6026	0	28.18047	30.76849	0	0	0	27.07512
320.9869	46.88316	0	28.18047	30.76849	0	0	0	26.93287
320.9869	46.88316	0	30.13527	32.72542	0	0	0	26.81459

4. Concluzii

Valorile înregistrate la dioxid de sulf (SO_2) s-au situat sub limitele pentru protecţia sănătăţii umane (0.125 mg/m^3) conform Ordinului MAPM nr. 592/2002 – pentru aprobarea Normativului privind stabilirea valorilor limită, a valorilor de pragşi a criteriilor şi metodelor de evaluare a dioxidului de sulf, dioxidului de azot şi oxizilor de azot, monoxidului de carbon şi ozonului în aerul înconjurător. [6]

La indicatorul dioxid de azot (NO_2) concentraţiile în toate punctele de monitorizare s-au situat sub concentraţia maxima admisă prin STAS 12574/1987 privind calitatea aerului din zonele protejate (0.1 mg/m^3).

Valorile concentraţiilor pentru indicatorul amoniac (NH_3), măsurate în punctele de monitorizare a calităţiia erului, s-au încadrat în limitele prevăzute de STAS 12574/1987, variaţiile medii lunare incadrandu-se in intervalul de eroare statistica.
In conformitate cu Legea nr. 104 din 15 iuie 2011 niciunul dintre factorii poluatori nu a atins nivelul critic pentru protectia vegetatiei si a valorilor limita pentru protectia sanatatii umane.

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ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN ROLES AND LOCATION OF OPERA HOUSES AND THEIR FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS: THE NATIONAL OPERA OF BUCHAREST AND WIENER STAATSOPER

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Abstract: My paper sets out to examine two major European opera houses, the Bucharest National Opera and Wiener Staatsoper, from the viewpoint of their architectural design roles and locations. The inspired location and design features of the two lyrical theatres are apt to ellucidate several financing and cultural management issues that both institutions are currently undergoing all the while trying to maximize on their outreach and cultural productions.

Keywords*: opera house, architecture, location, design, costs*

Very few attempts have so far been made at explaining present cultural management issues from the viewpoint of traditionally established locations and architectures of opera houses. In what follows, two major European opera houses, the Bucharest National Opera and Wiener Staatsoper, are brought together to the fore in an attempt premised on the fact that "usually things that are constructed have some sort of logical history and when this is known it is easier to take the right decisions at any one time" (Utzton 2000). Indeed, architecture, as many other concepts in the economics of an institution, remains an important factor related to the idea of saving that may turn out to be beneficial at its initial point of establishment but may however end up to be more costly in the long run, affecting the overall building maintenance budget. Likewise, part of our considerations about the architecture of the two lyrical theatres examines the inherent danger in large, "popular" buildings when they manifest the tendency to fill too may functions and rooms into those buildings (Ryding and Pechefsky 2001).

Size and reliability are the main design traits of the National Opera of Bucharest (NOB). The building looks majestic and is enhanced by the greenery that surrounds the lake. Its fairly new architecture represents the urban footprint to the communist beginnings of the 1950s. The first show staged in the new building was "The Queen of Spades" by Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky and was played on January 9, 1954. The foyer welcomes guests during performances and intervals and spans a fairly generous area, one that yet intimately allows for casual dialogues and quiet retreats. The inner elegance enhances a subtle balance arising from the simplicity of the walls and decorations of the ceilings and staircases. Of the two big halls, the Great Hall has a beauty of its own that contributes to the grandeur of the opera and ballet performances born from its womb, however the smaller performance hall is equally impressive with its rich ceiling decoration. The National Opera House of Bucharest is an emblematic construction for Romania's capital city being classified with the B-II-mA-19003 code on the historical monuments list. The National Opera's artistic-cultural activity takes place in the building located on the Mihail Kogălniceanu Boulevard nr. 70-72 (District 5) and was built between 1950 and 1952 based on the architectural plans drawn up by architect

Octav Doicescu. The emplacement allows building and outdoor performances in the green area outside the building in the Park Opera and the Opera has a total capacity of about 950 seats in the Main Hall and an estimated 200 seats in the Yellow Foyer. Beginning 2008, the upper floor Yellow Foyer and the ground floor Large Foyer have been changed into concert halls, being successfully used for Opera and Ballet Experimental Studio performances.

The building itself is made up of spaces designed for performances (stage, auditorium, foyer, storage for costumes and cabins), preparatory work and/or administration (ballet and singing rehearsal rooms, warehouses, heating section, offices, production workshops for scenery and costumes, etc). The Great Hall is built in the shape of a horseshoe and its performance stage is 30 meters high, 20 meters deep and 24 meters wide. The top floor of the building hosts the Opera Museum, whose collection includes photographs, letters, stage costumes, programs, posters and busts of great musicians and opera artists whose permanent exhibition is open to the public on the Opera second floor. The functional and architectural solutions provided by a multidisciplinary team led by Octav Doicescu illustrate not only a sober, decent, yet monumental architecture but also a sense of clear and defined volumes. With pilasters and arcades on two levels, with statues on pilasters and a moldings separation of registers profiled by a retired pediment over the main entrance, the building is flanked by sculptural compositions displaying a clear, bold theme. Instead of two smaller arches which initially rested on the three arcades, two representative bas-reliefs were placed on the facade, one depicting an opera scene (made by the sculptors Zoe and Boris Baicoianu Caragea) and the other illustrating a flight dancing scene (imagined so by the sculptor Ion Vlad). The side facades continue the lines of the volume register with rigorous rhythms and vertically grouped cavities. Other important design elements remain the ornamental architectural sculptures located in the front park of the building itself, such as the statue of the great composer George Enescu, a bronze sculpture made by Ion Jalea and the bust of Gheorghe Stefănescu (1843-1925), the founder of the Romanian Opera, as well as the 100 crystal gilded armed chandelier located in the Performance Hall.

Unfortunately, as the building meets the criteria of architectural and technological functionality of its early construction times, it needs careful and occasional restoring improvements. Statically, even if the construction is stable, in some of its areas, in the event of potential earthquake shakings, severe dislocations may occur which could jeopardize both the heritage and people's safety. Likewise, the basement is severely damaged by occasional strong water infiltrations hence one of the main problems of the building remains the high moisture level. Currently, the building still requires extensive restoration works, redevelopment and functional improvement, all of which have been slowed down and made difficult by the heritage preservation regulations in force. The National Opera is considered a heritage building therefore any intervention requires a long and cumbersome process and steps.

On the other hand, viewed from any angle, the present building of the Vienna State Opera stands out as a remarkable preservation of every single historic facade built since 1869. Its Renaissance designed facades with lateral loggia underscore at its finest the solemn and public character of the building. The two main decorative elements of the facade are two winged horses driven by the muse of poetry (Erato) and Harmony, made in 1876 by Ernst

Julius Hähnel. The renowned artist also designed the five bronze statues placed on the pedestal in the loggia arches (statues representing Heroism, Melpomene, Fantasy, Thalia and Love). Both sides of the building are marked by two old fountains by Josef Gasser, which represent two antagonistic worlds, the one on the left side bespeaks *music, dance, joy and ease,* while the other one evokes the image of *Loreley, suffering, love and hate*. The back of the building is visibly wider and includes the stage with adjacent spaces, whereas the front part of the building comprises the auditorium and the side rooms giving access to the public. Remarkable are also the distinctive room types, the French styled roofs above the corner towers and the saddle-type rooftops connecting the two bi-storey constructions. The transversal wings perpendicular to the main wing were originally used as carriage access road and in the immediate vicinity there are the flags of the monarchy. The building's inner space has been preserved largely in its original form, the main front area with a main vestibule, central staircase, foyer, loggia and tea room on the first floor retaining the historical spirit of monumental size and construction. The first segment of the staircase, located on the side of the main entrance that leads to the ground floor lodges, is marked by the founders' portraits of the Viennese opera, August Sicard von Sicardsburg and Eduard van der Null, designed as two medallions by sculptor Josef Cesar. Just above these ornamental medallions two elements are carved in relief that symbolizes the *opera ballet*. A special artistic imprint is achieved by the painting on the ceiling above the staircase that depicts *Fortuna*, a painting made by a refined artist, Franz Dobiaschovsky. Additionally, the seven allegorical statues created by Josef Gasser are representative of the seven independent art forms, architecture, sculpture, poetry, dance, music, theater and painting.

Undoubtedly, the most impressive historical highlights constitute the tea room (the former royal lounge of Franz Joseph I), located between the stairs and the middle lodge whose walls are beautifully decorated with 22 carat gold, the impressive paintings (Die Musik auf painting Adlerschwingen-by Karl Madjera), the majestic sculptures (August from Ligne), the wall decoration from the renowned Giani workshops and the exquisite tapestries with the initials of King Franz Joseph I.

The opera interval rooms surround the main staircase with a chain of about 120 square meters of rooms linked together. The *Gustav Mahler* Room, located on the right side of the staircase, is the most representative of them all and up until 1944 was the chancellery for all directors from *Dingelstedt* to *Karl Böhm*. On the 100th anniversary of *Gustav Mahler*'s debut as conductor of the Opera (11 May 1897), the room was given his name and his workroom is celebrated with his portrait made by *R.B. Kitaj*.

After the war, the Viennese Opera House was integrally reconstructed, this time with a greater number of rehearsal rooms to match existing needs, a cafeteria and more management and administration spaces. Most areas, including cloakrooms, are video monitored and technically equipped with speakers, so that permanent work communication with the stage can be maintained. During 1991-1993, the Vienna State Opera building underwent a thorough modernization process upgraded to the highest technical level by equipping the stage with hydraulically operated mobile floors, complex electro-mechanical lifts, ventilation systems, and high performing heating and fire prevention equipment. In addition to the two large *Carlos Kleiber* and *Eduard Eberhard Waechter* rehearsal halls, there are three rehearsal

rooms available for choir and orchestra ensembles, an organ hall (the State Viennese Opera boasts the unique 2,500 pipes organ in the world), a hall for ballet and ten soundproof study rooms.

In what regards the auditorium, the median lodge offers breathtaking views over the horseshoe shaped auditorium that was completely rebuilt after the war. While *Erich Boltenstern*, professor at the Faculty of Fine Arts Academy in Vienna, was commissioned to build the auditorium, the third gallery, cloakrooms and break rooms on the upper floors, architects *Otto Prossinger, Ceno Kosak* and *Felix Cevela* took over the decoration of the first floor halls, retaining the basic concepts proposed by the initial architects *Sicardsburg* and *van der Null*. Auditorium capacity is currently 2284 seats, of which 1707 are berths, 567 standing places, 4 special wheelchairs places and 4 are passenger seats. Acoustics-wide, Vienna State Opera always boasted perfect acoustics, largely resulting from a long process of solid wood surface ornamentation. Some of the upper floor seats with a partial view were equipped with reading lights, keeping the already auditorium established colours - red, gold and ivory. The chandelier is a crystal glass crown, with a total weight of 3000 kg, a number of 1,100 light bulbs, having a 7m diameter and a 5m height. The stage delimiting element is the *Iron Curtain*, made by *Rudolf Eisenmenger*, which depicts a scene from *Gluck*'s opera *Orpheus and Eurydice*. Another important moment in the architectural evolution of the Vienna State Opera was marked by the opening of a museum on the premises (Smith 2013), which reaffirms the traditional size of the building and the curatorial responsibility of the institution towards contemporary artistic creation. In 1998, the creation process of a series of large paintings was opened for the opera house (one painting per season), maximizing thematically on the artistic value and sophistication of the Iron Curtain (176 square meters). Thus, the series of iron curtain exhibitions (museum in progress, in collaboration with Vienna State Opera and Bundestheater-Holding), turned the season for a limited period of time into a very dynamic exhibition space of contemporary art that provided the illustrations for the book entitled *Die Vorhänge temporären Eisernen* (2012). The orchestra area spans 123 square meters being the place for artistic affirmation of about 110 musicians per show. Three iron curtains were built as anti-fire measures, a main one separating stage from auditorium and two more for side and rear protection of the stage. The architects' main aim since building reconstruction has been maximum security assurance therefore all wooden ceilings were replaced by steel and concrete finished ceilings. Roof tops were also replaced by terraces that serve both as evacuation passages and relaxing convenience spots during warm season performance breaks. Starting 1999, the terrace has housed a small children's theater called *Austria Mobilkom children's tent*.

Both architectural designs reviewed above display a certain equilibrium role, common to most opera houses in the world. What individualizes them, to various degrees, is not the design vs. non-design amenity characteristics and specific functional roles, but rather the managerial capacity to cover building maintenance costs and keep price-inelastic audience demands, more critical in the case of the National Opera of Bucharest. Complex engineering problems and escalating costs are as important today as they were at times when both opera houses were established, however in the case of the National Opera of Bucharest it seems that it was not the architectural planning and design that turned out to be costly in the long run,

affecting the overall building maintenance budget, but the lack of timely infrastructure investment that might have prevented the accumulation of basement water infiltration. In both cases, additional costs are incurred by the tendency to fill too many functions and rooms into the two opera house buildings but, operating on two funding models (Florea 2014) as these opera houses are, such costs are covered differently in the two countries. It remains to be seen in the distant future which of the two managerial paradigms are apt to faster and better solve the current problems (pertaining to their budgets, management, artistic performance, human resources, etc) both lyrical theatres are facing all the while trying to maximize on their outreach for larger audiences and better artistic productions.

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THE ATYPICAL STRATEGIC COORDINATION[1]

Speranța-Liliana Neagu, Councellor for European Affairs

Abstract: I propose as a research hypothesis - a different way to communicate some strategic elements at the EU level, and the setting up of new regulation regarding a new national institution in charge with ***the administration of the resources and a new EU common policy*** *- an equitable administration and revaluation of the resources in the EU, with a minimal support to the disfavoured people (considering the amount and the quality of life indicators, or the right to life and to a job).*
A strategy without flexibility is not a good strategy, especially whether it is 50 years since context and conditions have been changed; even resources have been modified, in addition to a combination of, some of them, new factors.

It is already known that the Russians and Chinese have especially prospective thinking at least 50 years.

1. Introduction

It is difficult to prioritize when making the final decision on the WTO rules, at the level of an entity, and when the national interest overlaps the requirement of the protection of the EU citizens, and external pressure is put on the **exploitation of the resources.**

Likewise, correlating the enactment of the policies and the strategies, even by the governmental structures, or not, is rendered difficult by the welter of sub-structures and all sort of subordination relations, mixed with the coordination ones. Usually, the number of authorities increases during the enactment of a strategy, and gradually, one can notice there are entities or authorities which are not fully committed or involved, from the very first applied measure. Usually the number of bodies increases while he strategy's enactment goes on and gradually it is noticed that some entities or authorities are partially or fully (as it were required) are not involved, from the very first measure is implemented.

Because of joining the **Euro Atlantic structures,** it is even harder to frame some relations pertaining to the state institutions.

2. Questionnaires Brainstorming

Most of the time, when a strategy is enacted, you must take into account the ultimate interest of the state, but the impact assessment, very often mirrors the progress and the ***welfare of the people.***

In my opinion, it is exactly for this reason why establishing the guiding line is different from signing and gradually enacting a strategy, or a mix of strategies, and the later must be accomplished through an atypical coordination, which paradoxically should be similar to the ***US emergency situations.***

[1] ***This material represents my own hypothesis of research, it does not involve the institution where I am working***

In my opinion establishing the guiding lines is different from the scenarios and the gradual enactment of a strategy or of a mix iof strategies, which are to be accomplished through an atypical coordination, paradoxically, perhaps similar with that of the emergency situations in the US.

For **celerity** reasons, during the measures' enactment, the coordination must be enacted by think-tank, having a high level training and vision and one of the promoters should be a personality agreed upon by the target group. It is an atypical coordination because benefiting from such projects are people from all the social categories, while the acting experts are from all fields. For efficiency reasons the coordination should be a modular one, and the minimal data package should be made available to those entitled to get them, at request.

From the point of view of a durable sharing and use of the natural resources, and their coordination could be typical or atypical. On the other hand, we need look to the future, and use the data in an integrated way. We need have an integrated approach for global strategies and for that 3-kind communication, with the extra parts of the project, also closed, open, semi-open, and a sectoral thinking with *Pert*[2]*[2]' analyze method,* as well.

You cannot prepare the seedbed or get a performing irrigation system erected if you fail getting ready the ground, before. Generically, this is true for the development of any strategy.

I suggest both non and governmental bodies to use *simple questionnaire*, but also add the *sectoral plans*, projects priorities, and find criteria for correct, equitable prioritisation, after some debate with stakeholders, in figure accountable is possible, after analyzing *all questionnaires* (the value of UE funds e.g., new jobs, improvement of the quality of the air – depending on the initial objectives).

2.1. Synoptic panels

If I wish to speak up about a good representation of all important classes, levels I could speak about some opened, to a certain extent and proportion, and about closed strategies. We may use the statistics related to Edward de Bono's[3] theory, in a synoptic table (I have already created a synoptic system for monitoring the legislation implementation and colours make it easier to prevent and to obtain big and fast results). *(Annex 1. Tabel of the lands and 2.Tabel of the waters).*

[2] *http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/PERT-chart*
[3] *Edward De Bono, SIX THINKING HATS, Ed. Curtea veche, 2008*
http://www.bmw.ro/ro/ro/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ArcMap
http://www.debonogroup.com/lateral_thinking.php
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_de_Bono[3]
http://www.curteaveche.ro/cursul-de-gandire-al-lui-edward-de-bono-instrumente-eficiente-pentru-a-va-transforma-modul-de-gandire.html

2.2. Examples of portfolios of resources management, worldwide

In the world, there are ministers of natural resources – e.g. - Minister of Natural Resources (Canada), Ministry of Land and Resources of the People's Republic of China, Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (Turkey), Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Georgia, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism of United Republic of Tanzania even Washington State Department of Natural Resources etc.

Extrapolating, we can do an analysis of the ownership titles of all MS not obligatory unproductive or unfriendly (e.g. the situation 110 years ago when the city building Braila area flourished there, factories pasta and biscuits due to infusion Greek-owned example.

2.3. De lege lata

De lege lata – we need make a screening of the current legislation on natural resources.

In my opinion, elaborating the database at UE level with the main natural resources will be proper, and with the legislation is necessary, as a minim, for a good protection of the UE citizens.

In some countries, money was given for projects without a big or normal impact for the population, but EU officials should have forward-thinking, especially given that in countries where a wave of development initiatives absorb huge amounts of EU money (e.g.. abattoirs that shot up like mushrooms, while, lately the livestock went drastically down, and sometimes in the same areas, the active population migrated to other countries, and left the children and the elderly behind, and the international funds are not fully or efficiently made use of, or most of the times, they are not spent in a durable way, to the communities).

The data base will start with the minimal necessary of land or population in a area to keep the national body (sociologists have some criteria). After that, we need fresh water and good soil…A complete list with different elements could be in practice after SM consultation at 3 peer levels – COM, Cons and EP[4].

2.4. The Land titling and Registration data base

The Land titling and Registration Should Be a Priority for former socialist countries. The irrigation system, also – but at low cost, for peasantry would generate more revenues.

I have in view the agriculture reform in Armenia[5], in Antiquity, which resulted in the farming of all field and land, without harming life quality of the peasants and farmers, who were, thus encouraged to contribute through taxes and fees to the total budget. Everything was about a balance between measures and the circumstances in the field; even such an approach relies on laws, studies, indices or expert advice. But all that matters is to make constant and durable earnings, both for the state and the other elements.

Appendix{3}

[4] The European ***Commission*** (EC)**, Council** of the European Union ('the **Council**'), The **European Parliament**
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiridates_III_of_Armenia

3. Institutional building

3.1 National Department of Strategic Resources

I propose the creation of a National Department of Strategic Resources at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), also considering that the relevant diplomat or public servant should be welcome to enable the durable use of the natural resources of any resources, any sort.

It is worth mentioning that in Hungary, a state body deals with the development of the human resources. Perhaps, there is no accident that both Hungary and Poland think the issue differently from other countries.

Each country should preserve its specific traits, but a protection measure would be required through the very lateral thinking of the future measures for the ancestral or the present resources, consumable or renewable ones, alike (depends on from which standpoint things are analysed, I mean brain creates as long as it lives, but the human work can perpetually generate gain, or an irrigated field and the taxes and fees can indirectly solve the secure enactment of the Schengen Agreement.

3.2. Legal regime for national resources

E.g. ***de lege ferenda*** – I propose the setting up of the new regulation regarding a new national institution in charge with the administration of the resources.

In several countries, media or interests, there are funds and associations, and an EU project should not be revealed, or whether it is partly achieved on funds from other sources, it should be kept partly or fully secret till the project is done.

4.1. Conclusions

Some risk alarm there is for food security and sovereignty when on media channels was revealed that a lot of lands was sealed and that part is almost 1/3 from total arable lands. I have not the correct date and a database will shows all figures and after that we can have some conclusions.

4.2. Final conclusion

The white colour in the Eduard de Bono's method needs to be enlarged, but this stage is to be intersected as follows: the global analysis is intersected by the sectoral one, like in any development of human life segment

I propose ***a new EU common policy*** - an equitable administration and revaluation of the resources from EU with a minim support for disfavoured peoples (considering the amount and quality of life indicators or the right to life and to have a job).

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Appendix{3}[6]

1. Table of the lands

Total of lands	The Land with Ro citizens owners	The Land with UE citizens owners	The Land with non UE citizens owners	The Land without owners – other categories	Note to improve the income from the lands	Note regarding the measurers to improve of the quality of the land	Income/ minimal income to secure life quality correlated with minimal costs and special tarrifs for the disfavoured
X	y	z	t	u			

2. Table of the waters

Total of waters	For popu–lation	Use for transport – income	Energy income	Irriga tion	Indu stry	Other using – the measures to reduce of pollution	Note to improve the income from the lands	Minimal income to secure life quality / correlated with minimal costs and special tariffs for the disfavoured	Note regarding the measurers to improve of the quality of the water
a									

[2] http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/PERT-chart

[6] Tables may be changed using Pert with Pert models and patterns (separately for global and sectoral issues; time and poririty zation by colours) or Bono with de Bono (global and sectoral), or crossed *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_de_Bonohttp://edwdebono.com/*

SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE MULTICULTURAL MINDSET

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Abstract : Abstract: The social influence capabilities have encountered many challenges during the recent years. The new technology requires a swift adaptability for all those capabilities to the change of social environment. An effective social influence capability must develop updated and very flexible policies, doctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques and procedures and simultaneously a highly up to date infrastructure. The last NATO Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) doctrine has been released in 2007and the remaining period has faced a lot of changes in the field of mass - media and communications. The good news is that NATO PSYOPS has issued his first draft of handbook (2013) and this came into effect a year later. While NATO PSYOPS has released his first and weak handbook, US Military Information Support Operations (US MISO) has continuously developed politics, a joint doctrine, field manuals regarding techniques, tactics and procedures and a designated infrastructure and up to date capabilities in order to keep the right track with the last technical and social development. The new revolution of the social networks has made many changes in the architecture of the media and social engagements. A senior strategist position in the field of social influence is highly required and this must effectively integrate a social media cell in the actual battlefield of ideas, beliefs, and values: CULTURE. The television component of both NATO PSYOPS and US MISO should enlarge their programs by developing relevant talk shows besides advertising slots they actually do. The main focus on the individual and group psychology should be transferred to the area of the scientific arguments and rhetoric.
Key-words: social influence, culture, arguments, rhetoric.

Another evidence of the power of social influence has been recently produced: the effects of a particular content of Charlie Hebdo magazine. It is the most significant event of how a certain media organization could reach a very important pillar of the people's daily life: *Culture*. Furthermore, the above-mentioned print media had subsequently the power to reach a very broad range of audience that would have affected the national security of many nations.

But the intent of this scientific research is to analyze the most significant differences between concepts, documents and structures of an important exponent of the influence communications - *psychological operations (PSYOPS)* - in real-life situation: the perception of US and NATO PSYOPS communities over the concept of Strategic Communications, an in-depth analysis of US and NATO PSYOPS handbooks and the way the US and NATO PSYOPS engage their capabilities in theatre of operations.

1. Strategic Communications (StratCom). Although PSYOPS is one of the StratCom's capabilities[1], the perception of PSYOPS community regarding this matter seems to be different. NATO PSYOPS Handbook does mention the cooperation between these two entities, but the real term is coordination, since StratCom is the one which incorporates PSYOPS. In the theatres of operations, Afghanistan for instance, StratCom is the communication pillar that coordinates PSYOPS. The same document[2] mentions that Military Public Affairs (MPA) is part of Stratcom whilst in the real-life situation MPA operates under Command Group authority and it is a standalone capability. A very compatible StratCom structure came into effect on 1st of January 2009 in Kosovo (KFOR)[3]. Joint Effects Centre (JEC) has integrated five capabilities and functions: Information Operations (Info Ops), PSYOPS, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Liaison Officers (UN & OSCE LNO) and Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMT). JEC consisted of two entities: the staff and the execution capabilities and functions. JEC's staff emerged through the redeployment of the Planning (PLANS), Operations (OPS) and Target Audience Analysis/similar (TAA) of the each of five capabilities and functions so that JEC PLANS, JEC OPS and JEC ASSESSMENT has gathered experienced military staff in the broad spectrum of the non-kinetic operations.

2. US Military Information Support Operations (MISO) vs. NATO PSYOPS process. There are seven steps for both: *planning, target audience analysis, product design and development, product approval, production, distribution and dissemination and evaluation*[4], but the way the two handbooks depict this process is completely different. The US field manual[5] allocates very detailed explanations for all MISO specialists in order for them to use a high quality standard for applying a very feasible MISO process whilst NATO PSYOPS handbook[6] is quite superficial and weak in terms of feasibility and accuracy of the PSYOPS process. An essential difference is given by the series development[7] which is designated to build synergy among various influence products (visual, audio and audio-visual) and actions in order to achieve the preferred behavior change. During the long-lasting history of psychological operations it has been demonstrated that only on very rare occasions a sole product can change the target audience's behavior. The US MISO field manual follows the

[1] *ACO Directive (AD) 95-2*, SHAPE, Belgium, 21 May 2012, pp. 4-5
[2] Idem, pp. 4-5
[3] Personal observations within HQ KFOR, March – October, 2009
[4] *FM – 3-05.301 – Psychological Operations Process, Techniques, Tactics and Procedures*, Fort Bragg, August, 2007, pp. 10-12
[5] Ibid., pp. 13-158
[6] *NATO Psychological Operations Handbook*, Draft version 1.1, April, 2013, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 33 - 40
[7] Op.cit, *FM – 3-05.301*, pp. 75-92

StratCom guidance in terms of overcoming the potential gap of "say-do" messages. In this regard, MISO planners realize a very accurate synchronization with conventional and non-conventional combat and support forces in order to make sure that what has been said will be accurately done. Once the influence strategy is reinforced by particular actions the overall originator takes advantage in terms of gaining credibility. If, for instance, the influence capabilities convey a society and economic development message through a variety of media outlets, at the end of the exposing stage, CIMIC forces start building essential infrastructure pillars: roads, bridges, schools, hospitals e.g. The concept of NATO PSYOPS overlooks the series development and it seems rather confused in the description of a logical process that would enable PSYOPS specialist to effectively use a strong toolkit on their way of achieving the desired end-state: target audience behavior change.

3. Communication/Influence strategy and the strategist. In the MISO/PSYOPS community the responsible entity for designing the influence campaign is the Operations and Plans Section (Ops/Plans) which is led by Executive Officer (XO).[8] The Ops/Plans Section is in charge with the design of the development of the whole communications/influence campaigns. This commonly creates plans: *Annex L* – the main PSYOPS plan, *supporting plan* (SUPLAN) and few others in accordance with the current mission requirements.[9] The job requirements for influence planners comprise a broad range of knowledge from "NATO planning tools policies and doctrine relating to information activities, to combined/joint operations planning skills with knowledge of PSYOPS policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, force structure and capabilities and particular cultural awareness."[10] A senior strategist might be the appropriate solution for any influence communications/influence structure with an advanced knowledge in integrated marketing and communications, advertising, journalism and multimedia. It is quite a real challenge to implement this position in a PSYOPS structure but even a bigger challenge is to train such an asset. It would be imperative to educate him in other institutions than the Military only and it would be used as "the PSYOPS visionary" being one of the main assets of the MISO/PSYOPS commander.

4. Social Media. Despite its significant role in the very recent military conflicts with a high impact on the entire spectrum of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and terrain (PMESII-PT) the social media issue is

[8] Ibid., pp. 75-84 and *NATO Psychological Operations Handbook*, pp. 34-36
[9] AJP- 3.10.1 (B) - *Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, pp. 48-55
[10] Ibid., p.39

vaguely reached.[11]A few words about this essential communications outlet have written and the main message is that the influence through social media is encouraged. The target audience would rather prefer to be part of the communication process and this must be accepted as a reversible action: from sender to receiver and vice versa. A target audience should not been seen as a passive receiver at any reason and this requires a very special attention, analysis, development and swift action in terms of social media engagement. A political-military organization like NATO may fail if it would rigidly engage the target audience by wording as an organization. Another crucial influence activity would be done by generating content. A useful information should be sent whenever available answering to a specific need of target audience. The continuity of the contact must be of the highest priority and this requires building a designated structure in charge with social media influence. Techniques, tactics and procedures for social media influence should be designed taking into consideration all the particularities of this quite new and different environment. The training of MISO/PSYOPS operators in this field should exploit their media and written/verbal communication skills

5. Psychology-based arguments vs. arguments and rhetoric. A PSYOPS argument represents the overall argument used to get the desired behaviour from a specific target audience. This argument is built in four stages: the main argument, the supporting arguments, the appropriate appeal and the last, the persuasion/influence technique.[12] These specifications are very useful for a MISO/PSYOPS operator which is deployed in a theatre of operations. This is feed with relevant analysis and information by an important asset – Strategic Studies Detachment- from the home-base unit through reach-back.[13]The speech-act theory[14] reveals that the verbal communication is seen as an enabling acts tool. The act is incorporated in the enunciation as the affirmative answer to the question "Will you marry this woman/man...?" where the actor doesn't intervene upon the description; hence he performs a very particular act. This is to reveal another perspective of the way to see and develop arguments in the field of MISO/PSYOPS. Who develops the influence messages in that case? Who really does the wording? According to US MISO anyone in charge with target audience analysis (TAA) and whoever has skills in journalism, public relations, advertising or marketing may develop the influence arguments. NATO PSYOPS shows a very similar approach with regard to the

[11] Op.cit., *NATO Psychological Operations Handbook*, pp. 60-61
[12] Op.cit., *FM – 3-05.301*, pp. 66-71
[13] Ibid., p.44
[14] Austin, J., *Cum să faci lucruri cu vorbe*, trad. de Sorana Corneanu, Bucureşti, Editura Paralela 45, 2005, pp. 94 - 111

influence wording being much more confused with this particular task. *Copywriting* might be the appropriate answer. A copywriter is a trained person in charge with the wording in the field of advertising. His position is at the same level with the Art Director (very similar with chief PDC[15] or Media Director in MISO/PSYOPS) with whom he cooperates to effectively synchronize the layout with the messages/wording. He would be used as a significant asset to create the scripts for radio, television and Internet products. This shortfall can be overcame by the influence organizations by reconsidering the role and the power of wording and by training or outsourcing a senior copywriter who requires a specific training in the field of Military, MISO/PSYOPS, mission requirements, cultural particularities and the work with interpreters.

6. The television and its formats. The constant advancement of the new technology significantly increases the call for MISO/PSYOPS to keep the appropriate tempo with emerging audio-visual media outlets and channels of dissemination. The main MISO/PSYOPS activity in this field is the television production, a process that goes before the broadcasting of television products using their own assets (deployable transmitter systems) or via available outsourced television stations. Television products usually include spots/commercials, commentaries, documentaries or news reports considered to be of specific interest to the TA and thus fit to convey the right messages that carry the influence arguments/themes in accordance with the MISO/PSYOPS campaign.[16] It is very well known that movies, documentaries, and at the moment video transmitted over the Internet have the real power to call upon profound emotional responses. Even the most remote location has the opportunity to get access to the television and Internet because of the digital technology via communications satellites. But, as the social media requires an active involvement of the audience, the television industry has adjusted its programs and has recently developed a new concept that is broadly accepted by the audience: the *talk-show*. This new concept is designed to actively bring the common people into the social, economic, political, military e.g. The TV producers select representatives of the common people and, by analogy, the last ones would identify themselves with the talk-show's participants. The talk-shows have the power to effectively sell the illusion of keeping the regular people involved in the daily life of his local administration, government, parliament, and social, economic and political organizations e.g. This is the reason an effective influence communications capability should swiftly adjust

[15] *Product Development Center*
[16] Op.cit., *NATO Psychological Operations Handbook*, p. 57

itself to the actively and reversible communication needs of the audience and to develop and implement structures/resources, training, techniques, tactics and procedures in this regard.

7. *Media products dissemination*. Any influence communication campaign should use various media outlets, mass-media and non-conventional ones, and to take into consideration a few media indicators in order to meet the criteria of success. US MISO and NATO PSYOPS documents solve the first part of this essential problem and this would be the time slots media products acquiring in the external media outlets (insert in newspapers/magazines, radio and TV spots, SMS/MMS, Internet), the management of the media products and the development of media products placement strategies. The media or communication plan is limited to a strict record of assigned media outlets, the time of exposure of the disseminated products by tracking numbers, the budget.[17] The media plan, the last part of the media in advertising[18], comprises all the media outlets, the indicators of effectiveness of the overall advertising campaign, the deadlines and timeslot and the budget. A media plan usually consist of the evaluation of the media outlets that could be used in the campaign, the selection of the best media vehicle, the identification (from the time point of view) of the key events of the campaign, the budget and the size of the capital/investments for each phase of the active communication.[19] The real-life influence communication capabilities within the theatre of operations have usually in its crisis establishment (CE) a one single position filled by an officer or the media director/PDC chief is extra charged with this additional task. Despite the available media outlets for product dissemination are crucial for an influence communications campaign, the US MISO/NATO PSYOPS don't use the main audience indicators in this process: *market share*, *rating*, *reach/cumulative rating* – which can be *daily*, *weekly*, and *monthly*, or *per program* or *per channel*. Another significant audience indicator is the *gross rating point (GRP)* which means the total amount of messages absorbed by a particular TA. The effectiveness of the investments (the allotted budget) can be determined through two other indicators: *cost per thousand (CPT)* and *cost per point (CPP)*. A very important variable is the budget-product effectiveness correlation which is based upon three indicators: *reach, frequency and continuity.*[20] The reach and the frequency show how many people of a particular TA are exposed to the designated messages (how many times) in the dedicated timeslot. In terms of communication campaign effectiveness, the advertising specialists use

[17] Personal observation within influence communication campaigns in the West Balkans and Middle East
[18] Dan Petre, Mihaela Nicola, *Introducere în publicitate*, Editura Comunicare.ro, 2004, pp. 153-154
[19] Ibid., p.155
[20] Ibid., pp. 169-170

the effective reach and the effective frequency in order to determine how many times a person must be exposed to a message in order to take the desired action: *behavior change*.[21] US MISO/NATO PSYOPS staff officer dissemination/similar is a sole asset who is continuously struggling to increase the effectiveness of the influence communication campaigns, but his limited resources and tools do not allow him to perform the appropriate work.

Conclusions:

1. Strategic Communications (StratCom) overtakes the Military area and this is the highest coordination authority of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Info Ops and PSYOPS. Its spectrum of activities sets at the national and international/multinational level where all the above-mentioned entities work in an integrated manner. Since Info Ops coordinates PSYOPS[22], the Military environment would solely operate with Info Ops coordinating PSYOPS rather than StratCom coordinating others coordinator;

2. US MISO depicted a very strong influence process whilst NATO PSYOPS has a quite weak one. NATO PSYOPS doesn't take into consideration the psychological actions (PSYACT) which is a very strong tool for arguments/messages reinforcement;

3. US MISO and NATO PSYOPS have both specialists in planning whose background relies on the MISO/PSYOPS basic course, and occasionally planning courses. The package of knowledge of a strategist must include integrated marketing, advertising, multimedia, journalism;

4. Despite social media environment shows a huge potential in the field of communications and influence, both US MISO and NATO PSYOPS are not adjusted to it, a very powerful reason for them to investigate and develop the appropriate guidance and resources;

5. Both US MISO and NATO PSYOPS don't have a designated arguments developer. Qualified personnel (copywriter) would be a feasible solution, instead of randomly nominating such a crucial asset. This asset would be placed at the top of the hierarchy in order to enable the cooperation with the media director/chief PDC;

6. Despite US MISO and NATO PSYOPS admit the two-way communication process, they continue to consider TA a standstill target from the television standpoint. Since the talk-

[21] Ibid., pp. 170-173
[22] MC-422/4 - *NATO Policy for Information Operations,* 2012

show succeeds to capitalize over other TV formats, it would be of the utmost importance for both influence entities to adjust their TV products to TA's requirements;

7. US MISO and NATO PSYOPS don't exploit properly their media dissemination assets in terms of media planning, especially in the theatre of operations. An effective media planning should flawlessly use the media audience indicators in order to support the overall influence communications campaign.

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INTERNATIONAL TOURISTIC FLOWS AND MULTICULTURALISM IN BISTRIȚA

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Abstract: The touristic attractiveness of the city of Bistrița resides in in its medieval constructions (such as churches, fortifications, or old buildings) and its leisure opportunities; in addition, the presence of many economic companies generated a well-represented business tourism. The analysis of the origin of international tourists reveals a high percentage of tourists from several important EU countries, and thus the link between local and European tourism.

Keywords: Bistrița Urban Area, touristic potential, international tourism, touristic flows, cultural tourism, business tourism

Introductory approach

Situated in a generous morphological-geographic site from the Bistrița Depression, on the homonymous river, in a region featuring the fan-shaped opening of the Livezile – Bârgău depression corridor, Bistrița experienced a dramatic geo-demographical expansion, from 14128 inhabitants in the year 1930 to over 80000 nowadays (including the hinterland comprising Slătinița, Sigmir, Unirea, Ghinda, Viișoara, and Sărata).

With an important location potential, Bistrița polarizes road transport, as the main freight and passengers flows are taking place on the route Bârgău – Bistriţa, Bistriţa – Sărăţel, continuing on the Dipșa Valley till Teaca, towards Reghin, and on the route Bistrița – Năsăud, through the Dumitra Depression, concentrating the most intense passenger transportation.

Tourist transportation, in particular, is carried out by bus and minibus, while an important part of international tourists benefit from the nearby airports from Tg. Mureș and Cluj-Napoca, using the plain. Regarding domestic tourist flows, the *Bucovina Axis*, over the Tihuța Pass, the *Mureș Axis* on the Dipșa Valley, and the *Someș Axis* crossing Năsăud or Beclean, are the ones most used by tourist buses or minibuses.

Methodological references

The drafting and elaborating the present paper was based on the following distinct steps:

- Inventorying the main natural and anthropical features;
- Creating a database regarding the relation between the urban space of Bistrița, the tourism opportunities it comprises, and the domestic and international tourism flows;
- Thoroughly studying the tourism flows situation from a leading hotel, *Coroana de Aur*, the most representative accommodation unit for cultural, recreational, polyvalent, and business tourism;
- Elaborating and distributing special questionnaires to the administration of the above-mentioned hotel, and graphical representing the statistics offered from this unit;
- Analysing and interpreting the data, and formulating several conclusions regarding the realities and tendencies of tourism in Bistrița.



Figure 2. Location of Bistrița inside national and county territory



Figure 3. Demographic evolution in the Bistrița Urban Area

Touristic attractiveness features

The touristic patrimony of Bistrița comprises mainly of numerous medieval anthropic touristic objectives, represented by the Evangelic Church, the former church of the Franciscan Monastery, the Cooper's Tower, the architectonic complex Sugălete, the Silversmith's House, the Andreas Beuchel House, also called the Ioan Zidaru House, the County Museal Complex, and, in addition, many leisure opportunities (baths, stadium, various sport facilities, playing rooms, SPA centers, etc.).

Figure 4. The Evangelic Church (14th century)

Figure 5. The church of the Franciscan Monastery (13th century)

The attractiveness of anthropic origin is strengthened by the presence of some original objectives nearby Bistrița, among which we mention: elements of Saxon culture on the axis Unirea – Livezile (the evangelic churches and the Saxon House Museum), the impressive Romanesque church from Herina, dated back to the 13th century, the roman castra from Ilișua and Orheiu Bistriței, Hotel Dracula near the Tihuța Pass, traditions and ethnographic activities from the Bârgău Valley, etc.

Figure 6. Cooper's Tower

Figure 7. The architectonic complex Sugălete (16th century)

In a stable, millennia-long symbiosis, the nature of the Bistrița Depression and the inhabitants of its historical-geographical space worked together to realize a material and

spiritual patrimony of high value and originality, which continuously attracts important flows of domestic and international tourists.

Even if the German population, dominant for many centuries, emigrated almost entirely from Bistrița and its surrounding area, the remaining elements of their civilisation arouse even today the interest of foreign tourists, especially those coming from Germany (fig. 7). Thus, in the suburban space of Bistrița, on the Unirea – Livezile axis, a former, representative Saxon building holding numerous artefacts of Saxon culture was transformed in a museum called „The Saxon House". In the year 2013, for example, from the circa 30 thousand tourists visiting this location, 10.255 were from Germany, many of them descendants of Saxons emigrated from Transylvania. In the same year, the Saxon House was visited by 14.345 Romanians, 1.873 Moldavians, 651 Ukrainians, 530 Russians, 207 Dutch, and several smaller groups of other nationalities.



Figure 8. Chart showing the proportion of German tourists visiting the *Saxon House* from Unirea-Livezile in 2013 (Source: The Saxon House)

Passenger traffic – case study Hotel Coroana de Aur

The entire touristic potential (attractive resources and infrastructure) represent the static element of the analysed phenomena. It sustains the motivation for the recreational activity, favours its realisation, but only in the presence of tourists, as dynamic element. Without the presence of humans to utilize the recreational features of resources, to use the services of the infrastructure, tourism as human activity is inconceivable. That's why touristic

flows are of major importance in Bistrita, too, as their intensity, frequency, and orientation determine the parameters of the process itself, as well as its linking to a wider area inside which passenger traffic is more or less intense.

In order to observe to which extent Bistrița's tourism is integrated in European tourism, we choose for our case study the "flagship" hotel of the town and the county, Hotel "Coroana de Aur" (*The Golden Crown*), which represents a true "mirror" of the area's international tourism. Thus, for a 5-year interval (2009 – 2013), the hotel provided some statistical data that we analysed and interpreted in order to formulate several conclusions regarding domestic and international touristic flows in Bistrița (table 1).

Table 1. Tourist arrivals at Hotel Coroana de Aur (Bistrița) between 2009 and 2013

Nr.	**Country**	**Arrivals / year**					**Total**
		2009	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	
1.	Romania	7934	8439	9114	7319	8812	41618
2.	Spain	1272	1405	1612	934	1009	6232
3.	Germany	1025	1137	1221	898	975	5256
4.	Italy	987	1190	1007	810	724	4718
5.	France	611	641	735	569	488	3044
6.	Austria	704	778	814	352	391	3039
7.	Holland	297	355	401	189	211	1453
8.	Belgium	175	136	203	180	129	823
9.	Hungary	116	162	197	87	82	644
10.	Russia	89	136	141	14	61	441
11.	Other European countries	710	811	1073	563	617	3774
12.	Countries from other continents	478	524	611	123	113	1849
	TOTAL, from which	14398	15714	17129	12038	13612	72891

	- International tourists	6464	7275	8015	4719	4800	31273
	- European tourists	5986	6751	7404	4596	4687	29424

Source: statistical data provided by the Administration of Hotel Coroana de Aur

The data are relevant for a relatively turbulent period of the last decade, when the years of economic growth at national level, mirrored in a significant growth at local level are marked by a positive trend in touristic flows, while in the years of the economic crisis, the regression of economic-financial activities is statistically observable in a clear decrease of touristic flows. Interesting is the year 2013, when, despite the deepening economic crisis, touristic flows record a modest increase compared to 2012 for domestic tourists and a quasi-stagnation for international tourists (fig. 8).



Figure 9. Comparison chart between the evolution of domestic and international tourist arrivals at Hotel Coroana de Aur in the interval 2009 – 2013 (Source: Hotel Coroana de Aur)

If we conduct a comparative analysis of all international tourists vs. European tourists, we can observe that Europeans hold a solid majority (fig. 9).



Figure 10. The amount of European tourists compared to non-European tourists accommodated at Hotel Coroana de Aur in the interval 2009 – 2013 (Source: Hotel Coroana de Aur)

The presence of tourists from the main European countries is explained either by the visiting Saxon emigrants or their descendants, organised in big groups (Germany, Austria), or by the major interest shown by entrepreneurs whit strong links to Bistrița's economic milieu (Spain, Italy, France, Holland, etc.). Besides, if we analyse European touristic flows in the studied interval basing on the motivation or interest of tourists, we will observe that approx. 45% are business travellers; almost the same percent are practicing cultural and polyvalent tourism (with interest in culture, leisure, sport, etc.), while approx. 10% are just transiting (fig. 10).



Figure 11. Proportion of various types of tourism practiced by European tourists accommodated at Hotel Coroana de Aur in the interval 2009 – 2013 (Source: Hotel Coroana de Aur)

The future of tourist flows seems positive (at least on short term), as the ascendant trend of arrivals in 2013, after their significant downfall in 2012, seems to continue in 2013, beyond harshening economic crisis. Thus, the number of tourists accommodated at Hotel

Coroana de Aur in the first six months of 2013 increased by approx. 15% comparative to the same interval of 2012.

Regarding the tourists from Bistrița travelling abroad (and implicitly their multicultural and multi-linguistic contacts at tourist attractions, in different countries and with different nations), we turned to a very active, dynamic and performant travel agency from Bistrița, "Sfara Tours", where we collected relevant statistical data for the past five years (2010-2014). These data did allow us to perform the following analysis on the matter in hand.

There are two main travel tendencies among tourists from Bistrița:

a) One, represented by a relatively large number of tourists, towards summer sea resorts in for major regions: *the Turkish Mediterranean seaside*, where the resorts in Antalya lies at the top of tourist's preferences (246 tourists, between 2010 and 2014, representing 35,6% of tourists from Bistrița seeking this type of tourism); *the Greek Aegean and Aegean-Mediterranean region*, with 62 tourists (9%) from Bistrița in the above-mentioned timeframe; *the Egyptian Red Sea region*, with 288 tourists between 2010 and 2014 (41,6%); and *the Tunisian Mediterranean seaside*, with 95 tourists from Bistrița in the analysed time period, representing 13,8% of the total.

   Questionnaires completed by tourists from Bistrița visiting sea resorts in the above-mentioned regions and dealing with the actual motives of the vacation revealed that a majority (484 tourists, approx. 70%) also sought cultural attractions of the respective nations (regardless if in Antalya, Turkey; Heraklion, Rhodes, and Corfu in Greece; Hurghada in Egypt; or Tunis and Monastir in Tunisia).

b) Tourists from Bistrița preferring winter sports chose in the same time period (2010 – 2014) mainly two Alpine resorts; *Kaprun*, in the Austrian Alps, and *Les Deux Alpes*, in France. In the case of the alpine resort of Kaprun, the majority of Bistrița tourist arrivals were due to them attending the celebrations held there for the National Day of Romania (28.11. – 02.12. each year), with tourist numbers rising in the first two years (over 600 in 2010 and over 1000 in 2011), but falling back afterwards (600 tourists in 2012, over 400 in 2013, and approx. 350 in 2014). The French ski resort Les Deux Alpes was visited by tourists from Bistrița mainly at the end of March – beginning of April each year, as in that period a Romanian-organised snow festival is held there, and tourist numbers increased each year in

the analysed timeframe (45 tourists in 2010, 300 in 2011, over 800 in 2012, over 1200 in 2013, and circa 1700 in 2014).



Figure 12. Comparison chart showing the evolution of tourists from Bistrița visiting the Alpine ski resorts Kaprun (Austria) and Les Deux Alpes (France) between 2010 and 2014

Figure 13. Tourists from Bistrița in Kaprun, Austria, in the year 2013

The travel experiences shared online by tourists from Bistrița who visited the above-mentioned ski resorts regarding the multicultural and multilinguistic milieu they encountered and the festivities they attended there were most insightful, underlining the beneficial role of traveling abroad for intercultural exchanges.

Conclusions

The existence of medieval touristic attractions, of many leisure opportunities, and numerous businesses offering products valued abroad support Bistrița as an interesting and attractive tourist destination.

The analysis of statistical data from the "flagship" hotel Coroana de Aur (*The Golden Crown*) allows us to conclude that from the significant number of international tourists benefiting from the accommodation services offered by the hotel, the majority are Europeans, among which most of them are EU citizens.

If we study the typology of tourism activities practiced by international tourists accommodated at Hotel Coroana de Aur, we can observe that bussines tourism, besides cultural and polyvalent tourism, cover each approx. 45%, while transiting tourists represent 10%.

Twinning with towns from other European countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Poland, etc.), featuring valuable tourist attractions and housing important businesses and companies, Bistrița became also by means of international tourist flows a town linked to present-day European passenger traffic.

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THE IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT: With the aim of better understanding the mechanisms behind social movements, we intend to examine the distinction between mass-media and new media, discussing both the downfall of the traditional mass-media model and how new media have evolved. A special attention will be given to exploring the role of social networks in activism and to mobile youth culture. Globally, the younger generations are the driving force behind online social movements as they easily embrace each new technological breakthrough. Therefore, they can radically influence social change.

Key words: new media, mass media, mobile youth culture, social networks, activism

Introduction

On our way to work, in offices, on the screen of a mobile desktop - these are just a few of the "locations" where one can access the Internet, the most valuable tool of current mass media. The distinction between traditional media and new media becomes thinner and thinner every day. We are part of a generation of change, adaptation, reinvention and reorganization of the fundamental values on which the society is built.

The explosion of new technologies creates new tools and new opportunities for the reinvention of old structures supporting civil society, activism, fight for or against beliefs, ideals, or even fundamentalisms. We have always been part of a network transmitting information by word of mouth, little by little. Incidentally, this is one of the basic principles of activism: to disseminate information in order to reach a larger and more varied target audience.

The same principles are the basis of this new digital network that Joyce (2010: 2) describes as ‘an interconnected group of devices that use digital code to transmit information.

The beauty of networks is that connectivity is distributed. Networks do not connect us only to the center, they link us to each other as well. And, when large numbers of citizens are able to more easily connect to one another, to send and receive original content, and to coordinate action, they are able to create effective political movements'. Certainly, this definition does not apply only to political movements, but also to any social movement, be it with political implications or not.

With the strengthening of this reinvented network, traditional media, but also the tools through which they are conveyed, must reinvent themselves, because we are witnessing a time when those who cannot adapt to new generation requirements lose the promoting battle of mass media. The younger generations do not wait, but they quickly embrace each and every new technology. Thus, a new culture is being created among young people – Mobile Youth Culture - in which participatory democracy has won.

With the help of adolescents and young adults these technologies are incorporated in the daily routine and fulfill the purpose for which they were created: to form a compact network of individuals who share the same ideas, objectives and moral values, people always ready to protest for things they are entitled to and actively participate in changing the society.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that these social movements both on-line and off-line have their limits and their negative aspects and that media tools are not only used for disseminating verified information and substantiated opinions but also for subjective information. Online activists who hide behind these tools thinking that they can keep their anonymity are not as safe as they expect to be.

1. Differences between mass media and new media

With the development of new technologies in various fields, there was a shift of information from the mass media, which slowly erode, to the new, mostly digital, media (see L. Nădrag, 2011: 90-109). These new means of transmitting information to a large extent influence our perception about daily events, at national or international scale. A decade ago, those who mostly decided what was to be broadcast through mass media were those who had, in one way or another, the power: political groups, TV producers or media moguls. The current alternative - the new media - show that anyone can express their discontent, dissent or support for a particular cause. Anyone can lead a movement in the digital world using new technologies. Some of the most popular new media are blogs and social networking sites, where anyone can create their own platform to express their views.

Thus, we are witnessing technological and socio-cultural changes. From the challenge of keeping the traditional means of information, to the new lifestyles of users of new media technologies (e.g. reading an article about the conflicts in Egypt, in the subway, on our way to work), it is impossible to deny the impact on a cultural level. So, we should not deny the role of bloggers in shaping the new context of information. Currently, traditional media have lost the monopoly, although this is an industry that relies on huge financial capital, on the structure of multinational trusts and huge audiences. In this respect, it takes a contrastive approach of mass media and new media in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of reducing the audience, the disappearance of certain newspapers that were not able to cope with the avalanche of information provided through the most powerful new media tool - the Internet -, and how much influence bloggers and the social media of the virtual world can have on real-time decisions of the decision-making bodies in the real world.

1.1. The evolution of new media

Better understanding the difference between mass media and new media requires a concrete definition of the two terms in their current meaning. The new media are a combination resulting from the growing need for information and free expression of opinions, be they political, social or cultural, and technological developments. Mass-media can be defined as "ways of communication that involve transmitting information in a certain way, or some form to a large number of people" (Chris Livesely, Central Sociology, 2011 www.sociology.org .uk) or as defined in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian language, but also in other dictionaries and encyclopedias: totality of technological means of mass communication of information (television, press, radio, Internet, cinema, etc.) (DEX – Romanian Academy edition).

According to these definitions, new media are, indeed, part of mass media. It could be classified as a branch of this area, but as will be shown, new media are different from traditional media, primarily by being a combination of the two dominant communication media until a decade ago: interpersonal medium (one-to-one) and mass communication (one-to-many) (Crosbie, 2002). A conclusive example of this is e-mail, which can transmit personal information from individual to individual, or send the same message of global concern to hundreds, thousands or millions of people (e.g. the famous "spam" type of e-mail from various chain stores which invite you to access their bids).

Vin Crosbie, in his paper "What is New Media?" provides a clarification in this regard. He makes a comparison between the three types of transport (land, sea and air) and the three media of communication: interpersonal, mass and new media. Crosbie (2002) notes that: "Because the New Medium simultaneously encompasses both the characteristics and the reach of the two previous communication media and therefore can easily perform each of those media's individual tasks, many people mistake the New Medium as merely an electronic extension of the Interpersonal or Mass media".

It should however be noted that new media are not just about developing new technology and versatility of this medium of communication. What is really important is the relationship of all users of new media technologies that facilitates the existence of new media.

Terry Flew (2000) states that we should not ask what are the technologies that facilitate new media, but rather what innovations it brings to society (10). It is very important what we do with this new medium of communication and how it influences us in turn. Currently we can relate, represent and bring a contribution to changing the world in ways that seemed impossible 100 years ago, which means that our lives and culture have been changed in the process. This global cultural transformation has an effect on the development of the world as large as Morse code or the light bulb invention.

The postmodern theorist Keith Bassett argues that: "the rapid development of the New Media and computer technologies […] have the potential to transform the very nature of the public sphere and open up new channels of communication to a proliferation of new voices. The public intellectual of today must now be much more alive to the possibilities for participating in what could become a new 'cyberspace democracy' – an expanded public sphere which is less academic and less elitist, and demands the use of more accessible forms of language and discourse than those which intellectuals have become used to" (Bassett 1996: 519).

Based on Bassett's statement, one can theorize that new media opened the way to a medium of communication for all of us. There is an attempt to erase the line between specialized press and media aimed at ordinary individuals so that, due to the diversity of items offered, the Internet is currently the most powerful new media tool of information for all those who can access it; it is how ordinary people, through images, records, audio testimonials, blogs are explained concepts such as democracy, cloning, environmental pollution or the presence of various dangerous additives in food.

We are witnessing an attempt to equalize the cultural level. While this is viewed positively in some circles, there are plenty of critics who say that this new media communication environment creates inequalities by the fact that it is not widely accessible socially and geographically, that it provides access to information categorized as hazardous, such as pornography, religious/political fanaticism, viruses and hackers that undermine the integrity of civil society. Some countries (China, Iran) have gone up so much that they have limited access to certain sites, spying on Internet users and persecuting the bloggers of the opposition's movements. (Moyo, 2009).

Having positive and negative aspects, pros and cons, the fact is that new media allow the user to choose the information that s/he wishes to receive daily. S/he selects it from a variety of sources, and checks its usefulness. The information is available any time with just a touch of a button. The traditional mass-media, such as cable television, apparently offer a multitude of choices in terms of television broadcast, but each TV channel has certain rules in selecting the information.

1.2. The downfall of the traditional model of mass-media

What we call today traditional means of information, such as radio, television and print media were themselves a kind of "new media" in the past decades. This distinction between traditional and new means of information is temporary. As technology advances we are already talking about the concept of postmedia, about blurring even further the boundaries of the three aforementioned means of communication (interpersonal, mass media and new media), and a softening of the functions performed by the tools that provide such information.

Mass-media roles as known worldwide, i.e. to inform, to monitor, to serve political and economic systems, to provide entertainment, to function as a community forum and create a sense of solidarity, are constantly changing and redefining.

Since the 90s, Felix Guattari had a vision of the changes imposed by this new era of information, namely that the digitations of the television will reach the point where the TV screen is at the same time the computer display and telematic receiver[1]. Practices that today are performed by multiple devices will be united under the same denominator. Cabling and satellite televisions will give us access to over 50 channels and telematics will offer us multiple databases with images and cognitive information. This hypnosis related to watching TV programs will vanish. From that moment on, we expect a transformation of mass-media

[1] Telematics is the technique of long-distance transmission and enhancement of information, combining computer (large computers and gigantic "banks" of data) with satellites and other modern methods of communication (telephone, teleconferencing, videoconferencing, etc.). http://dexonline.ro/definitie/telematica.

power going beyond contemporary subjectivity and opening the door to an era of re-inventing the community-individual rapport and interactive use of communication, information and culture tools. (Guattari, 1996)

Guaratti's assumptions are correct. Today we are witnessing, indeed, a reinvention of mass-media tools' utility. But we must not forget that the TV or the screen of a smartphone are merely information receivers that we choose to make our own. The persuasion power of these tools lies in the transmitted messages. Neil Postman's remark completes this idea and states that: "Our televisions help us communicate with the world, but they do so with a placid, unchanged smile. The problem is not that television presents entertainment topics, but that all topics are presented as entertainment [...]" (Postman 1985: 89).

Perception plays a very important role in the formation of an objective opinion on a certain situation. If a mass medium, be it print, television or radio, is governed by certain political principles or economic power that prevents it from presenting the matter in a different light, there is a so-called optimism related to the value of these digital networks that Joyce (2010: 12) describes:

> "*the networked nature of the digital world allows for people to communicate and take action outside of—and sometimes in opposition to—traditional hierarchical power structures. In a hierarchy, those at the top have power over those at the bottom; networks have a much flatter power distribution, with authority defined by peer-to-peer relationships. The hope is that the nature of power in the digital network will change the nature of power in the real world as digital networks become ever more integrated into our lives*" (Joyce, 12).

Therefore, networks are gaining more power in society because there is a very low probability of these being influenced by external sources. Traditional mass-media do not provide this certainty. We can say that the technology is "socially constructed" (Bijker et al. 1987), which means that users are those who add value and meaning to technology by the way they use it, for example, the option to choose Facebook as a means of informing a group of political activism.

Jenkins (2006) creates an analogy between the contemporary changes in the aesthetics of mass-media, communication infrastructure, and balance of cultural influence. He does not speak about a downfall of the media, but rather a "convergence" (Jenkins, 2006) between old and new, by incorporating the old tools into the new ones.

"*Convergence represents a paradigm shift – a move from medium-specific content toward content that flows across multiple media channels, toward the increased interdependence of communication systems, toward multiple ways of accessing media content and toward ever more complex relations between top-down media and bottom-up participatory culture*". (Jenkins 2006: 243).

Ashley Highfield, director of BBC New Media & Technology explained in a speech in October 2003 that digital technologies will have a major impact on the organization of television and that television will be unrecognizable in the future, being defined not only by linear TV channels, packaged and programmed by producers. Instead, they will be like a kaleidoscope, thousands of broadcast content, some of which cannot be classified as true channels. These transmissions will combine content and emitter's programs with our contribution as spectators. Even at the most basic level - the public will want to organize and recognize the content the way they want. They will add comments to our programs, will vote for or against them, in general will do whatever they want. At another level, the public/audience will want to create these video streams themselves, from scratch, with or without our help. At this level, the current relationship between the "traditional news announcer" and " satisfied spectator" will disintegrate (Highfield, 2003).

2. Manifestations of New Media

From the rapid, simultaneous and interconnected development of transmission systems, from the quality, quantity and structure of the content and user interfaces, it is easy to underestimate the collective impact of these changes on how society, namely the younger generation, communicates and absorbs information. Finally, it will be important to understand how these technologies facilitate, amplify or modify cognitive processes and/or the social behavior of the generation that is defined by using the Internet.

First, it should be understood that every means of information dissemination in turn passed through these stages of innovation, acceptance and naturalization in society, then their place on the pedestal was occupied by a new medium. In this sense, we can talk about the "diffusion of innovation" (Beal and Bohlen, 1955), "the process by which an innovation [new ideas, opinions or products] is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (Rogers, 1983: 5).

In this sense, Rogers (1983) identifies five categories of persons who adopt these new technologies during their development stages. The first two types are: innovators (approx. 2.5%) and the first followers (13.5%), members of the early majority (34%), a majority of the late members (34%) and conservatives (16%). Among the innovators and early followers most of the people are young. They are among the first to come into contact with new technologies due to their education in an era of informatics and digital literacy.

The activism of the youth should not be underestimated. Currently, they are the most open to new technologies, the most curious regarding their use and they use social media the most effectively. A study carried out in the United States in 2010 shows that 72% of young adults between 18-29 years old use social networks, significantly higher than the 39% of over 30 years old users (Lenhart et al., 2010).

A study conducted by CURS in Romania, for the foundation Friedrich-Albert, mentions, among others, that: "Young people in our study inform about political life in the country primarily through the Internet, which shows both a very good opening towards new media communication and a relative rejection of classical, traditional media, such as television and the (now defunct) print "(Sandu et. al. 2014). The same study shows that 93% of young respondents between 15-24 years have Internet access, and as for the 25-29 age group, the percentage is somewhat lower, 84%.

In Bulgaria, for example, Eurostat statistics show that the proportion of young people who use the Internet is close to 90% for 2014, and that daily home users' share is 46% of all respondents, regardless of age (Statista.com, 2014).

Conclusion

Therefore, it is very clear that those who influence the development of new technologies, the ideological development of mass-media and their reorientation are young adults who view society in a certain way, who are always in motion and who, in this time race, want to keep track of what is happening around them.

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